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Abstract
This study critically examines the legal aspects of the agricultural trade 
performance of developing countries in GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
Following an introductory Chapter outlining the general background of trade in 
agricultural products and defining the main elements of the thesis, Chapter Two focuses 
on an analysis of the substantive agricultural trade provisions within the GATT. It also 
argues that GATT rules in farm trade are generally weaker than those which apply to 
other sectors, and thus warrant strengthening.
The third Chapter examines the trade achievements of developing countries in 
seven consecutive multilateral rounds of trade negotiations under the auspices and 
contractual rights and obligations of the GATT. It considers the reality of many sectors 
of particular interest to developing countries such as agriculture, textiles, clothing and 
footwear, which have been subjected to 'exceptional’ treatment. The Chapter gives a 
chronological examination of the evolving agricultural trade regime of developing 
countries after World War II, up to the Uruguay Round negotiations.
Chapter Four embodies the basic argument of the thesis by analysing two 
different perspectives of developing and industrial countries in the system. It argues that, 
despite the inclusion of Part IV to the GATT in favour of developing countries and the 
application of special and preferential treatment, these countries have been the main 
victims of disarray in the agricultural trading system. Their efforts to increase export 
earnings in the context of the existing GATT framework are shown to have been 
hampered or undermined by strong protectionist measures of industrial countries.The 
strong need for developing countries to receive permanent special and preferential treat­
ment in their exports to industrial countries is outlined as is their demand to be more 
integrated into the trading system.
It argues that the new waves of bilateralism and regionalism by industrial 
countries, even under the umbrella of Article XXIV, has negated impacts on the 
principles and practice of multilateralism. An ever-growing number of bilateral trade-
iii
arrangements have been agreed outside the framework of GATT, to the detriment of 
weaker trading partners. Serious trade conflicts and high budgetary costs were 
experienced by industrial countries in the agricultural sector in the 1980s and that, 
combined with the growing recognition that farm programmes were not working 
effectively, convinced governments to establish a ’fair and market-oriented trading 
system.’
The fifth Chapter analyses the status of agricultural trade in the final Uruguay 
Round negotiations and investigates the conflict that arose as a consequence of the 
increasing protection afforded to the agricultural sector within nearly all industrial 
countries. It indicates that in the UR there were signs of change. The developing states 
tried to use the external trading environment as a vehicle to speed their development. It 
is why a number of these countries were actively involved in the launch and decision 
making process of the UR and its outcomes.
The final Chapter seeks an optimal trade perspective to benefit all contracting 
parties by analysing the positive moves toward a global consensus in the entire history 
of GATT negotiations. The final remarks also identify the conclusions of the thesis. This 
suggests that it is time that industrial countries recognise the increased participation of 
their developing partners. Consideration should be given to economic, political and 
social concerns, such as food security, environmental protection and overall employment, 
which can build an equitable international trading environment that every country could 
get its fair share of the market. It also concludes that despite achievements in liberalizing 
trade in many sectors, the overall international trading environment, and especially the 
agricultural sector, warrants a substantial improvement redressed in favour of developing 
countries.
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Preface
I was born in a rural and agricultural community in the central part of I.R.of 
Iran. Although I moved to the capital, Tehran, in my early school years, I still felt the 
suffering of agricultural communities in the developing world.
My father was running a small business as well as a carpet making workshop. 
For the first time in my life I saw the difficult and harsh process of producing an 
agricultural product, when we cultivated our comparatively big, (6000 sq.m) backyard 
of peas production. Since then the love of agriculture and nature never diminished in 
my consciousness.
Later, while I was serving in the Ministry of Education consulting on a 
nationwide practical educational programme on delicate handicrafts, and the expansion 
of the famous Persian carpet industry and when I finished my law studies at Tehran 
University, I devoted my knowledge to rural and agricultural communities by serving 
as a legal consultant in the agriculture and rural development sector, being involved 
in agricultural and land disputes, even efforts for better legislation for rural com­
munities.
In the course of my study, I wrote some articles in Iranian national 
newspapers introducing the GATT system to the Iranian people and media.
After the formal request of Iran to consider possible accession to the General 
Agreement, a national committee has been set up to examine the potential benefits or 
losses of joining the GATT or its successor WTO. I hope this background and the 
presentation of this study eventually will benefit the developing world amongst whom 
I was born and I hope to serve the cause of their well being.
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A critique of the evolving international agricultural trade 
regime of developing countries under the auspices of the 
GATT, by particular reference to Uruguay Round Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations. 
Introduction
PURPOSE, CONTENTS AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS; DELIMITATION 
AND METHOD OF THE STUDY.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was designed to preside 
over the new economic order that would follow the end of the second World War. Some 
commentators called it the ’constitution o f world trade V If this claim were true, it 
would have a great role to play in the global framework of economic activity. Since the 
creation of the GATT (1947), agricultural trade has been at the core of many 
controversial discussions but the GATT system has not been successful in liberalising 
agricultural trade. Is this because of the inherent protectionist nature of trade in 
agricultural products or because of the conflicts of interests between industrialised and 
developing countries or disputes amongst the powerful countries of the North 
themselves? (EC, US and JAPAN in particular).2
The latter group criticise each other for unjustified protectionism resulting in 
distorted conditions of competition. Members of the developing part of the international 
community criticise the industrial countries for discriminatory restrictions on their farm 
products, and other protectionist measures. Perhaps there are other invisible obstacles for
reaching a consensus in liberalising agricultural trade. The present thesis aims to discuss 
certain of these problems.
Farm trade is an important source of income for a number of countries, not least 
for the developing countries which have to fulfil their development needs and finance 
their long term development plans.3 It is believed that agricultural products are subject 
to discrimination compared with industrial goods. Agricultural products are described as 
’latecomers ’ into the legal regulatory system of international trade and the GATT system 
in particular.
Agricultural trade involves some of the most complex issues in the entire web 
of international trade negotiations, despite the fact that agriculture represents only 10% 
of total world merchandise trade.
Sustainable agricultural development is heavily influenced by national agricultural 
policies. Both domestic and foreign policies directly or indirectly affect the performance 
of a national food and agricultural sector. The efforts at international coordination of 
agricultural policies within GATT negotiations deserve, and obviously receive, serious 
attention, especially those policies on the agenda of the negotiations that are supposed 
to have the most adverse effects on other countries.
A- THE MEANING OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT AND THE SCOPE O F THE  
RESEARCH
There are two different views as to the meaning of the General Agreement: a)- as 
an international agreement containing the basic rules and principles for governing 
international trade relations, and b)- as an organisation functioning and operating as the 
main international forum for discussion and rule-making in the development of the 
international trading system.
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 3
Research on agricultural protection and its removal has became important in 
recent years with market-oriented structural reforms in many developing countries and 
the current debate over multilateral trade reforms in the GATT. It is worth noting that 
most GATT-related agricultural trade liberalization research has focused on aggregate 
measures of trade liberalisation, although research on protection and subsidy policies in 
fact have widely different functions and impacts.4
The main aim of the thesis is to examine the legal issues in agricultural trade 
rather than to discuss its political or economic aspects but, as Usher5 has remarked;
"it is not always possible to separate the law from the policy to which it gives effect". 
However, the main concentration in the present thesis is on legal issues, but economic 
elements and terms will be examined where relevant, since it is important to consider 
the economic background in agricultural trade from the internationally defined legal 
regime. Also the practical success or failure of these legal regimes in relation to 
industrial and developing countries is subject to investigation.
B- CONTENT OF THE STUDY
The function of international law in regulating international trade, with GATT 
as a main framework and instrument, involves not only the regulation of trade 
bilaterally, but also the management of fair competition amongst the members of the 
international community of states. A series of questions emerge as to how fair, and how 
competitive, the current system of trade in agricultural products is.
It is proposed to examine the main elements of the subject by reviewing the major 
agricultural issues in the rounds as well as protectionist measures of industrialised 
countries in this area. These may answer a series of selected questions relating to 
developing countries problems and their agricultural trade performance in the GATT 
negotiations. The thesis is divided into six Chapters as follows:
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(1) Chapter one
The first Chapter provides a general background of the thesis and trade in 
agricultural products, the GATT legal system and relevant definitions. It comprises three 
sections. The first attempts to answer questions such as: What are the characteristics of 
agricultural products ? Are there any legal criteria for the definition of such products? 
What constitutes semi-processed products ? What are the problems peculiar to 
agricultural commodities ? (e.g.short life-span, labour intensive production, overcapacity 
and other related issues).
The next section proceeds to examine the relevance of agricultural trade in the 
economic development and prosperity of developing countries, including the degree to 
which such countries are dependent on agriculture and agricultural markets.
Section III concentrates on a concise historical background of trade in agricultural 
products, investigating the extent to which, since the end of World War II and the 
inception of the GATT system in the late 1940s, trade in agricultural products has 
featured as a controversial subject of discussions aimed at the creation of a general 
system of regulation for international trade in agricultural products. The attention is 
concentrated upon the legal as opposed to the economic aspects.
The section also considers how it was that the wealthy industrialised nations of 
the west achieved their large scale economic efficiency through increased international 
trade in manufactured products, and why they failed to pursue comparable gains through 
the liberalisation of agricultural trade. The reasons for the rapid expansion of agricultural 
trade in the post war period is summarily surveyed. Different ways to protect farming 
populations in the west by paying heavy direct or indirect subsidies are also subject to 
a brief examination.
Due consideration is also given to the fact that, in a highly complex and still
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relatively under regulated market for trade in agricultural products, rules for special 
arrangements or treatment for special products exist and have to be discussed. This is 
mainly because of the special nature of agricultural products.
International Commodity Agreements have attracted a disproportionate amount 
of attention in the post war period. The simple reason for their prominence is that if we 
are considering the validity of GATT as an important model for regulating agricultural 
trade relations, it is relevant to examine the impact of similar or alternatives attempts 
such as Commodity Agreements and other efforts submitted under the auspices of UN­
CTAD, FAO, WFP etc. on trade in farm produce.
(2) Chapter two
The main argument of Chapter Two deals critically with the current GATT 
framework and its development and shortfalls in relation to agricultural trade. It consists 
of three Sections. They set the scene for the arguments that are followed in the thesis 
and refer to the proposed roots of the problems that have arisen since the establishment 
of the GATT system.
It is not possible to discuss the complex system of GATT unless the scope, limits, 
functions and organs of the system are examined. It specifically refers to GATT 
principles, rules of procedures and its main decision making machinery especially those 
that could assist developing countries such as the International Trade Centre (ITC). Such 
a discussion is useful since any new suggested amendments or changes in policy would 
have to be fitted into the current framework.
Provisions of the GATT on agriculture are the subject of section II. It covers 
many substantive provisions in the GATT system, important for examining their 
respective roles in the substantive arguments of the thesis. Its main focus is on Article
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XI and its sub -articles on border protection measures such as quantitative restrictions, 
etc. It elaborates other provisions such as: Article XVI regarding export subsidies and 
domestic subsidies; Article XIX on emergency action on imports; and Article XXVIII 
concerning modification of schedules.
It should be realised that many provisions are devised to initiate development 
prospects in the GATT system, especially to support developing countries trade 
performance. These provisions directly or indirectly relate to agricultural trade issues. 
They are namely: 1979 enabling clause of the GATT, Article XVIII in favour of 
developing6 and least developed countries, Article XIX, Article XXIV, Part IV of the 
GATT for consideration of developing countries interests, and the Generalised System 
of Trade Preference (GSP) in favour of developing countries. The relevant arguments 
and counter arguments on the validity and the effectiveness of these provisions are also 
subject to examination. Due to the importance of these provisions they form a separate 
discussion in Chapter Four relating to perspectives for developing countries.
The final section of Chapter Two is devoted to the dispute settlement procedure 
and its impact on agricultural trade disputes in the GATT. The importance of such a 
system became apparent in recent years because of the ever increasing frictions and 
disputes regarding trade in agricultural products among the major trading nations, due 
to intensified competition for export markets and the use of export subsidies. It is 
possible to say that the dispute settlement mechanism has an important impact on 
agricultural trade provisions. The nature of such disputes is examined together with the 
different stages of dispute settlement, establishment of panels and the development of 
the mechanisms. It will also be shown how conflicts of interest between the parties are 
reflected in panel proceedings.
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(3) Chapter three
Agricultural trade is the backbone of the economy of the developing countries, 
and hence its role in the development and prosperity of these nations cannot be ignored. 
Before examining the agricultural issues in the past rounds, it is important to realise that 
this large sector of international commerce, crucial to the developing countries, has been 
excluded from the GATT framework and has been subject at times to extremely 
protectionist regimes.
It is important to find out why crucial sectors of agriculture and textiles were 
excluded and to find out under which economic or political pressures agriculture was 
returned to the GATT agenda in the latest rounds, especially in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. The section also examines the major tasks of the first six rounds of trade 
negotiations in the GATT, particularly the role of industrialised countries in shaping the 
negotiations. After ten years of GATT operation (1948-1958) the most remarkable move 
in recognising agricultural trade problems especially those of developing countries, was 
the ’Harberler Report’ (1958) as the outcome of the panel of experts in committee III 
of the GATT.7 There were other committees and reports related to either developing 
countries or agricultural trade which will be discussed in Chapter Four as perspectives 
of developing countries in the GATT.
In general terms, in the period leading to the Kennedy Round negotiations (1960) 
the world market for agricultural goods had been, typically, in chronic surplus. 
Consequently, the emphasis for much of the negotiations was on protecting market 
positions against imports of farm products. The importing countries were defensive about 
their farm interests and critical of aggressive marketing policies used by exporters.8
The Kennedy Round took certain steps, especially by classifying the agricultural 
trade negotiations in different categories such as cereals group, meat, dairy and other
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products. The Tokyo Round in the 1970s adopted more practical steps to solve the 
agricultural trade problems. The steps in question included considering special treatment 
of agricultural products, market management, suggestions for adjustments to domestic 
trade policy and changes in the decision making structure of the GATT.
The most crucial achievement of the Tokyo Round was the introduction of so 
called codes o f  conduct which provide detailed and specific rules on subjects that have 
been covered in the GATT in general terms.9 They are known as: The Dumping Code, 
the Standards Code, the Import Licensing Code, Customs Valuation Code, Procurement 
Code and the Subsidies Code. The question related thereto is why the industrialised 
countries have been disappointed by the small number of developing countries who 
became signatories to these Codes?10 What explains the suspicions of developing 
countries toward the codes ?
After reviewing the impact of the seven previous Rounds on agricultural trade 
issues, and the reasons for their success and failure, the main question remains as to 
what progress has been achieved, what has been left undecided and how is it possible 
to reconcile between conflicting demands in future. Lastly what options may led to an 
overall solution ? Before starting the analysis of the latest multilateral trade negotiations, 
it is possible to evaluate both developing and industrial countries situation, in order to 
seek an optimal perspective.
(4) Chapter four
The fourth Chapter of the thesis starts with a critical examination of the conflict 
of interests between industrialised and developing countries, the GATTs’ supervision and 
attitudes towards these nations. It will also discuss the role of these two groups of 
countries in changing the patterns of trade in the GATT system.
The dominant position occupied by the GATT in the field of international trade
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regulation has created a political environment for bargaining on trade issues between two 
distinguishable categories of nations, industrial and developing countries. These two 
groups are looking to secure their own interests in the system, but they did not have 
equal leverage for tackling their problems. It is mainly the wide gap between them in 
many political, social and economic dimensions that is the major obstacle. As a result 
of this unequal position, the present thesis examines the issues from two basic 
perspectives in the GATT system: (a) the perspective for developing countries and (b) 
the perspective for industrial countries. Each group has its own attitudes towards the 
GATT system. In this sense an intensive study of such attitudes requires an elaborate 
investigation of all effective elements of the present GATT rules and obligations.
The existence of two extreme views creates conflicts of interest in many areas. 
The final achievements of the GATT negotiations should contain substantive rules for 
reconciling the different views. These outcomes and objectives will complete the third 
perspective as an optimal perspective of the GATT in agricultural trade in favour of all 
contracting parties. It tries to bridge the gap between the first two perspectives or views. 
Such an outcome may be treated as an optimal trade regime in agricultural products in 
the GATT system, under which each Contracting Party may get its desirable fair share 
of the market.
Section I of Chapter Four contains the first perspective in question, with 
particular emphasis on development prospects for the GATT. It examines legal policy 
issues raised by the previous and current negotiations within the GATT system towards 
developing countries with reference to questions as to whether current welfare based 
legal policy can provide protection for developing countries’ interests, or not.
The second sub-section explains what the term’ special and differential treatment ’ 
for developing countries means and, more importantly, its significance for the various
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negotiating groups in the GATT. It looks to special and differential treatment as a 
negotiating objective for developing countries and how significant it has been for their 
trade performance. Many developing countries may have good reasons to feel cheated 
of their rights under the current international trading system. It limits the liberalisation 
process to certain sectors, and accordingly does not accommodate the trade interests of 
all its participants.
The second perspective appears in section III with a critical analysis of the 
industrial states’ views towards the GATT agricultural trade policies and their influence 
in shaping the GATT rules. Although there are many similarities on the general attitudes 
of the industrialised countries’ towards the developing countries, nonetheless from a 
practical point of view, different policies and approaches exist. For this reason, the 
industrial countries are categorised as the EC countries, the US, Japan, and lastly, the 
OECD countries. Agricultural trade policies in the first three major trading areas is 
summarised in the section .
The efforts at international coordination of agricultural policies within GATT 
negotiations deserve and obviously receive serious attention, especially those policies on 
the agenda of the negotiations that are supposed to have the most adverse effects on the 
other contracting parties. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC appears to 
belong to that category. The EC and some other industrialized countries have been 
blamed for pressing, distorting, and destabilising world market prices through their 
highly protective policy measures. The US and Cairns group are therefore asking the EC 
to reduce their protection levels for temperate zone food products.
The section also examines how protectionist measures and their elements, such 
as tariff and non tariff measures along with other restrictions on trade, such as health and 
sanitary regulations, affect trade policies. Industrial countries are always able to find
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escape routes for discharging their obligations towards other participants.
There are some criticisms aimed at the industrial nations for their negative 
attitudes towards agricultural trade liberalisation in the GATT system from the 
beginning. The GATT’s ability to open up agricultural trade was undermined when 
certain explicit allowances for liberal agricultural trade practices were written into its 
rules, including the use of quantitative import restrictions and export subsidies. To what 
extent are these in contradiction with the industrialised countries’ claims for 
liberalisation of farm trade in GATT negotiations ? Is there an element of hypocrisy ?
Another important issue is the regionalization of the world economy that became 
a central issue engaging both policy makers and analysts. The EC integration 
programme, and its near future enlargement, the US regional plans from Alaska to 
Mexico especially the US- Canada Free Trade Agreement in addition to other intra- 
regional trade and investment in Asia (APEC), and the subsequent negotiation failures 
of the Uruguay Round talks have fed fears that the liberal multilateral system could 
fragment into regional blocks.11
(5) Chapter five
The next Chapter examines the reason for launching the Uruguay Round. It refers 
to earlier attempts to launch a new round, and addresses the unresolved issues for the 
new agenda. The study of the agricultural trade issues became more important where it 
was ignored largely in previous negotiating rounds. One of the reasons for managing 
agricultural trade issues outside GATT was the ability of industrial countries to promote 
domestic agricultural production by a wide variety of support mechanisms, giving rise 
to the accumulation of surpluses of many products and necessitating the subsidization 
of exports.
Developing countries who were mainly producers or exporters of agricultural 
commodities have been major losers in such a situation. Their traditional markets have
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been increasingly eroded while the pressure of surpluses on the world market has 
seriously reduced their export earnings. Consequently, many industrial countries have 
found interest in the positive outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agricultural 
products.
Another reason for ignoring agricultural products in previous rounds was 
primarily due to historical reasons, since at the inception of the GATT a number of 
countries made it a pre-condition for their accession to the Agreement that special 
waivers and protocols be granted that allowed them to accord special treatment to their 
agricultural commodities, so that agriculture was virtually taken out of the negotiations 
agenda.
The Punta Del Este Ministerial Declaration (1986)12 presented the main aims and 
desires of the participants in broad terms. It obliged the GATT members to take 
appropriate steps on (1) the reduction of import barriers (2) increasing control over 
direct and indirect subsidies affecting agricultural trade, and (3) minimising the use of 
sanitary and health regulations as a form of trade barriers.
The Round inherited the conflict of interests from previous negotiating rounds, 
particularly in the agricultural sector. It is crucial to find out the extent to which the 
Uruguay Round was expected to solve deadlocked issues and build a consensus between 
conflicting interests. Did the industrialised nations give up their protectionist 
programmes? Are the final results of the Uruguay Round negotiations another repetition 
of previous Rounds ? The developing countries for their part do not want past regimes 
which paid no attention to their products of interest. They expected a firm timetable for 
dismantling agricultural subsidies to emerge from the Uruguay Round.13 A close 
examination of the negotiating groups (committees) in the Uruguay Round elaborates the 
real situation of agricultural trade in the Round.
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(6) Chapter six
It is clear that conflicts of interests exist between the major players so that the 
success and survival of their interests is largely dependent on an overall compromise 
of the big players in the game and their genuine contribution to liberalising farm trade. 
At the same time to create an international trading environment, to assure more 
favourable treatment of trade, specially by providing better market access and less 
barriers for the weaker members of the international community of states.
These points are reflected in the optimal perspective in the third section. An optimal 
regime is formally defined as one which brings the maximum of benefits to all trading 
partners, in terms of benefits to consumers in the form of cheap imports and home 
prices, and in terms of adequate income for farmers as corresponding to the notion of 
a fair standard of living with an adequate level of income for population groups 
involved in production of agriculture and foodstuffs products.
Some of the issues addressed are important for building a consensus between 
differing interests, such as defining different criteria for the two major groups of 
interests. How were the GATT negotiations in the key agricultural products conducted 
to accommodate the real demands of both groups ? What were the options, and how far 
would the domestic economies of the parties benefit from reform ? It will be also 
important to emphasise how the complexity of existing programmes made negotiations 
especially difficult. Have the industrialised nations sacrificed their national interests in 
farm support policies to give more favourable treatments to product from developing 
countries ?
The section will suggest some optimal solutions for reconciling the demands of 
extreme groups and thus reach a compromise between their demands. The result will 
be reflected in the proposed optimal perspective that is reflected in Chapter Six, 
especially measures for securing the interests of developing countries. The last section 
of Chapter Six is devoted to the final conclusions of the thesis.
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C- THE ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY
The thesis aims to deal with the state of negotiations on agricultural trade as they 
stood at the end of 1993 when the final stages of the Uruguay Round were concluded.14 
This date is the cut-off date for the purpose of the research. Except for the final text of 
the Agreement on Agriculture and some relevant articles, the main material sources are 
before 1994.
The thesis is intended to provide an extensive research on the development of 
agricultural trade in the GATT negotiations; it discuses a list of the key issues under 
negotiation and the range of options proposed to deal with them. In addition to assessing 
conflicting views on the GATT agricultural trade regime of industrial countries, it 
focuses on the performance and opportunities of developing countries in the negotiations. 
It also examines the possible implications of the Uruguay Round results for developing 
countries. Owing to the great diversity of agricultural issues, it may not cover all 
aspects of the subject in their relevance to developing countries.
The negotiation issues included in the study follow the general work programme 
of the Negotiating Groups related to agriculture in the rounds as the issues are 
interrelated and often overlap, on many occasions their delineation into separate topics 
has not been possible in the thesis. The question of the appropriate treatment of 
agricultural interests of developing countries has been implicit in many negotiation 
agendas; they have been, in some discussion areas, interlinked with other surrounding 
issues, and they are correspondingly treated in the thesis.
As sources, primary legal texts, official publications, textbooks, periodicals, legal 
and economic journals have been consulted. GATT published and unpublished materials 
such as Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (in 40 Volumes), have been used as 
a matter of first priority.15 During a visit to GATT headquarters and UN offices, 
especially the UNCTAD Commission, in Geneva, the author has had the opportunity to 
have access to first hand publications in the GATT library and UNCTAD documents in
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addition to contacting experts.
Information from GATT contracting parties and their national trade ministries has 
been valuable. Since the study was written in the UK, and the European Commission 
was negotiating on behalf of the EC member states, information from the EC 
Commission, European Parliament, EC Publication office and other EC offices in 
Luxembourg, have been very valuable, including close contacts with the European Com­
mission office in Edinburgh for access to many relevant (current) publications. Library 
collections like those of the British Library, National Library of Scotland, governmental 
departmental libraries and information offices, e.g. in the Department of Trade and 
Industry and especially MAFF, officially in charge of agricultural trade negotiations, 
have been very helpful. While by no means perfect, it was intended that the presentation 
of this study will make a contribution to the ongoing promotion of structural reforms in 
agricultural trade worldwide, and especially amongst developing countries, and a better 
understanding of major problems of these countries in the GATT system.
Notes to the  Introduction
1. It is also called "the anchor of the postwar trading system"- Bhagwati Jagdish, The World 
Trading System at Risk, Mass:Ballinger, London, (1991), at Preface p. vii.
2.The term ’industrial Countries’ is used throughout the thesis to mean major industrial countries 
of the west or so called ’developed countries’. Since ’development’ in its absolute term does not 
mean only economic or industrial development, some developing countries argue that although 
the role of economic or industrial development is very important, in the definition of development 
the role of moral, social and cultural factors could not be ignored.
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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL BACKGROUND; TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS; THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM; DEFINITIONS.
THE FOREIGN FOX.
(wrrw i r o r / x n r a  to
A technical cartoon appears on the front cover of the Thames Essay on: The Case against General 
Import Restrictions. The Cartoon w as first published in February 1890.
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Introduction
 In all, these developments make the
present time one of the most exciting and 
important [areas] for analysts of trade policy 
since the advent of what might be called the 
’Age of GATT’. The network of agreements, 
understandings, and generally accepted rules 
has created a system which, while not quite 
’international law’, nonetheless performs much 
the same functions.1
In preparation for the discussion of agricultural trade in the light of provisions 
of the GATT multilateral trade negotiations particularely in the Uruguay Round, the first 
chapter of this thesis attempts to define its main elements. This includes the definition 
of agricultural products and other relevant issues. tSuch clarification is of vital 
importance; without it, legal definitions and other terms used in the thesis would not be 
understood in context.
Section I attempts to provide answers to questions such as: what are the charac­
teristics of agricultural products? Are there any criteria for the definition of such 
products in different legal systems? What constitute semi-processed products? What are 
the problems peculiar to agricultural commodities? A better distinction between 
agricultural and other industrial products and the need for special treatment of 
agricultural products are the subject of a sub-section. The role of international law and 
international economic relations is addressed, and the relevance of GATT and its 
agricultural trade regime to the economic development and prosperity of developing 
countries is considered.
In Section II, following some introductory descriptive notes with regard to the 
place of agricultural products in international trade, attention is concentrated on the
19
relevant legal aspects of international economic relations. The same section also refers 
to the place of agricultural trade in the economic development and prosperity of 
developing countries, including the degree to which such countries are dependent on 
agricultural markets.
Section III presents a concise historical background to trade in agricultural 
products, in order to promote a better understanding of the importance of trade in 
agricultural products. It investigates the extent to which, since the end of World War II 
and the inception of the GATT system in the late 1940s, trade in agricultural products 
has featured as a controversial subject. The main focus in this respect is on whether 
trade in agricultural products can be treated like any other sector in the GATT system.
International commodity agreements have attracted a disproportionate amount of 
attention of contracting parties when working out traditional and alternative instruments 
of international trade negotiations including agricultural products. If we are considering 
the validity of GATT as an important pattern for regulating agricultural trade relations, 
it is crucial to assess other models such as those submitted under the auspices of 
UNCTAD or FAO on trade in farm produce. Although the emphasis of Chapter I is on 
the chronological development of substantive GATT rules relating to international trade 
in agricultural products, the question of why trade in agricultural products has featured 
as a controversial subject of discussions in international trade relations is addressed.
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I. DEFINITIONS; SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS; THEIR SIGNIFICANCE IN TRADE.
What are agricultural products? How are their characteristics defined for the 
purpose of international economic relations and the legal standards which govern them? 
What are the differences between unprocessed, semi-processed and processed agricultural 
products, and what particular legal standards are applied to them? Why do we need to 
distinguish them from other industrial products? How do such characteristics of 
agricultural commodities as short life span, labour-intensive production, overproduction, 
government intervention (subsidies etc.) affect or complicate the legal approach to 
international agricultural trade ?
A- DEFINITION AND SPECIFICATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
The term ’agricultural product(s) ’ needs some clarification. Without a proper 
definition it is difficult to refer to the relevant discussions in the context of GATT 
negotiations. In the first place, it is clear that they are not industrial products, but they 
may be unprocessed or processed products and as such they may be governed by 
different legal standards and may generate disputes. For example, is wheat flour a 
natural or a processed product? 2 An answer to this question in the negative or 
affirmative may make the difference between the possible application or exclusion of 
GATT rules. There are a number of other similar situations such those of pasta,3 (in 
home market competition) canned fruit,4 (export market competition) sugar5, poultry6. 
Each of them needs clarification.7
A distinction between apparently similar goods is, not least, important with
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regard to the application of different tariffs at state borders and in the settlement of 
disputes arising from applied tariff charges. An acceptable distinction of certain products 
will close the door to any abuse or false nomination of other industrial goods as 
agricultural commodities claiming benefits from certain preferences at the borders. It 
may not always be possible to find a universally acceptable definition of agricultural 
products in all international agreements. The GATT, for example, does not appear to 
have a proper definition of agricultural goods or products, although there are some 
relevant references to them.
Before examining references in the GATT, it is possible to recall other 
international and national legislation and practice in order to adopt suitable definitions. 
However, it must be borne in mind that legal texts are often imprecise and may need 
interpretation by courts or arbitration tribunals. Secondly, legal texts may provide 
definitions which are particular to the purpose of the text itself. In order to arrive at a 
specific definition it may be necessary to consider several in turn.
(1) Definition under the EC Law:
Article 38 (1) EC8 provides for the extension of the common market to agriculture 
and trade in agricultural goods and defines these goods as products of the soil, of stock 
farming and of fisheries, and also as products of first stage processing directly related 
to these products. Fishery products are considered as agricultural products.This approach 
equates fish farming to other agricultural activities. When fish farmers are culturing the 
fish eggs and growing them like other products of soil and water, it is possible to place 
them in the same category.9
In addition Article 38(3) EC refers to a specific list of products governed by the 
agricultural rules of the Treaty.10 When the EC was established in 1957, the question 
arose as to which products should be added to the list by the EC Council of Ministers
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within two years of the entry into force of the EC treaty in order to comply with the 
rules.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was called upon to distinguish semi-processed 
and processed goods. In case 185/73 HZA Bielefeld v. Konig, [1974] ECR 607, the 
Court gave a purposive interpretation to the phrase ’products o f first stage processing 
directly related to basic agricultural products’ holding that the relevant point was the 
economic relationship between the basic product and the finished (final) processed 
product, rather than the number of technical processing operations involved. It held that 
there should be a clear economic interdependence between the basic primary products 
and the final processed products.
In cases of this nature, however, the price of the basic agricultural raw material 
ingredients in the final product becomes a completely marginal cost and, as a result, 
basic agricultural products in question may not correspond to the given ECJ definition. 
This means that the share of agricultural components of total ingredients of the final 
product should be quite substantive in comparison with added materials or substances. 
Tomato puree or different fruit concentrates could be examples of such products, i.e. 
basic agricultural products.
However, in practice, it has not always possible to have a clear distinction between 
agricultural and non-agricultural goods incorporating, nevertheless, an agricultural 
element. Sometimes, owing to the particular importance of some products, countries try 
to include them among agricultural goods in order to benefit from particular trading 
conditions. For example, at the time of the accession of Greece to the EC, special 
measures were adopted to include cotton into the agricultural commodities list. Although 
Annex II11 itself was not amended to include this product, specific provisions were 
introduced12 to include cotton production, marking its importance and ’recognising the
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specifically agricultural character o f this production
Using such cases as a basis for providing a more clear and practical step, the EC 
Common Customs Tariff (CCT)13 was created and developed under the International 
Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
(ICHCDCS).14 The Convention is regarded as the main practical source for the 
distinction (identification) of all products, including agricultural and raw materials.
Hear two major legal considerations arise; 1)- products falling within the 
definition applied in Bielefeld v. ’Konig’ are not to be treated as agricultural products 
unless they are specifically listed in Annex II15 of the EC Treaty or in Regulation 7a, 
and 2)- when interpreting these lists, regard may be given to other headings of the 
(CCT) and to accepted aids used in the interpretation of the relevant tariff.16
Wool is another example of a product excluded from the definition of agricultural 
products. In case 77/83, CILFIT v. Italian Ministry of Health,17 it was held that although 
this product is indisputably grown on sheep, it did not fall within the concept of ’animal 
products not elsewhere specified or included’ under Common Customs Tariff (CCT) 
heading 05.15b, included in Annex II.18 In addition to the grounds listed in the case, the 
other reason for this approach could be the marginal cost of unprocessed wool in relation 
to wool yarn, which is at least one fifth of the price of the processed product.19 Natural 
leather, with similar characteristics, cannot be considered as an agricultural product.
Regarding fishery products there should perhaps be a distinction between the 
industrial catches on the high seas by big ships, on the one hand, and fish farms in 
shallow internal waters, on the other. One may potentially separate these two different 
categories of fish possibly as industrial and agricultural products, especially when big 
factory ships are processing fresh catches for different frozen and canned fish products. 
This is an internationally applied norm or criteria accepted by the EC as well as other
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organisations.
It is not possible to examine the list of other (disputed) commodities constituting 
a large variation in farm products. What is clear, however, is that the EC legal system 
has adopted clear definitions in regard to agricultural products, although it must be 
realised that a vast and controversial area relating to many agricultural processed product 
may still exist.
(2) Definition under US Law :
In US legislation, chapter 4 of title 19 (customs duties) of the US Tariff Act of 
1930,20 in the section regarding ’countervailing and anti-dumping duties ', refers to the 
definition of industry producing agricultural products such as food processing, but not 
to the definition of agricultural products themselves, and supplies a partial definition for 
processed products:
In general terms, when an investigation involves a distinction of the processed 
agricultural product, producers or growers of the raw agricultural products21 may be 
considered to be part of the industry22 producing the processed product, if :
1) (i) the processed agricultural product is produced from the agricultural product through 
a single continuous line of production: and (ii) there is a substantial coincidence of 
economic interest between the producers or growers of the raw agricultural product and 
the processors of the processed agricultural product based upon relevant economic 
factors, which may, in the discretion of the Commission23, include price, added market 
value, or other economic interrelationships.
Chapter 4 of the Tariff Act also defines the processing of the product concerned as: ’ ’ the 
process of a raw agricultural product through a single continuous line of production” based on 
two distinctive conditions:
(i) the raw agricultural product is substantially or completely [attached to] the production 
of the processed agricultural product; and (ii) [if] the processed agricultural product is 
produced substantially from the raw product.24
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As a general criterion for the definition of agricultural products, the US definition 
has elaborated general criteria for distinguishing between processed and raw materials. 
It is similar to the ECJ approach in HZA Bielefeld v.Konig. When applying to 
processed and semi processed agricultural products, the US definition could be accepted 
in the absence of a more detailed and clear definition.
(3) The GATT Definition
There is no definition of agricultural products under the General Agreement. 
Article XI:2(a) refers to export prohibitions or restrictions applicable to shortages of 
’foodstuffs'. Article XI:2 (c) refers to "import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries 
product, imported in any form". According to the interpretive note included later in Article 
XI:2(c), it covers;
the same products when in an early stage of processing and still perishable, which 
compete directly with the fresh products and if freely imported would tend to make the 
restriction to fresh products ineffective.
Article XVI:3 also refers to export subsidies on ’primaryproducts’ as defined in 
the Interpretative Notes and Supplementary provision thereto as:
any product of farm, forestry or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has 
undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in 
substantial volume in international trade.
Article XX(b) refers to the general exceptions for the adoption or enforcement 
of measures necessary to "protect human, animal or plant life or health"25 by Contracting 
Parties.
A GATT panel, established under the Subsidies Code, examined the term ’primary 
products ', especially regarding processed commodities. The panel found wheat flour26 
to be a processed or non-primary product that became subject to the prohibition on 
export subsidies contained in Article 9:1 of the GATT Subsidies Code.
In considering the importance of a clear distinction between raw and processed
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agricultural products for the purpose of taxes, there have been many long debates in the 
GATT dispute settlement panels, when certain processed products were exported while 
prohibited or allowed either under Article XVI :427 or the provisions of the Subsidies 
Code.28
During the Uruguay Round negotiations on agricultural products, it was indicated 
that products falling within Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Classification 
Nomenclature29 (now the Harmonised System), and selected as agricultural products, 
could be considered by participants in a different light according to their own 
interpretation.
Such practices may not be compatible with what would be intended in a strong 
and institutionally regulated trading system. As the CCCN definition is commonly 
accepted in the GATT system, I have taken it as the base for defining agricultural 
products for the purpose of this thesis.
B- SCOPE OF COVERAGE AND CATEGORISATION
Regarding the scope of coverage of agricultural products in the GATT, it should 
be noted that some of the 14 negotiating groups under the Uruguay Round have been 
dealing with issues that have implications for agricultural trade. Their respective 
mandates have overlapped with that of the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, especially 
with the mandates of the Negotiating Group on Tropical Products, and the group on 
Natural Resource- Based Products. Although in practice some of these, such as tropical 
products, were excluded from the negotiations agenda, they are clearly agricultural.
The categorisation of agricultural commodities is especially important when the 
question of application of individual tariffs arises. Internal and external protection 
measures and border controls based on a systematic control of different varieties of
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agricultural products also indicate the need for the categorisation of agricultural 
commodities. Lack of a proper mechanism of categorisation opens the door to false 
declarations of invoices and generates confusion at border crossings. All products may 
fall into one of the main categories of Agriculture, Mining or Manufactures. Agricultural 
products are food and raw food materials.31 Each of these is divided to include certain 
kinds and varieties of agricultural products.32
For example, the fruits alphabetical guide33 includes every kind of fresh fruit, 
from the most familiar orchard and soft fruits to the exotic varieties now widely stocked 
by greengrocers and suppliers.34 Categories for fruits can be divided into 34 kinds, and 
each of these then divided into different varieties.35 Herbs are divided into 21 different 
species.36 Spices are also divided into 26 varieties of species.37 Fresh vegetables are 
divided into 46 different kinds.38 Pulses are distinguished in terms of 18 different kinds.39
At present, the CCCN (now Harmonised System) is the basis for the 
categorisation of agricultural and other products in the GATT; but what developing 
countries need is to have a proper system of rules and regulations regarding each 
individual commodity of interest. At the same time, these countries need to establish 
their national standards systems with due regard to popular and current systems 
applicable in many industrial countries.They would then able to pave the way for 
competing in the markets of industrial countries.
C- SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CONDITIONS
The special characteristics of agricultural products play a vital role in defining 
corresponding trade patterns. Because of these special characteristics and their special 
significance in the economy of developing countries, agricultural products require a 
different approach from that of industrial goods. Most industrial goods have a fixed
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content of ingredients and application, which is different from agricultural products. If, 
for example, certain quantities of meat or fresh fruits are imported to a country, their 
quality may change at any point in transit. In addition, because of such characteristics, 
they deserve special and different treatment in comparison with industrial goods. Such 
a differential approach involves the protection of commodities derived from agriculture, 
whereas industrial products can tolerate greater competition. Unlike industrial goods, 
agricultural products, because of their nature, need more time and labour in their 
production, harvesting and packaging. The production process of industrial goods may 
take only a few hours or days, whereas agricultural commodities need months or years 
of intensive work for production. The whole production line of industrial goods may be 
adjusted or replaced quickly, but for agricultural products many other natural elements 
may be involved that may not be within human control.
(1) Perishable Nature
The perishable nature of agricultural products makes it difficult to sell them with­
out considering the long distance transportation system, price fluctuations in the market 
and the nature of consumer demand.
Many fruits and vegetables are considered as highly perishable. Transporting 
them over long distances may be difficult, plus the fact that times of harvesting may 
have to be staggered according to the climatic zone of production. In practice there is 
no real regulated world market in fruit and vegetables, except for certain products which 
can be stored or frozen for long periods. The main trade arrangements for such products 
are made therefore in terms of volume, seasonal availability and geographical scope. For 
example, owing to competition and availability of local substitutes, products such as 
apples, bananas and citrus fruit, are subject to more elaborate regulations and border 
control measures.40 In comparison, fresh vegetables are subject to a more liberal 
approach.
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(2) Bulky Character
The bulky character of agricultural products can involve extra costs for labour, 
transport and adequate road systems to facilitate their movement, especially for their 
collection from the place of production and their delivery to a market. In remote and 
rural areas a high percentage of products may be destroyed before reaching their 
destination. For example, it was estimated that as a result of bulky character, inadequate 
packaging, and long distance transport, 70% of the potatoes in the former Soviet Union 
were lost. This may represent a problem common to many developing countries.
In comparison with agricultural produce, an equal volume of industrial goods, 
such as a set of cameras or radio cassettes, needs much less space, care and attention. 
For industrial goods there is no need for the further expenditure, attention and care after 
production, whereas in agricultural commodities, in addition to reasonable costs of trans­
port, stocking and distribution, there are extra costs of preservation.
(3) The Geographical Impact
Geographical location and climate also influence the production of agriculture. 
In many areas such as Central and Western Asia, North Africa or the Middle East 
insufficient water resources, and scarcity of annual rainfall, mean that irrigation is the 
main task of farmers. In addition to the difficulties in cultivating the harsh lands, a large 
proportion of the production costs of farm products is spent on water. Finding water and 
cultivating or preparing the soil are essential aspects of farming. The farmers may rely 
on rain feed crops (harvests) that are heavily dependent on the scarce annual rainfalls 
in many regions. In contrast, Europe, the Far East, Japan do not lack water although 
excess rainfall may be an obstacle to growing particular products. In such areas water 
resources are a major element of productivity and can contribute to the reduction of 
production costs.
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The total annual rainfall or the availability of rivers and other water resources has 
a direct impact on production costs. The extra cost of irrigation in most developing 
countries in the world, such as I.R.of Iran, in comparison with many Mediterranean and 
European regions, is a burden to developing countries’ farmers. Even the shortage of 
sunshine in Northern Europe and the UK is another difficulty for producing many fruits 
and horticultural products; as a result, it affects the agricultural trade position of the 
relevant countries.
Another criteria in respect of climate is market demand for certain products. For 
example, in tropical climates, the demand for consumption of milk is not the same as 
areas of cold and moderate climates.
(4) Technical Advantages
In recent years, by employing modem techniques in flat farmlands in North 
America and Europe, farmers have multiplied harvests, whereas in many parts of the 
developing world farmers are attached to traditional systems of farming in rough lands. 
The use of fertilisers and pesticides in the industrialised world has been another 
revolution in agricultural production. Available data and practical results show how 
direct efforts to use new methods have increased overall productivity and per capita 
earnings for farmers.
When industrial goods are produced, they may not require excessive care or 
expenditure for storage. Agricultural commodities, such as dairy and horticultural 
products, need substantial attention even after production (although there are new 
methods of cold storage, deep freezing etc.). It is, for example, not possible to keep 
fisheries products more than a few hours in normal temperatures after catching from the 
sea, especially in warm climates, if a modem system of refrigeration or sufficient ice is
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not available.41 Such technical advantages reduce production costs in the industrial world, 
as one of the main reasons why developing countries are not able to compete with 
industrial countries even if their labour costs are substantially lower.
In comparison with developing countries, industrial countries benefit from certain 
general and technical advantages such as; a)- the use of chemical preservatives, b)- 
access to industrial processes applied to different varieties of agricultural raw materials 
for preparing dried, canned or deep frozen products, and c)- the use of organic materials 
in production, whereas in developing countries many agricultural products may be 
destroyed at harvest time and before reaching the market.42
In EC countries, the consumption of processed products such as vegetables and 
fruit has been increasing as a result of general economic and technical developments and 
better standards of living. Certain EC products, such as tomatoes and peaches in which 
the Community is more than self-sufficient can be processed into juices and canned 
goods.43 At the same time the EC imports a large amount of processed products from 
developing countries. Only developing countries that have the technical capacity to 
convert their agricultural products into processed products in conformity with EC 
standards enjoy access to EC markets.
One may live without using modem industrial goods (such as domestic electrical 
goods), no one can survive without food. This means that the degree of dependency on 
agricultural products is much higher than on other sectors. The security of food supplies 
is a high priority for any nation seeking a balance between the interests of farmers and 
consumers. It is also important to realise that economic independence is impossible 
without an adequate supply of foodstuffs for the total population of a country.
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D- PROBLEMS CREATED B Y  OVERPRODUCTION .
Agricultural overproduction, a common phenomenon in industrialised, well 
developed countries, is a matter of concern not only for agricultural economists, but also 
for lawyers dealing with legal standards applicable to international agricultural trade. 
Dumping of domestic agricultural surpluses on international agricultural commodity 
markets may not only threaten the stability of commodity prices, but also disrupt the 
proper operation of legal standards applicable to trade in agricultural products.
With the legal relevance of overproduction and its international consequences as 
given, dumping practices by individual members of the international community of states 
may interfere with unwritten standards of fair competition and fair sharing of 
international agricultural markets.
Cereals overproduction in the US and dairy products surpluses in the EC are 
examples of such overproduction. In practice any attempt to regulate international 
markets has normally a direct effect on domestic policies of participating countries. For 
example, an agreement helpful to the EC countries to tackle its dairy overproduction 
problems will affect Australian and American policies. This is an area of agricultural 
trade and negotiations that also affects the interests of developing countries.
As stated before, the use of modern techniques by industrial countries and 
drought in recent years in the southern hemisphere, have created an opportunity for 
industrialised countries to use their huge surplus stocks as a bargaining position. The 
developing countries in such situations should have long term plans for dealing with the 
challenge, especially with dumping of surplus products in their markets.
E- AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS DESERVE SPECIAL TREATMENT
In the present thesis a crucial question is why, in GATT negotiations, 
governments should treat agriculture as a ’special case’ or grant it a different treatment
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in comparison with industrial products. Some believe that this may be a trivial question, 
because any sector of the economy should be regarded as a special case in so far as it 
is a recognisable sector. However, agriculture is the only special sector which i)- 
provides for many human essential needs, ii)- is subject to erratic output variations 
related to weather, iii)- employs millions of people in small businesses and provides jobs 
in rural areas where other employment opportunities are scarce, iv)- has special 
government ministries with deep seated involvement in economic and social 
programmes, affecting agricultural trade, and, lastly, v)- demands the adoption of new 
technology requiring a significant resource adjustment to alleviate existing problems.
Further distinctions between agriculture and other sectors are observable. At the 
political level, governments and politicians cannot ignore the significance of rural 
population votes at election times.
Consideration of the above factors indicates that agriculture is a special economic 
activity. It is vital to give agricultural products different treatment in comparison with 
industrial goods.
F- THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS
In international trade in general, negotiations rest on the assumption that while 
each country has the sovereign right to impose and to alter conditions of import and 
export over its borders, as well as the right to organise and regulate its domestic market 
as it sees fit, such rights should be exercised with a discretion linked to an awareness 
that they can have an impact on other countries subject to international legal rules.
The latest Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-93) covered all agricultural 
products, raw and processed, giving priority to sectors in structural surplus and to those 
sectors where serious disruptions are foreseeable.44 More substantive issues had to do
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with methods of negotiation, objectives underlying these negotiations and negotiating 
tactics which might have prejudiced the negotiations’ outcome. Concerning methods of 
negotiation, there are serious questions to be answered as to the appropriate techniques 
for establishing the framework to encourage fruitful discussions on agriculture.
If agricultural issues are assessed as not being fundamentally different from other 
economic or trade issues, the conduct of negotiations may be left to intergovernmental 
groups dealing with such matters as tariffs, non-tariff measures, safeguards and tropical 
products. In such situations agriculture would be subject to the same discipline as other 
economic and trade sectors, with mutual discussions of problems and exceptions and a 
final trade-off of interests among sectoral positions.
G- GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE
As already hinted, government intervention plays an important role in the 
agricultural sector. In this regard certain questions arise such as i)- what should be the 
objectives of governmental intervention and management? ii)- who should manage the 
market? and iii)- how might a good quality of governmental management be accom­
plished ?
Certain objectives of government market management are closely bound with the 
assessment by governments as to the performance of agricultural markets. It is generally 
agreed that in the absence of government intervention, a number of important 
agricultural goods have a chronically unstable market price. Hence, stabilisation of the 
domestic market may be one of the prime objectives of governmental farm policies. The 
main aim of such policies is to have an effective and widespread central management 
of the market.45
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(1) State trading practices
State trading has been a common practice in many former socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe and in developing countries. This is the most common way of 
controlling imports of agricultural products. The main aspect relevant to the present 
thesis is the role of state trading in developing countries, mostly concentrated on the 
public consumption products such as food and cereals.
In relation to GATT, the rules governing state trading have always been difficult 
in concept and even more so in their application. In theory, this matter is covered under 
GATT Article XVII, but in practice nothing has happened. Owing to the special nature 
of agricultural products, government intervention comes in many forms, but the use of 
state monopolies, or state-authorized monopolies, is widespread. Although in western 
Europe cooperatives predominate agricultural production and trade, state trading has been 
viewed largely as an instrument of socialist governments.
Wheat and coarse grains are particularly dominated by such intervention. In 
practice almost 90% of world trade in wheat and about 70% of trade in coarse grains 
is managed by governmental cooperatives and agencies.46 Two distinctive elements can 
be found in GATT rules governing governmental monopolies operating in agricultural 
trade:
1)- that state trading bodies operate on a non discriminatory-basis, governed only by 
commercial considerations,
2)- that entities with import monopolies negotiate a limit on the level of protection 
applied in the form of a price make-up.
In practice, neither of these provisions has been enforced, giving the monopolies 
a freedom to operate without regard to rules normally applied to international 
agricultural trade. Generally two types of government intervention could be found in 
state trading practices .
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a- Government control of trading enterprises
Legal constraints on the commercial policies of private sectors by governments 
who are setting up a monopoly or an enterprise under their control is common in many 
industrial and developing countries. Such a practice requires a means of influencing the 
flow of imports and exports potentially as effective as the imposition of tariffs or quotas. 
GATT contains a number of rules aimed at preventing this form of trade distortion. 
Among these provisions is Article XVII. The Article even applies to state enterprises 
that are facing competition from private firms unaffected by government control, 
b- Government procurement
Government procurement is the term used to describe government practices in 
many countries for purchasing goods for their own needs and consumption. This practice 
in its broad form constitutes an effective element in many national economies and has 
usually been used as a means of supporting domestic producers. Not only under GATT, 
but also within the efforts of OECD, attempts have been made to reach international 
agreement on the reduction of such governmental preferences. The Agreement on 
Government Procurement of 1979, signed in the course of the Tokyo Round, has been 
a major step forward in resolving disagreement in this field.
Here we may put forward a substantive question as to who should manage the 
domestic market, the government or the private sector ? In other words, which policy 
serves the public interest and which policy clashes with accepted international legal rules 
governing the trade? In practice governments in their domestic market management or 
intervention policies have to consider cost-benefit factors. If they intend to gain some 
benefit from market management at an intervention level, they must also expect to pay 
economic and political costs .
Thus, political attitudes towards burden sharing are delimited by the extent to
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which concessions would lead to advantages.lt is clear that participants in trade, by 
virtue of their market position, have different abilities to participate in management; their 
actions will depend on the burden that they are prepared to shoulder. Some actions will 
be more effective than others.
Many developing countries have good reasons for their intervention policies in 
this field, such as supporting the producers and helping their consumers. For example, 
in I.R.of Iran, governmental bodies normally buy cereals from domestic producers to 
help them at harvest time when they are not able to sell their cereals at a fair price, and 
will sell to consumers at a low price.47 In some cases, like that of wheat flour, the price 
for all public consumers is subsidised so that it is eight times under the present market 
price.48 At the same time the government imports certain quantities from abroad to 
compensate national production shortfalls. In such situations, the states in developing 
countries have no other choice except to control procurement which directly relates to 
national food security. In addition, these countries resist any competition or intervention 
by foreign companies in their markets.
Industrial countries are against such practices and seek a choice of competition 
for their agencies in the developing world. The reality is that a majority of developng 
countries are not able to open their markets to foreign competitors. For many of these 
countries, opening up markets to competitions means a gradual elimination of their 
farming population.
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II. INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE REGULATION; ITS
RELEVANCE TO GATT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
(A legal analysis)
At the level of public international trade law, the GATT is the only world-wide 
agreement setting out general rules and procedures for the coordination and liberalization 
of the foreign trade policies and laws that currently cover more than 120 participating 
countries. At the national level, the domestic foreign trade laws of most GATT 
Contracting Parties are based on the international GATT rules.
A- THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A brief review of the role of international law and its relevance to international 
economic institutions will provide a better understanding of the global dimension of 
agricultural trade negotiations in the GATT system. It is also essential to question the 
relationship between international economic institutions, such as GATT, and their 
relevance to agricultural trade. What is the legal machinery on which international trade 
regulation depends? When answering these key questions, certain elements related to 
them must be examined. Starting with the role of international law, as the main source 
of international trade law and the GATT, one definition says contemporary international 
law is:
an instrument for resolving fundamental world problems. For achieving true equality 
amongst states and nations, for settling international disputes by peaceful means...49
It is possible to say that global and regional treaties, conventions, and 
international economic institutions, are legal instruments which fulfil such objectives.
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They are supposed to pave the way for economic development for all members of the 
international community of states and peoples .
The emergence of institutions such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and various specialised agencies50 with economic development as 
their principal objective, has introduced a new phenomenon in the law making process 
in international law. Although public international law does not usually influence 
discussions regarding what should be done in the international trading system, there is 
nonetheless a cardinal principle, namely the principle of ’pacta sunt servanda’, requiring 
adherence to international treaties and agreements, such as the GATT.
International law also plays a major role in dispute resolution, where law is taken 
into consideration in the avoidance of disputes and by aiming to prevent disputes through 
promoting international and bilateral conflict resolution by various means.51
(1) International Law as a framework for economic objectives
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the UN provide a legal framework for the 
development of international co-operation and collective economic security.52 A question 
related thereto is whether all nations have the same share in decision-making in 
international relations or are the issues dominated also by political and economic factors. 
Former Argentine president, Raul Alfonsin has stated that :
one of the characteristics of the present day is that international relations are
53increasingly relations among powers rather than relations among societies.
It is clear that only a handful of industrially developed countries have an 
influence on major political and economic international decisions. Consequently many 
states are only observers of big power games in the international arena. In this respect, 
the ad-hoc working group of the United Nations ECOSOC decided that:
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Economic and social progress in the world would be accelerated by the strengthening 
and development of economic relations amongst the states, irrespective of differences 
in the level of their economic and social systems.54
One may also add: irrespective of countries political and economic strength.
Without co-operation on a non-discriminatory basis it is not possible to achieve
prospective goals, or in other words:
International co-operation in the field of trade, finance and economic relations should aim 
in particular at the achievement of accelerated and self-sustained economic growth of 
developing countries and the progressive reduction and ultimate elimination of the gap 
existing between their economies and those of developed countries. 55
Considering such a gap, sooner or later industrial countries should realise that 
their existing economic policies towards developing countries may not be fair, since their 
application not only fails to serve the weaker side, but in some cases exhibits actual 
negative results for the weaker partners.
B-THE CONTRACTUAL BASIS OF GATT FOR REGULATING INTERNATIONAL  
TRADE.
International trade between states requires a stable global economic and legal 
order based necessarily on norms of behaviour and rules accepted by all nations and 
administered as basic principles of international law.56 One of the main foundations of 
such co-operation in the field of international economic relations, is the GATT 
multilateral trading system, within which most of the global merchandised trade moves 
today. GATT provides a system of basic rules as well as a forum in which member 
countries are able to consult and negotiate to resolve trade disputes and to clarify and 
develop the rules.57
The GATT is unique among international trade arrangements because it is a
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quasi-contractual order and contains provisions governing non-compliance and the set­
tlement of disputes. In comparison, other institutions or agreements dealing with trade, 
such as international commodity agreements, may contain obligations and legal rights 
not applicable to trade generally. Others, such as those drawn up under the auspices of 
UNCTAD and the OECD, are general in nature but contain no legally binding clauses 
nor a basis for ensuring enforcement.58 As such they do not yield any proper guidance 
on agricultural trade. They focus mainly on a system of managed trade rather that one 
based on a regulatory and continuous framework.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as its name indicates, is an 
agreement general in its nature and specific in its application. It comprises a set of rules 
and disciplines for general application to a broad range of goods entering world trade. 
The GATT contains general rules to be applied to all trade activities, such as rules for 
’national treatment o f other contracting parties goods ’ and specific rules with respect 
to the use of policy instruments that affect international trade. For example, the rules that 
prohibit the use of quantitative import restrictions are applied, with certain exceptions, 
to agricultural products.
C- THE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND FOOD PRODUCTION 
IN  THE WORLD.
Before examining the GATT and its agricultural trade regime, it is possible to 
evaluate the place of agricultural products and food commodities in overall world 
production and the economic environment within which trade in agricultural products 
plays a major part. Such an evaluation can enable us to understand the important and 
crucial role of agricultural trade in the contemporary world and the legal rules 
underlying it.
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Trade in agricultural products is not a new phenomenon. It has its roots in the 
first stages of human civilisation. The first signs of trade possibly started with the 
exchange of surplus farm and hunting products.59 The ’Great Silk Road’ was a 
significant trade link in ancient times trading silk (if we treat silk as an agricultural 
product)60 and other textiles and spices between China, Central Asia and the Middle East 
and Mediterranean region. Such trade dealt not only with the exchange of goods, but 
also led to exchanges of cultures and civilisations.61
In economic terms, since World War II, world trade in agricultural products has 
been declining as a proportion of world merchandise trade, but it remains substantial, 
amounting to a value of more than $300 billion in 1990. It is of vital importance both 
for exporters and importers dependent on it.62 A major share of agricultural trade relates 
to food products (used for human consumption), accounting for about three quarters of 
all agricultural trade; the rest is devoted to agricultural raw materials normally converted 
into industrial goods, such as cotton .
Production, preparation and trade in agricultural products are of vital importance 
in employment and other economic factors underlying the GNP in both industrial as well 
as developing countries. The following table shows the importance of agricultural 
exports to developing countries in various production groups.
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Table NO. 1
Share of developing countries in world agricultural exports, by product group, 
1970-1989. (Percentage)
Product Group 1970 1980-1982 1989
Cereals 15.6 13.7 11.7
Meat 20.3 14.2 11.6
Edible Oils 34.7 43.7 47.5
Dairy Products 2.1 2.0 2.4
Sugar 68.2 60.7 52.2
Tropical Beverage 91.2 84.7 78.4
Spices 85.6 81.6 72.4
Tobacco 25.4 27.9 24.7
Roots Tubers 32.9 42.7 41.9
Fruits 33.3 36.7 38.6
Vegetables 29.7 30.3 25.2
Total Agriculture * 35.6 29.4 25.9
* Excluding fishery and forestry products.
Source: FAO, Trade Yearbook UNCTAD secretariat calculations
It was estimated that in 1988 agriculture accounted for only around 2% of the 
gross domestic product of industrial countries, whereas in the same year it accounted for 
about 15% in developing countries as a whole. In terms of employment, agriculture’s 
share in the labour force is generally much greater than its share of GNP (Gross 
National Product). In developing countries it was nearly 60% of the labour force with 
income derived from different agricultural activities in 1989. In comparison, the 
corresponding share of developed market economies was only 6%.
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D-DEPENDENCE OF THE THIRD WORLD ON PRIM ARY COMMODITY 
EXPORTS.
As indicated in the last section, third world countries have a vital interest in 
agricultural commodities exports. This dependence makes them more susceptible to the 
results of the GATT and any other international agricultural trading negotiations.
The developing countries have different trade positions. Those who are able to 
convert agricultural raw materials into processed and semi-processed goods benefit more 
than those who are simply exporting agricultural raw materials.63 In addition there are 
different effective elements for presenting merchandise goods in the contemporary world 
such as packaging, trade mark, complying with standards and the application of sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary in the production line.
Agricultural trade has played a substantial part in the historical development of 
the third world countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. Primary 
product exports have traditionally accounted for a sizeable proportion of individual gross 
national products. In some smaller countries, anywhere from 25% to 40% of the 
monetary GNP is derived from the overseas sale of agricultural and other primary 
commodities such as coffee, cotton, cocoa, sugar, palm oil, etc.. Consequently, the 
participation of third world countries in the negotiations on trade in agricultural products 
is a direct result and a reflection of their interests in agricultural trade. In this respect 
four different categories of countries can be distinguished, i)- net exporters, ii)- net 
importers, iii)- those which are basically self-sufficient, and lastly, iv)- those 
occasionally and marginally involved, as either exporters or importers, in agricultural 
trade.
A brief examination of available data and information relating to the third world
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and its problems yields a better understanding of the political, social, and economic 
situation of third world countries, with respect to which law has an important role to 
play. If we consider the degree of developing countries dependence on foreign trade 
earnings and the scarcity of hard currency resources, we find that there might be good 
reasons to invoke a special and differential treatment for these countries.
In many international trade treaties and conventions, especially in the GATT 
system, developing countries are given differential treatment in their exports,64 but in 
practice the recent figures indicate that, in spite of such differential treatment, the trend 
of progress for agricultural exports has been negative.65
How is it possible to explain and justify such a downward trend ? The answer 
lies in the relatively high structural dependence of developing countries on agricultural 
production, ultimately translating itself into a high dependence on agricultural exports 
based on the only available national products. As a result, the share of agricultural prod­
ucts from developing countries in their total merchandise exports ranges from 50% to 
100%.66
In comparison in industrially developed countries this share varies from 60% for 
New Zealand and 35% for Australia to more than 20% for the EC, 13% for the USA 
and 5% for Japan and all non-EC European countries.
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TABLE-2
SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN PRODUCTION AND LABOUR FORCE IN SELECTED 
REGIONS. (percentage)
REGION
SHARE IN
GNP
1965
SHARE IN
GNP
1988
TOTAL 
SHARE IN 
LABOUR 
FORCE 
1965
TOTAL 
SHARE IN 
LABOUR 
FORCE 
1989
Developed market-economy 
countries
5.5 2.3 16.5 5.9
Developing countries 28.4 15.4 70.6 57.1
Africa 35.3 20.8 78.9 66.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 41.0 34.0 - -
Latin America 15.7 9.2 44.5 27.0
Asia 38.0 17.8 67.5 55.0
East Asia 41.0 22.0 - -
South Asia 44.0 33.0 - -
Source: GNP: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development statistics, 1990, New York, 
1991; labour force: FAO, Agrostat files. Data for subregions of Africa and Asia are from World Bank, 
World Development Report, 1990 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1990).
We must bear in mind that in addition to national policies, market access, 
geographical advantages, labour skill and technology advantages, others factors including 
the law, play a direct role in overall agricultural production in different countries. No 
nation is able to establish an advanced economy without relying on a secure and reliable 
trade policy based on a legal framework.
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Developing countries have thus far been substantial losers in the world market 
share as a result of protectionist measures and other barriers to their trade applied by 
industrialised countries, especially with regard to such products as meat, cereals, sugar, 
tropical beverages, spices and vegetables. This is a direct reflection of the import policies 
of industrial countries, since the share of industrialised countries’ agricultural imports 
has shown a general decline in the 1970s and 1980s, while developing countries have 
had an increase of domestic demand because of rapid population increase. Industrial 
countries became more self sufficient and developing countries became more dependent 
on agricultural imports. This contributes to the imbalance against third world countries. 
For example figures for 1989 indicate that gross food imports of developing countries 
rose to around $62 billion, with their net food imports attaining the unprecedented level 
of about $17 billion. These figures are reflected in table three. The food imports of all 
net food-importing developing countries totalled nearly $36 billion while those of 
low-income food-deficit countries totalled around $10 billion.67
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TABLE No. 3
AGGREGATE FOOD68 TRADE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1989
(Million of dollars)
Countries Imports Exports Net imports
Developing countries (132) 61630 44937 16694
Net exporters (28) 12550 31407 -18857
Net importers (104) 49080 13530 35550
Low-income food deficit 
countries(69) 69
19734 9779 9955
World 216202 - -
Source: FAO, Agrostat files and UNCTAD secretariat calculations.
In the contemporary world, developing countries are sensitive to any change in 
their agricultural trading patterns. Consequently, the results of GATT and other 
international trade negotiations will particularly affect them. Owing to the use of 
protectionist measures by industrial countries, the agricultural trade of developing 
countries has suffered considerable losses. This trend will not be redressed unless 
industrial countries grant favourable and differential treatment in agricultural trade to 
developing countries. In addition to reducing the level of tariffs for developing countries, 
every effort should be made to deal with other protective measures such as non-tariff 
barriers. These may be raised as new measures to replace the previous high tariffs 
applied by industrial countries.
It is also apparent that developing countries who are mainly dependent on 
agricultural products are substantial losers in the world market share as a result of 
protectionist measures and other barriers to their trade. These measures have been 
applied mainly by industrialised countries with regard to certain products such as meat, 
cereals, sugar, tropical beverages, spices and vegetables.
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III. SALIENT FEATURES AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INTERNA­
TIONAL TREATIES OTHER THAN GATT AS POSSIBLE LEGAL MODELS 
FOR TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.
This section surveys major international attempts to regulate trade in agricultural 
products outside the GATT framework, at bilateral, regional and international levels. It 
does so firstly, to emphasise that the GATT in its nature is a general agreement dealing 
with many issues as well as with agricultural products, and thus particular treatment in 
favour of agricultural products or their producers, could not be expected. Perhaps those 
countries who have more competitive advantages will benefit more than others. In 
comparison there are other specific treaties or special agencies, established to tackle 
agricultural trade problems in a more specific manner, containing provisions for co­
operation or assistance to developing countries The second reason is to asses the 
comparable effect of such international entities on agricultural trade performance of 
developing countries as apposed to the overall GATT system.
For example the EC, the world’s largest trading block, has its own Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) developed since 1962 on an elaborate legal base. It is not 
possible to have a proper and extensive survey of the GATT and the world agricultural 
trade policies without understanding how CAP operates. The EC legislation on CAP has 
a direct effect on GATT decisions and vice-versa. Other international attempts to 
regulate agricultural trade also have their own importance. A brief review of such 
international and regional agreements can help to assess the significance of GATT in its 
institutional environment, especially in respect of directly or indirectly comparable 
arrangements. Light may also be cast on future changes that might be envisaged in the 
structure and processes of the GATT as far as agricultural trade is concerned.
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A- INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
One of the traditional ways to manage agricultural trade outside GATT has been, 
and still is, to negotiate particular international commodity agreements.They typically 
cover trade performance, marketing, price, quantity, and the overall management of the 
commodity in question. On this basis the interested parties come together and decide the 
management of the market for products that they intend to share.
Agreements of this kind, to manage trade, are in essence agreements which limit 
competition among the participating states and give them a stronger voice against 
outside competitors.
International Commodity Agreements (ICAs), were made as long ago as 1903 
with the International Sugar Agreement; but it was after the Second World War that 
commodity agreements proliferated.70 ICAs for coffee, wheat, cocoa, olive oil and sugar 
were established, but failed to stabilize prices or solve the problems of developing 
countries’ fluctuating export earnings.71
ICAs can be negotiated among just a few exporters or importers, or among all 
exporters or importers. The latter approach has been a preferred strategy for most ICAs 
proponents over the years.72
ICAs interfere with the philosophy of GATT, which is to allow the free play 
(function) of market forces; but they are not a serious obstacle to GATT. The GATT 
record in the agricultural area serves to indicate the extent to which agriculture forms 
an exception to the basic GATT philosophy.73 In this respect there is a similarity 
between GATT and ICAs. But the main difference is that GATT encourages a multi­
product and multinational approach rather than emphasising certain commodities or 
regional countries.74 From a legal point of view Article XX of the GATT directly refers 
to ICAs, by stating :
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Subject to the requirements that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions] prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting party of measures :...(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under 
any intergovernmental commodity agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by them or which is itself so submitted 
and not so disapproved; 75
It should be realised that in general terms ICAs are a system of managed trade 
rather than a regulated trading practice. Some industrial countries put forward ICAs in 
order to control the worlds’ commodity markets in a harmonized way. The developing 
countries’ approach was to seek more gains by collective decisions. A commodity 
agreement gives more power and a stronger voice to developing countries with respect 
to products of interest. In practice only a number of ICAs such as oil, sugar and coffee, 
have been the subject of successful negotiations aimed at securing agreements in the 
sense that they secured higher export earnings for developing countries.
B- THE IDEA OF A N  INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANISATION (ITO) AND  
HAVANA CHARTER
The International Trade Organisation (ITO) was intended to be the fundamental 
basis of GATT, envisaged as a result of pre-and post-World War II experiences in 
international trade negotiations. It was the result of a convention in the early 1930’s 
drafted to commit the signatories: "to abolish within a period o f  six months all imports 
and export prohibitions or restrictions". 76
Some believe that the establishment of the ITO was envisaged as a result of the 
Allies’ intention to establish a better international trading environment, when they
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created the ’Charter o f World Trade'.11 This charter called for the establishment of a 
better trading system and general liberalization of trade, with agricultural products 
treated like any other commodity, that is, with no special advantages or privileges 
attached to them.78
One positive feature of the intended ITO was the subsequent encouragement of 
individual commodity agreements between producers and consumer states to stabilize 
prices.79 Any further attempts to create an international trade organization to operate on 
a global scale, includes particular reference to the realities that led to the failure of 
ITO.80
One of the main reasons for the failure of ITO was the lack of consideration of 
developing countries’ interests. It was also apparent that USA policy, reflected in the 
original proposal for ITO, did not include more than a passing reference to economic 
development.81 This position proved totally unacceptable to the least-developed world 
which sought affirmative commitments by all participating countries for advancing the 
process of their economic development. Most importantly, specific exceptions to many 
of the prohibitions of the ITO charter were sought to permit the less-developed countries 
to follow an independent commercial policy. This position created a division between 
the parties over the drafting of the Havana Charter.82
Ultimately, the GATT inherited only the specific exceptions to the commercial 
policy prohibitions of the Havana Charter.83 With the collapse of the ITO, Chapter III 
of the Havana Charter, entitled ’Economic Development and Reconstruction ’ stumbled, 
except for Article 13, which became Article XVIII of the GATT. This is evidence of the 
belief that the developing countries interests could no longer be neglected in an 
international trade regulatory system.
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C- THE UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN  AGRICULTURAL TRADE.
In examining agricultural trade in the GATT system, the role of the UN and its 
agencies as a major organisation influencing international economic and commercial 
policy making cannot be ignored. The legal justification for consideration of these 
organizations is Part IV, Article XXXVIII(2)(b) that calls for joint action of all 
contracting parties to proceed with development objectives as well as appropriate 
collaboration in the matter of trade and development policy with the UN and its agencies 
and other institutions recommended by UNCTAD.
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was one of the first collec­
tive attempts on the part of the UN for promoting international trade. It followed the 
UN call for a possible global agreement with a wide range of collective rules for the 
establishment of a new world economic system. The UN involvement in agriculture 
particularly focuses on food and agricultural development issues. Table Four represents 
a clear picture UN attempts and other intergovernmental bodies in the area of 
agriculture, specially on food sector and interlink between these agencies. A concise 
review of the attempts in three of them, relating to development and agricultural trade 
performance of developing countries, helps us in a search for an optimal perspective for 
agricultural trade.
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Table NO. 4
Major Intergovernmental bodies in the Agricultural and food field
Organisations That are part of the UN Food 
System.International Wheat 
Council
^  World Food Council
U.N Development ProgrammeU.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organisation
Global Informati- 
on and Early 
Warning.
World Bank.
Secretary-GeneralU.N General Assembly
U.N Economic and Social council International Fund 
for Agricultural 
Development.
International 
Fertilizer Supply 
Scheme.
Committee on 
World Food 
Security_____
Consultative Group 
on International 
Agricultural Research
Consulative Group 
on Food Production 
and Investment in 
Developing 
Countries.
Source: MacLaughlin Martin M., World food Industry : Has anything Happened Since Rome? 
Overseas Development Council, No. 27, 1975.
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(1) Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)
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As a specialised agency of the UN, FAO has as its main objective the promotion 
of international consultations and cooperation related to the production and export of 
agricultural commodities.84 It was established as the result of a resolution adopted by the 
Bretton Woods 1944 conference calling for parallel action in other fields of international 
economic relations and broader primary objectives of economic policy such as:
1)- The reduction of obstacles to international trade and the promotion of mutually 
advantageous international commercial relations;
2)- Bringing about the orderly marketing of staple commodities at prices fair to the 
producer and consumer alike.85
The first session of FAO in Quebec (October-November 1945) adopted 
resolutions in which primary emphasis was placed on an expansion of agricultural 
production, and on raising the standards of nutrition and living throughout the world.86 
The formation of the FAO Intergovernmental Group on Meat that sets guidelines for 
international co-operation in the livestock and meat sector could be seen as a successful 
joint action of GATT and FAO in the area of agricultural commodities trade.87 The 
group pointed to the need for special treatment for agricultural products in international 
trade and the development of a coordinated agricultural trade policy among the 
participating states. As one of the successful88 UN agencies in the area of food and 
agriculture, FAO has attracted the membership of a substantial number of developing 
countries who have raised their voice for a more favourable development of agricultural 
trade and promotion of food policy amongst its members. It could also be considered as 
an prospective alternative to the GATT agricultural trade regime.
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(2) The United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
The UNCTAD conference, created as an organ of the General Assembly in 1964, 
had common goals and similarities with GATT in its attitudes towards developing 
countries.89 UNCTAD has maintained its close involvement with agricultural trade 
through its integrated programme for commodities which was adopted at the Nairobi 
conference.90 The Common Fund programme established by the integrated programme 
for commodities (that covers tropical and agricultural raw materials) is mainly related 
to development objectives that deserve its particular importance in the area of 
agricultural trade.
The UNCTAD programme of action deals with a wide range of industrial and 
raw materials, that agricultural products being considered as part of them, in addition of 
having development objectives. It aims to:
1. achieve stable conditions in commodity trade, including avoidance of excessive price 
fluctuations, at [certain] levels.91
2. improve and sustain the real income of individual developing countries through 
increased export earnings, and to protect them from fluctuations in export earnings, 
especially from commodities;
3. seek to improve market access and reliability of supply for primary and processed 
products, bearing in mind the needs and interests of developing countries;
4. diversify production in developing countries, including food production, and to expand 
processing of primary products in developing countries with a view to promote their 
industrialisation and increase their export earnings;
5. improve competitiveness, and to encourage research and development on the 
problems of national products competing with synthetics and substitutes, and to consider 
where appropriate the harmonisation of the production of synthetics and substitutes in 
developed countries with the supply of natural products produced in developing 
countries;
6. improve market structures in the field of raw materials and commodities of export 
interest to developing countries;
7. improve marketing, distribution and transport, and increase developing countries’ 
participation in such activities and earnings from them. 92
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The UNCTAD programme of action has tried to touch some genuine trade prob­
lems affecting developing countries, among them barriers to trade in agricultural 
products and other commodities. Side issues such as processing of raw materials, 
transport, distribution and marketing in products of interest to developing countries are 
also taken into consideration.
From a legal point of view, Article XXXVIII(2)(b) of the GATT could be 
regarded as a basis for joint action between the UNCTAD and GATT.93All the above 
cited development objectives of UNCTAD, especially the participation of a substantial 
number of developing countries, could influence the decision making process in the 
GATT system. A practical sign for this in the past has been the inclusion of part IV in 
the GATT in 1965, entitled ’trade and development ’ in favour of developing countries. 
This has largely been considered to be a reaction to the UNCTAD I suggestions in 
1964.94 The other successful joint action has been the establishment of the International 
Trade Centre (ITC).
(3) The links between GATT, IMF and the World Bank (IBRD)
The IMF too could play an important role in trade in agricultural and other 
commodities. One of the main purposes of trade in agriculture and other commodities 
is to provide a reasonable and regular income for developing countries whose economies 
are heavily dependent on export of such products. Where an arrangement fails to provide 
such a regular income in this respect or does not exist, the IMF helps to secure 
additional protection to enable the loser countries to draw from the IMF compensatory 
financing facility to meet temporary shortfalls in export earnings.95
The IBRD could play an active role in this regard. But despite the importance 
of maintaining close relations between GATT, IMF and the IBRD, such co-ordination 
has received less attention. Essentially, the negotiating objective in this area is to ensure the
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consistency and compatibility of the three organizations in their respective efforts on 
trade, monetary, and development issues.96
There were some new initiatives in the latest GATT Uruguay Round negotiations 
(1986-1993) to motivate the IMF system to allocate some funds to those developing 
countries who are trapped in the protectionist programmes of industrial countries, and 
whose economies have suffered as a result of cutting farm subsidies and liberalisation 
of world trade. This is also an area where the World Bank could contribute.97
D- THE TREATY OF ROME AND THE ESTABLISHM ENT OF EC
From the legal point of view the twelve EC states defined their legal status as 
united individual GATT contracting parties. However, since the Dillon Round, the EC 
Commission has participated as a GATT contracting party ’sui generis’ in all GATT 
committees except the Budget Committee.98 It means that the EC exercises and 
represents almost all the rights and obligations of individual member states. Owing to 
the close relationship between GATT and EC as the worlds’ largest trading bloc, the 
EC’s arrangements with ACP, Mediterranean and some individual countries are of 
particular significance as typical trade and development models of relationships between 
North and South, especially in the area of agriculture and tropical products trade.
For example the Lome’ conventions are comprehensive co-operation agreements 
between the EC and African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries.99 It was 
first signed in 1975 and renewed by three consecutive conventions, in 1979, 1984, and 
1989. The fourth Lome’ Convention (1990-2000) is currently in force.100 These 
arrangements will be investigated further in connection to industrial and developing 
countries perspectives in the GATT on Chapter Four.101
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E- CONCLUDING REMARKS
Trade in agricultural products has a multi functional dimension. Unlike other 
trade or commercial activities, from the early stage of human civilization it has been a 
circle that joined up many aspects of human economic and social life. Owing to different 
geographical, environmental and social differences in the world regions, it is not possible 
to prescribe the same identical regime for agricultural trade problems of all countries. 
Every individual region or nation has its own particular agricultural charactristics. In 
comparison to services and industrial products, and despite all technical advantages in 
these sectors, almost all nations of the world are dependent on agricultural products 
which they treat it differently from other sectors.
In the overall framework of the GATT, agricultural trade plays a vital part. It 
includes the main bulk of exports from developing countries. At the same time, in the 
industrialised world, it is an area of socio-economic survival for rural populations. Many 
developing countries are heavily dependent on internal supplies and export earnings from 
these commodities, but the degree of dependency varies from country to country and 
product to product. A clear definition and categorization of agricultural commodities will 
reduce the tension and disputes over these products in world markets.
With reference to international economic organizations, it is possible to suggest 
that the GATT Contracting Parties should continue to explore whether cooperative 
arrangements prescribed by such international institutions would be desirable for 
promoting better trading advantages than those presented by GATT. To this end, it 
seems necessary to include a range of cooperative dialogues in the GATT negotiations.
Commodity Agreements, are also of immense legal interest because they are 
multilateral treaty arrangements which seek to regulate aspects of international trade in 
some agricultural commodities, an area of great importance to developing countries. In
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the words of Fawcett, "international commodity agreements are instruments of trade regulation 
and, as such, a form of international organisation law can be seen at work in them in both 
aspects..."102
ICAs could still be treated as a strong alternative to the GATT agricultural 
trading regime for developing countries. The main advantage of the commodity approach 
is that industrial countries not producing the same commodities are not able to interfere 
in the market with their usual policy instruments, whereas in a system like GATT the 
developing countries have no choice except to share their gains with those who have 
stronger trading capacities.
The ITO discussion became once more significant when in the final text of the 
Uruguay Round agreement, the establishment of a global World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) came under practical consideration. Considering the lack of an active 
participation of developing countries in its early years, perhaps it is desirable that in any 
future negotiations establishing a global trade regulatory system, the developing countries 
must participate more actively. It is only under these circumstances that they may secure 
a better consideration of their overall interests. It is possible to assume that if any future 
international arrangement ignores the reality of the third world’s interests, it will not be 
able to attract the full cooperation of all nations.
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1 .Rubin Seymour J. and Mark L. Jones, ’Conflict and Resolution in US-EC Trade Relations at 
the Opening of the Uruguay Round,' Oceana Publications, New York, London, (1989), p.8.
2 .GATT, BISD, 29th Sup. Geneva, (1982-83) pp.42-46 .
3 .See Ibid: (Terms of reference).
4 . Ibid.
5. For more information, see GATT, BISD, 30th Sup.Geneva, (1982-83), pp.39-43.
6 .Ibid.
7. In the section related to agricultural products definitions, there will be more references to 
these products.
8. For ease of reference the term EC is used thought this thesis to refer to the former EEC and 
European Community or present European Union.
9.Two leading cases relevant to this subject in the European Court of Justice were: Case 61/77, 
Commission v.lreland, [1987] ECR 417, and Case 141/78, France v.United Kingdom, [1979] 
ECR 2923.
10. The Council was also empowered to decide what products should be added to this list within 
two years of the entry into force of the EC Treaty (until end of December 1959).
11. Agricultural products are listed in Annex II to the Treaty as amended by Regulation 7a, See 
Appendix. See also J. Usher, Uniform External Protection: EC Customs Legislation before the 
European Court of Justice’ (1982) CML Rev. 389.
12.See Protocol No.4 to the 'Greek Act of Accession to the EC’ in 1981, OJ 1981 L211/2.
13. At the beginning of January 1988 both the statistical nomenclature NIMEXE and the tariff 
nomenclature CCT were replaced by the Combined Nomenclature (CN), which is based on the 
Harmonised System as defined by the Customs Cooperation Council. The Combined 
Nomenclature is published annually in the Official Community Journal. It consists of around 
16,000 codes at the 2, 4, 6, and 8-digit levels, and for each code there is a descriptive text in 
each of the 9 official Community languages.
14.OJ 1987 L 198/1.The new text of the Common Customs Tariff is contained in Council Reg. 
2658/87(OJ 1987 L256/1).
15.Reference may made when interpreting Annex II to the Explanatory Notes to the 1950 
Customs Cooperation Council Convention, see Case 61/80, Cooperative Stremsel-en- 
Kleurselfabriek V. Commission. [1981] ECR 851.
16.See J. Usher, Supra No. 11.
17. [1984] ECR 1257.
18. Cited in Usher,Supra, note 11.
CHAPTER ONE NOTES 62
19.This is based on my own practical experiences in the carpet industry, taking into account all 
elements of preparing the raw wool for commercial use. Reference to my own written textbook 
on: 'The Art of Making Persian Carpets" in Persian, 2th ed. Ministry of Education, Classification 
219/5, I.R. Iran, Tehran, (1989).
20. See United States Code Service, No. 19, 1677, Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, (1992).
21 .For the purposes of this sub paragraph, the term ’raw agricultural product’ means any form 
of farm or fishery product.
22. In general the term ’industry’ here means the domestic producers as a whole of a like 
product, or those producers whose collective output of the like product constitutes a major 
proportion of the total domestic production of that product....,the term also means the domestic 
producers of the principle raw agricultural product which is included in the like domestic product, 
if those producers allege material injury,or threat of material injury, as a result of imports of such 
wine and grapes products.
2 3 .The term ’Commission’ here means the US International Trade Commission.
24.For the purpose of clause (i) (II) in addition to such other factors, there may also be 
considered eventually to the question of coincidence of economic interest. The US Trade 
Commission shall:
(I) if price is taken into account to consider the degree of correlation between the price of the 
raw agricultural product and the price of the primary agricultural product; and "(II) if added 
market value is taken into account, consider whether the value of the raw agricultural product 
constitutes a significant percentage of the value of the processed agricultural product"
25.The above-cited provisions of the General Agreement were among those reviewed by the 
Negotiating Group on Agriculture,as part of its mandate to achieve greater liberalisation of trade 
in agricultural products.
2 6 .Op cit in note 3.
27. Article XVI:4 relates to the ban on export subsidies of non-primary products.
28. It also remained to be decided whether this practice should be eliminated or made subject 
to reduction commitments in itself or in conjunction with reduction commitments on internal 
support.
29.For examples of products falling under the Common Customs Tariff and Common 
Commercial Policy see Cases 37 and 38/73, Social Fonds voor de Diamentarbeiders v. 
Indiamex, [1973], ECR 1609.
30.The US, in its proposal to the GATT included many other products such as casein, skins, 
wood and cotton in its definition, and excluded manufactured tobacco.See UN, Uruguay Round, 
Further Papers on Selected Issues, prepared by UNCTAD/I TP/42, Geneva, 1990, at P .7.
31. See GATT International Trade Yearbook, 88-89 Geneva, Vol. 1, Appendix I, (1989), p.46.
32. For more detailed categorisation of agricultural products see "Expert Series" on 10 different 
series.See Dr. Hessayon D.G ’The Vegetable Expert’ published by pbi Publications, England 
(1990). This book is in 10 volumes covering 10 categories of agricultural products such as 
Vegetables, Fruit, Flower etc.
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33. In my search for a proper definition and categorisation of agricultural products I came 
across the book which categorises the main food products on a scientific and logical basis: 
Ellwood Caroline, Rosemary Wadey Hamlyn: 'Nature of Fruits and Vegetables Course,’ Hong 
Kong, (1990), pp.20-21 and 230-232. It is not possible to list all the agricultural products in the 
present thesis.
34 . See supra note 32.
3 5 .Supra No.33. For example, fruits are divided as follows : (1) apples, (2) apricots, (3)bananas, 
(4) blackberries, (5) blackcurrants, (6)cherries, (7) crap apples, (8)coconuts, (9)dates, (10)figs, 
(11 )gooseberries (12) grapefruit (13)grapes (14) kiwi fruit (Chinese gooseberries) (15)lemons, 
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CHAPTER TWO
THE GATT AGRICULTURAL TRADE REGIME :
THE RELEVANCE OF ITS PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RULES TO 
THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
(GATT as a legal instrument)
Agricultural trade in its global context, reproduced from com puter softw are by Iman Moradi.
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Introduction
’’Perhaps the most difficult question to determine is 
how much to decide by rule and how much to leave 
to discretion." ”lt is an advantage, and not a 
disadvantage, of the scheme that is invites the 
member states to abandon that licence to promote 
indiscipline, disorder and bad-neighbourliness 
which, to the general disadvantage, they have been 
free to exercise hitherto".
John Maynard Keynes1
Chapter two aims to provide a fuller examination of the GATT structure and its 
procedural and substantive rules relating to agricultural trade and the developing 
countries’ interests in the system. Owing to the fact that such rules are not concentrated 
in a specific part or section of the General Agreement, a proper coverage of them is a 
very difficult task. In addition, there are certain multi-dimension rules that are not 
directly related to development or agricultural trade issues yet have a multi functional 
coverage, for example, rules on subsidies and border protection.
A clear idea of the legal nature of the system, its operation and its institutional 
framework gives perspective to decide which new initiative or decision in the 
multilateral trade negotiation is well or badly taken. Knowledge of the system will help 
to analyze the relations between different groups and clarify the enforceability and 
applicability of contracting parties decisions. This information gives indicators as to the 
possibility for altering the rules and determinations and identifies who has the decision­
making authority in the system. Thus one can address to what extent developing 
countries can participate in decision making mechanisms, seeking a more favourable 
treatment for themselves in the decision making authority of the GATT.
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I. THE PRINCIPLES, SCOPE, INSTITUTIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
GATT AS THEY RELATE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE.
A- THE PRINCIPLES
The cardinal principles laid down in the preamble of the GATT are reflected in 
different articles such as: non-discrimination subject of Articles I, III, XIII, XVII, and 
transparent policy making by means of tariffs (Articles II, X), market access (XI: 1), 
public choice of the least-distortive trade policy instruments (Articles III, XI: 1, XIII, 
XVI), undistorted rule-oriented competition (Articles VI, XVI:B) and judicial review 
(subject of Article X:3).2 Some of these articles are of particular importance to the 
present thesis. For example Article I embodies unconditional MFN treatment. It applies 
in respect of custom duties and other legislation for importation and exportation of 
goods,3 This principle obliges the contracting parties to accord unconditional and 
non-discriminatory treatment to their respective products.
It must be realised that in the GATT, apart from the above principle, Article 
XXVIII bis also refers to the conduct of ’negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous basis' . This principle is hardly mentioned in connection with the GATT. 
In reality reciprocity plays a role not only in the multilateral negotiating rounds to which 
Article XXVIII bis applies, but in every situation where a balance of interests of 
contracting parties is involved.4 It is also possible to conclude that reciprocity and 
unconditional MFN are the basis of many controversial discussions in the GATT 
especially as regards relations between industrial and developing countries.
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Article II also serves as the central obligation in the negotiating rounds. The same 
Article indicates that the developing countries should receive special treatment. This is 
considered as another cardinal principle that is emphasised in two amendments to the 
General Agreement.
From a legal point of view one commentator has suggested that: 
non-discrimination, open markets and fair trade are the GATT main principles.5 
Reciprocity is also described as a commonly invoked principle. In other words, it can 
more easily be said that GATT rules manifests examples of the non-reciprocity 
principle.6 In conclusion non-discrimination, reciprocity and transparency are the main 
GATT principles. They lead to an open trading environment and exchange of 
concessions with respect to the lowering of trade barriers. Both classical and neo­
classical trade theory states that free trade will maximize the level of welfare of the 
countries participating in international trading system.7
The contracting parties are also prohibited from awarding any trade preference 
or privilege to certain contracting parties whilst ignoring the other parties. It must be 
realised that developing countries are exempted from this obligation when giving such 
concessions to each other. It is also believed that Article I does not apply to measures 
taken against unfair trade practices (such as countervailing duties imposed on subsidised 
imports) because these are inherently discriminatory, and that the only applicable anti- 
discriminatory rule is that of Article XX (d).8
When the US or EC negotiate with Bangladesh or Botswana, there is little 
evidence of reciprocity as described in the principle. In relation to the developing 
countries as Dr. Khan has written: The principle of reciprocity is substituted by the 
principle of non-reciprocity and eventually the operation of the MFN principle is 
suspended in favour of the principle of ’Differential and More Favourable Treatment 
to the developing countries' .9
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In practice, the assumption of economic equality of contracting parties did have 
some validity in the early days of the GATT when most of them were industrialised 
countries, but that balance was changed substantially when the number of contracting 
parties expanded to accommodate many new developing, least-developed and landlocked 
countries.10
B- THE RULES OF PROCEDURE IN  THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS
The traditional method of negotiations in the GATT is the request and offer 
approach. The contracting parties identify the changes they desire in the trade barriers 
of others and draw up a list of their own barriers on which they are prepared to 
negotiate. Although dealing takes place bilaterally, the outcome is ’multilateralized’ as 
a result of the GATT MFN principle.
A second approach which was introduced in the Kennedy Round negotiations, 
involves agreement on an ’across-the-board cut’ in tariffs. The depth of the cut is the 
focus of discussion, but exceptions can still be negotiated through the ’request and offer ’ 
method. A third method of negotiation, the rules and obligations approach, was practised 
during the Tokyo Round negotiations in the 1970’s to address non-tariff barriers.
Owing to the particular nature of agricultural products it is difficult to liberalise 
them by using these tariff related negotiating methods. The first approach is useful when 
the trade barriers are easily identifiable, such as quotas and tariffs. But it should be 
realised that tariffs and even quotas are not the major barriers to trade in agricultural 
commodities. The main instruments of agricultural protection are domestic policies and 
non-tariff measures that are more complex than ordinary tariffs.
On the other hand, many countries have had trouble in applying the GATT rules 
that are sufficiently strict to constrain domestic policies. The rules were originally 
drafted to avoid conflicts with domestic policies.11
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(1) Schedules of Tariff Concessions
The reduction of the level of protection is among the prime objectives of the 
GATT. It must be carried out through the prohibition of quantitative restrictions and the 
decrease in existing tariff levels via reductions in reciprocal tariffs. In order to fulfil 
these objectives and as a practical step, Article II introduces the special scheme of 
’schedule o f  concessions ’ under which the contracting parties to the GATT are obliged 
to undertake the commitment to levy tariffs concession at no more than the proposed 
schedules of item-by-item tariffs of which the detailed lists are normally achieved during 
the GATT rounds.12
(2) Subject of the Negotiations
The primary subject matter of the GATT is trade in goods, although there are 
some closely related provisions, especially in the GATT analytical index.13 They are not 
specifically referred to in the General Agreement but action has nevertheless, been taken 
by the contracting parties.14 For the purpose of serving developing countries agricultural 
trade interests, it is necessary to focus on some of these issues .
C- M AIN INSTITUTIONS OF THE GATT
The GATT’s institutions are set up to carry out its legal duties towards 
contracting parties.15 They are categorised as: i)- Contracting Parties,16 ii)- Council of 
representatives,17 iii)- Consultative Group of Eighteen,18 iv)- Secretariat,19 v)- Commit­
tees and other bodies,20 vi)- Negotiating Rounds. Like any other contracting party, 
developing countries should be able to benefit from these organs, but under normal 
circumstances these organs cannot provide special favours to developing countries in 
comparison to industrial countries. It is therefore, important for developing countries to 
participate actively and to realise how it may be possible to benefit from the underlying
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provisions. In order to provide a clear idea of the GATT institutional framework, a flow 
Chart is provided as ’Table 5 ’ on the next page.
D- INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The International Trade Centre (ITC) was founded in 1964 in order to assist 
developing countries to expand their level of exports. Owing to the importance of 
agricultural trade in third world countries, one of the main aims of this Centre is 
concentrated in this field. The Centre is a joint body of UNCTAD and GATT and 
amongst its objectives is the provision of ’assistance to developing countries in the field  
o f trade promotion.,21
The parent organisations are jointly and equally responsible for policy guidance 
and the programme orientation of ITC, especially for policy matters, operation and 
management, acceptance and use of trust funds, the review of the work programme and 
budget and finally review of programme performance.22 The ITC can be treated as a 
potential and prospective establishment relating to the development objectives of the 
GATT for serving the developing countries, by giving technical assistance to them and 
to further their active participation in the negotiations. On the other hand, the role of 
UNCTAD as an important UN body dealing with developing countries can not be 
ignored. Such a joint co-operation is helpful, since two parallel organisation are able to 
share their past experiences and future plans for collective responses to the third world 
needs for an active trade practice.
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Table 5
ORGANIZATION CHART OF GATT
Director General
Deputy of D.G
Contracting U.N
Parties GATT UNCTAD
ITC
Technical Assistant Unit.
Agricultural
Commodities
Tropical
Products
Trade in 
Service
14 committees
Subsidies mid 
Contervailing  
Duties________
Dumping
Technical
Barriers
Safeguards
Functioning of 
the GATT 
System
Tamfs and 
Non Tarrif 
Barriers
Dispute
Settlement
GATTArticles Textiles
Trade Related Industrial
Investment Gooda
GATT NEGOTIATING 
ROUNDS
1.Geneva Round (1948)
2.Annecy Round (1949)
3.Torquay Round (1950-51)
4.Geneva Round (1955-56)
5.Dillon Round (1960-61)
6.Kennedy Round (1964-1967)
7.Tokyo Round 
(1973-1979)
8.Uruguay Round 
(1986-1993)
The original source of the Chart is GATT Document No.1510, p.3. but new changes have been made.
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II. THE GATT SUBSTANTIVE RULES AND DISCIPLINES DEALING WITH
AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES.
Since the establishment of GATT, agricultural issues have been amongst the most 
controversial areas on its agenda. In the present section an analytical study of these 
provisions will be carried out, as well as a study of the importance and role of 
agricultural trade amongst the majority of participants in their day to day relations. 
Perhaps it is not possible to examine the two homogeneous and complementary issues 
of agricultural trade and developing countries separate from each other, since developing 
countries economies are heavily dependent on the export earnings from trade of 
agricultural products .23 
A- BORDER PROTECTION MEASURES
Border protection measures are amongst the essential elements of agricultural 
support policies that form common trade practices in many industrial countries. In 
GATT terms they come under three provisions namely: 1)- Exceptions under Article 
XI:2 of the General Agreement 2)- Special exceptions (waiver, under the Protocol of 
Accession) 3)- Measures not covered under the General Agreement. 24
The main examples of the first kind of provisions are; quantitative restrictions 
on agricultural products which are permitted (in some cases) under Article XI; special 
attention is paid to subsidies, especially export subsidies measures on agricultural 
products as ’primary products', are included under Article XVI.25
(1) Article XI and its exceptions to the general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions .
Article XI of the GATT relates to the ’General Elimination o f  Quantitative 
Restrictions'. What are quantitative restrictions? They are defined as: ’the amount of a
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product which can be imported,26 irrespective of the tariff charged.’ Imports in excess 
of this amount are not allowed. Since the main discussion of Article XI relates to certain 
exemptions to this general rule and directly involves agricultural products, food shortages 
and food security issues, it is considered as one of the main GATT Articles designated 
to agricultural trade issues.27
a- Exceptions under Article XI:2 of the General Agreement
Paragraph 1 of Article XI forbids the application of any restrictions other than 
those named to the sale or export of any product by contracting parties:
1.No prohibition or restriction other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory 
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
It is believed that Article XI tries to close the door to any abuse of quotas, 
import or export licences or other measure which forms an obstacle to trade 
liberalisation.28 Consequently the exceptions to this general ban are provided under 
paragraph 2 of the Article particularly sub Articles 2(a) and 2(c)(i). ’ The provisions o f  
paragraph 1 o f this Article shall not extend to the following: (a) and (b)...and (c)...' The 
main part of the argument is laid out in these sub Articles which will be discussed in 
turn.
Although the term ’quantitative restriction’ is often used to mean simply a quota, 
the inclusion of the words ’or other measures' indicates that the scope of the paragraph 
is not limited to quantities. Its application is determined by the consequent result rather 
than by the form of the action in question.29
Claire Wilcox, the American chief negotiator in the GATT negotiations, referred 
to these restrictions as imposing rigid limits on the volume of trade by indicating that
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quantitative restrictions :
insulate domestic prices and production against the changing requirements of the 
world economy. They freeze trade into established channels. They are likely to be 
discriminatory in purpose and effect. They give the guidance of trade to public 
officials; they cannot be divorced from politics. They require public allocation of 
imports and exports among private traders and necessitate increasing regulation of 
domestic business.30
Wilcox also believes that quantitative restrictions are among the most frequently 
applied methods that have been devised for restricting trade. They are also treated as 
regulations serving to isolate the local market from the world market, by permitting 
both the quantity and content of imports to be controlled, and consequently helping to 
facilitate economic planning.
b- Article Xl:2 (a) exception, and shortages of foodstuffs etc.
Article X I  :2 (a) reads "Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent 
or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting 
party;" The reference to critical shortages of foodstuffs in this sub-Article gives special
power to countries to prevent the export of foodstuffs that are of internal shortages.
In other words, Article XI:2(a) permits export prohibitions or restrictions 
temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other 
essential products. This constitutes the closest thing to a food security clause under the 
GATT, but applies only to an exporting country, which would have the right to decide 
for itself what products are 'essential'. The limiting factors are that the shortage should 
be a critical one and that the measures be temporary. There is no provision under the 
GATT for an importing country to restrict imports of foodstuffs in order to assure 
domestic production for food security reasons 'per se. ’ It is possible to indicate that a 
permanent exception in this area could possibly assist the importing countries in order 
to assure their domestic production and consequently their food security. This is
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common to many developing countries, especially food importing countries, that the 
lack of such provisions may act as a counter measure against their farming population 
interests.
c- Article XI:2(b) and the exception for the Standards Code
Sub-Article (b) in Article XI :2 makes Article XI :1 (which permits certain 
exemptions to the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions,) inapplicable to 
prohibitions or restrictions ’ necessary to the application of standards of regulations for the 
classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade’.
In the interpretation of the sub-Article on the Standards Code, it is possible to note 
that it is based, in part, on Article XX(b) of the GATT, permitting restrictive measures 
’ necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’ when those measures are not a 
means o f ’arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or a ’disguised’ restriction on international 
trade.The actual purpose of Article XI:2(b) and of Article XX(b) should be examined, 
and the interpretation of these provisions should be coordinated in the Standards Code. 
Although the Code applies to all products, it only tangentially addresses agricultural 
trade issues.
A practical example of this reference is in Section 14.25 of the Standards Code
which allows the Code dispute settlement procedures to be invoked :
....where a party considers that obligations under this agreement are being 
circumvented by the drafting of requirements in term of processes and production 
methods rather than in terms of characteristics of products. 31 
Some recent agricultural trade disputes have proved the importance of a clear
distinction between process and production methods and the real characteristics of
products’ in question. For example the dispute regarding spin chilling of poultry. The
EC’s so-called ’third country Directive’ established scientific standards which must be met
by any potential foreign meat processing plants. From the US exporters point of view
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the rule is discriminatory, since similar standards are not imposed on Community
processors. They also argue that their products already comply with the Community’s
standards. The extra costs of complying with the EC’s standards can be substantial, and
indeed few plants have been certified as being in compliance. A similar and
controversial dispute concerns the use of growth hormones in animals, when the EC
refused to accept a testing scheme initiated by the US, which subsequently raised the
matter under the dispute settlement provisions of the Standards Code.
d-Article XI:2(c):Quantitative Restrictions and Exceptions for certain farm 
programmes:
Article XI:2(c)(i) permits:
import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries products, imported in any form, 
necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate to restrict the 
quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced, or, if there 
is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for 
which the imported product can be directly substituted.
The second sub-Article introduces internal measures that operate ;
"....to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no 
substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the 
imported product can be directly substituted, by making the surplus available to certain 
groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at price below the current market 
level ;...... "32
Regarding the first paragraph, an interpretive notes to the term ’ in any form’ 
specifies that it "cover the same products when [they are] in an early stage of processing and 
still preachable, which compete directly with the fresh product and if freely imported would tend 
to make the restriction on the fresh product ineffective."33
In addition, measures to restrict domestic animal production by restricting 
imports of particular feed grains or other animal foodstuffs are permitted, provided
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domestic production of the restricted commodities is ’relatively negligible. ’
As stated, such exemption only applies where the agricultural import restrictions
are necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures imposing certain limits in
domestic production or sales of products.34
e- Clarifying some ambiguous terms in Article XI
The last paragraph of Article XI and its later amendment clears some ambiguous
terms in the Article by indicating:
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any product pursuant 
to sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public notice of the total quantity or 
value of the product permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any 
change in such quantity or value....
In one of the recommendations of the committee on trade in agriculture35 in 
1983, it was suggested that, in order to allow market forces to operate to a much greater 
extent, to liberalise trade and to prevent more serious prospective surpluses the ’tariffs 
only' approach was recommended as follows:
i)- all non-tariff barriers maintained under Protocols of Accession, waivers, 
Grandfather Clauses,36 state trading, or measures not specifically provided for, such as 
variable levies and minimum import prices, should be phased out;
ii)- It was suggested that Article XI, which was originally meant to provide for 
the general elimination of restrictions other than tariffs, should be amended by the 
deletion of all but paragraph 1 of the Article, so tariffs would be the only permissible 
restriction on trade;
iii)- as unbound tariffs37 are a problem in agriculture, all unbound tariffs should 
be bound and should be the subject of negotiations.
The Article might be strengthened by interpretation of the words 'temporary’ in 
article XI:2(c)(ii), ’necessary’ in Article XI:2(b) and ‘'previous’ ’representative period’
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in Article XI:2 together with a reporting requirement based on Article XI: 2.
The other suggestion was to establish some concordance between the reference to 
'any agricultural or fisheries products' in Article XI:(2)(C) and 'any primary product’ 
in relation to Article XVI:3 of the GATT. As discussed in Chapter one disputes have 
arisen as the meaning of the term primary products.38
It seems that Article XI: 1 is applicable to import restrictions on any ’agricultural 
or fisheries product’ in any form (including slightly processed perishables that compete 
with the fresh products) 'necessary ’ to the enforcement of three types of domestic 
programmes or measures: production or marketing controls, removal of a ’temporary’ 
surplus through free or below market food given away to consumers, and production 
controls on animal products when production depends on imports, 
f- Article XI and the position of industrial countries
The United States and the EC have ignored Article XI. Instead, each has 
provided protection at their borders for certain farm produce without regard to the 
existence of the measures mentioned in Article XI:2(c). In practice both the US and the 
EC have tried to escape from the obligation of this Article. In 1955, the US obtained 
a waiver under Article XI39 so that it could apply fees and quotas to agricultural imports 
which interfere with domestic farm programmes under Section 22 of the US 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.40
The EC further has determined that its common levies and minimum import prices 
were sanctioned by the GATT at the time the Community was created. As a result of 
a complaint on this issue,41 a GATT panel was established and the US representative 
argued that the minimum import price for tomato concentrates,42 which prohibited the 
importation of the product below a certain price, was a restriction on imports and, thus, 
in breach of Article XI: 1. The US again argued that the effect of the minimum import
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price was to raise the price of the product for the benefit of EC agricultural producers 
by limiting imports.
Additionally the system could not be justified under Article XI:2(c) as there was 
no system leading to the restriction of domestic production. The EC representative 
argued that the idea of establishing the system was to prevent imports coming in at 
prices which would adversely affect the intervention system of the fresh tomato market.
As a result of the panel’s proceedings and analysis, the following conclusions 
emerged: the minimum import price was a restriction within the meaning of Article 
XI: 1:, more importantly, the intervention system for fresh tomatoes did not constitute 
a governmental measure under Article XI:2(c).
Since this measure was not justified under Article XI:2(c), there was a prima- 
facie case of nullification or impairment of the benefits pertaining to the US under the 
General Agreement.43 This particular complaint is illustrative of two points. Firstly as 
stated earlier, Article XI cannot be used for protectionist purposes; and the restrictions 
on import must be accompanied by substantially equivalent restrictions on domestic 
production. Secondly, it indicates the rise of non-tariff barriers (i.e. licences and 
securely deposits) as a method of controlling the import of directly competitive 
agricultural products. 44
g- The conditions and the adequacy of quantitative restrictions which are 
permitted under the GATT.
Article XI:2(C)(1) in its present form permits restrictions (but not a prohibition) on 
imports of any agricultural or fisheries product imported in any form under two basic 
conditions.
1)- restrictions must be necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which 
operate to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed
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or produced.
2)- that the import restriction shall not be such as to reduce the total of imports relative 
to the total of domestic production reasonably expected to prevail between imports and 
domestic production.45
Here the question of adequacy of the existing Article XI:(2)(1) for bringing all 
quantitative restrictions under a common discipline arises. It seems that this Article 
involves criteria for the innovation of quantitative restrictions and the conditions under 
which substantially all quantitative restrictions might be brought under effective rules 
and disciplines. It is obvious that the maintenance or continued expansion of import 
access is more likely to be assured in an environment in which domestic production is 
effectively controlled.
In practical terms, the range of quantitative restrictions applied in conformity 
with the existing Article XI:2(c)(i) criteria is not extensive. This in itself, however, does 
not constitute a valid basis for relaxing the existing criteria, since to do so would 
involve the risk of merely legitimising certain non-conforming measures at the expense 
of jeopardising existing unrestricted tariff bindings.
In a draft elaborating upon Article XI, in relation to the establishment of the 
committee on trade in agriculture, it was stated that:
Such an approach could hardly be regarded as a strengthening of the linkage under 
Article XI between national policies and trade measures, or as a step in the direction of 
greater liberalisation of trade in agriculture. On the other hand, if Article Xl:2(c)(i) is to 
be more operationally effective, some better definition is needed of the domestic 
measures or policies in respect of which contracting parties may legitimately have 
recourse to quantitative restrictions.46
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(2) Special exceptions ( waiver, protocol of accession )
There are two distinct circumstances under which Contracting Parties have 
exceptions for border protection measures, 
a- special exceptions under waiver
The first circumstance is when the General Agreement has failed to provide 
sufficient scope for subsequent or reinforced protective measures. In such cases 
additional exceptions were sought and granted to individual countries. An example of 
this practice was the controversial waiver of 1955, when GATT granted a waiver 
pursuant to Article XXV:5 to the US from its obligation under article II and XI:
to the extent necessary to prevent a conflict with such provisions of the General 
Agreement in the case of action required to be taken by the Government of the United 
States under Section 22.
Section 22 of the US Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1933, as amended, requires 
that either fees or quotas be imposed on imported products by the President, whenever 
he finds that imports "render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with" any US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) price support or similar agricultural programme, or 
"reduce substantially the amount of any product processed in the USA from any agricultural 
commodity or product thereof which is covered by an agricultural programme. Import
controls pursuant to section 22 were applied on certain dairy products, cotton, peanuts, 
and sugar and sugar-containing products, 
b- Exception under Protocol of Accession
The second exception from the obligation of Article XI is practised under the 
Protocol of Accession. For example, Switzerland has an exception specifically relating 
to agriculture incorporated into its 1966 Protocol of Accession to the GATT. 
Switzerland has reserved its position with regard to the application of the provisions of 
Article XI to the extent necessary to permit it to apply import restrictions pursuant to 
certain Swiss legislation concerning agricultural products.47
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Since these measures are in contradiction with the general provisions of the 
GATT, and are controversial issues in agricultural trade, there have been certain 
proposals that all such specific exceptions allowed through waivers, Protocol of 
Accession, or the ’ Grandfather Clauses’48 should be eliminated and made consistent with 
revised rules and disciplines.
(3) Measures not covered under the GATT
There are certain types of restrictions on agricultural imports which are not 
subject to rules expressly mentioned in the GATT, and have largely escaped the General 
Agreement control system. These rules are subject to so called gray-area measures 
namely, variable levies, voluntary restraint agreements, counter-trade and long-term 
purchasing agreements. Many industrial countries, especially in Europe, rely on variable 
levies, voluntary restraint agreements, counter-trade and long-term purchasing 
agreements as measures for restricting imports.
The governments rely on variable levies of one sort or another to ensure that 
foreign imports do not undercut prices of domestic products. There was a common 
intent in the inclusion of certain measures within this area into the GATT, whether they 
are non-tariff, quantitative restrictions, or unbound tariffs whose levels are variable, but 
there has been no consensus on how the variable levies may be covered under the 
General Agreement. The reluctance of certain industrial countries on solving this issue 
cannot be ignored.
There were also some proposals in the early Uruguay Round negotiations for the 
elimination of variable levies and minimum import prices. Other counter proposals in 
the negotiation also suggest that they should be maintained, providing that the 
calculation of minimum import prices or of the differential between domestic and world 
prices is given clearer definition.
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(1)~ Export subsidies ( 2) - Domestic subsidies.
The rules on subsidies appear at various points throughout the General Agreement.
For example, Article III:8(b) excludes ’the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic
producers’ from the national treatment obligation. Article V I  contains provisions on
anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Lastly Article XVI (as amended in 1955) makes
a distinction between subsidies, in general, and export subsidies. Article XVI is
examined below:
Article XVI, Section A reads :49
if any contracting party grants or maintains any form of income or price support which 
operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce 
imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in 
writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the 
subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or 
exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidisation 
necessary....
The Article clearly indicates the alternative approaches for subsidies, but it does
not define it. Subsidy may be defined as: 50
Effectively, a method of supporting a price. The government subsidises prices when 
it allows goods to be sold at a price lower than the market price, by giving the seller 
the difference between the selling price51 and a viable one. The term subsidy is also 
used for a sum of money given by one person to another to help him over a difficult 
period.
It should be realized that sometimes governments buy public goods from farmers 
or producers, or foreign countries directly or through governmental agencies, in order 
to sell to the public at a lower rate or without any administration or storage charges. In 
such situations since there is no potential seller to receive the difference between the 
two prices in the above definition, it is possible to assume that the government itself 
subsidises the consumers.
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One aspect of non-tariff barriers which was recognised by the founders of the 
GATT concentrated on the provision of export subsidies. In this respect Article XVI :(3) 
was devised to deal with export subsidies for primary products as follows:
contracting parties shall seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary 
products. If however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy 
which operates to increase the export of any primary product from its territory, such 
subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having 
more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product...
As the paragraph indicates, the obligation of each Contracting Party to acquire, 
through the use of export subsidies, is limited to achieve not more than 'equitable share 
of world trade’. In the light of Article XVI:3 account should be taken of the previous 
performance of contracting parties. An exporting contracting party entering into the 
market for the first time will not mean that the party has acquired more than an 
equitable share of the market.52 The equitable share obligation governing export 
subsidies on primary products is based on ex-post facto evaluation of the trade effects 
of such subsidies, and has proved to be largely unenforceable.53
In practice, given the factors which may cause a rise in exports from one 
contracting party to the detriment of another, such as crop failure or advantages gained 
from lower transport costs, it is also clear that the phrase in question presents a 
considerable definitional problem. As a result of complaints made by Australia against 
French exports of wheat flour, a GATT panel was established. The panel listed several 
factors which it considered relevant in determining whether or not a contracting party 
has acquired more than an equitable share of world trade.54
The panel determined that it was important to consider the desirability of satis­
fying world requirements in the product concerned, taking into account the special
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nature of the product. The panel also established that there had been a quantitative 
increase in the level of French exports of wheat flour. It struggled with the problem of 
establishing a causal connection between the subsidy and the increase in the share of 
world export trade. The nature of this causative problem can be justified by reference 
to the fact that increase in exports may be due to factors other than subsidy matters.55
a- Subsidies code and the weakness of export subsidies provisions.
Article XVI:3 is weak as regards the use of subsidies for the export of primary 
products.56 The Tokyo Round negotiations discussed this weakness and the final result 
of the Round led to the creation of the ’Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties'.51 
The export subsidies issues were fully interpreted in Article 10 of the Subsidies Code, 
attempting to make the GATT rules stronger by making them more specific and by 
defining various ambiguous terms. The overall result generally was to some extent 
welcomed by developing countries who faced competition by subsidised agricultural 
commodities exported from industrial countries. The industrial countries especially the 
US, were not satisfied with the new GATT Subsidies Code. Objections centred around 
the mechanisms for assessing the share of world trade and the periods to be taken into 
consideration when determining any such change over time. The US objection had two 
main grounds: First Article 10:2(a) and (b) of the Code which provides that:
(a) ’more than an equitable share of world export trade’ shall include any case in which 
the effect of an export subsidy granted by a signatory is to displace the exports of 
another signatory bearing in mind developments on the world markets;
(b) with regard to new markets, traditional patterns of supply of the product concerned 
to the world market, region or country, in which the new market, is situated, shall be 
taken into account in determining "equitable share of world exports trade";
The second ground was: Article 10:2(c) of the subsidies code which indicates
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that: ’a previous representative period  shall normally be the three most recent calender 
years in which normal market conditions existed.
Despite the overall satisfaction of developing countries with the Code some 
questions remain:
a)- are world markets to be determined by considering both commercial and non­
commercial export sales?
b)-does one country displace another when the subsidising country increases its share 
of an expanding market, as in the poultry case58 or when it increases its share at the 
expense of another exporter, as seen in the sugar and wheat flour cases? 59
c)- what is a new market and what conditions of competition are allowable there ?
The definitional problems inherent in Article XVI: 3 have not been remedied as 
this new definition looks into the effects of export subsidies on the trade and production 
of other signatories. In practice this conclusion is illustrated by reference to the GATT 
panel’s findings on complaints made separately by Australia and Brazil about EC 
refunds on the export of sugar.60
After the panel finding of serious prejudice or threat of serious prejudice to 
Australian and Brazilian interests, the GATT established a working party to discuss the 
possibility of the EC limiting its subsidisation of sugar exports.61
Here the legal base for the working party was Article XVI :1 which clearly states 
that:
In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other 
contracting party is caused or retained by such subsidisation, the contracting party 
granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or 
parties concerned or with the Contracting Parties, the possibility concerned of limiting 
the subsidisation.
By referring to Article 25 of the Havana Charter, the members of the Working 
Party argued that62 the EC, rather than its producers, had a positive obligation to limit
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the effects of the subsidisation. The majority of the working party members concluded 
that the EC countries had not advanced any meaningful possibility of limiting the 
subsidisation and their failure to do so is an indication that the threat of serious 
prejudice, (found to exist by the GATT panels) would continue.63
Regarding the Subsidies Code, it is possible to conclude that the Code reaffirmed 
the material injury criterion,64 recognised the possibility of Article XXIII actions, 
improved the procedures to be followed and established a commission on subsidies and 
countervailing measures with supervisory powers. Some of the concepts were better 
defined and an updated version of an ’illustrative list’ of practices considered and added 
to the General Agreement. However, the Subsidies Code did not fundamentally depart 
from the original GATT provisions. On some controversial issues no agreement was 
reached. Therefore the differential treatment of export subsidies on primary and 
manufactured products continued. There is still no connection between the concepts of 
Article XVI and Article VI, or in Jacksons’ opinion:
....between the GATT obligations on the use of subsidies, the violation of which may 
give rise to claims for compensation by the aggrieved party, and the GATT rules on 
which imports of products produced or exported with the assistant, to remember that 
even if a subsidy is not prohibited by GATT, GATT may permit it to be offset by 
countervailing duties, and in the view of some, vice versa. 65
On the base of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of Article VI, 
XVI, and XXII66 which embodies the Code on Subsidies, it is possible to conclude that 
the Article realised that export subsidies may cause injury and in order to minimize such 
injury, the code provides two criteria: i)- that GATT member governments must avoid 
granting export subsidies on primary products; and ii)- that, in the case of non primary 
products they should not grant, either directly or indirectly, any form of subsidy which 
would lower export prices below prices in domestic markets.
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This prohibition on the use of export subsidies does not apply to developing 
countries but only to industrial countries on the base of 1960 GATT Declaration on 
Export Subsidies.
2) - Domestic Subsidies
Article 8:2(c) of the Subsidies Code pledges the signatories to undertake that 
they will 'seek to avoid causing, through the use of any subsidy .... serious prejudice to the 
interests of another signatory1 in any other market. This Article was used as a basis for 
complaints in cases involving pasta67 (regarding home market competition), canned fruit 
(export market competition), sugar,68 poultry, wheat flour and some other agricultural 
products.69 A majority of the recent disputes have concentrated on US complaints about 
internal assistance or subsidisation by other states, including special support given to 
grain producers as a result of the enlargement of the EC to include Portugal and Spain 
as additional EC members.70
Domestic subsidies were also the focus of many multilateral negotiations. For 
example, in the Tokyo Round negotiations, it turned out to be impossible to determine 
a criteria for the application of domestic subsidies, taking into account all its possible 
effects (such as distortion created by competition) to the overall economic performance 
of the contracting parties.71 At present, the GATT does not have the substantive norms, 
nor the institutional machinery, for creating and monitoring such criteria.
It is possible to conclude that progress in this area will not be on the basis of a 
new agreement prohibiting the use of export subsidies in any form, since such an 
agreement would be difficult to negotiate and take much time for implementation. 
Rather, such progress should be through the avenues already provided by the GATT, 
and especially by Article XVI; 1.
However, since progress in this area is dependent on a dispute between two or
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more interested parties, a new role should be found for the committee on subsidies es­
tablished by the 1979 code.72 Lastly, progress in the area of export subsidies will be 
slow, given the prevalence of these measures. However the proposal made above seeks 
to prove that any progress in this area should be balanced and reciprocal. This would 
make the necessary political commitment to such reform a little more forthcoming.
C- SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES IN  ARTICLE X X
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures play an important role in contemporary
agricultural trade practices. Article XX provides an exception from the GATT obligation
for the adoption or enforcement of measures necessary to protect human, animal, or
plant life or health "subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or [are] a disguised restriction on international 
trade..."
From a legal point of view two definitions were given to sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures :73
1. Any measure designed and applied to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
from risk arising from or created for agricultural, fishery products.
The second definition refers to certain preventive measures:
2. Any measure indicated to control or prevent the movement across national 
boundaries, of pests, disease, disease-causing organisms and disease-carrying 
organisms which can adversely affect human, animal or plant life or health or otherwise 
cause damage, together with measures intended to control or prevent the use of 
additives and the presence of contaminants in foods and beverages in order to protect 
human health.
Further guidelines in Annex A on sanitary and phytosanitary measures gives a 
proper explanation of all issues relevant to border control and governmental practices 
in this area.74 The agreement applies to all such measures used by contracting parties
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who must ensure that their existing legislation in this area is made consistent with the 
agreement within two years following the entry into force of the said agreement.
Although it is logical for any society to protect and safeguard its consumers 
against the import of health hazardous products, in recent years the application of 
various complex regulations in this area have proved to be a major obstacle to 
agricultural trade of developing countries.75
It is also a common barrier for industrial countries trade. For example the 
prohibition of tomatoes import from Brittany (France) to US markets was declared 
because of the presence of the Mediterranean Fruit Fly that appeared in the 
Mediterranean regions of France. The EC considered the application of these measures 
by US authorities to be excessive and not justifiable on phytosanitary grounds .
In recent years the US intensified its pressure in this area by strengthening its 
rules and legislation, relating to the ban on the use of hormones in meat production, the 
controls by US ’Food and Drug Administration’ (FDA), ’Environmental Protection 
Agency’ (EPA), the ’Nutrition Labelling and Education Act o f 1990’ (NLEA) may be 
considered as common examples of such regulations .
The US concern for stricter standards on imports not only affects the EC and 
other industrial countries but they even affect developing countries. It is one of the 
reasons behind the inclusion of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in Uruguay Round 
agenda.
What worries developing countries is the application of these rules as another 
obstacle to their fragile trade, although no one could deny the importance of these rules 
in agricultural and foodstuff sector. The present developing countries production and 
trading standards are far from being in conformity with the proposed complex rules. The 
application of any of these measures could create another obstacle to free flows of their 
agricultural commodities to industrialised markets.
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D- ARTICLE XIX, EMERGENCY ACTION ON IMPORTS.
Article XIX allows protective measures to be taken in special circumstances to 
safeguard domestic products, but before any recourse to the safeguard clause, three 
conditions must be fulfilled:
There must be an increase in the level of imports; such increase is to be at­
tributable to a)- unforeseen developments and b)- the effect of GATT obligations; and 
the increased level of import must cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers 
of like or directly competitive products. In practice, it is not necessary to show that 
there has been an absolute increase in the level of imports. Such condition is satisfied 
merely by showing that there has been a relative increase in imports that must create 
a potentially dangerous device, given the prevailing economic conditions. Its availability 
for protectionist purposes is constrained by the subsequent conditions and other 
provisions of Article XIX.
The second condition relates to the aspect of causation. The level of imports 
must be due to unforeseen developments and the effect of an obligation incurred under 
GATT. The question concerns the meaning of 'unforeseen developments’. In this respect 
an early GATT working party report realised the difficulty of interpreting this provision 
and finally suggested the following definition:
Unforeseen development should be interpreted to mean development occurring after 
the negotiation of the relevant tariff concessions which it would not be reasonable to 
expect that the negotiators of the country making the concession would and should 
have foreseen at the time when the concession was negotiated.76 
By this definition, it is possible to conclude that any increase in imports can be
attributed to unforeseen developments. Indeed, in examining the interpretation and 
application of article XIX, one may conclude that, in the benefit of the doubt, on the 
question of the unforeseen development, seems to go to the contracting party invoking 
Article XIX.77
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(1) Article XIX and the MFN concept
Some commentators believe that in the case of a non-discriminatory safeguard 
action taken pursuant to Article XIX, trade disadvantages, as opposed to advantages, 
that are imposed on one country’s export of particular goods also apply to all other 
supplier countries. In other words, the MFN principle turns into a most disadvantaged 
nation principle.
The reciprocity which derived from the negotiation on tariff concessions can thus 
be changed into compensation and retaliation provisions under Article XIX utilised as 
a corrective mechanism. There may be the assumption that countries best placed to 
retaliate would be equally affected with less powerful countries, and would act 
effectively to cut short protective measures.
In recent years the abandonment of Article XIX by most GATT parties and the 
resulting consequences requires more elaboration :
a)- the main purpose of MFN clause in bilateral trade agreements was to ensure 
that powerful trading parties each secured, often from weaker countries, the benefits 
accorded to other powerful parties. On the other hand one of the most important 
functions of the MFN principle was to ensure that weaker developing countries obtain 
the benefits accorded to powerful nations. That is why they are exempted from the 
reciprocity principle in tariff negotiations; but this has not secured any tariff concessions 
on sensitive items. The reciprocity principle still applies in the case of safeguard 
measures, where the concept prevails that it should operate as a penalty.78
b)- the parties have to balance global obligations against distinguishable national 
interest or powerful lobby groups, for example, with respect to the applied safeguard 
clauses in bilateral agreements to enable them to protect their domestic interests without 
breaching international obligations.79 Article XIX recognises this in a multilateral
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context by allowing state intervention to meet the situation where an industry is faced 
with a sudden rise of import competition80
c)- it must be realised that the application of the MFN and the reciprocity 
principles to Article XIX measures is based on an interpretive note to Article XIX 
consultations, according to which all supplier countries are to be treated equally by the 
country imposing the safeguard measure and although, unlike Article XXVIII, there is 
no specific requirement to offer compensatory adjustment, in practice the process of 
consultation may produce a similar result.81
d)- a further justification advanced for the application of the MFN principle to 
Article XIX measures is that the right to retaliate against a unilateral withdrawal of a 
concession is only useful in the conduct of trade relations where there is equal 
bargaining position in bilateral trade. In such a situation a country invoking the 
safeguard knows that it potentially faces an equivalent loss of a trading advantage from 
a strong trading partner. On this basis, by importing the MFN clause into Article XIX, 
the interests of the weaker side should be indirectly protected by the intervention of 
more powerful countries who will wish to restore the reciprocal balance in any bilateral 
deal.
e)- as originally instigated, Article XIX safeguard measures are supposed to be 
temporary. However, the language in paragraph 1(1) which allows the measures to be 
maintained for ’such times as may be necessary to prevent or remedy in ju r y together 
with the consultation procedures, has allowed the affiliation of long-term emergency 
measures. Those supplier countries, which complain and do not negotiate compensation, 
have three months within which to impose retaliatory measures. In practice, this loss of 
remedy has been avoided by the parties ’rolling over’ the consultation process every 90 
days and technically continuing consultations.82
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E- ARTICLE XXVIII, MODIFICATION OF SCHEDULES
Article XXVIII has an important role in the context of GATT because tariff 
negotiations and the resulting concessions from them lie at the heart of the GATT 
agricultural trading system. This Article enables the Contracting Parties to renegotiate 
the concessions granted to them on the basis of this Article, especially for two types of 
negotiations; open season negotiations, and out of season negotiations.83 It is possible 
to say that the Article refers to trade in agricultural products which are subject to 
concessions especially for developing countries. There are two different situations in 
which the open season negotiations may lead to either the modification or withdrawal 
of concessions:
Firstly, not earlier than six months before the end of a period of firm validity, 
contracting parties may elect to modify or withdraw a scheduled concession from the 
first day to the next period of firm validity.84
Secondly, a contracting party may be affected at any time during one period of 
firm validity. According to Article XXVIII, open-season negotiations must be held with 
the contracting party with whom the concession was originally negotiated, with any 
contracting party deemed to have a principal supplying interest, and any other 
contracting party who has a substantial interest in the concession.
The interpretive notes to Article XXVIII suggest the need for consultation to 
ensure that those contracting parties having a large share in trade deals, and affected by 
concessions, have had an opportunity to protect their interests.85 Perhaps the main 
purpose of the consultation is to reach agreement on the effect of the modification or 
withdrawal of the concessions and to provide for compensation for the injured party.86
The terms of Article XXVIII also suggests that it cannot be used for protectionist
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purposes. Furthermore it provides that the contracting parties shall undertake,
"...to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not 
less favourable to trade than that provided for in this agreement prior to such negoti­
ations. "
When the contracting parties are not able to reach an agreement, Article 
XXVIII: 3 permits the modifications or withdrawal of a concession. This is equivalent 
to the withdrawal of substantially equal concessions by either the party with whom the 
concession was initially negotiated, or the contracting party having the principal 
supplying interest, or the contracting party deemed to have a substantial interest, or all 
three. This position raises the problem of defining what is meant by ’substantially 
equivalent concessions ’.
The ’out o f season’, negotiations mentioned earlier, are the subject of Article 
XXVIII:4. The negotiations in question may be carried out at any time, but the only 
requirement is authorization by the contracting parties.87 We need to bear in mind that 
such an authorization is given in very limited circumstances, and for good cause such 
as development purposes.
Regarding the provisions relating to tariff conferences, there was no provision 
for them in the General Agreement until the addition of Article XXVIII bis in 1957. 
The provisions are essentially consistent with the Havana Charter rules. Two principal 
differences exist. One, of limited importance, is that whereas the Havana Charter 
imposed an obligation upon members to enter into tariff negotiations upon the request 
of any other member, the General Agreement imposes no such obligation.88
The second principle is that, whereas the Havana Charter required negotiations on 
a selective product by product basis, Article XXVIII bis provides, in the alternative, for 
the use of 'such other multilateral procedures as may be accepted by the contracting 
parties concerned’.
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After the addition of Article XXIII bis, during the Kennedy Round, the 
Contracting Parties made their first major departure from the system that had been used 
since the first round of negotiations. They were able to do this without amending the 
General Agreement. The fourth essence of the change was precisely to reject the 
selective product-by-product method in favour of a multilateral procedure termed the 
linear or across the board method.
In Article XXXVI: 8 of the General Agreement the industrial countries clearly 
stated that they did not expect reciprocity from developing countries for general 
commitments made in trade negotiations. This principle was reiterated in a decision of 
Contracting Parties in 1979 following the Tokyo Round.
III. THE GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AND ITS RELEVANCE TO 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE ISSUES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The term ’dispute settlement’ is given to the GATT’s procedure for adjudicating 
legal disputes between the contracting parties. In practice, without a proper enforcement 
mechanism, it is not possible to enforce any decision or panel finding for or against 
parties. In other words, a dispute settlement mechanism is merely one part of a broader 
institutional framework, namely, the subject of the effectiveness of the rules. This 
broader subject focuses our attention towards a surveillance mechanism, which is a 
necessity in any international institution or agreement of this nature. In this respect, 
establishing a sound dispute-settlement procedure could facilitate an appropriate (proper) 
adherence to rules by contracting parties.
The main reason for including the present section is to examine the structural 
nature and the impact of the dispute settlement procedure on the agricultural trade 
performance of developing countries.
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It is a common belief that the GATT is unique among international trade arrange­
ments because it is contractual and contains provisions for non-compliance. In 
comparison, other agreements may contain legal rights and obligations but do not apply 
to trade universally. Others, such as those drawn up within UNCTAD and OECD are 
general in nature but contain no legally binding clauses nor any basis for ensuring 
enforcement.
There is no doubt that agricultural trade is one of the most controversial areas 
in the GATT and is the subject of many disputes amongst its contracting parties. The 
long standing conflict of industrial countries in the Uruguay Round over agricultural 
trade issues is another sign of such controversial nature.
A- THE NATURE OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE DISPUTES AND THE 
PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES .
The main aim of the dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT is to preserve 
the rights and obligations of the contracting parties and to clarify its provisions. Such 
a system is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system.90 Agricultural disputes have substantially increased in recent years owing 
to the huge budgetary costs to governments in agricultural support policies. These costs 
are associated in particular with surplus production of certain products on the one hand 
and the ever increasing frictions and disputes regarding trade in agricultural products, 
on the other. They are a direct result of intensified competition for export markets with 
the use of export subsidies.
The rules governing trade in agricultural products should be strictly enforced, but 
the effective application of the newly negotiated rules governing trade in agricultural 
products requires a strengthened dispute settlement process within the GATT system. 
Furthermore, considering particular problems that have been experienced in resolving
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agricultural trade disputes, it is essential to adopt clear and enforceable rules in this 
sector to enable the dispute settlement to operate more effectively .
(1) The effects of agricultural trade disputes on the GATT and the parties.
Protectionism has an enormous effect on the overall production of agricultural 
commodities, with a potential capacity to lead to full scale trade wars. A question that 
may arise regards the role of dispute settlement mechanisms in creating a fairer deal for 
developing countries.
There are many examples of agricultural disputes that illustrate how protectionist 
measures of industrial countries play an important role. Among these is the oilseed case91 
which arose after the sharp fall in the production of oilseed, as a result of Dillon Round 
negotiations (1962), when the EC agreed on a zero-tariff for oilseeds. The EC then 
applied a protection scheme by subsidising its farmers to substitute for their losses. In 
the course of a decade, the protection programme brought a fivefold expansion of EC 
oilseed production. In 1989, the US won a case, which was the biggest GATT case ever 
filed in terms of trade value, against the EC oilseed policy. The panel hearing the 
dispute ruled that processor payments discriminated against imports, and that the 
programme was important in the framework of EC tariff provisions binding on soya­
beans and soya products. The EC accepted the panel decision and undertook to change 
its oilseed policy.92
Although the above case may not directly affect developing countries,93 in many 
cases they are not able to distance themselves from the overall impact of such disputes. 
In addition the importance of political and economic involvements or politicisation of 
the cases in recent years is significant. In other words, there are many ways that politics 
influences the panel decisions. For example, a trade diplomat from a powerful importing 
country may indicate, implicitly or otherwise, to a less-developed exporting country that
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the granting of development aid, trade preferences or military assistance might have to 
be reduced or terminated unless the developing country ’voluntarily ’ agrees to limit its 
competitive export of, say, textiles or agricultural products. It may also concern political 
support for the election campaign of a particular political party in developing countries.
When the cases become politicised, those who have more political influence will 
win. In such situations the developing countries are mainly the potential losers. Con­
sequently a fairer dispute settlement mechanism for them implies de-politicisation of 
negotiations and frees them of partisan political and economic influences.
Considering the present conflicts over agricultural protectionism, it is possible to 
conclude that recent agricultural trade disputes increase international friction, leading to 
the imposition of trade restrictions. The escalation of such disputes can catch 
manufacturing goods in the retaliatory crossfire. More generally, such trade disputes 
endanger the credibility of the GATT system, a key point for industrial countries 
domestic policies, since agriculture is an important component of any free-trade 
coalition.94
(2) The GATT provisions on dispute settlement
The original dispute settlement provisions, laid down in Articles XXII and XXIII, 
were amended in 1955. Further supplementary dispute settlement rules and procedures 
were negotiated and agreed upon successively in 1958, 1966, 1979, 1982, 1984, and 
finally became an important subject of the Uruguay Round negotiations agenda.95 In 
addition to those main articles there are provisions recommending the use of other 
multilateral procedures for the settlement of disputes among these: Articles XII:4, XIX:3; 
XXIII:2, XXIV:7,10, XXV:5, XXVIII:4.
The cardinal dispute settlement provision could be regarded as Article XXIII.96 
It is worth mentioning that there is no specific reference to developing countries, or 
those countries in a weaker position to cope with complex dispute settlement procedure.
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Even paragraph 2 of Article XXIII of GATT that refers to the consultation with 'the 
Economic and Social Council o f the United Nations ’ and other appropriate inter-govern­
mental bodies does not seems to have any effect on the developing countries, unless the 
ECOSOC is prepared to assist them, that in itself is subject of specific formalities and 
procedures.
As a result of ongoing difficulties in resolving agricultural trade disputes, a 
number of new proposals for changes to the overall GATT dispute settlement process 
have been submitted. For the first time a serious attempt was made in the Tokyo Round 
to bring substantial changes in agricultural trade rules in the GATT, in order to reduce 
the generation of disputes and the degree of government intervention in the agricultural 
sector.
Despite some difficulties in the adaptation of panel reports, the GATT provisions 
have placed some limitations on the arbitrary wills of contracting parties, which 
otherwise might have generated even more restrictive agricultural trade regimes. In 
addition, the current rules of dispute settlement in the GATT have prevented the erection 
of a number of new agricultural trade barriers, simply by disapproving the irregular trade 
practices of contracting parties. The system also forced the removal or reduction of other 
unusual barriers to trade.
B-DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
(1) Bilateral consultation and negotiations;
The first step in resolving a bilateral dispute according to Article XXII :1 is that 
each contracting party accord sympathetic consideration for consultation to other 
contracting parties. Thus, the initial focus is on bilateral consultations concluded in 
language which avoids any reference to confrontation. If the bilateral consultation does 
not resolve the dispute in a satisfactory way, either of the parties may request
CHAPTER TWO SECTION III 105
multilateral consultation with the Contracting Parties as a whole under Article XXII :2 
of the GATT.
Considering the above requirements, it is possible to compare the first stage of 
the GATT dispute settlement system with the classic pattern of dispute resolution in 
many international institutions with five recognisable stages as: a)- negotiations.97 b)- 
good offices98 c)- mediation:99 d)- inquiry and ’fact-finding’100 and lastly e)- concili- 
ation.101
In addition to the other internationally recognized steps for resolving disputes,102 
the GATT indicates the possibility of resort to other means of dispute settlement such 
as ’chairman ruling’, fact-finding and inquiry by an independent ’group o f  experts' ,103 
Since developing countries are less equipped with legal and administrative means104 to 
deal with lengthy panel proceeding, early solutions such as negotiations, good offices 
and mediation are more favourable mechanisms for resolving their disputes.
(2) The request to the GATT Council for appointment of a panel.
Following the evident inability of two contracting parties to resolve a conflict 
through consultations and negotiations the GATT dispute settlement procedure starts. A 
panel normally comprises of three (or occasionally five) neutral individuals agreed to by 
the parties on an ad hoc arbitration basis to adjudicate on the disputes. Usually these 
individuals are GATT representatives of neutral countries.
(3) Establishment of a panel; panel proceedings
Like many other aspects of the GATT’s decision making process, the dispute 
settlement procedures also depend on the parties’ consensus. The defendant country must 
accordingly consent to the creation of the ad-hoc panel, appointment of its members and 
lastly the adaptation of its terms of reference.
These points can be treated as weaknesses of the system, because no decision is 
adopted unless every one, including the defendant country, agrees. If the panel rules
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against the defendant, this country must also consent to the adoption of that ruling by 
the GATT Council. The defendant must furthermore consent to any retaliation that is 
proposed in response to its non compliance. Few countries give consent to comply in 
such situations.
In practice, those countries who have more political influence and control over the 
system and have a pre analysis and calculation of the effects of the panel decisions on 
their trading system may block the procedure. Developing countries are vulnerable on 
such occasions. The really critical use of the blockage power has been against adoption 
of panel legal rulings by the GATT Council, and developing countries are more likely 
to be the losers.105
Over the years, among industrialized countries, the US has probably earned the 
worst grades in this regard.106 For example, in Nicaragua’s 1985 complaint against a 
politically inspired US trade embargo, the US did not accept a panel until Nicaragua 
agreed in advance that the GATT could not examine national security claims. It means 
that such blockage powers have grave consequences for developing countries.
Also out of 14 cases that were blocked but not overruled, the EC were 
responsible for blocking 5 cases, the US 4, Canada 3, and Nicaragua and Korea 1 
each.107 This is an evidence of what is mentioned above and the fact that developing 
countries are unlikely to be in a position to influence panel decisions.
(4) Action b y  the Council and duration o f panel procedures.
The GATT rules are not directly enforceable in domestic courts of most 
contracting parties. They also impose no direct legal restraint on government officials, 
unless and until GATT rules are enacted into the domestic law of the contracting 
parties.108 The Council acts on behalf of the disputing parties after receiving reports of 
breaching the roles. It has a legitimate duty according to the mandate given to it by the 
Contracting Parties,: "to consider matters arising between sessions of the CONTRACTING
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P/ARTIES which require urgent attention, and to report on these with recommendations as to 
action; ”109
Many disputes lead to a negotiated settlement on the completion of an adopted 
panel report; but if they are not settled, the report may recommend any of three types 
off relief. The preferred form of relief is removal of the offending measures.110 If this is 
not possible, sufficient compensation to the complaining party may be recommended. 
I f  the conflict goes further, the last stage is retaliation by reciprocal suspension or 
withdrawal of the concessions or obligations under GATT.111 It is possible to conclude 
that in legal terms, the GATT articles on dispute settlement system gives the Contracting 
Parties, who are acting collectively, the right to issue legal rulings.
One of the new positive steps in the panel proceedings is that they are 
increasingly practising the citation of previous panel reports, and there have recently 
been references, both by a disputant112 and a panel,113 to the principles of general inter­
national law regarding the interpretation of treaties. In comparison some114 believe that 
broad policy commitments cannot be dealt with effectively by the GATT’s panel 
procedure because they are difficult to translate into precise and enforceable terms. 
Disputes arising from broad policy commitments could be best dealt with through a 
process of monitoring, surveillance, consultations and negotiation.
C- HOW DO THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT POLICIES AFFECT DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES ?
There has been an increase in trade disputes over agricultural trade policies in the 
GATT system. In the past decade some of these disputes have been successfully resolved 
in favour of a more open trading regime. However since a substantial part of agriculture 
trade is shaped outside the effective discipline of international trade rules, the dispute 
settlement system does not apply to them. In addition, on certain occasions, the parties
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have chosen not to adopt the recommendations of the GATT panels established to settle 
such disputes.
When the GATT system talks about providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system,115 one may suggest what could be more important than 
giving a fair share of benefits obtained from a secure international trading system, to all 
contracting parties in order to create a better global trading environment.
In order to reach a solution in the case of an alleged violation of rules and 
disregarding the rights of other contracting parties, the injured party should have 
recourse to all possible ways for an early settlement of the dispute. On the other hand, 
to raise a case with the panel, requires information and legal expertise which many 
developing countries do not have. As stated before there are other important issues to 
be considered, such as political and economic forces and different influences in the 
panels proceedings and negotiating tactics that determine the outcomes.
As Jackson116states, there are various methods that are employed by governments 
as well as by private individuals’ for influencing the conduct of other governments and 
private trade activities. The methods can be classified into two main categories as: power 
oriented and rule oriented techniques. The power oriented technique is the common 
practice of many industrial countries in the history of trade relations. By applying it, the 
stronger party tries to impose its own terms and conditions to influence the conduct of 
the weaker party or parties.
By contrast, in the second category, when a trade practice is considered as 
creating discrimination in a market, the recourse to a GATT dispute settlement panel 
may lead to a legally binding decision by the GATT Council indicating that the trade 
discrimination concerned must be discontinued. Such a decision can be regarded as a 
’rule oriented’ technique in the system.
Hauser117 also argues that the function of liberal international trade rules is thus
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not only to promote a welfare-maximising international division of labour, but also the 
peaceful, rule-oriented rather than power-oriented settlement of international trade 
di sputes among governments. The developing countries who have witnessed economic 
and political conflicts of interest in the agricultural sector may ask from industrial 
countries to what extent the present practices in the GATT are free of political 
influences.
While the panel proceedings are based on power-oriented techniques the 
developing countries are not able to raise their cases and defend their rights. In contrast 
a rule-oriented system would give them a chance to raise their voices in the panels free 
o f any political intervention. They could benefit from a strong dispute settlement system 
that not only gives them an equal chance in the panel proceedings, but to some extent 
it might protect their rights. A means to legal protection would be to employ certain 
independent economic and legal advisors or consultants to assist developing countries 
in raising the cases and to assist them in panel proceedings.
The reality is that many developing countries are not able to raise their cases and 
support them in the panels. This is mainly because of the lack of information and 
technical expertise, and well trained officials (trade diplomats). In this situation a strong 
Council could be very helpful by acting more effectively on behalf of developing 
countries. In addition to the recommendation (or enforcement) of the panels decisions, 
it could supervise panel proceedings.
Furthermore, since the bulk of trade amongst developing countries mainly takes 
place in neighbouring borders, they normally do not affect other contracting parties. The 
majority of disputes related to developing countries is either in market access oppor­
tunities for industrial countries or the high level of competition amongst industrial 
countries in their markets under these circumstances.
It is possible to conclude that, since the establishment of the GATT, its dispute 
settlement system has improved considerably, but it should be realised that this system
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does not clarify who is right and who is wrong, and it is not able to impose any 
sanctions by itself. The truth of the matter is that GATT is not a juridical system, nor 
is it an enforcement body. It is not also a court, charged with authoritative interpretations 
o f  the system of law. In other words "It is a system o f balanced rights and obligations 
together with a cumulation o f trade agreements based on mutual concessions and on 
national decisions to agree, or not agree, with other nations".11*
It is also possible that in negotiations on the procedure of settlement of disputes 
in the panels, two types of techniques power oriented and rule oriented, tend to be used 
in varying degrees and combinations. The institutions available to states for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes are usually divided into so-called diplomatic and the legal means 
o f settlement of disputes.
The resort to political terms for solving such trade disputes is inherently weak 
because it could bring back power diplomacy and weaken the multilateral rules approach. 
This risk is more serious for smaller trading nations that are less able to impose their 
terms and conditions on others. A continuation of power oriented diplomacy is also 
dangerous for the credibility of the system itself. By accepting or even widening this 
practice, the contractual, legal character of the GATT is undermined and there is a 
further risk of changing the GATT into an agreement without legally binding rules.
From the legal point of view some argue that the panel reports have no binding 
force and this could be seen as the weakness of the system. They must first be adopted 
by the Council on behalf of the Contracting Parties. The contents of a report are not 
substantively re-examined in the Council, since the Council does not usually act without 
consensus.119 In this situation, the ’losing’ party may hold up the adoption of a panel 
report interminably while it purports to analyze it and to explore possible negotiated 
solutions with the opposing party.120
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Agricultural trade provisions of the GATT are subject to many controversial 
discussions in the system. It was first in 1950s that the major trading powers conceded 
that agriculture should be accorded a special status.121 The role of agriculture, in both 
absolute and relative terms, in the overall development context of a number of 
developing countries cannot be ignored. For many such countries, agriculture offers the 
only real possibility for income growth and the generation of foreign exchange earnings. 
In addition, their prospects for attaining a level of food supplies necessary for the 
promotion of economic development, also depend upon the development and expansion 
of their agricultural sectors.
In practice this has meant that agriculture has continued to be protected by 
various national mechanisms, including import restrictions, and exporting countries have 
been forced to negotiate voluntary restraint or orderly marketing agreements outside 
GATT. There is no reason why a multilateral safeguard system should not apply to all 
goods, including agricultural products.
Considering Article XIX, it seems that GATT gives to the party which imposes 
trade restriction, the unilateral right both to decide whether a safeguard measure is 
necessary and if so, whether it technically falls within Article XIX. A supplier state 
cannot, in the absence of a notification, claim compensation or exercise the right to 
retaliate under that provision. Its only recourse would be to complain of nullification or 
impairment of benefits under Article XXIII, a very lengthy process with an uncertain 
result. Similarly, third countries which may have had to absorb the goods barred from 
export to the country invoking Article XIX have no standing under that provision to 
complain about the effects of such trade diversion. They too, must consider the 
conditions laid out in Article XXIII ,122
Under the Subsidies Code, industrial countries are prohibited from using export 
subsidies on non-primary products. However some of these countries do subsidize the
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primary product contents of processed products. Although there are differing views on 
the eligibility of this action, since there has been some proposals that this practice should 
be eliminated or it should be governed by substantive new rules for export subsidies on 
primary commodities.
The conflicts of interest amongst the contracting parties in recent years have 
created some serious threats not only to the dispute settlement mechanism, but also to 
the continuation of GATT as a guardian of the flow of international merchandised trade 
amongst its contracting parties.
From an institutional perspective, one may distinguish the GATT from most other 
international treaties in its dispute settlement machinery, which can culminate in the 
withdrawal of trade concessions and theoretically gives it the means to enforce its rules 
and regulations. In practice, the operation of the GATT dispute settlement system has 
been handicapped by certain elements mainly :
a)- the lack of clear-cut rules about what happens when a panel’s recommenda­
tions are not implemented by disputing parties;
b)- the rule that panel reports must be adopted by consensus, which allows parties 
to the dispute to block recommendations which would be detrimental to them.
In order to strengthen the multilateral trading system, it is essential to have a 
more binding enforcement procedure and an appeal body as a last resort to rule on 
disputes. The next chapter will examines the Agricultural Trade progress in multilateral 
trade negotiations of the GATT from the early stages until the launch of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations in 1986.
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Introduction
Why have concerns about unfair trade risen to 
the forefront today? A conjunction of several 
factors drives these concerns. But if these forces 
have to be understood, assessed, and, for the 
most part, declared as hazardous to the health of 
the world trading regime, it is necessary to 
analyze the role of free trade vis- a -vis fair 
trade.1
How has the GATT, particularly its policy towards developing countries, reached 
the present stage ? This Chapter examines the treatment of agricultural trade problems 
in the GATT multilateral trade negotiations from as early as 1947 to the launching of
the Uruguay Round (UR) in 1986, in a chronological order. In two main sections, the
Chapter deals with six early rounds; but, because of the importance of agricultural trade 
discussions on the Tokyo Round negotiations agenda, the second Section is devoted 
mainly to this Round. An important intent of the present chapter is to find out why 
agricultural trade issues were neglected or ignored during those long years, and what 
consequences the developing countries faced.
It is also essential to find out why agricultural trade issues are at the centre of many 
international conflicts and disagreements and to discover why over the past forty-six 
years the contracting parties were not able to take substantial steps to tackle the 
outstanding backlog issues. Was this because of the inherent nature of the GATT system 
in tackling agricultural trade issues, or the powerful political influence of major agr­
icultural producers and exporters that are mainly industrial countries? Lastly, why have 
fundamental reforms in the agricultural trading system never been addressed directly by 
these negotiations ?
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I. THE FIRST SIX ROUNDS OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS.
Since industrial countries played a substantial part in those negotiations, the role 
of industrial countries’ policies and the nature of agricultural trade problems were linked 
from the early stages of the GATT Agricultural Trade negotiations.
As a result of world wars, most European countries employed a form of direct 
central governmental management of agricultural production and distribution policies. 
Such policies came into effect at the same time as the Americans stepped up their price 
support systems and controls. Later the US Congress broadened the scope of price 
support legislation2 by making supports mandatory for a number of non-basic 
commodities, including dairy products and authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to 
provide support for other products, at his discretion.3 Consequently most of these policies 
were developed without regard to GATT or international trade rules, at a time when 
domestic agricultural industries and economies were very different than at present. 
Latterly, with pressures for opening up of borders to foreign commodities, and for a 
variety of other internal and external economic reasons, national agricultural policies 
have not been able to exist without considering the situation of outside world.
For a proper understanding of the development of agricultural trade issues in the 
GATT, developments will be dealt with in chronological order. This will help us assess 
the contracting parties’ attempts to make every effort to create an international arena as 
the base for their trade negotiations .
A - GENEVA ROUND, 1 (1948) qqq
The first session of periodic gatherings of the GATT member states started in 
Havana in March 1948.4 Later in the same year, at the second session held in Geneva, 
the contracting parties disposed of the remaining components of the post-Havana revisi-
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ons of the General Agreement, and decided to conduct another round of tariff 
negotiations in the following spring.5 These sessions are considered to be the first Round 
of GATT multilateral trade negotiations.
One of the standard practices during the initial stages of GATT was for the leading 
purchasers of a product to negotiate reciprocal concessions directly with the leading 
supplier. These concessions would then be generalised to all contracting parties of the 
GATT. As a result, in the first Round of trade talks, among the twenty-three participants 
in the negotiations, a total of 45,000 concessions or similar agreements were negotiated.
In this Round agricultural trade issues were negotiated amongst other issues (such 
as industrial goods). No specific treatment, except that indicated in the original text of 
the General Agreement, was given to agricultural commodities, and ultimately there was 
no particular committee or group allocated to negotiations on these products. In this 
respect there was no significant progress in consideration of the agricultural trade 
interests of the developing countries. In the course of the Round, there were efforts that 
led to the conclusion of an international wheat agreement, but owing to some 
disagreements, in practice, the Agreement was not successful .
B- THE ANNECY ROUND (1949)
Begun in April 1949, this had tariff negotiations as one of its main aims, to allow 
the remaining industrialised and some of the key developing countries to negotiate for 
joining as new GATT contracting parties. It was quite successful.6 As a result of tariff 
reductions in this Round, levels of tariffs were reduced substantially,7 exemplified by an 
average reduction of tariffs in the United States of 35%.
Since the developing countries had been excluded from reciprocity in the rounds, 
little motivation existed for industrialised countries to enter into negotiations with 
developing countries’ representatives. Any apparent motivation was further reduced by 
the effective exclusion of agricultural products, important to many developing nations,
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from the GATT system.8 It must be realised that since the industrial countries’ policy 
require at least a minimum level of economic, political or social interest in any bilateral 
or multilateral deal, there was no motive to come to agreement with developing 
countries. This was one of the main reasons for supporting the exclusion of agricultural 
trade from the Annecy Round negotiations’ agenda .
The principle of reciprocity that is embodied in countless texts adopted and 
applied at international level, such as the Havana Charter; is not necessarily considered 
as constituting an obstacle to preferential practices. One might then conclude that the 
lack of interest of industrial countries to promote their economic and trade relations with 
developing countries is not so much due to acceptable legal reasoning but as a result of 
their own specific economic and trade interests. These however do not promote the 
interests of developing countries.
C- TORQUAY ROUND (1950-51)
Despite a record of consistent disappointments regarding agricultural trade negoti­
ations in the past rounds, especially on the part of developing countries, many countries 
made agricultural negotiations on fundamental reforms one of their top priorities in their 
policy making procedures. The Torquay negotiations were generally considered 
successful as more developing countries joined the GATT system, bringing the total to 
38 countries.9 Some 8700 concessions were negotiated, yielding tariff reductions of about 
25% comparing with 1948 levels.10 Regarding agricultural trade negotiations, the situati­
on was almost the same as in the previous round. There was some hope that the 
newcomers who joined the GATT would put more pressure to liberalise agricultural 
trade, but the desire of these countries was again overshadowed by the decisions of 
industrial countries who dominated the negotiations.
D- GENEVA ROUND, 2 (1955-1956)
The disadvantaged position of developing countries continued in the fourth mul-
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tilateral round of trade negotiations held in Geneva. It involved a large number of 
contracting parties. However, the resulting concessions given by the US as a major 
player affected only a small percentage of its dutiable imports from any country except 
the UK, which had failed to conclude any agreements during the preceding negotiating 
round at Torquay.
The dominant role of the US in the negotiations cannot be ignored. Although the 
number of countries with which the US reached agreement was quite considerable, the 
resulting tariff reductions affected only 16% of US dutiable imports.11
It was in these years that under the US Public Law 480 (The Food For Peace 
programme under the US Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954) 
the US disposal of surplus cereals through food aid to developing countries was started. 
Such an elaborate plan brought large scale disruption in the world market during the 
1950s and 1960s and, as a result, many of the large agricultural exporting countries such 
as Australia suffered considerably. Australian interests were clearly set back, and 
Australia lobbied for the incorporation of a remedy into the GATT.12 On the other hand, 
the US entered into special commodity agreements on agricultural products outside the 
GATT system. These agreements had considerable effects on the agricultural exporting 
countries as well as developing countries. Regarding the overall position of developing 
countries, the situation was almost the same as in previous rounds.
After the completion of the Geneva Round in 1958, the ’Harberler Report’ 13 
recognised two basic elements at the basis of all agricultural policies in Europe and the 
US: stabilisation and protection. By examining the various methods chosen by countries 
to implement these two elements, the report criticised external protection as a source of 
instability in world trade. It also argued that the exports of developing countries were 
lagging behind the growth of world trade generally and placed an important part of the 
responsibility for this on the policies of the industrial countries. It is possible to conclude 
that, since in those years most of the developing countries were subject to industrial
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countries’ political and economic dominance, they were not able to raise their voices. 
Later, to some extent, this balance was changed more in favour of developing countries, 
but benefited only a few of them.
The findings of the Harberler Report led to the creation of three committees; 
Committee I was to convene a further tariff negotiating conference; (not subject of the 
thesis). Committee II was to consider the improvement of the agricultural trade situation 
of developing and least-developed countries14 by reviewing the national agricultural 
policies of member governments. This committee began by consulting the contracting 
parties and its main mandate was :
a)-assembling data on the use of non-tariff barriers by the contracting parties to support 
domestic agriculture income; and b)- examining the effects of these measures on 
international trade in agricultural products; and, c)- suggesting procedures for further 
consultation between all contracting parties on agricultural policy issues.15 The third and 
the most important result was the establishment of GATT committee III,16 relating to 
developing countries and their development objectives, including some issues relevant 
to agricultural trade.
The Committee also identified five fundamental barriers to the trade of developing 
countries as: i)- customs tariffs, ii)- quantitative import restrictions, iii)- other non-tariff 
barriers, iv)- revenue duties and internal taxes, and v)- trade barriers affecting export of 
tropical products.17
It should be realised that many countries of the present developing world were 
then in the early stages of independence from colonial powers and had no strong voice 
in the early rounds of GATT to participate more actively and to have better gains from 
international negotiations.
E- DILLON ROUND (1960-61)
The Dillon Round negotiations created an opportunity to tighten agricultural trade 
rules in the GATT, before the highly protectionist European Common Agricultural
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Policy (CAP) rules emerged. The CAP rules were in their final stages of creation in the 
1960s. This opportunity was essentially lost. The negotiators were preoccupied with 
reducing the common external tariff created by the EC for manufactured products. In 
such a situation most of the agricultural issues were left to the side in a series of ’stands­
till’ agreements.18
Perhaps one of the main reasons for setting aside agricultural trade issues was the 
fact that the industrial countries, as the main players in the early rounds, had no 
imminent interest in trade of agricultural commodities in comparison with industrial 
goods. This was mainly because of the strong waves of industrialisation in the western 
world and their undisputable supremacy over the mass production of industrial products. 
Perhaps in such an environment there was no need to compete in agricultural markets.
(1) The industrial countries’ policies and their effect on developing 
countries in the Dillon Round.
During the drafting of the GATT text, the US negotiators obtained the inclusion 
of Article XIX. This Article closely followed the language of an earlier bilateral US- 
Mexican Agreement19 and permitted the unilateral withdrawal of a concession if it 
resulted in increased imports that caused or threatened serious injury to a domestic 
industry. In the US-Mexico agreement, the US obtained a general clause to permit it to 
withdraw or modify a tariff concession that resulted in serious injury to an American 
domestic industry. This was treated as an escape clause.20 Later, in the US Trade 
Agreements Extension Act of 1951, the Congress insisted on incorporating detailed 
criteria and procedures governing the administration of this escape clause. In addition, 
the American administration gave the Secretary of Agriculture special powers and 
responsibilities regarding perishable agricultural products similar to those given upon the 
President’s request to the Tariff Commission.21
The criteria which the Americans applied in the escape clause regarding Article 
XIX provides a clear example of how industrial countries are able to raise restrictions
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or withdraw or modify tariff concessions already given to developing countries, where 
they themselves determine or measure the level of serious injury. Such voluntary 
withdrawal is a source of instability, since the developing countries are not able to have 
long term investments in their agricultural production for trade purposes. There should 
be more detailed criteria for clarifying the state of injury, otherwise any industrial 
country may withdraw the given concessions at any time, 
a- Determination of serious injury
One of the ambiguous terms in relation to developed and developing countries 
was in regard to the question of ’serious injury’ to a domestic market in dispute cases. 
This was a controversial area between the developed and developing countries for many 
years. The developed countries requested that criteria be applied in the determination of 
serious injury of particular concern for them. They required that:
action by developed countries be taken, more frequently than in the past, on the basis 
of low-priced imports; in other words the price level would tend to become the sole 
factor for such action. 22 
The first US confrontation with the newly framed EC farm program started
during this Round. The prospect of the application of variable levies to US imports,
previously restricted only by tariffs, was gradually. The first tangible demonstration of
the effect on trade came shortly after that. It was at the time when the Community
issued its legislation regarding poultry products.
The application of new legislation in accordance with the EC CAP and against
US decisions had a sharp and considerable effect on US trade and provoked American
retaliation,23 marking the start of a long and complex conflict between two industrial
competitors. It has continued to affect agricultural trade policies of developing countries
up to the present time.
It was in the same Round that the US negotiators were required to operate under
trade legislation allowing them to discuss at most a 20% tariff reduction, and forcing
them to conduct the negotiations on a laborious item-by-item basis. It was by
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proceeding on this basis that US negotiators managed by the end of the Round to secure 
what constitutes today the single largest trade concession ever granted to the US in the 
GATT, a ’zero-duty’ binding on EC import of oilseeds.24
This action has reduced the use of Community grains as cattle feed within the EC 
boundaries and has intensified EC grains surpluses and consequently increased the use 
of export subsidies, therewith raising the cost of grain support. In order to reverse this 
effect, the EC implemented an oilseed policy that encouraged the production and 
domestic use of EC oilseeds via the payment of subsidies to EC oilseed processors who 
purchased domestic seeds at a high target price and crushed the seeds for domestic use. 
This policy brought such a substantial increase in EC oilseed production that in the 
course of one decade a fivefold expansion occurred. The oilseed case was the biggest 
in terms of trade value and concessions, neither the American nor the EC negotiators 
realized the grave consequences which would later emerge for EC farm producers.25
The case also clearly demonstrates another consideration, in the sense that 
agricultural trade problems acquired a long standing nature in the GATT. The oilseed 
case had been a live subject in many past rounds and was still, among the leading 
controversial cases in the GATT UR of multilateral negotiations. Another major conflict 
regarding the US and the EC was over ’guaranteed access’ for the US to EC markets. 
For the US, the question was whether to complete the Dillon Round on the basis of 
uncertain assurances26 by the EC for its traditional export commodities to the European 
market, or whether she should insist on obtaining new binding commitments and thus 
possibly cause the Dillon Round to collapse. In this situation, the conflict with Europe 
was settled on the basis of two so called ’standstill agreements' designed to protect US 
GATT rights.27 The US Kennedy administration, decided to conclude the Round without 
insisting on further new commitments.28
(2) Developing countries’ agricultural trade situation in the Dillon Round.
When examining the agricultural trade situation in the Dillon Round, certain results
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can be identified :
a)- Despite the fact that agricultural trade issues were raised and discussed in these 
negotiations and certain decisions emerged, these issues were still overshadowed by 
negotiations relating to manufactured products of vital interest to the industrial 
countries, as having special priority to be negotiated, as opposed to the agricultural 
commodities of developing countries.
b)-The Round was characterized primarily by item-by-item negotiations for the 
reduction of tariffs. Very little attention was given to the complex and ambiguous area 
of non-tariff barriers. It was the task of the Kennedy Round to address these issues.
The highly sensitive and protectionist policies applied to agricultural products 
in industrialised countries markets29 were another area of concern. The agricultural trade 
issues were, however, set aside. It is interesting to mention that out of 4400 tariff 
concessions (covering $4.9 billion of merchandise trade) made in the Dillon Round, a 
low proportion were related to agricultural products, since only 160 of them were 
considered as items of particular interest to developing countries.30
Although many items were produced both by developed and developing 
countries, the difference in the figures show how the negotiations dealt more with the 
interests of the industrial rather than of the developing countries. It is important to ask 
how it could be possible to reach a balance between the interests of all the conflicting 
parties.
In the light of a variety of serious discriminations in force against developing 
countries’ exports, it is not easy to answer this question. The discriminatory measures 
are based mainly on a wide range of modern protectionism such as: rules of origin, the 
degree of processing, as well as quantitative restrictions, internal taxes, state trading, 
monopolies and other similar restrictions, such as mixing regulations and price support 
programmes. These are identified as the main trade obstacles in industrial markets faced 
by developing countries who look for market access for their agricultural products and
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raw materials.31 Such obstacles would apply either directly or indirectly to many 
agricultural commodities, during the processing stages, and would have included issues 
such as: quantitative restrictions, internal taxes and support policies.
A balance of interests means that the industrial countries should realise the 
nature of the difficulties facing developing countries in trade relations with the industrial 
world, and try to eliminate or minimise their adverse effects.
F- THE KENNEDY ROUND (1963-67) 32
The Kennedy Round paid more attention to agricultural trade problems by adopting 
a resolution on 6 May 1964, at the meeting of the trade negotiation committee at 
ministerial level. In relation to agriculture, it was declared that:
The committee, while reaffirming that the trade negotiations shall provide for the 
acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products in 
furtherance of a significant development and expansion of world trade in such 
products, noted that it has not yet been possible to formulate agreed rules to govern, 
and methods to be employed in the negotiations. In view of the importance of this 
subject to the success of the negotiations, the necessary rules and procedures shall
33be established at an early date.
In addition, the drafting of general arrangements on certain products such as
cereals, meats and dairy products was a major step in consideration of the agricultural 
trade problems. Regarding the less-developed countries, there was more emphasis on 
their participation in the negotiations. The committee realized that every effort should 
be made to reduce barriers to exports of less-developed countries and agreed that this 
consideration should particularly be borne in mind when approaching to the question 
of exceptions.
Some commentators believed that the entry of developing countries to the 
negotiations could be treated as a turning point, since it paved the way for their future 
participation within the multilateral trading system. Opposed to this view were those 
less-developed countries participating in the Round who issued a statement indicating
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their disappointment over the scarcity of benefits that they had received. One of the 
elements of disappointment was their failure to achieve a reduction or elimination of 
duties on particular products of interest to them, especially tropical products, and the 
continuation of non-tariff barriers in the developed countries’ markets.34
In response to this criticism, the GATT Secretariat prepared an analysis of the 
value of concessions granted by major developed countries to less developed countries. 
The analysis showed that the Kennedy Round actually reduced duties on almost 60% 
of imports from the developing countries into the markets of the major industrial 
countries, and that almost 90% of these reductions were greater than 20% percent, with 
almost half of the reductions greater than 50%.35
Tropical products also received particular attention for the first time in the course 
of the Kennedy Round negotiations and seven groups of tropical products were 
identified:36 They covered a wide range of tropical products, but owing to difficulties 
of having a proper definition of these products, certain categories overlapped with 
temperate zone products such as citrus fruits, olive oil, and other agricultural products 
such as rice.
From the less developed countries’ point of view, major shortcomings were the 
absence of reductions in duties on various tropical products on which they really are 
dependent and expected greater gains. It should also be noted that the agricultural 
products and raw materials demanded by industrial countries were mainly selective. 
They were products that were either not produced in industrial countries, or there was 
a shortfall of production in industrial countries’ markets; and lastly, the production costs 
were too high in comparison with imports from third world countries
The United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) did its 
own analysis, finding that average tariff reductions on products of interest to the less 
developed countries were smaller than those of interest to developing countries.37 It 
supported the idea that under those circumstances the poor countries were not able to
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gain any substantial advantages in the GATT system. Either they were not represented 
on many international committees or, when represented, they lacked negotiation 
techniques, skills and a proper knowledge of the management of the market. As a result, 
under the general circumstances governing their day to day economic policies, they were 
and continue to be unable to make any significant gains in multilateral trade deals.
(1) The inclusion of Part IV of the GATT
One of the important events of Kennedy Round in favour of developing countries 
was the inclusion of Chapter IV. Until 1965 the principal GATT Article dealing with 
the problems of trade and development was Article XVIII. Later in November 1964, 
Part IV added three additional article to the text of General Agreement to deal mainly 
with ’Trade and Development' objectives and to attract more participation of developing 
countries in the system. The other reason was to secure the interests of developing 
countries which happen to have important interests linked to agricultural trade. It is 
important to examine the general effects of this inclusion on the developing countries 
together with its positive or negative effects on their economic interests in general and 
on their agricultural trade in particular.
Since the majority of the GATT members are developing countries, the system 
cannot ignore their interests, but to what extent was it successful in securing an 
equitable share in international markets for them? One may ask why the interests of 
developing countries were not considered in the earlier stages of establishing the GATT 
system. The answer lies in the fact that, in the early stages of the GATT, there were 
only a small number of independent third world countries party to it, and among them 
very few developing countries. The majority of existing members now counted as 
developing countries were at the time still under the sovereignty, protection or 
administration of European countries. This is why, even after gaining independence, the 
virtual exclusion of agricultural commodities from the tariff negotiations kept these 
countries on the margin of multilateral trade negotiations.38 On the other hand since
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many of them did not actively participate in the system, they were not able to raise their 
problems and defend their rights in the negotiations. More details and the effects of the 
inclusion of part IV will be explained in chapter IV of the thesis.
(2) Industrial countries1 policies
Unlike many other major tariff negotiations in the pre-GATT period,39 the more 
active participation of contracting parties in the Kennedy Round, especially in 
agricultural deals, was encouraging.40 For example, during the first phase of the 
Kennedy Round negotiations, the number of US negotiated bilateral agreements in 
agricultural products with other countries was twenty-two, in comparison to thirty-two 
bilateral agreements in the course of the thirteen years prior to GATT (1934 to 1947).41 
It is a clear indication that the GATT and the Kennedy Rounds were providing a 
relatively important framework for such negotiations, especially vital for the economic 
interests and administration of the US. On the other hand, there is evidence of an 
overall increase in the number of agriculture and commodity agreements. One may ask 
to what extent the developing countries were affected by industrial countries’ deals and 
secured a fair-share of economic interests in the bilateral arrangements and whether 
these could be considered as a success for them.
Metzger42 believes that the enactment of the US Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 
and her concern about the enlargement of the EC, and the establishment of the EC 
CAP were interpreted as one of the main reasons for initiating the Kennedy Round. The 
Round led also to the conclusion of a reasonable number of US bilateral agreements 
with other countries, especially with EC member states. It also emphasised the 
importance of the agricultural sector in the US economy. On the other hand, it was the 
first time that agricultural trade issues were treated as an integral and effective element 
in the negotiations.
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a- The EC ’Mansholt Plans* in 1963.
One of the main efforts of the EC Commission at the time was to resolve both the 
internal and external deadlocks over agricultural policies known as ’Mansholt I  and IP 
Plans.43 The first plan proposed the introduction of agricultural negotiations in the 
Round and established a Common Community Prices for cereals. It was a kind of device 
that politically facilitated the reduction procedures for the member states whose prices 
were supposed to be reduced in order to reach a common price level. The main 
mechanism was to compensate from Community funds those farmers facing losses or 
hardship.44 The EC Commission tried to persuade all EC member states to agree to the 
first plan, but the second plan, ’Mansholt IP was the subject of some bargaining in the 
Council of Ministers which led to delays for the final approval. The debates on the 
second plan continued until the extent of the policy difference between the EC and other 
negotiators became clearer. The US opposed the EC views for alteration of the margin 
of support in alliance with the world changes of price. The EC response was that the 
exporting countries could avoid any increase in the Community’s levy if they discharged 
their obligations to observe the reference price and to avoid offering products at lower
45prices.
At a bilateral, level there was a decision in principle by Italy that fruits and 
vegetables, hitherto excluded from the CAP, would receive ’Community preferences' 
comparable to those given to CAP products. Although such internal difficulties in the 
EC proved to be short lived, they created a ground for optimism, and as a result some 
individual proposals were submitted.46
Among them was an EC proposal47 which attempted to bring agricultural 
products into the negotiations and pay more attention to them. This proposal was based 
on the belief that governmental intervention in production and support of agricultural 
produce distorts free competition in world trade. Broadly speaking, it had two major 
elements:
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a)- a mechanism through which the level of support provided by each contracting party 
to its farmers could be measured; b)-a way to bind the existing level of support for 
providing the basis for future negotiations on agricultural commodities.48
In other words, two distinctive features could be found in the EC proposal for 
negotiations on agricultural products. First, a method of measuring the margin of 
protection or support provided in each country to its agricultural producers. Second, 
binding existing margins at the negotiations on customs duties.49
Measuring the level of support given to agricultural producers could be treated 
as an assessment mechanism comparable with the guaranteed price given to domestic 
producers and the price for the product on the international market. Such a system of 
support measures provided a basis for future negotiations on the level of agricultural 
support. However, this system suffered from two major defects. The first one was that 
it ignored the protection afforded by tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The second was the 
assumption that the world price represented the cost of production. In other words, it 
ignored the impact which domestic agricultural programmes and the use of export 
subsidies can have on world trade.50
According to Evans,51 after further clarification, it became clear that the EC 
negotiating plan was not in fact a proposal for negotiating the ’margin o f  support’. It 
was not a negotiation but rather the freezing of the status quo. And the status quo to 
be frozen was not the ’margin o f support ’ but rather the level of remuneration to 
domestic producers. In other words ’the margin o f support was simply another name for 
variable levy.' It was also a base for further clarification and discussion in respect of 
the level of support to domestic agricultural producers in the Tokyo Round.
(2) Other agricultural trade deals in the Kennedy Round
The International Wheat Conference was held under the auspices of the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome (1967). It was attended by 
representatives of fifty-two nations. On the basis of US and other industrial countries’
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initiatives at this conference, the International Grain Agreement was established.
The International Grain Agreement (IGA) comprised two main elements: the 
Wheat Trade Convention and the Food Aid Convention. Despite many controversial 
arguments in implementing these agreements, both conventions were subject to some 
strong criticism, too extensive to be fully discussed here. The principle objection to the 
first Convention concerned its price range and its side effects. The minimum price 
indication was said to be too high because it was very close to the corresponding 
average export price of the past five years prior to the Convention.52 The other objection 
was that the high minimum price would benefit France by reducing the subsidy required 
to export French wheat surpluses, thus lightening the cost of CAP for grains.
Antagonists of the Wheat Trade Convention argued that US markets in the 
developing countries would be hurt by the minimum prices. The US stood to lose its 
commercial wheat markets. World wheat production could be stimulated by high 
minimums, and these would compete with the exports of traditional suppliers. It was 
also argued that higher prices would reduce commercial purchase capabilities of the 
poorer countries. The rejection of the IGA at the time by the Communist states, 
especially the ex Soviet Union, was another stumbling block.
The signatories to the second part of the IGA, that is the Food Aid Convention, 
committed themselves to supply certain amounts of wheat and other coarse grains, or 
the cash equivalent, to certain receivers. The industrialised countries depending on their 
economic or production capacity, allocated a certain amount of food aid to third world 
countries.53 Criticism was made of the selection criteria applied to determine aid 
recipients. If such decision were to be made by donor countries, geographic, colonial 
links and potential reciprocal benefits might overly influence by excluding some poor 
countries completely from such aids. Another question concerns the manner in which 
aid may affect other sectors of donors’ aid programmes or their existing commitments. 
One of the US authorities at the time nonetheless defended such mood stating that :
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....By diverting surpluses from the commercial market the program will help us maintain 
our access to the markets of importing countries and reduce the pressure on export 
markets. 54
This is a mere indication that such food aid is not free of economic or political 
ambitions by US as well as other industrial countries.
(3) The overall results of the Kennedy Round negotiations
It is important to realise that at the end of the Kennedy Round, 30% of the 
dutiable imports of the leading participants were left untouched by the latest tariff 
reductions, while almost one-third of the reductions on the remaining imports were less 
than the full 50%. Similar to those of earlier rounds, the principle equating the binding 
of a low tariff with the substantial reduction of a high tariff had failed to survive intact 
in the realities of tariff bargaining.
In this situation, in the course Kennedy Round, the across-the-board principle 
was seriously compromised.55 On the other hand, the GATT Director-General at the 
time, Mr. Wyndham White, suggested that future tariff negotiations could usefully take 
the form of attempts to achieve global free trade in specific industries.56 The main 
question at the time was whether this could be done in a single sector, since the 
elimination of all tariffs in a specific industry generally does not by itself satisfy the 
principle of reciprocity, and the members of the world trading community are supposed 
to demonstrate any disposition to de-emphasize that principle. At the same time, there 
were other ways to achieve reciprocity by linking two or three sectors together including 
agricultural commodities in a single ’package ’.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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II. THE TOKYO ROUND (1973-79)
To what extent did the Tokyo Round (TR) achieve anything new beyond the 
ground covered in previous negotiating rounds, mainly with respect to agricultural trade 
of particular interest to developing countries?
In examining the developing countries’ position and efforts for the possible 
evolution of agricultural trade regulations in the TR, it is not possible to reach a 
conclusion unless different elements of negotiations are carefully examined. A 
chronological review of the events regarding the developing countries’ participation and 
of their agricultural trade performance is also required.
A- TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATIONS
It was during the 28th session of the Contracting Parties in November 1972 that 
the Japanese delegation’s suggestion for holding a special meeting at ministerial level 
was accepted,57 Such a meeting was scheduled for the following year in Tokyo to set 
directions for the negotiations.58 This led to the collective US, EC, and Japanese call for 
the launch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.The US administration took 
the initiative for the preparation of this new round, aiming to deal with the important 
subject of non-tariff barriers. Some commentators believed that in this round American 
officials were more tolerant than in previous rounds towards negotiating agricultural 
trade issues.
The seventh GATT round was launched in September 1973 in Tokyo, by the 
Tokyo Declaration. This Ministerial Declaration set out a broader agenda and 
established more ambitious goals than any other multilateral trade negotiation in the 
GATT. The other distinctive feature of the TR, in the light of previous rounds, was the 
participation of non-GATT countries as well as contracting parties in the negotiations. 
The main objective of the Round was the elimination of most effective non-tariff
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barriers,59 but owing to the special nature and wide scope of such barriers, it was 
necessary to investigate to what extent the TR negotiations would succeed in eliminating 
such non-tariff barriers and achieve its initial goals.
B- THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE SITUATION A T  THE BEGINNING OF THE 
ROUND
The period after the Kennedy Round (1967 onwards) was a period of vacuum 
and confusion. The Round had left unfinished business, recognized as such in the 
adoption of the GATT Programme of Work in November 1967.60
During the Kennedy Round negotiations, there were some moves among develo­
ping countries to remove barriers to trade between themselves.61 The participation of 33 
countries in those negotiations proved to be a step towards liberalisation of trade in the 
third world countries.
(1) The publication of the Pearson Report on developing countries.
The ’Pearson Report’ of the Commission on International Development was 
published in 1969. The Report emphasised the significance of negotiations in the GATT 
system among developing countries, and recommended the conclusion of wide-ranging 
agreements extending to all developing countries. It also stressed that developing 
countries should devote as much effort to save their mutual trade, as to securing better 
access for their primary and agricultural products to industrialised country markets.
C- SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIESf INTERESTS.
More than any of the previous rounds, the TR was intended to consider the 
special needs of developing countries who demonstrated their interest by participating 
in the negotiations in large numbers. In comparison with earlier rounds, when only 20- 
30 developing countries participated, the total number of participants in the TR rose to 
100. The increase was attributable to greater participation by developing countries.
It should be noted that there were different reasons to explain why the number
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of developing countries had increased. One reason could be the realisation of the 
importance of GATT in the international trade arena, and the growing independence of 
a number of developing countries from previous colonial rule and the participation of 
these countries in free market economy systems.
It is clear that the mere increase in number of participants could not by itself 
induce an improvement in the quality of the negotiations nor a swift change of 
industrialised countries attitude towards developing countries. Participation in the system 
could not mean that any participant would get its equitable share in the prevailing 
system. It can be guessed that what the developing countries hoped for was an increase 
in the number of participants with common problems and goals, on one hand, and their 
effective participation in the decision-making machinery of multilateral trade 
negotiations, on the other, leading to more favourable treatment for trade in products 
of interest to them, namely agricultural commodities.
Lastly, there may be certain criteria for assessing the negative or positive results 
of such a participation. The main criteria concern a positive increase in the overall 
volume of the participants’ trade. By participating in the system, developing countries 
should have more free access to other markets. And, lastly, they could face less non- 
tariff barriers in their trade deals, especially in competitive industrialised countries’ 
markets.
D- M INISTERIAL DECLARATION GUIDELINES
The TR presented an opportunity to review and improve the working of some 
of the fundamental provisions of the GATT. ’The Tokyo Declaration of GATT Ministers' ,62 
adopted at an early stage, became the basic constitutional document for Multinational 
Trade Negotiations (MTN), calling for ’ ’the expansion and ever greater liberalization of 
world trade” and to ’ ’ achieve benefits for the international trade of developing countries.” Six 
relevant subject areas where on the negotiation agenda.
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1)- negotiations on tariffs, 2)- reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, 3)- 
reduction or elimination of barriers to trade in selected sectors, 4)- the adequacy of the 
multilateral safeguard system 5)-agnculture, and 6>tropical products. The declaration 
also provided for the establishment of a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) to 
’elaborate and put into effect detailed trade negotiation plans and to establish the 
negotiating procedures, ’ and to ’supervise the progress o f  the negotiations ’63
The other noteworthy step was that the industrialised countries did not expect strict 
reciprocity from the developing countries and that the least developed countries received 
special attention regarding their economic situation.64
E- THE M AIN  ELEMENTS OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
The leading question for developing countries was whether the negotiations 
would deal effectively with their international trade problems, especially regarding trade 
in agricultural products.65 In this respect a preparatory committee chaired by the 
Director General of the GATT, was set up to formulate the ministerial meeting.66 The 
committee was not able to resolve the extent of special and differential treatment to be 
accorded to developing countries; the question was left for discussion in the ministerial 
meeting in September 1973.
The technique which was used in the first stage of the preparatory committee 
was the collection of basic documentation and information to facilitate and to find a 
solution to agricultural trade problems. The products that count as most prominent in 
international agricultural trade were the subject of attention in the early stage of 
negotiations. Eight-sub groups were formed for cereals, dairy products, meat, vegetable 
oil & oilseeds, fruit, vegetables, wine and raw tobacco. Later the work was extended 
to all other agricultural products.67
The next task was to concentrate on measures which affect imports and exports 
such as tariffs, variable levies, centralized trading & quantitative restrictions; and 
measures that affect production. The negotiations led to a broad spectrum of suggestions
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as to how the principal problems in agricultural trade might be dealt with. These 
included a wide range of topics that led to controversial discussions in negotiations, and 
also covered and influenced specific measures relating to production, exports and 
imports of the major trading countries.68 
(1) Agriculture groups in the Round
The Agriculture group in the TR was divided into three sub-groups in order to deal 
with cereals, meat and dairy products, as three important categories of products in the 
agricultural sector. The negotiations on these commodities were discussed under three 
headings :
i)- stabilisation of markets and prices; ii)- access to supplies and exports;
iii)- measures for developing countries.
One of the aims of the agricultural group was ’to seek mutually acceptable 
solutions to the problems peculiar to international trade in agricultural products. *9 The 
above issues were normally discussed as a starting point for policy attitudes in 
negotiations; but the assumption was that the negotiations themselves would be able to 
proceed only at the level of commodity details.70 Perhaps a successful outcome of the 
agricultural trade negotiations rested on the balance of solutions in agriculture and other 
negotiating fields. In order to reach a conclusion, it is possible to start the analysis of 
the main elements of the TR negotiations.71
F- TOKYO ROUND CODES OF CONDUCT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
Owing to the fact that in the TR there was no formal mechanism for drafting 
agreements, the progress achieved during the negotiations could be treated as having an 
ad hoc nature. This format of negotiations made it difficult to predict what sort of 
discussions would be on the agenda in order to prepare for an effective participation in 
the negotiations.
The formal documents which emerged from the TR were two protocols to the 
GATT dealing with tariff reductions, and nine ’codes’ some of which were referred to
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as ’agreements’72 and others as ’arrangements’.73 From a legal point of view, these 
agreements are not formally connected to the General Agreement and they were usually 
adopted to bring the results of the rounds within the GATT system. Six of the so-called 
codes that were initiated in the TR were more relevant to developing countries interests. 
They set the scene for more specific and detailed rules on subjects that had been 
covered by the General Agreement only in general terms. Considering that these codes 
provide some form of reference or special treatment for developing countries and even 
some of them directly include agricultural trade problems, it is important to examine 
them in more detail.
Since only a small number of developing countries became signatories to these 
codes, industrial countries were disappointed with the outcome. It is important to realise 
that the codes are in addition to an ’agreement on technical barriers to trade'’ whose 
scope of coverage includes both agricultural and industrial goods. Some codes with 
direct or indirect relevance to developing countries and their agricultural trade issues 
will be explained below as follows:
(1)- The Dumping Code:
The main aim of this code is to prevent contracting parties from selling their 
products in other markets at a price lower than those in the home market (the place of 
production). The code also defined the conditions under which an anti- dumping duty 
could legitimately be imposed by an importing nation. Article 13 of the code dis­
courages industrial countries from imposing anti-dumping duties on exports from 
developing countries.74
This can be regarded as special and favourable treatment for developing 
countries, enabling them to sell their industrial and agricultural processed products in 
industrial countries’ markets without facing anti-dumping duties. At the same time it 
must be realised that, owing to lower production costs and cheap labour in developing 
countries, they may be able to produce cheaper products in comparison with industrial 
countries. Hence, the question of dumping is among the controversial areas of North- 
South trade dealings.
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(2)- Code of Customs Valuation:
The Code instructed the GATT contracting parties to use as the primary 
valuation test for customs purposes the actual price paid or payable for goods. This was 
to prevent fraudulent invoices from being presented at the borders of developing 
countries. In addition, there is provision for technical assistance as to how to implement 
the code and to help these countries introduce greater flexibility to regulate their inter­
national trade systems. The main objectives of the Customs Valuation Code were:
to elaborate rules for the application of GATT provisions in order to ensure greater 
uniformity and certainty in their application, and to provide for a fair, uniform and 
neutral system for valuation of goods for customs purposes, precluding the use of 
arbitrary or fictitious customs values in conforming with commercial realities. 75
a- The Customs Valuation Code and its interest for developing countries.
Customs valuation deals with the method used for determining the value of 
imported goods for purposes of calculating duties.76 Despite existing standards, there 
was a considerable need for uniformity between states, since often customs valuation 
constituted an obstacle to imports,77 owing to the general lack of expertise and market 
intelligence among the developing countries. The acceptance and implementation of the 
Customs Valuation Agreement by these countries in the TR would mean, in some cases, 
the elimination of another form of restrictive practices that affect their trade with the 
outside world. From a practical point of view, it means that the practices followed by 
some countries to determine value on the basis of domestic prices in the exporting 
country or on the basis of domestic prices in the importing country, pose special 
problems to the developing countries’ agricultural trade.
The practice of levying duty on the basis of current domestic value in the 
exporting country operates particularly to the disadvantage of developing countries as, 
in many cases, there is no direct relationship between the prices prevailing on the 
domestic markets and the prices at which developing countries sell their goods on the
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global markets. Practices of including in their dutiable value those customs duties 
already paid on products of which the goods have been relieved by the exporting 
country, are also particularly disadvantageous to developing countries. In their case, the 
general level of customs duties is relatively higher than that in the industrial countries. 
The Agreement expressly eliminates the possibility of marking valuation adjustments 
for protective purposes in the case of imports from so-called low-price producers.
Furthermore, two distinctive provisions may be found in favour of developing 
countries. First, the flexibility in delay in the application of computed value method for 
a further period of three years. The second provision was concerns the technical 
assistance for developing countries with a view to helping them to set up new valuation 
systems based on the Agreement provisions. As a result, the industrial countries would 
furnish, on mutually agreed terms, technical assistance to developing countries that 
requested such a service from them.78
One of the main difficulties for developing countries is the lack of knowledge 
of different dimensions of international trade, as issues related to customs valuation are 
very complex to deal with. Technical assistance in this field would seem most valuable. 
If the contracting parties are seeking for greater uniformity in the area of customs 
valuation, they have no choice except to assist their weaker partners to regulate their 
customs valuation tests. At the same time, they should try not to confuse them with 
wide, complex and unnecessary customs regulations nor protect them against customs 
tricks that are in force in industrial countries borders such as fraudulent invoices.
(3)- Government procurement code:
A considerable market for imported goods involves the participation of govern­
mental corporative bodies. Sometimes governments impose restrictive conditions that 
restrain import competition. This may be in the form of preferences for local goods 
within certain price parameters (e.g. giving preference for local goods unless the
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imported goods are more than 15% cheaper). As state policies and local governments 
sometimes become restrictive towards the informal practices rather than written 
legislations. Article 111:8 of the GATT79 to some extent authorises the discrimination by 
governments in their procurement contracts.80 (i.e. it allows discrimination in purchase 
of grains for internal consumption.)The scope and ingredients of the code are related 
to governmental procurement from the domestic market and its impact on international 
competition. In order to safeguard their balance of payments position, the developing 
countries may invoke various exceptions from the code, embodied in Part III.81
The agreement on government procurement was also designed to secure greater 
international competition that accordingly results on more effective use of tax revenues 
and other public funds through the application of commercial considerations when 
governments procure for their own purpose. 82
It also contains provisions on special and differential treatment for developing 
countries, defined so that parties to the Agreement may properly take into account the 
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries, in particular the least- 
developed countries. Such an approach may safeguard their balance-of-payments 
position, and help the promotion or development of these countries economies through 
regional or global arrangements among themselves.83
In addition, compatible with the provisions of the Government Procurement 
Agreement, parties to it may undertake, in the preparation and application of laws, 
regulations and procedures affecting government procurement, to promote more 
quantities of imports from developing countries, bearing in mind the special problems 
of the least developed countries and those at low stages of economic development.
(4)- Import licensing code:
Import licensing requirements in some countries frequently involve time 
consuming, needlessly complicated and often expensive procedures. Generally it is
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possible to say these requirements are an annoyance to the local importers and foreign 
exporters in their trade exchanges. The agreement in this area was designed to minimise 
the use of import licensing procedures as an obstacle to trade. It provides certain guide­
lines, in order to simplify and harmonize the procedures available for importers to be 
able to obtain the required licences. The lack of such a system can be treated as an 
obstacle to international trade, especially in developing countries and can constitute 
another non-tariff barrier to trade.84
If a developing country, in its bilateral trade dealing, requires an import licence 
and if obtaining such a licence may drive that country to go to a lengthy process of 
obtaining that permission, the resulting situation may force the country to give up hope 
and stop the procedure because of bureaucracy involved. This causes disruption to the 
free flow of trade between countries, and consequently certain measure is taken in 
pursuance of provisions of the Agreement for simplification of licensing procedures and 
for making them more transparent. It should lead to a considerable reduction in the 
number of obstacles which these countries may face in their multilateral trade deals.
(5)- The standards code:
There are other technical barriers that are capable of interrupting the flow of 
international trade. They are easy to implement and difficult to deal with. The Agree­
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade or the Standards Code contained a number of 
provisions which aim to deal with the special problems facing developing and least 
developed countries in their trade relations.
Four common forms of such technical barriers are:)- health (sanitary and phyto- 
sanitary) regulations, 2)- safety regulations 3)- environmental regulations and 4)- the 
obligation of the members to provide national and nondiscriminatory treatment to 
imported products especially those of developing countries. Most of the provisions have 
been incorporated into the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, on the basis of 
the specific proposals made by developing countries.
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The Standards Code also contains a number of specific provisions proposed by
industrial countries. Among them Article 11 deals with technical assistance to other
parties and provides for advice on the preparation of technical regulations especially to
the developing countries. Similarly, sub Article 11.5 provides that:
parties shall, if requested, advise other parties, especially the developing countries, and 
shall grant them technical assistance on mutually agreed terms and conditions regarding 
the steps that should be taken by their producers, if they wish to take part in certification 
systems operated by governmental or non-governmental bodies within the territory of 
the party receiving the request.
In order to emphasise special and differential treatment for developing countries,
Article 12 contains such a requirement for ’special development, financial and trade
needs ’ and recognizes the fact that :
developing countries should not be expected to use international standards as a basis 
for their technical regulations or standards, including test methods, which are not 
appropriate to their development, financial and trade needs.
Furthermore, assurance was given to LDCs by international standards bodies that 
they will consider preparing standards on products of special interest to their economies. 
Upon the request of particular LDCs, the provisions of Article 12.8a, the complete 
waiver of obligations under the code, was granted for a limited time period. It is 
possible to conclude that as in the case of other codes, the developing countries were 
exempted from certain obligations clashing with their development, financial and trade 
needs.85 Thus, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade contains provisions to deal 
with special problems that developing countries confront in their overall trade perform­
ance. It should be noted that most of these provisions have been incorporated in the 
Agreement on the basis of particular proposals made by developing countries.86 This is 
a clear indication that developing countries were playing a more effective role in the TR 
negotiations in comparison with previous rounds.
The legislation implementing the Standards Code was more complex, but 
achieved essentially the same result. The Code requires national governments to ensure
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that technical standards do not operate in certain specified ways creating unjustified 
barriers to trade.87 Furthermore, in the case of federal states such as the US, the Code 
makes national governments responsible for the activity of local governments and 
nongovernmental bodies, through a provision using the same words of GATT Article 
XXIV: 12, requiring national governments to comply with the obligations of the Code.88
(6)- Subsidies Code :
In April 1979 the Subsidies Code was concluded to guarantee that, on the one 
hand governmental internal subsidies do not act as a distorting element in international 
trade, and on the other, countervailing measures by importing countries do not 
unjustifiably frustrate international trade. Export subsidies are numerous; but an 
exemplifying list for them was added in an Annex to the Code,89 concerning: 
exemptions, remissions (negligent), deferral (suspension) of direct taxes (income taxes) 
or social welfare taxes (e.g.social security) on exported goods (as examples of the 
subsidies code).90
In addition to achieving the general aims of ’the Agreement on interpretation 
and application o f Articles VI, XVI and XXIII o f  the GATT’ called 'Code on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Duties ’, the developing countries had two particular objectives in mind 
for the negotiations:
1)- to ensure that the importance of subsidies, including export subsidies, in their in­
dustrial and development programmes was fully recognized;
2)- to avail of an adequate liberty to undertake that such a subsidy performance could 
be maintained; and to ensure that special and more favourable treatment would also be 
achieved in respect of the conditions under which the Committee of Signatories may 
authorize the application of counter-measures against their exports of products 
subsidized at the production or export stage.
In application of countervailing duties the contracting parties are required to 
ensure that the imposition of countervailing duties is in harmony with the provisions of
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Article VI of GATT (i.e. includes a material injury test). The definition of material 
injury provides that the determination of injury should be based on the objective 
examination of two essential elements:
-the volume of subsidized imports and their effect on prices in the domestic market for
like products; and
-the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products 91 
It is possible to conclude that the Agreement on ’Interpretation and Application o f  
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, ’ acknowledges that export subsidies may cause injury. 
Furthermore, it recognizes that these are an integral part of the economic development 
processes of developing countries, and that governmental intervention in the economy, 
by using financial support measures, should not be considered as subsidization in 
developing countries. These countries are not subject to the commitment made by 
industrial countries, not to use export subsidies on industrial products.92 The Code on 
Subsidies and Countervailing duties however, inter alia, provides that developing 
countries should endeavour to enter into commitments to reduce or eliminate export 
subsidies when their use is inconsistent with their comparative and development needs.
G- SOM E OVERALL RESULTS OF THE TOKYO ROUND CODES
It is worth noting that the Agreement on subsidies and Countervailing Duties 
covered subsidies for both industrial and primary products including agricultural, 
fisheries and forestry products. The definition of the methods concerning export sub­
sidies on primary products, possibly providing the exporting country with more than an 
equitable share of world export trade, has been made more explicit in the Agreement.93
Dispute settlements arising from the implementation under the Code are handled 
under existing Articles XXII and XXIII procedures of the GATT. While the composi­
tion of the codes was a major step forward for solving many outstanding problems of 
developing countries , they did not deal with all their agricultural problems. For 
example, it was somewhat unclear whether agricultural commodities and bilateral export
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restraint agreements were included within the coverage of the agreement. The US 
position was that in the absence of any provision excluding agricultural products in 
particular codes such as Import Licensing Procedure, agricultural commodities are 
deemed to be included.94
The EC has, in principle, taken the position that agricultural products are not 
covered, some countries such as Switzerland have supported the US interpretation, but 
in practice even the EC has on occasion applied the provisions of the code to its 
agricultural products.95
H-HOW  DID THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BENEFIT FROM  THE  
OUTCOMES ?
The TR negotiations tried to tackle some real problems of developing countries 
and to accommodate particular provisions as solutions to subsidies and different 
measures of internal support. If subsidies are an integral part of the economic develop­
ment programmes of developing countries, government intervention in the economy 
through financial support measures should not, per se be considered as a kind of sub­
sidization for developing countries. They are not subject to the commitment made by 
industrial countries not to use export subsidies on industrial products, although they 
agree not to use such subsidies in ways which exert a serious influence on the trade of 
another signatory.
The agreement concerning developing countries in the TR, contains provisions 
for the extension of special and differential treatment to developing countries in cases 
of third market subsidization. In such cases, it has been proved that account should be 
taken of the trade and development needs of the developing country concerned, 
irrespective of whether it is responsible for displacing exports, or whether it is the 
country whose exports might be displaced in the third market. In the application of 
subsidies, developing countries retain, within a framework of international surveillance, 
a large measure of freedom to use both production and export subsidies.
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The creation of the codes of conduct marked an important stage in the history 
of GATT. They manifested the intention of the contracting parties to make the GATT 
more relevant to the existing international trade environment. But it is also possible to 
say that the existing regulation system of the GATT was not able to consider the 
extensive contemporary realities which developing countries were and are facing in their 
international trade relations.
In order to make the GATT rules more relevant to agricultural trade, the 
Contracting Parties acknowledged the need to further develop their co-operation in the 
agricultural sector and to establish an appropriate consultative framework for the 
negotiations.96
(1) Creating a multilateral agricultural framework for developing countries.
As with previous rounds, in the TR multilateral trade negotiations, there was a 
lack of a particular surveillance mechanism to monitor the application of the results of 
the negotiations relating to the agricultural sector. The main aim was to provide a forum 
for exchange of information, consultation and for dealing with problems in agricultural 
trade.97 It seems that most of the previous decisions were not implemented in practice 
and one of the assumptions is that the developing countries who were to be the real 
beneficiaries of these negotiations, were not able to enforce their rights and get benefit 
from the results of previous negotiations supposed to be in their favour.
There are many reasons for the lack of a monitoring device. One main reason 
is the deficiency of legal knowledge and expertise in dealing with cases which is a 
common phenomenon in many developing countries. The other reason was the lack of 
a strong surveillance mechanism, especially in the early years of the GATT. Lack of co­
ordination and joint action amongst the developing countries is another disadvantage. 
However, it should be noted that, contrary to the old pattern of participation, for the 
first time in the history of GATT negotiations, a large number of participants expressed 
their concern in a concrete form in respect of agricultural trade, pointing out that:
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the establishment of some fundamental understandings on the conduct of agricultural 
trade could provide a framework for avoiding continuing political and commercial 
confrontations in the highly sensitive sector and would lead to an improved level of 
international co-operation among participants. 98 
The exchanges of information and the establishment of an International
Agriculture Consultative Council were considered as useful and practical suggestions of 
the Agricultural Committee in the negotiations. The participants in the Committee also 
realised that a broad consensus and improved level of international co-operation in 
matters affecting agricultural policies and trade were both desirable and necessary. This 
common desire was reflected in the final text which recommended that the Contracting 
Parties: "further develop active co-operation in the agricultural sector within an appropriate con­
sultative framework."" Such an indication gives more weight to an active co-operation 
and more consultation among the participants in agricultural trade negotiations. The 
developing countries could be potential beneficiaries of such consultations which would 
help develop policy-making mechanisms in international trade negotiations, so as not 
to rely only on the good will of industrialised countries to assist them.
I- AGREEMENTS REGARDING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Agricultural agreements were numerous and negotiated largely to deal with many 
non-tariff aspects of international agricultural trade often resulting in serious barriers 
such as quotas.100 They were negotiated, both at bilateral and multilateral levels. Many 
aspects of non-tariff international agricultural trade, often the cause of serious barriers 
(such as quotas), were negotiated among the parties. The other important issue, of 
substantial importance during the negotiations, concerned the particular problems of 
developing countries. As discussed before, three sub-groups were established to deal 
mainly with cereals, meat and dairy products.
The TR created a good opportunity for negotiations on a number of multilateral 
and bilateral trade agreements.These are related to agricultural commodities and are of 
particular interest to developing countries. Owing to the wide coverage and relatively 
technical nature of agricultural trade arrangements, these will not be discussed in detail,
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but it would be worthwhile to examine the salient features of the relevant agreements 
on a sector by sector basis and their overall role in agricultural trade performances in 
the TR.101
(1) Cereals trade progress in negotiations.
Cereals occupied a major role in the negotiations. The cereals market holds a key 
position in agricultural trade, both because of the significance of wheat and rice as food 
crops in the world and because wheat and maize figure extensively in the diet of farm 
livestock in many countries. Considering the importance of the cereal trade, the EC has 
a special cereals regime and this has always been regarded as the cornerstone of the 
CAP, a position which gives it a special privilege. The US similarly follows the same 
pattern by having the highest distinctive approach to issues related to cereals. In spite 
of repeated struggles over other products such as poultry, cheese, tobacco and citrus 
fruits, the cereals market has always provided the main area of contention in the Euro- 
American confrontation in agricultural trade.
The high economic and political capacity of the main competitors in the cereals 
trade points to the scope and importance of cereals negotiations. The main competitors 
chose different approaches to reach their goals in the negotiations, for example the 
American position and policies towards the International Wheat Council (IWC) was a 
matter of concern for many participants. In this area issues involving the competition 
and market access opportunities in the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, 
in addition to the competition in other major grain markets in the world, mainly those 
of developing countries has always been among the controversial cases in GATT negoti­
ations. 102
In contrast, the developing countries have had a marginal role in the trade of 
cereals, with few exceptions, since their main concern has been to provide for the 
essential needs of their own populations. At the same time, owing to the insufficient use 
of equipments and application of new techniques, these countries are heavily dependent 
on natural elements such as water resources and rainfall, especially in the production
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of key cereals like wheat, barley and maize. In comparison, the industrial countries have 
developed their production capacity by using modern techniques and cultivating a higher 
percentage of farmlands. Many of the industrial countries have achieved surplus 
production and they have considered the developing countries as potential markets for 
their surplus cereal exports
(2) Meat products and their unstable import controls
Meat products too required special treatment in the TR negotiations. The lineup 
of country interests differed significantly in these products from that of the grain 
market. In meat products, the major trading problems arose from more or less 
unconventional import restrictions, usually of a quantitative nature resulting in con­
siderable uncertainty for exporters. For it, the US, and the EC along with Canada and 
Japan had a portion of the responsibility. Australia and New Zealand were alone among 
the developed countries with a strong interest in trade liberalisation in meats, while 
Argentina and a number of other developing countries waited on the sidelines.103
Many developing countries are either important producers and exporters or are 
heavily dependent on the imports of meat products. As such they were interested in the 
negotiations relating to meat products. Article III of the Agreement relates to 
information and market monitoring. This Article relaxes the rule relating to mandatory 
information and in that context, industrial and developing countries participants who 
were in a position to do so, ’shall consider sympathetically any request to them for  
technical assistance’. If the industrial countries are genuinely providing the developing 
countries with a permanent support on technical information in agricultural trade issues, 
it is a positive step in the right direction.
(3) Arrangement regarding bovine meats
The second arrangement related to bovine meats. Its main purpose was to 
promote the expansion, greater liberalization, stabilization and more co-operation in the 
international meat and livestock markets. This would evolve by progressive dismantling
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of barriers and restrictions to world trade in bovine meats and large animals. In 
accordance with this arrangement, the International Meat Council was set up,104 con­
sisting of all participants in the arrangement for further assistance in this field.
Similar to the previous agreement on dairy products, the Arrangement regarding 
bovine meat emphasised the importance of the process of consultation between 
participants when problems arise. The International Meat Council will function similarly 
to the International Dairy Council and is made up of representatives of all participant 
countries.105
In those years, there has been a tendency among developing countries to participate 
more actively in international meat markets; but the Argentinean lesson, being as one 
of the first victims of such participation, should be considered.106 There are some 
developing countries who have a potential capacity to produce meat with competitive 
prices in comparison with industrial producers, but their main task should be to develop 
self-sufficiency in these highly significant commodities.
In addition to some measures on special and differential treatment for developing 
countries, the access to information provided within the arrangement could serve as a 
basis for market analyses, thus assisting developing countries with their efforts in the 
development of production techniques, export facilities, marketing in meat sector. Such 
a measure could be an important procedure for assisting many developing countries.
(4) Dairy products
Overproduction of dairy products and the EC’s inability to move this onto the 
international markets on the one hand, and the US political will for liberalizing in some 
form its own import policies on the other, led to changes in this sector. The Community 
approach was to argue for commodity agreements covering butter and milk powder 
(which was subject to a gentlemen's agreement) with an international price range. The 
fact was that the introduction of any international agreement in this sector needed to 
impose discipline on domestic policies, and specifically on the EC, CAP. It would be 
an ambitious attempt to regulate what is probably the least satisfactory of the temperate-
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zone commodity markets.
It is important to note that the developing countries have no direct interests in
dairy negotiations. They more or less rely on their own limited resources; but in the
meantime some of them could be considered as potential markets for the modernised
mass dairy products from industrial countries. A useful assistance to developing
countries would be the use of new techniques in the production and processing of dairy
products. An example of these new techniques is the use of biological methods in the
production of milk and animal output.
a- International Dairy Arrangement107
The main objective of the International Dairy Agreement (IDA) was to expand and
liberalise world trade in dairy products under stable market situations, in order,
(a)to expand and liberalize world trade in dairy products; (b) to achieve greater stability 
in world trade; (c) to avoid surplus and shortages, under price fluctuations and, more 
generally, serious disturbances in world trade; (d) to improve international co-operation 
in these areas.
Owing to the highly competitive nature and unstable prices of dairy products 
especially in industrialized countries, any agreement in this area was considered of cruc­
ial importance for these countries.108 The scope of coverage of this arrangement related 
to fresh and preserved milk and cream, butter, cheese, curd, and casein. The IDA also 
established an International Dairy Council aiming for consultations, information 
gathering, and the probable extension of coverage to other dairy products. Consequently, 
the IDA initiated three protocols for fixing minimum export prices, to which adherence 
was to be on voluntary basis; the three were :
a)- the Protocol Regarding Certain Milk Powders, b)- the Protocol Regarding Milk Fat,
c)- the Protocol Regarding Certain Cheeses.
Developing countries have little general interest in dairy product trade since most 
are not able to fulfil their own internal market needs. Some of the industrial countries 
have emerged in recent decades as mass importers of dairy products.This area may be of
CHAPTER THREE SECTION II 159
particular importance to industrial countries; but they are always looking for potential 
markets in the developing world to dispose of their surpluses of dairy products.
(5) Bilateral agricultural agreem ents
The bilateral agreements dealing with agricultural commodities are quite 
substantial. In the present Section some of those dealing with non-tariff measures will 
be discussed. It is interesting to note that the US is a party to all the eighteen 
arrangements. In comparison, the EC is a party to only five of them, but both of them 
are principal players to these agreements.
The question is: why are these two trading blocs are always partners to these 
agreements? The answer lies in their dominant power, especially during the 1970’s, 
together with their international trade policies designed to secure sales of enormous 
exports with hardly any imports of agricultural commodities. The sheer number of these 
agreements, especially on the US side, is an indication that there should have been a 
change of US policy in comparison to earlier rounds. In order to come to a conclusion 
on this point, we need to draw our attention to the circumstances in which these 
agreements were negotiated and the underlying benefits of these agreements to the US 
economy and its prospective counterparts .
1 - Agreement between the US and EC on Cheeses. 109
2 - Agreement between the US and EC on Poultry. 110
3 - Agreement between the US and EC on Rice . 111
4 - Agreement between the US and EC concerning High Quality Beef.112
5 - Agreement between the US and EC on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef.113
6 - Agreement between the US and Switzerland on Cheeses.114
7 - Agreement between the US and Switzerland concerning trade on Beef.115
8 - Agreement between the US and Austria on Agricultural Products.116
9 - Agreement between the US and Finland Concerning Cheeses.117
10- Agreement between the US and Argentina on agricultural products. 118
11- Agreement between the US and Australia on agricultural products.119
12- Agreement between the US and Israel on tariffs and agricultural products.120
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13- Agreement between the US and Iceland on agricultural products.121
14- Agreement between the US and Portugal on cheeses and meats.122
15- Agreement between the US and Canada concerning cheeses.123
16- Agreement between the US and Norway concerning cheeses.124
17- Agreement between the US and Sweden on different cheeses.125
18- Agreement between the US and New Zealand on Industrial and agricultural products.126
Most of these agricultural trade agreements were negotiated between the US and 
other industrial countries, but a few with the third world side, although developing 
countries may not be immune to the consequences of such deals. In other words, in the 
absence of similar agreements, the US and other industrial countries have no choice 
except to buy or to exchange their demanded agricultural products from developing 
countries. For example under the last agreement above "agricultural products agreement 
between the US and New Zealand",127 US tariff concessions to New Zealand involved 
wool, lamb, beef, veal, butter and cheeses. In exchange New Zealand granted 
concessions on tobacco, rice, citrus products. If in the first place there was no agreement 
between US and New Zealand, it would allow developing countries to compete with 
both countries for selling their agricultural commodities.
(6) US agricultural agreem ents with le s s  deve loped  countries.
With less developed countries, the US concluded 28 bilateral agreements, 
particularly dealing with agricultural and raw materials. Principal concessions involved 
canned fruits, vegetables and cigar tobacco. Based on TR, MTN reductions, the average 
duty on agricultural commodities imports from LDCs was reduced to 2.6%. The 
concessions covered soya-bean products, tallow, fresh fruits and nuts, and poultry.128
It is possible to conclude that, although these bilateral exchange agreements to 
some extent reduced the average duties, they were mainly negotiated to secure the 
supply of commodities of interest to US industries and markets in exchange for getting 
rid of surpluses on less developing countries’ markets. In other words, these agreements
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could be considered as one way of dealing with developing countries, treating the 
industrial partners as different from developing countries.
J- THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN  THE ROUND.
Parallel to the TR negotiations, in May 1974, the Sixth Special Session of the 
UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration and Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The Declaration was 
an important step for dealing with the real problems of "developing countries which 
constitute 70 percent of the world production [but] account for only 30 percent of the worlds 
income",129 and called for a new order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdepen­
dence, common interest and co-operation among all the states "...which shall correct 
inequalities and reduce existing injustices".130 There were calls for increased access to 
markets of the developed countries for products of LDCs’, for negotiation of commodity 
agreements to stabilize prices of raw materials, for the establishment of a link between 
the prices of exports and imports of LDCs.
The UN attempts through UNCTAD in the course of the TR can be interpreted 
as reflecting a common goal and desire by the representatives of the international 
community to prescribe certain rules aiming to assist developing countries. In practice 
one could investigate to what extent these international identities have secured a 
proposed equitable share in the world economy for the third world countries.
K- REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN  THE TR.
One of the major events not to be ignored in relations between developed and 
developing countries parallel to the TR (1970s’), was the negotiation of the Lome’ I 
Convention between the EC and then 46131 developing ACP countries in Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific region.132 This Convention was not negotiated under the 
auspices of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations of GATT, but since on one hand the 
regional arrangement establishing the Convention could be subject to the provisions of
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Article XXIV of the General Agreement and both sides are considered as contracting 
parties to it,133 the consequences of tariff exchanges will directly effect the GATT rules.
In October 1975 there was another attempt in Bangkok by the developing 
countries on the basis of the 1970 experience, for the interchange of tariffs and non- 
tariff concessions or specific measures in favour of developing countries. The main aim 
was to enlarge the depth and type of concessions and extend product coverage. The 
Bangkok Agreement was signed by 7 countries: Bangladesh, India, Korea, Laos, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
In 1977 there was another agreement by five,134 mostly new industrialised 
countries in Asia (ASEAN), leading to a preferential trading arrangement. It included 
long term quantity contracts, preference in procurement by ASEAN government entities, 
extension of tariff preferences, and the liberalisation of non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
among the members on a preferential basis. Some important and basic commodities 
were covered by these preferential arrangements including, rice, crude oil and some 
industrial goods.135 Despite the considerable objections from industrial countries, 
especially the US to the overall trade performance of the ASEAN, and the raising of 
the graduation concept as against the New Industrial Countries,136 the ASEAN pact has 
become a live and prima facie evidence of the success of some new industrialised 
developing countries.
L- TANGIBLE RESULTS OF THE ROUND FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
Regarding the complex and diffuse results of negotiations,137 the developing 
countries expressed considerable dissatisfaction. This reaction deserves attention, since 
the special consideration of developing countries was one of the principal pillars of the 
Tokyo Declaration.
It is important to realise that in the TR negotiations, the GATT secretariat took 
a more active role in drafting some proposals on behalf of the developing countries and 
introduced them to the related negotiating groups. Among the proposals were those for
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the negotiating group on agriculture. This shows that the industrial countries have 
accepted that the secretariat and its officials may play a more active role as chairmen 
of groups and sub-groups in the negotiations and direct the course of negotiations in a 
more neutral environment.
In the course of TR, the GATT secretariat established a special ’Technical 
Assistance Unif for the consideration and promotion of agricultural trade performance 
of developing countries. It was based on four important study elements:138
(1) S tudies about individual countries
Studies are based on gathering available information from different countries, 
including those not in GATT and, through a process of clarification and explanation, 
making full and effective use of the supplied materials. The Technical Assistant Unit 
concentrated on a careful examination of a variety of available data such as: MFN duties 
and their binding status within GATT, existence of a levy, where applicable, status 
under the CAP, and quantitative restrictions, if any. Its main purpose was to reach more 
accurate practical decisions regarding developing countries.
It must be borne in mind that many organisations try to collect data regarding 
the present and past trade activities of different countries. Taking into account the time 
and expense for collecting and upgrading such data, unless there is an effective and
practical use of such information, it may not be rewarding to collect them.
(2) Tropical produ cts
Tropical products are of vital importance in the export earnings of many 
developing countries. The expectation of the Technical Assistance Unit was that there 
would be many requests for technical assistance in this area. Its aim was to continue 
extending assistance to developing countries or groups of tropical products producers 
in the preparation, revision or resubmission of their request lists of concessions, 
including the identification of tariff and non-tariff treatment applicable to individual
products and of trade flows in those products;
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(3) Other produ cts
There were other product areas of particular interest to developing countries, 
such as certain fruits and vegetables in fresh and processed form; fish and fishery 
products; hides and skins and various items in the leather goods sector; and certain 
wood products. The secretariat assembled data on these products in the form of 
background notes, covering developments in production, trade, import treatment and 
other relevant data which could be useful in the context of the negotiations. It covered 
many agricultural products of particular interest to developing countries.
(4) Implications o f tariff reductions for developing countries.
The developing countries searched for a clearer procedure for the implications 
of alternative tariff reductions suggested during negotiations. Since many international 
concessions in favour of developing countries may end up with the lack of an 
administrative mechanism for implementing them, it is important to follow a practical 
procedure to benefit from the deals, otherwise they end up having no tangible 
implication. There are different comments on the real effects of the TR on industrial and 
developing countries. Deardorff and Stern139 measured the overall effects of the TR 
tariff negotiations under GATT, including certain minor non-tariff agreements as 
follows:
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Table No. 6
The effects of the TR on trade and welfare of the major contracting parties.
Exports Changes in Welfare
$b . Imports $b. % of
All countries * 13.2 13.7 0.10
Industrialised countries 13.4 14.1 0.11
UK 1.2 1.2 0.18
France 1.5 1.5 0.05
Sweden 0.4 0.8 0.98
Japan 0.4 0.6 0.08
US 3.3 2.3 0.03
Developing countries -0.2 -0.3 0.00
Notes: * Based on economies as in 1976 - i .e. applying the changes to 1976 economies.
The changes in total exports and imports are not equal because certain countries 
are omitted from the analysis. The table clearly indicates that the TR negotiations 
brought to the developing countries negligible or negative achievements. It shows the 
major domination of the Round by industrial goods rather than by products of interest 
to developing countries. One major reason could be the general reductions in tariffs 
which reduce the advantages they reap from their tariff concessions, regarding 
agricultural trade goods, while the non-tariff barriers they face are not altered.140
M- CONCLUDING REMARKS TO THE CHAPTER
It is possible to point out that the techniques and procedures developed in the 
GATT negotiations must be considered in the light of its unique nature as an institution. 
This applies both to the origins and to the structure of the institution and to the 
questions that the GATT contracting parties address.
In the seven rounds of multilateral trade negotiations prior to the UR, there was
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only limited progress in achieving negotiated trade liberalisation between industrialised 
and developing countries. Throughout the period in question there has been ongoing 
debate over the issue of how developing countries should participate in the negotiations.
In the first Round the only achievement was an unsuccessful international wheat 
agreement. Some positive reforms issued from the second Round, but a proposal for a 
permanent board to review agricultural trade disputes, ’the international consultative 
council’ ’ was quashed. Even the Kennedy Round negotiations were not able to resolve 
most of the important problems in the agricultural sector.
It was, however, for the first time that agricultural issues were introduced as part 
of the agenda. Even though the GATT was modified in 1965 to add a special part 
dealing with developing countries, in order to accommodate their needs, these debates 
did little to contribute to resolving their problems. The complex issue of non-tariff 
barriers was addressed during the Kennedy Round, but largely without success. The 
1969 Antidumping Code141 was one of the significant result in the area of non-tariff 
barriers.This did not give any particular benefit to developing countries, but probably 
acted as a barrier to the cheap imports of agricultural commodities from developing 
countries.
The other important factor was that the Kennedy Round deals was largely con­
ducted among industrially developed countries with similar economic structures. It 
resulted in a significant liberalisation of trade among these countries. The tariff 
reductions focused mainly on industrial goods as products of interest to industrial 
countries, rather than on agricultural produce that are the dominant source of export 
earnings for developing countries.142
One of the major moves from the developing countries’ side in the Kennedy 
round was the resolution put forward by 21 developing countries calling for what 
became known as the ’Action Programme’. It consisted of the following seven major 
elements:
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1)- a call for standstill provisions to prevent new tariffs and other barriers against 
exports by developing countries, 2)- elimination of remaining quantitative restrictions 
by industrialised countries within one year,143 3)- duty-free entry for tropical products 
to be achieved by December 31, 1963, 4)- elimination of tariffs on primary products 
5)- reduction and elimination of tariffs on export of semi-processed and processed 
products from developing countries by at least 50% over three years, 6)- a progressive 
reduction of internal taxes and duties on products wholly or mainly produced in 
developing countries, 7)- an annual report to ensure implementation of the Action 
Programme.144
The developing countries tried to practise their rights regarding the waiver under 
Article XXV (5) of the GATT.145 In this respect, India, Egypt and Yugoslavia concluded 
an agreement involving preferential tariff concessions; which was approved under the 
GATT system,146 but owing to political reasons, that agreement made no express 
reference to Article XXV (5) of the GATT.
Consequently under the same waiver, 16 developing countries concluded a protocol 
in 1971, extending tariff concessions to one another on certain listed items. The 
industrial countries and developing countries outside the protocol were not able to 
benefit from these concessions. Later the number of participants rose to 18 countries.147
It is possible to say that despite the predominant position of agricultural trade 
problems in the Kennedy Round negotiations, the results were insignificant compared 
with the objectives that were set on the agenda of the Round. In comparison, in the TR 
negotiations, a significant enlargement of agricultural markets was an essential 
requirement of agricultural exporters. To achieve such an objective, the TR participants 
had a strong political commitment to negotiate and achieve results on agriculture.
In this respect, some more specific factors distinguish the TR from its 
predecessors. The involvement of new issues made the negotiating task more complex. 
It led to the integration of agricultural trade into the set of principles which govern
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international commercial relations among the signatory countries of the GATT.
It is possible to conclude that the success of the TR MTN was among the most 
successful steps in the history of GATT, especially in the drafting of codes of conduct 
in non-tariff trade barriers, but they were mainly directed towards the industrial 
countries. The recognition and substantial reduction within the new area of non-tariff 
measures were considered as one of the success of the Round. The codes too, "have 
proven to be largely effective, at least in dealing with the trade problems prevalent at the time 
they were adopted. ",48
The developing countries made tariff cutting commitments in the form of tariff 
bindings or reduction on $3.9 billion of their imports. It was as a result of intensive 
pressures from some industrialised nations that developing countries were forced to 
reduce their own tariffs. This effort has been promoted by the IMF and the World Bank 
which have used their policy based loans to encourage such trade liberalisation.149 It 
must be borne in mind that the use of such methods by industrial countries to force 
developing countries to cut their tariffs may bring liberalization to trade, but who is 
going to pay the cost? Lowering the tariffs and consequent fall of home products may 
lead to a decline in production and growth of unemployment in the third world.
A large number of states, particularly those with a substantially smaller share of 
world trade participated in the TR. One of the criteria with which it is possible to 
evaluate the TR is to determine to what extent the agreements which were negotiated 
further in the course of the TR, rationalize international trade legislation. It may be that 
in spite of substantive gains, they contribute to more complexity, confusion, and 
incoherence in the obligations of the states in international trade.
On this point some serious questions can be raised about the agreements that 
resulted from the TR MTN. Additionally, it must be emphasized that the new 
substantive obligations undertaken by parties under these agreements might not be the 
focus of concern, but rather the relationship of these agreements to existing framework 
of international trade legislation, particularly, the rules of the GATT itself were
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important.
Generally speaking, at the end of TR, developing countries expressed their 
displeasure at the way in which they had been left on the periphery of negotiations. 
They issued a statement saying they had not been consulted on the "framework of 
understanding ".150
On the other hand the TR took some positive steps towards the better understan­
ding of the real problems of developing countries, and certain prominent decisions were 
directed toward them. The extent to which these changes were implemented and what 
the real contribution of these decisions will be in terms of prosperity and the 
advancement of international trade in developing countries is a subject deserving more 
investigation in the future.
Some positive results of the TR negotiations in favour of developing countries 
could be summarised as :
a)- The reduction of import duties and other trade barriers by industrial countries 
on tropical products imported from developing countries. This was considered to be the 
first concrete result of the TR. Industrialised countries may possibly claim such moves 
as a sacrifice of their interests in the TR. The fact is that tropical commodities do not 
bear any threat or competition to the industrialised markets; as a result, they do not 
deserve to be the subject of solid protectionist measures in industrial markets.
b)- Differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation 
of developing countries. The preferential treatment of and between developing countries 
was recognised as a permanent legal feature of the world trading system. It came under 
an ’enabling clause' which includes the provision of a permanent legal basis for the 
extension of the GSP by industrialised countries to developing countries.151 Although 
it was not the first time that a GSP was granted to certain beneficiaries, as in previous 
rounds they were authorized as a temporary waiver of GATT obligations.
c)- The other important step was giving "greater flexibility to developing countries 
in applying trade measures aimed at meeting their essential development needs"}52
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CHAPTER FOUR
AN ANALYSIS OF TIIE PERSPECTIVES OF TIIE DEVELOPING 
AND INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES IN THE GATT SYSTEM.
t h e  t i m e s . Lo n d o n
How cartoonist Lurie in The Times, London, saw  the is s u e s  facing the GATT ministerial meeting the 
day after it began, on 25 November 1982.
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In troduction
As James Bovard1 quoted, 
when politicians call for fair trade with for­
eigners, they almost always hypocritically use 
a concept of fairness that makes a mockery of 
the word’s normal usage. In exchanges 
between individuals-and in contract law- the 
test for fairness is the voluntary consent of 
each party to the bargain: "the free will which 
constitutes fair exchanges,"
Before analysing the final round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, it is 
necessary to have a full analysis of the existing GATT agricultural trade regime in 
respect of two distinctive groups of beneficiaries, namely industrial and developing 
countries. Such an approach seems necessary in order to find the root of the problems 
existing in international agricultural trading relations. Some of these issues have been 
identified in the earlier parts of this thesis in relation to; 1)- the examination of the 
international trade institutions in Chapter one, 2)- the investigation of the agricultural 
trade provisions in Chapter two and 3)- the review of the task of the seven multilateral 
trade negotiations on the evolution of agricultural trade in Chapter three. In order to 
have a comprehensive approach, some repetition of certain issues is inevitable, although 
the approach taken in this Chapter is analytical.2
This Chapter deals with two categories of policies i.e. those of industrial and 
developing countries. Its aim is to address certain issues such as: a)- the effectiveness 
of the policies of the two groups in generating a more liberal and fairer global trading 
system, b)- the effectiveness of the GATT rules and preferential provisions for the 
economic well being of developing countries, c)- whether these provisions really fulfil 
the objectives and principles laid down in the GATT system, d)- whether the developing 
countries have been able to benefit from existing legal provisions or whether there are
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still vital obstacles to be tackled, such as lack of legal and administrative expertise. One 
of the main tasks of the chapter is to compare the two essential trading perspectives in 
two separate sections seeking a proper solution for agricultural trade policies affecting 
developing countries.
Section one concentrates on the perspective of developing countries in the GATT 
system. Since many developing countries lack both a proper and effective policy-making 
machinery as well as efficiency in their administrative and legal systems, the question 
is how they may learn from successful industrial countries to improve their trading 
performance. Can existing programmes of developed countries be recommended as 
practical models for the agricultural trade performance of developing countries?
When raising such questions developing countries should realise the difficulties 
of employing industrial countries trading patterns for tackling their existing problems. 
This is mainly because of their different economic structures so that implementing 
industrial countries trading patterns is not always commendable.
In section two, after examining the common characteristics of industrial 
countries’ agricultural trade policies and their effects on developing countries, different 
elements of the three leading industrialised countries policies towards the developing 
countries are examined. Particular attention is also given to the possible or negative 
aspects of the existing trading patterns regulating trade between industrial and third 
world countries.
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I. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ PERSPECTIVE IN THE GATT
The main aim of this Section is to focus on the perspective of developing 
countries in the GATT. It seeks to have a clear picture of the role of these countries in 
the system by examining the provisions relating to agricultural trade and the effects of 
previous and current application of GATT regulations in their trade performance and 
welfare situation.
The Section is divided into eight sub-sections. The first one focuses on the 
question of ’special and differential treatment ’ for developing countries in the GATT. 
What does ’special and differential treatment’ mean and, more importantly, what is its 
significance for the various negotiating GATT groups? The second and third sub- section 
deals with two important articles relating to development objectives in the GATT Article 
XVIII and Article XXIV. The Harberler Report and two important Committees related 
to it are discussed in the fourth sub-section. The Pearson Report on agricultural trade 
issues is explained in the fifth sub-section. These reports were followed by two other 
reports in 1985, ’Leutwiler Report’ and 1987 ’Cable Report’ that will be explained 
briefly.The inclusion of Part IV to the GATT, its outcomes and the effects of GSP on 
developing countries are the subjects of sub sections six and seven and the last sub­
section examines the clash of industrial and developing countries interests in the system.
More generally this section examines the significance of the provisions that were 
designed to assist the trade performance of the developing countries in the past. The 
credibility of the GATT as a fair trading mechanism particularly towards the developing 
countries will be explored.
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A- THE NEED FOR SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT.
A key question has always been why developing countries need special and 
differential treatment.This refers to various rights and privileges given to developing 
countries contracting parties to the GATT, but not simultaneously extended to industrial 
countries. Such treatment involves two different criteria. First, the recipients of such 
treatment have, as developing countries, relatively more freedom to protect domestic 
markets than industrial countries. Second, preferential terms of access to industrial 
countries markets are only granted to developing countries.3 
(1) The main articles and provisions dealing with differential treatment.
Developing countries are given special treatment under different articles and 
provisions of the GATT that may be divided into five different categories: Articles 
XVIII (governmental assistance to economic development), Article XXVIII:bis(3), Part 
IV, and the 1979 Framework Agreement known as the Enabling Clause, and the General 
System of Trade Preferences (GSP).
As stated before (in chapter three) the Tokyo Round had recognised "the 
importance of the application of differential measures to developing countries in ways 
which will provide special and more favourable treatment for them in areas of 
negotiation where this is feasible and appropriate"4
B- ARTICLE XVIII AND ITS REFERENCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
It is important to define the terms ’developed’ and ’developing’ countries, since 
they are sometimes used as if these were inherently distinct and homogeneous groups. 
In practice, of course, there are many common characteristics to distinguish one group 
from the other but, at the same time, there is within each group a great deal of diversity 
in trade interests and levels of economic development. Such a definition seems vital to 
distinguish who are eligible subjects of special treatment by industrial countries.
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The other main question is whether the notion of development is self selective 
for the countries, or are there internationally recognised criteria for this purpose. It seems 
that each international organisation has provided a list of developing countries in the 
light of its own criteria.5
Neither in the GATT nor in its relevant context is there any definition of a 
’developing country’. In the absence of such clarification, the system functions according 
to the principle of self-designation: developing countries are those which designate 
themselves as such.6 In addition each GATT contracting parties determines which of the 
countries that claim to be developing it wishes to include in its preference scheme. 
Behind the question of definition of the term ’developing countries' lies the question of 
who should give aid to whom. The mandate given to the Committee on Trade and 
Development of the GATT includes the task of considering any question which may 
arise as to eligibility of a member country to be considered a developing country.7 
(1) The definition o f developing countries
In the 1955 GATT Review Session, Article XVIII was amended in order to make 
the GATT more attractive to developing countries. In its new version, entitled ’Gover­
nment Assistance to Economic Development ’, it endows contracting parties, "the economy 
of which can only support low standards of living and [are] in the early stages of development"8 
with extended preferential rights and privileges, on the basis of which these countries 
"shall be free to deviate temporarily from the provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement, 
as provided in Section A, B and C of this Article.
Article XVIII-A, allows developing countries to re-negotiate binding tariffs in 
order to promote the establishment of a particular industry. A developing country using 
this provision is expected to offer compensation or face retaliation. Article XVIII-B is 
in fact the balance-of-payments escape clause for developing countries. Section B of the
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Article gives developing countries the more desirable right to use quantitative restrictions
in a process for overcoming their balance of payments problems.9
Article XVIII-C permits a developing country to apply quantitative import
restrictions for infant industries or production structures. It should be realised that there
is some similarity between sections A and C of Article XVIII regarding the payment of
compensation or retaliation in the absence of a negotiated agreement. It seems that the
Article reflected the pre-dominance of the import substitution approach to economic
development and has not been particularly helpful to developing countries. According
to Dam it has rarely been invoked, even after its revision in 1955.10
An interpretative note is annexed to the agreement to explain, with respect to the
formula 'Low standards o f living and in the early stages o f  development’, as follows:
1 .When they consider whether the economy of a contracting party "can only support low 
standards of living", the Contracting Parties shall take into consideration the normal 
positional circumstances such as those which may result from the temporary existence 
of exceptionally favourable conditions for the staple export product or products of such 
contracting party.
2.The phrase ’in the early stage of development’ is not meant to apply only to 
contracting parties which have just started their economic development, but also to 
contracting parties the economies of which are undergoing a process of industrialization 
to correct an excessive dependence on primary production.
It is not clear if this clarification implies that the phrase coincides with, or is 
broader than, what elsewhere in the GATT is referred to as 'less-developed' and what 
in later GATT practice is referred to as ’developing’ contracting parties.11
Regarding those developing countries that are involved in ’undergoing a process 
o f industrialization ’ or, as they are called, new industrialized countries such as ASEAN, 
some industrial countries such as the US, have objected that they have graduated12 from 
the early development stages and are no longer entitled to developing countries status. 
This is different from the above mentioned GATT criteria.
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It is not the subject of the present thesis to examine these characteristics in more 
detail; but regarding developing countries’ dependence on agricultural trade, it is possible 
to indicate that in almost all the developing countries, over half of the working people 
are engaged in agriculture and in many of them at least 75% of the population are 
engaged in agricultural activities.13 Agriculture is so dominant in their economy and day- 
to-day life that any progress in their economies is dependent on rural development. Id 
developed countries (LDCs) were initially defined in 1971 by the UN General Assembly 
by using three distinctive criteria; a per capita GNP of $100 or less; a 10% or less share 
of manufacturing in the GNP; and a literacy rate of 20% or less.14 There are other 
definitions and criteria in other organisation that are not the subject of the present thesis. 
C- ARTICLE XXIV, CUSTOMS UNIONS AND FREE TRADE AREAS
Regional and other trading arrangements are the main concern of Article XXIV. 
Such arrangements, in which a group of countries agree to abolish barriers to imports 
between themselves, have been established in many parts of the world. In Article XXIV, 
GATT recognises the value of closer integration of national economies through freer 
trade. It therefore permits such groupings as an exception to the general MFN treatment, 
provided that certain criteria are met. The main purpose is to ensure thereby that such 
arrangements facilitate trade among the participating countries without raising barriers 
to trade with other non-participants.
It is understood that such regional arrangements are a step towards economic 
development for most developing countries as the main bulk of the GATT contracting 
parties. They are considered as possible instruments for more co-operation and 
liberalisation of world trade.
In practice industrialised countries benefited from these opportunities by having 
the upper hand in negotiating these arrangements. In the industrial world the US and EC
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have the biggest share of bilateral and regional arrangements with other countries, among 
them: "Group Seven" as one of the most powerful trading pacts having regular 
negotiating sessions for joint action,15 but the conformity of it under Article XXIV is 
ambiguous since it does not have the characteristics of a regional arrangement.The major 
arrangements could be categorise as: i)- the European Economic Area (EEA), in force 
since January 1994, ii)- the Lome (I-IV) Conventions between the EC and ACP 
countries, iii)- the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) between the US, Canada 
and Mexico, that is one of the biggest free trade areas in the world based on a broader 
initiative, ’Enterprise for the Americas' which envisages a trade-promoting agreement 
extending across the whole of the American hemisphere.16 and iv)- America’s free-trade 
deal with Israel.17 These are recognisable examples of joint regional arrangements that 
perhaps industrial countries deriving benefits from them.18 There are many regional 
groupings among developing countries themselves as follows;
v)- recently the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)19, vi)- the Andean Pact 
countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, viii)- the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) comprising Costa Rica, El-Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
ix)- the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA, comprising Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the Andean Pact members), x)- the Caribbean 
Common Market (CARICOM) comprising 12 countries in that area.
From the legal point of view, regional groupings under Article XXIV may have 
two different forms: they may vary from full integration, including the creation of a 
customs union, or free trade areas, but in both cases, duties and other barriers to trade 
between countries in the group are expected to be eliminated ultimately; but they all 
embrace the principle of MFN treatment as regards to third parties.These regional 
groupings have a particular impact on their bilateral relations with the outside world.
In a free trade area, each member state maintains its individual commercial
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policy, including its tariffs, towards non-members. In both cases, duties or other
regulations applied by the customs union, or individually by the members of a free-trade
area, are required to be no more restrictive towards non-members than those which were
applied before the establishment of the group.
It may be concluded that if the unconditional MFN principle is a basis for the
equal treatment of all participants in the GATT system, Article XXIV constitutes an
exception to it. Furthermore, as stipulated in paragraph 4 of Article XXIV, GATT even
encourages the formation of such customs unions and free trade areas:
...the contracting parties recognise the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the 
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the 
economies of the countries parties to such agreements.20
American policy makers such as Claire Wilcox, the Director of the Department
of State Office of International Policy, have explained how the US refusal to accept new
preferential arrangements while encouraging customs unions had economic reasons:
A custom[s] union creates a wider trading area, removes obstacles to competition, 
makes possible a more economic allocation of resources, and thus operates to increase 
production and planes of living.
Making a comparison between a customs union or preferential approach she stated:
A preferential system, on the other hand, retains internal barriers, obstructs economy in 
production, and restrains the growth of income and demand. It is set up for the purpose 
of conferring a privilege on producers within the system and imposing a handicap on 
external competitors.
In summary, according to Wilcox, it is possible to say, a customs union is 
favourable to the expansion of trade on a basis of multilateralism and non-discrimi­
nation; a preferential system is not.21 In practice, in order to be in conformity with 
GATT standards a customs union must, however, meet both internal and external criteria 
which set them as ’legal’ free areas apart from "illegal" trade preferences. 22
Thus, it may be concluded that customs unions are able to have a framework for
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removing the barriers and obstacles from agricultural trade. One of the main reasons for 
this is because of the special nature of agricultural products. Partners to a regional trade 
arrangement are able to exchange agricultural commodities more easily with neighbour­
ing countries than sending them over far distances. This advantage is recognised in the 
EC trading context as short distance agricultural trade advantage or ’proximity’. In other 
words the trading partners in a regional treaty are able to exchange their agricultural 
commodities more easily and at a lower cost within a shorter time scale. In a nutshell 
it is possible to conclude that agricultural trade derives more advantages from a regional 
rather than international framework.
(1) How may developing countries gain in regional arrangements?
The main question for developing countries is the effectiveness of regional 
treaties or groupings for the promotion of their economies, especially in the agricultural 
sector. Regional trading in the past, to some extent, benefited the developing countries 
since it is easier to have trade arrangements across the borders rather than transport 
arrangements for long distance international transactions. This idea is also recognised by 
the EC under a special term called ’proximity’ that prefers trade links between EC and 
North African and Mediterranean countries in comparison to other trading regions.23
The other advantage of regional trade is that the traditional food diet of peoples who 
are living in the same area is compatible,24 as it is based on the consumption of local or 
continental products. This implies that consumers in different climates and continents 
require their own traditional foods and other local products, rather than using non- 
traditional food diets. As it was explained in the first chapter of the thesis, from a 
geographical point of view, it will be easier to exchange their commodities with a 
shorter period of delivery from the production line to the consumption point. This is
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very helpful in the case of perishable agricultural produce; transport costs are much
cheaper especially for bulky food commodities and vegetables. The similarity of 
standards and less effective sanitary and phyto-sanitary barriers among the developing 
countries is another advantage of regional trade pacts.
In regional trade, there are less border crossings and application of different 
transit taxes and administrative problems, whereas in other international transactions, the 
merchandise may pass different territories or borders, facing more transshipment, and 
many barriers such as tariffs, health and safety certificates requirements, and particularly 
multi-modal transport systems. Perhaps some may argue that modern air transport 
systems are also useful for developing countries, since it will give them the same 
advantages as developed countries have, to transport their products to long destinations. 
Although this is true, it is very costly and not within the means of many developing 
countries. A combination of elements facilitates modem transnational trade. The 
developing countries should hence apply a mixture of all the available facilities in their 
means in order to have better gains both in regional and international arena.
D- ’HABERLER REPORT’ AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The first signs of consideration of developing countries interests came as a result 
of the decision of the twelfth session of the GATT Contracting Parties (1957). It was 
agreed to establish a panel of experts to examine trends in international trade, with 
effective consideration of agricultural protectionism, fluctuations and failure of export 
earnings to keep pace with import demand in developing countries. These were identified 
as worrying features of the international trading environment. It is hence important to 
examine how the relevant objectives of GATT emerged and what the status of the real 
problems of developing countries in the system were.
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The Haberler Report introduced a radical change in the status of the less 
developing countries in the GATT. It supported the view then current among the primary 
producing countries that existing rules and policies were relatively unfavourable to their 
economic interests. As a result the potential benefits of their participation in the GATT 
were limited.25
The Report also criticised the policies of both industrial and developing countries, 
particularly industrialised countries. It was observed that, owing to differences of 
demand between industrial goods and primary products, the developing countries who 
liberalised imports of industrial goods would experience a greater flow of imports on 
manufactured goods, in comparison to the case that industrial countries open their 
borders to low quality primary products from developing countries.The reason is mainly 
because of high demand and the novelty of many industrial goods in developing 
countries markets. In contrast, if developing countries export any processed or 
manufactured goods, they are not generally able to compete with high quality imports 
from industrial countries. On the other hand agricultural commodities in industrial 
countries that are subject to internal and external protection have already satisfied the 
industrial countries internal demands and eventually reduce the need for imports from 
developing countries.
The Report findings led to a number of procedural decisions by the Contracting 
Parties aimed at making the GATT rules more effective for dealing with agricultural 
products. One of the other crucial decisions was to begin regular ’consultations' with 
principal importing countries concerning the application of protective measures in favour 
of their domestic agricultural products. The report pointed to the result of the GATTs’ 
secretariat data collection of 1965, in relation to the use of the same restrictive m- 
easures. The report indicated that more than twenty industrial contracting parties
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admitted the use of quantitative restrictions. Among them, 10 countries operated state 
trading monopolies; four imposed variable levies on some imports;26 at least four, 
including the US, supported prices of some products at predetermined levels; and one, 
the UK, made wide use of deficiency payments.27
(1) Committee II and agricultural trade issues
As stated in chapter three of the thesis, Committee II was one of the three 
committees established as a result of the ’Haberler Report’ to deal mainly with 
agricultural trade issues. Its main mandate was;
a)- to assemble, in consultation with other organizations such as FAO, data regarding the 
use of non-tariff measures for the protection of the developing countries national 
agricultural products or in support of incomes of agricultural producers, and the 
agricultural policies from which these measures derive, b)- to examine the effects of the 
above measures on international trade in agricultural products,
c)- to suggest procedures for further consultations between all Contracting Parties on 
agricultural trade policies that eventually affect international trade.
As the result of fundamental differences of opinion between the Committee 
members over the nature of GATT some disputes arose,28 but the Committee concluded 
that there should be a moderation of industrial countries attitudes for reducing the 
protective measures agricultural trade.29 At the same time the Committee criticised the 
change of attitude from price support to income support that had almost the same effects. 
A fundamental change in the nature of price support schemes in national agricultural 
products also was recommended. It was further recognised that the price-setting exercise, 
common at the time, should take account of the need to increase consumption and to 
ensure that it should not encourage more production in industrial countries.
The Committee further realised that there was a disruption in the balance of
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rights and obligations each contracting party expected from GATT, by indicating that:
These developments are of such a character that either they have weakened or 
threatened to weaken the operation of the General Agreement as an instrument for the 
promotion of mutually advantageous trade. This situation raises the question as to the 
extent to which the GATT is an effective instrument for the promotion of such trade.30 
On the base of Committee II suggestions in 1967, a work programme agreed to
establish another Agricultural Committee whose principal mandate was to examine the
problems of agricultural trade and to consider effective solutions for them.31 But the
findings of that Committee did not lead to a fundamental shift of the industrial countries
position towards consideration of agricultural trade problems of developing countries.32
(2) COMMITTEE III AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
The principle mandate given to Committee III was:
to consider and report to the Contracting Parties on other measures for the expansion 
of trade, with particular reference to the importance of the maintenance and expansion 
of export earnings of the less developed countries [for] the development and 
diversification of their economies. 33 
Committee III succeeded in identifying the real problems of developing countries,
by establishing a working programme with an agenda that included the trade interests
of developing countries and the barriers facing their trade performance. The Committee
also examined the obstacles to the expansion of trade in primary and agricultural
products.34
During 1960-61 the Committee further concentrated on the problems facing 
developing countries who were exporters of certain products. It dealt with the question 
of a speedy removal of export quantitative restrictions35 affecting developing countries 
exports and the elimination of any element of discrimination against their exports as the 
result of import restrictions. The Committee emphasised tariff reduction and the need 
to recognise the non-applicability of the reciprocity principle to developing countries.
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In 1961 the Contracting Parties adopted a Declaration on the promotion of trade 
of less-developed countries.36 The Declaration urged contracting parties to avoid the use 
of production and export subsidies on primary products involving prejudice to the export 
interests of developing countries. Moreover, Committee III established special working 
groups to deal with trade in tropical products and a ’Action Programme',31 that paved 
the way for a fuller participation of developing countries in the GATT system.38
(3) The main results of the Haberler Report, Committee II and III.
The Haberler report considered excluding the agricultural sector from the 
GATT’s agenda, since many industrial countries were not able to cut their protectionist 
measures in this sector. It also recommended the allocation of funds for buffer stock 
action in developing countries.
It is possible to conclude that the publication of the Harberler Report on trends 
in international trade was one of the first attempts to realise the developing countries’ 
crucial situation, and to criticise the industrial countries policies in the early years of the 
GATT operation. It also realised the major gap between the industrial and developing 
countries in terms of unequal bargaining position and economic and political skills. 
These Committees represent an historical watermark with a declaration of intent by 
industrial countries in favour of developing countries.39 They may be considered as 
turning points in GATT relations with developing countries. It was the GATT’s turn to 
consider and respond to the Reports’ findings.
Although the suggestions of Committee III were neglected from the outset, they 
could be perceived as a first courageous step in identifying the nature of agricultural 
trade problems of developing countries during the early days of the GATT operation. 
Later the Committee recalled that in the three years of its existence, it had made an 
extensive study of various types of barriers to the trade of less-developed countries. On
CHAPTER FOUR SECTION I 1 9 5
the findings of Committee III, a general policy Declaration was provided as a basis for 
positive action in two stages:
a)- that immediate steps should be taken to establish specific programmes for action and, 
where feasible, target terminal dates, for progressive reduction and elimination of 
barriers to the exports of less-developed countries; in this connection it was necessary 
to pay attention to the question of duty-free entry for tropical products, and, b)- the 
contracting parties were obliged to improve market opportunities for the exports of less- 
developed countries. 40
The GATT response was the establishment of three committees in the November 
1958 session to lay down the foundation for a Co-ordinated Programme of Action 
directed towards the expansion of international trade in agricultural products and 
consideration of developing countries interests. Later the recommendation of Committee 
II lead to the creation of a Programme of Action for consideration of developing 
countries agricultural trade interests in the GATT system.41
E- THE PEARSON REPORT AND MOVES TOWARDS THE UNDERSTANDING 
OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE PROBLEMS.
The ’Pearson Report’ of the Commission on International Development, 
published in 1969, emphasised the significance of negotiations in the GATT system 
among developing countries, and recommended the conclusion of wide-ranging agree­
ments extending to all developing countries. Subsequently in 1970, there was an increase 
in negotiations among developing countries themselves, with the effective participation 
of sixteen developing countries in the system.42
These trends at the beginning of the Tokyo Round can be treated as a clear in­
dication that these countries were no longer mere observers or endorsers of the industrial
CHAPTER FOUR SECTION I 1 9 6
countries’ decisions in the negotiations. In the meantime, these developing countries 
realised that agreements among themselves in the framework of the GATT would 
facilitate the circulation of agricultural commodities on a more regional level. It was the 
result of such effective participation that 300 consultations took place within the 
framework of GATT, leading to the conclusion of more than fifty bilateral agreements 
among developing countries. Subsequently these agreements were made multilateral 
among the sixteen participating countries.
The industrial countries were exempted from these agreements known as 
Protocols Relating to Trade Negotiations Among Developing Countries. Despite the 
disagreement of the American administration who considered these concessions as a 
waiver of the GATT rules, the exchanges of concessions among developing countries 
was one of their successful attempts to develop bilateral trade or so called South-South 
trade relations.
The objection of the American negotiators had no legal grounds, because the 
conclusion of such bilateral agreements amongst the developing countries was based on 
the exemptions from obligations under the MFN principle. Article XXIV of the GATT 
recognises the creation of custom unions, regional arrangements and free trade areas 
among the contracting parties. Moreover Article XXV(5) of the GATT allows the 
developing countries to exchange preferences with each other in any products of interest, 
without granting similar preferences to the industrial countries.
In addition to this progress, during the preparations for launching the Tokyo 
Round in 1972, the GATT secretariat realised that technical assistance is an essential 
need for almost all developing countries to help them participate more actively in the 
negotiations. The Technical Assistance Unit was established in 1974 within the 
secretariat to help third world countries. This was a major step towards the full 
participation of developing countries.
The specific indication in the Pearson Report for encouraging developing
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countries to negotiate bilateral agreements among themselves is of particular importance 
and is in conformity with the GATT rules and articles relating to developing countries. 
Bilateral agreements could also lead to more regional arrangements among developing 
countries.
F-THE 9LEUTW ILER9 AND 9CABLE9 REPORTS AND DEVELOPING  
COUNTRIES.
The ’Leutwiler report ’ was completed by seven eminent persons following the 
invitation of the GATT Director General in 1983 to report as an independent group on 
the problems facing the international trading system. It was called ’ Trade Policies for  
a Better Future Although it was not particularly directed towards developing countries, 
its findings are of value in recognising the nature of agricultural trade problems. Among 
other things the Leutwiler Report recommended that Voluntary Export Restraints and 
Orderly Marketing Arrangements, practised at the time by industrial countries should be 
brought into the conformity with GATT rules; in addition to the textiles and clothing 
arrangements. The Report further states that the special treatment that developing 
countries have received so far under the GATT system is of limited value.43 One of the 
major findings of the Report was that in the course of ten years between 1963-73 there 
was a sharp decline in the labour force and substantial shift from agriculture to industry 
and service sectors especially in the industrial world. Three regions were taken into 
account, North America, Japan and Western Europe, with three sectors under 
consideration.
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TABLE NO. 7
The shift of jobs in industrial countries from agriculture to other sectors between 1963-73
(millions of jobs)
Sector North America Japan Western Europe
Agriculture -1.5 - 4.9 - 8.8
Industry + 4.9 + 5.0 + 1.7
Services + 15.7 + 6.5 + 11.5
Source , OECD, cited in GATT, Trade Policies for Better Future, Proposal for action 44
Table 7 clearly shows that three major industrial blocks have lost 14.5 million 
jobs in the farm sector, but in return they gained more than 45 million alternative new 
jobs in other sectors. In developing countries where there were no alternative jobs, they 
could not cope with such enormous job losses in the agricultural sector. This led to mass 
emigration in the last three decades and the building up of thousands of new cities in the 
third world with over a million inhabitants creating a demand for food coming from 
industrial countries.45
Later in 1978 the ’Cable Report’, launched under GATT auspices, noted 
disillusionment of developing countries with the negotiations in the Geneva Round. 
Among the many recommendations, the Report notes the importance of foreign 
investment regulations in LDC’s which hamper growth of manufactured exports. It also 
argues that middle income and industrialized LDC’s should look at reducing protection 
of their own markets in return for improved access to industrial markets for their 
agricultural commodities and find ways of diversifying to manufactured exports.
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G- THE EFFECTS OF THE INCLUSION OF PART IV  OF THE GATT ON  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
Part IV clearly sets a number of criteria to assist least developed and developing 
countries. For example Article XXXVI(2) calls for a "rapid and sustained expansion o f  
the export earnings o f the less -developed contracting parties". Article XXXVI(6) is the 
base for monetary co-operation in the area of trade and development in the GATT. It 
emphasises the importance of international lending agencies for contributing to the 
economic development of these countries. Article XXXVI(8) states that industrial 
countries do not expect reciprocity46 for commitments made by them in trade 
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed 
contracting parties.
Article XXXVII lists a number of commitments by industrial countries to assist 
third world countries. For example Article XXXVII(l)(a) requests industrial countries 
to accord high priority to the reduction and elimination of barriers to those products that 
are currently or potentially of particular export interest to less-developed contracting 
parties. Article XXXVIII calls for joint action of all contracting parties to proceed with 
development objectives as well as appropriate collaboration in the matter of trade and 
development policy with the UN and its agencies including UNCTAD. 47 
H-THE ADAPTATION OF ENABLING CLAUSE (WAIVER CLAUSE) FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
As Dam notes, the legal recognition of development needs as such is of great 
synbolic significance in the GATT system whereas in terms of concrete rights and 
obligations little or nothing has been gained by them.48
Ii other words the recognition of development needs in itself is an important principle, 
bit in practice the developing countries have not been able to make any substantial
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gains. The decision on ’Differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and
fuller participation o f developing countries ’ commonly known as the Enabling Clause,
was adopted at the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979. It was considered to be a clever
compromise. Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties 
may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without 
according such treatment to other contracting parties
Paragraph 2 limits the application of this exception to four different occasions:
1)- tariff preferences in accordance with GSP;
2)-non-tariff measures within the framework of "instruments multilaterally negotiated under 
the auspices of the GATT."
3)- tariff and, under certain conditions, non-tariff preferences granted to one another by 
developing countries (an alternative to Article XXIV GATT) and; 4)- special treatment 
of the least developed among the developing countries.
It should be realised that under paragraph 1 and 4 developing countries not 
GATT members also benefit from differential treatment. In paragraph 3, three conditions 
are laid down for treatment under the Enabling Clause; differential treatment:
(a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote trade of developing countries and not 
raise barriers or to create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties;
(b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other 
restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis; (c) shall ... be designed and, if 
necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs 
of developing countries.
The first two conditions safeguard traditional GATT principles particularly in the 
interest of industrial countries; (b) is particularly problematic, because it must be 
accepted as a consequence that the value of preferences is reduced by general tariff 
reductions. The last condition was included to assist developing countries and give them 
a better chance to cope with their trade difficulties.
(1) Outcome of negotiations regarding the Enabling Clause
The Enabling Clause allows GATT Contracting Parties to provide differential
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treatment in favour of developing countries in respect of the above conditions. It requires 
that any action is intended to facilitate and promote trade and to respond positively to 
developing countries’ development, financial and trade needs. Arrangements providing 
for differential treatment must not prevent the further reduction of trade barriers on a 
MFN basis, nor create obstacles to the trade of countries not parties to the arrange­
ments.49
Although the Enabling Clause gives a permanent legal authorization for prefer­
ences, it does not really offer any legal certainty for the receivers as developing 
countries, since many of them like GSP, are temporary. One of the best examples of this 
practice is when the EC or the US unilaterally decide on certain criteria such as: the 
category of developing countries included in their preferential schemes, on the products 
involved and on the application of tariff quotas.
7- GSP AND IT S  EFFECT ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE
The main reason for considering this section is to evaluate the economic advantages 
sought by the developing countries and the trade barriers resulting from various 
limitations contained in the regulations governing preferential treatment. It is possible 
to investigate whether the system has brought any meaningful trade benefits to the 
developing countries.
The subject will be dealt with in different dimensions. The first one is the origins 
and the political problems surrounding trade preferences. One of the main focuses here 
is the achievements of developing countries in the GSP. The industrial countries’ gains 
from them will be dealt in the next section .
The GSP was formally introduced at UNCTAD, in its first session in Geneva in 
1964. The main goal of the Conference was to establish a new international trade policy 
that would contribute to raising the material wealth of the developing countries through
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trade rather than aid. The GSP is one of the original initiatives in the field of interna­
tional trade policy aimed at stimulating economic development by introducing preferen­
tial treatment in favour of the developing countries.
It is important to note that the rapidly evolving nature of the international trading 
system has affected the prospective advantages embodied in the preferential system. One 
of the new developments has been the establishment of the EC as an important trading 
block and the revisions in trading arrangements with numerous developing countries.
In 1986 a negotiating committee was set up in Brasilia to investigate the im­
plementation of a Global System of Trade Preferences among developing countries. 
Consequently the Ministerial Declaration agreed to launch the first round of GSTP 
negotiations before September 1987. The negotiations followed in 1988 with 
participation of 62 developing countries at ministerial level in Belgrade to adopt a 
practical agreement on the GSTP. At present it is a trading arrangement under which 
members of the G-77 will exchange trade concessions among themselves.50 This is one 
of the successful attempts by developing countries in their global trade relations that its 
scope of coverage goes even beyond the boundaries of the GATT system, and allows 
other developing countries to participate in the scheme.
(1) How does the system help developing countries’ agricultural trade 
performance ?
Some experts51 believe that, in principle, the GSP is intended for the industrial 
export of developing countries, not for agricultural exports.52 Thus developing countries 
could possess actual or comparative potential advantages, but they should take into 
account all dimensions of the issue. The margin of preferences could be large, in 
keeping with the level of MFN protection if it also is high. In practice it is in this area
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where preferences could be effective, but in many instances they are limited by 
voluntary export restrictions,53 tariff quotas and ceilings.54 For example in textiles, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey have been able to expand their share of EC imports of 
textiles dramatically in the last decade, while less preferred countries in Asia, falling 
under the MFA have seen a decline in their market share in industrialized countries.55
The same picture emerges in agricultural products: imports falling under the CAP 
do not receive preferential treatment or enjoy only limited preferences56.
It is possible to conclude that the measures dealing with the developing countries’ 
interests and their development needs basically rotate around two cardinal principles in 
the GATT system: the principle of reciprocity in relation to developing countries, 
replaced by the principle of non-reciprocity. In other words the operation of the MFN 
principle is suspended in favour of the principle of ’Differential and Favourable 
Treatment’ for the developing countries.
The critics of GSP refer to the arbitrary nature of the system. There may be good 
reasons for such a claim; for example in the US, the Congress has been especially fond 
of granting the President unreviewable powers to withdraw GSP or to retaliate against 
foreign governments not living up to their obligations toward the US. Thus, for example, 
the law implementing the GSP allows the President complete discretion to withdraw 
preferences, including discriminatory withdrawals against a particular developing 
country.57 The other weakness of GSP is the temporary nature of it, since the industrial 
countries may grant GSP for a certain period of time, but an early withdrawal of such 
preferences could damage the development plans of developing countries that have 
balanced their trade policies with the GSP.
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J- WHAT SHOULD BE  DONE TO SECURE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INTER­
ESTS ?
In the light of the foregoing it is possible to argue that the interests of developing 
countries can be taken into account in a number of ways. In sectoral terms, the in­
dustrialised countries could undertake significant trade liberalisation in the areas of 
greatest interest to developing countries such as: agriculture, textiles and tropical 
products. Agreement could be facilitated by provisions for their progressive adjustment 
to trade liberalisation, such as technical assistance to domestic industry and national 
administrations in applying appropriate liberalisation strategies.
Among the developing countries, the newly industrialized countries (NICs) 
supposed they had more to gain from a stronger GATT system, because it would help 
them to protect access to industrial countries markets on which their growing prosperity 
has been largely based. NICs could contribute substantially toward agricultural trade 
reforms, both by participating in the negotiations and by liberalization of barriers to their 
markets (including textiles and agriculture). In particular, the NICs could have 
undertaken two specific reforms to help dispel any charge that they are 'free riders'.
The first would link reforms on safeguards by industrial countries (including 
gray-area measures)58 with reform of balance of payments safeguard rules used by 
developing countries (the Article XVII-XIX issue). The second would be textile 
liberalization by the developing countries, which would complement the broader reform 
of the existing quota system by the industrial countries, and participation by some NIC’s 
such as Korea, in the agricultural trade reforms.
The developing countries also tried to practice their rights regarding the waiver 
under GATT Article XXV(5). In this respect, India, Egypt and Yugoslavia concluded
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an agreement involving preferential tariff concessions between themselves, although it
was approved under the GATT system,59 but owing to political reasons that agreement 
made no express reference to Article XXV(5) of the GATT. Subsequently, under the 
same waiver, 16 developing countries concluded a protocol in 1971 extending tariff 
concessions to one another on certain listed items. The industrial and developing 
countries outside the protocol were not able to benefit from these concessions. Later the 
number of participants rose to 18 countries.60
K-THE CAIRNS GROUP: A N  AVENUE FOR CO-OPERATION OF
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTERS.
The Cairns Group is a coalition of 14 agricultural producing industrial and 
developing countries. The objective of this coalition is to achieve fully liberalised trade61 
in agriculture by eliminating distortive agricultural policies and by binding the necessary 
undertakings under strengthened GATT rules and disciplines.The Cairns approach for 
creating a single grouping between industrial and developing countries who share the 
same interests in agricultural exports is of particular importance. It was originally 
developed to press for the inclusion of agriculture on the UR agenda.
The Group argued for reform in the Uruguay Round on three important areas, 
domestic support, market access and export competition.62 What is important is their 
emphasis on the collective approach of the two groups of nations with different 
economic, political and social backgrounds. Having similar goals in agricultural trade 
encourage them to set aside their differences and to co-operate on common 
interests.Countries who are exporters of agricultural commodities are able to join this 
group or try to arrange similar regional agricultural trade arrangements with interested 
parties.
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L- HOW MAY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES POLICIES CLASH WITH IN­
DUSTRIAL COUNTRIES ?
The industrial countries, monitoring developing countries’ agricultural policies, 
have on a number of occasions objected to developing countries taking protectionist 
measures in favour of their farming populations. One of the most recent cases has been 
the Philippines new 'Act providing a Magna Carta for Small Farmers' implemented in 
February 1993. The US complained that the legislation specifically prohibited imports 
of agricultural products that are produced locally ’in sufficient quantity’, including 
poultry and poultry products, pork and pork products and com and other feed grains. 
The US believed that 'those restrictions were having a negative impact on USA 
producers, and expressed concern that they might be extended to imports o f  processed 
potato, as well' 63
The US argued that applying such measures is contrary to the Philippines 
commitments to trade liberalization.In response, the Philippines explained that the 
'Magna Carta' was a comprehensive piece of legislation designed to relieve the 
condition of its small farmers. It also indicated that part of the legislation concerning 
trade measures was not a step backward but represented only 'a pause' in its structural 
reform programme. The Philippine officials argued that recent trade developments had 
led their government to conclude that it could not continue to pursue trade liberalization 
at the expense of the interests of its farmers. It is interesting that the EC made the same 
complaint echoing the US concern and described the measures as inconsistent with the 
GATT and Uruguay Round’s 'standstill' commitment against new trade restrictions.64
This case was a prime example of the difficulties of developing countries in the 
GATT. Perhaps the Philippines legislation was the last resort to help its farmers, but 
under the standstill commitment any new measure was unacceptable and the Philippines
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were not only prohibited from applying any protection to their farming population but 
were also obliged to open their market to products from industrial countries. It shows 
how market intelligence helps the US to determine that the Philippines practice "might 
be extended to imports o f processed potato as well",65 which serve against US access to 
Philippine markets.In such a situation it is worth noting the vulnerability of developing 
countries.
II. THE PERSPECTIVE OF INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES IN THE GATT 
TOWARDS AGRICULTURAL TRADE PERFORMANCE OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES.
The first section covered the perspective of developing countries in the GATT. 
This section elaborates the perspective of industrial groups in the system and involves 
a critical analysis of the policies of three leading industrial countries, namely the EC, 
US and Japan66 as practical examples of policies towards developing countries and their 
influence in shaping the rules and mutual relations with developing countries. Although 
there are many similarities within these countries’ policies and attitudes towards the third 
world, they have, nonetheless, different preoccupations.
In the examination of agricultural trade policies of these major industrial states 
or groups, particular attention is given to those policies affecting developing countries. 
For example it looks at the protectionist measures and their related elements such as 
tariffs and non-tariff measures, health and sanitary regulations, affect agricultural trade 
performance of developing countries.
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The impact of interventionist decision-making policies of industrial countries on 
the third world is also queried, as is the non-applicability of agricultural trade policies 
o f industrial countries in developing countries, bearing in mind the degree of divergence 
in the policies of the industrial groups themselves. Systemic difficulties arise from the 
protectionist nature of industrial countries’ policies and measures.
Some have criticized the industrial countries’ policies as routinely trying to find 
escape routes for discharging their commitments towards other participants, mainly 
developing countries. An example is the raising of non-tariff barriers against cheap 
imports from developing countries. Another criticism is that industrial nations are not 
serious in choosing GATT as a suitable instrument for liberalising agricultural trade. 
GATT’s ability to open up agricultural trade was undermined from the start when certain 
explicit allowances for more liberal agricultural trade practices were written into its 
rules, including the use of quantitative import restrictions and exports subsidies.
A - THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES’ AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
POLICIES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
Developing countries need to assist their farming populations but, unlike in in­
dustrialised countries, such assistance does not normally generate structural surpluses. 
Accordingly, developing countries’ assistance to the agricultural sector can and should 
be exempted from production limits commitments in so far as it does not lead to 
disruptions of the market.
In order to analyze different dimensions of the industrial countries’ policies, the 
following aspects are dealt with below:
a)- the share of agriculture in industrial countries’ economy and the relationship between 
agriculture and development; b)- the need for change of attitudes in industrial and 
developing countries; and c)- the potential importance of developing countries markets.
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(1) The importance of agriculture in industrial countries’ economy.
In comparison with developing countries whose agricultural trade occupies a 
significant share of foreign export earnings, in developed market economies only New 
Zealand has an agricultural share of exports in the same range as that of developing 
countries.
In Europe the pattern of agriculture has changed more rapidly than almost any 
other economic sector. In 1986 some 15.2 million people were employed in agricultural 
activities in the Community of ten member states. This number has dropped to 5.2 
million, i.e. by almost two-thirds; even by enlargement, the twelve EC members have 
had an agricultural work-force of just over 10 million.67
In comparison, in OECD countries agriculture represents only 8% of total 
merchandise trade, contrasting with around 60% for New Zealand and 35% for Australia 
to more than 20 per cent for a number of European countries.68 These figures indicate 
that parallel to emphasis on and protection of the agricultural sector in industrial 
countries, the economies of developing countries are more dependent on agricultural 
trade.
Different levels of dependence on the agricultural sector correspond to application 
of different policy towards developing countries. Many of the developing countries, 
India in particular, have stressed the close connection between agriculture and the 
development process in their countries. In practice the industrial countries pay more 
attention to their agricultural sector than do developing countries.
(2) The need for change of attitudes in industrial countries towards 
developing countries.
Owing to the particular dependence of developing countries on agricultural trade, 
the GATT negotiations could be expected to pay specific attention to this by special
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reference to the dimension of agricultural development in their societies.
In recent years, the application of new techniques such as research innovations, 
the control of livestock disease, improved varieties of traditional crops, and development 
of non-traditional crops that are drought resistant or insensitive to water salinity, have 
led to the acceleration of farm production in many industrial countries. They are 
reflected in the mass production of certain products such as grain and dairy products in 
industrial countries. In comparison many developing countries faced a sharp decline in 
their agricultural output. They expect the GATT system to realise the need for a 
substantial change of industrial countries’ attitudes toward developing countries, by 
giving freer access to their markets with less non-tariff barriers.
The other area of concern relevant to developing countries is the reduction in the 
total output of some products that were subject to their traditional export to industrial 
countries. For example the export of meat by Argentina to the EC market was stopped 
after the EC achieved self sufficiency in that area. In response, the industrial countries 
also require developing countries to adjust their domestic and foreign trade policies in 
line with industrial markets. Examples for such changes of policies in recent years 
include India’s freer pricing and regional trade system and Argentina’s reduction of grain 
export taxes.69
(3) Developing countries markets a potential target for industrial countries
The developing countries are still the best markets for the sale of industrial 
countries surplus commodities, and have resulted in substantial profits. Uncertainty and 
dramatic change of policies in the third world also contribute to substantial gains by 
industrial countries. For example, Mellor and Johnston (1984)70 cite the case of Taiwan, 
where feed use of cereals rose from 1% to 60% of total use between 1961 and 1981. 
The key factor in grain import demand for some rapidly growing economies is the shift
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of attitude from food to feed use of commodities in order to fulfil the high demands for 
meat.
One of the most plausible reasons for more cereal imports, in addition to rising 
output per capita, is the decline of total national cereal production as a result of 
environmental changes, and non-profitable production of cereals by developing 
countries,71 and the increasing level of income from other sectors in these countries. For 
example, the report by Winrock International projected cereal imports of 152 million 
metric tons by Africa, Asia and Latin America in 1993.72
The increase of grain imports in the majority of developing countries could be 
the result of a general decline of national cereal production which can be caused by 
different elements such as climactic changes (global warming), lack of proper 
management and investment in the agricultural sector, and the urbanisation of developing 
countries.
B- US POLICIES TOWARDS THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Since the establishment of the GATT the US has tried to impose its own terms 
and conditions on the system. Despite resistance from the EC and a substantial number 
of developing countries the US succeeded in accommodating its terms to the system to 
some extent.
The US Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1955 has played a significant part in 
avoiding the GATT obligations, waived under GATT Article II (schedules of 
concessions) and Article XI (general elimination of quantitative restrictions). The US 
argue that these Articles are in conflict with actions required under Section 22 of the 
Act. The Section requires the US administration to impose quantitative restrictions and 
special duties on imports that are likely to damage US farm support programmes.73
For many year the US has been the world dominant power in agricultural
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exports. The earnings from grains and other agricultural commodities exports to the
developing world has been an important potential target for US grains export. Between
1970 and 1980 the value of US agricultural exports more than doubled in real terms,
with the real value of exports more than tripling. Owing to some interrelated events this
sharp rise dropped dramatically during the 1980s.Any agricultural trade liberalisation in
the GATT negotiations offers the potential for a sharp increase in US export of grains,
oilseeds, and beef to developing countries.74
a- US East Asia policies
Regarding the dominant power of the US administration in the developing
countries, such as East Asia, Ingersoll75 has indicated that:
US policy makers should recognize that fears of foreign economic domination on the part 
of the less developed nations of East Asia are legitimate, but at the same time they 
should strive to convince these nations to open their economies to the technology...that 
flows from foreign investment.
One may ask what is the acceptable price for such transfers of technology and 
foreign investment to these countries. The US administration acts in the belief of having 
a vital interest in building stronger ties with the third pillar of the world economy, the 
Asia and Pacific region. The US gains more from the exports to this area rather than 
encouraging the countries to rely on their own domestic market. In this respect Ingersoll 
suggests that free trade under GATT is the best instrument for all countries of East Asia 
and emphasises that such an approach safeguards the economic independence of these 
nations. He also urges the US to offer them a choice between GATT and tough bilateral 
agreements that restrict their exports to the US, if necessary, through so-called voluntary 
restraint agreements.
The US has preferred to manage its relations with East Asia on a bilateral basis 
and there has recently been a flurry of new proposals and initiatives. But some regional 
initiatives remain relatively weak.76
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b-The US and Central American developing countries
US economic relations with Latin American states are of particular importance, 
since their exports to the US grew faster than other region during the 1980s. The US is 
currently the most important market for the region, absorbing almost 40% of their 
exports. The US also supplies about one-third of Latin American imports. There are 
distinctive characteristics for each country, for example, more than two-thirds of 
Mexico’s total trade is with the US, while the proportion is about one-fifth for Chile, 
Paraguay and Uruguay.
Central American countries established four regional arrangements, Andean Pact, 
Central American Common Market (CACM), the Caribbean Common Market 
(CARICOM) and the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). These regional 
groupings have a particular impact on their bilateral relations with the USA. In economic 
terms, agricultural product imports from Latin American countries to the US are 14 
percent in comparison with fuel (25%) and manufactured goods (55%), but the 
importance of Latin America as a trading partner for the US has declined over the past 
decade, largely as a result of the overall economic slow down in the region and inability 
to finance imports.77
In addition most imports originating from developing countries, including all of 
those from Latin America, are eligible for preferential treatment under the US GSP 
scheme. A number of other preferential schemes have also been introduced by the US 
for individual developing countries or groups of countries in the region. These include 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Andean Initiative.78 The scope of these preferential 
agreements remains limited by many restrictions.
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c) -Relations with other nations
The US-Mexico Free-Trade Agreement was established as a comprehensive free- 
trade agreement on the basis of the greatest possible mutual benefit entailing the gradual 
elimination of all trade barriers, adequate protection for improving and expanding the 
flow of goods, services and investment between the two countries.79
These policies including the US and Canada Free Trade Agreement (not a subject 
of this section) are part of the overall US bilateral and regional approaches towards the 
outside world. Many of them fall under the Article XXIV umbrella, but in practice they 
are under US domination and far from GATT objectives.
The EC, Japan and especially the US have strong interests that are, according to 
their terms, more compatible with a liberal multilateral framework.80
The US is responsible for the first highly visible breach of the agricultural trade 
provisions of the GATT as early as 1951, in the Dairy Quotas case.81 Such violations of 
GATT rules have opened the door for other strong parties to violate the rules involving 
long term uncertainties for all the contracting parties.
Since the consequences of US bilateral actions are enormous, and the slow 
procedures of the GATT could not tackle them easily, such policies have been the main 
source of disunity in the GATT. For example, according to a report (from October 1985 
to September 1987) that was considered by the GATT Council in 1990, most of the 
contracting parties had wanted the working party to recommend that the US should 
undertake a review of the waiver in order to set a realistic timetable for its termination, 
but the US disagreed and declared that Section 22 was needed because of the lack of 
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines in international farm trade.
The EC has also contended that the US waiver had created an imbalance of rights 
and obligations in the GATT while several other delegations expressed concern about
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the lack of progress in removing the 35 year old waiver. This means that the GATT 
system lacks a practical mechanism for forcing its rules on the contracting parties, 
especially industrial powers such as the US.
In addition to waivers, the application of protectionist measures have affected 
imports of agricultural products into the US, particularly in livestock and meat, (e.g. 
through measures for foot and mouth disease control) fruits and vegetables.82 The US 
has provided preferences to eligible Caribbean countries e.g.on sugar, under the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act.
It must be realised that many of the potential customers of the US are less 
developed countries whose purchasing power is constrained by insufficient foreign- 
exchange earnings and spreading debt-service obligations. Many of them do not have 
sufficient negotiating power to argue with the US in the terms of bilateral and multi­
lateral trade.
C- THE ROLE OF THE EC COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY TOWARDS 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In examining the industrial countries perspectives in the GATT, one of the most 
important models dealing with trade in agricultural products is the EC Common 
Agricultural Policy that acts as a general policy-making machinery for harmonisation of 
individual national agricultural policies. On the other hand the overall impact of the EC 
and its Common Agricultural Policy on global agricultural trade, and has its own 
significance. Table Eight represents a clear picture of the legal decision making process 
of the EC under CAP, although there are some changes to this procedures as the result 
of the recent EC legislations.
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Since the mechanisms establishing the CAP have been extensively described 
elsewhere it is not the purpose of this thesis to repeat those works.83 However, there are 
two important aspects of CAP which should be explained. First, use of import levies and 
export subsidies serve to isolate domestic producers from the effects of external 
competition by nullifying price competition. The second is the application of GSP to 
some 300 agricultural products but, due to the selective and arbitrary nature in the 
application of the scheme, in practice preferences are often limited to price or 
quantitative restriction for a limited number of countries and products.
Of these issues, the use of export subsidies has created the greatest friction in the 
last ten years. It led to an increase in total production level in EC countries. Unresolved 
conflicts about the Community’s increased share of the world market in sugar, wheat 
flour and dairy products for example, and its practice of subsidising the primary product 
component of processed products like pasta, have contributed to the view that GATT 
disciplines on subsidies under Article XVI and the Subsidies Code have been ineffective. 
Under the Subsidies Code, industrial countries are prohibited from using export subsidies 
on non-primary products. However some of these countries do subsidize the primary 
product component of processed products.
There are differing views as to whether this is allowed under GATT rules or not. 
It has been proposed that this practice should be eliminated or governed by whatever 
new rules are established on export subsidies on primary products. This is why the US 
and the Cairns Group sought significant specific reduction commitments on export 
subsidies from the Community.
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TABLE NO. 9
Percentage Region/ Group Primary Fuels Manufactures Total of 1988,*4 commodities to EC
All Developing countries o f which 1923 3306 4920 10149 6.9
ACP 491 443 85 1019 5.2
Mediterranean 85 225 694 754 1673 6.4
South-East Asia86 266 - 2587 2853 6.8
Latin America 87 894 261 404 1559 5.4
West Asia 88 24 1346 177 1547 9.1
Source :UNCTAD secretariat estimates, based on official international data.
Considering the above figures, the biggest gainers in commodity trade in the 
world are expected to be the oil exporters of West Asia and North Africa and the 
economies of South-East Asia whose exports are predominantly manufactured goods and 
who are among the Community’s major developing country suppliers of high-technology 
manufactures.The estimated net trade creation for ACP and Latin American countries is 
likely to be much more modest. The effects of the SEM on developing country exports 
are likely to be positive, but relatively small, assuming that EC trade policy towards 
non-members remains unchanged.89
(1) EC Mediterranean policy
Owing to its the geographical location, historical colonial ties and importance of 
agricultural products in Mediterranean countries, the EC established preferential trade 
and co-operation agreements with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia,90 and with Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria,91 with Israel and, later with Yugoslavia.92 Association 
Agreements are intended to establish Free Trade Area (FTA) with associated states.
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(2) EC Lome’ Conventions policy
The conclusion of four Lome’ Conventions between the EC ACP can be regarded
as a practical and endurable system of a relationship between North and South countries.
The preamble to the first Lome’ Convention clearly refers to the establishment of such
a pattern by indicating that:
a new model for relations between developed and developing states compatible with the 
aspirations of the international community towards a more just and balanced economic 
order.
In other words its prime objectives are :
a)- a partnership in which the political, social, cultural and economic options of each 
partner are respected;
b)- secure and lasting co-operation based on a freely negotiated and legally binding 
contract;
c)- permanent dialogue by ACP countries, through 3 joint institutions: i)-ACP-EC 
Council of Ministers, ii)- ACP-EC Committee of Ambassadors, iii)-ACP-EC Joint 
Assembly;
d)- Overall, flexible co-operation using the full range of aid and trade development 
instruments.93
In addition to Aid, Development, Financial and Technical co-operations, in
relation to trade it provides :
-duty and quota -free access to the EEC market for almost all ACP exports 
-guaranteed purchase by the EEC market for almost all ACP exports 
- funds for trade promotion and development.94
One of the main principles of the Lome’ Convention has been to allow the ACP 
agricultural products to enter into the EC market free of customs duties and other 
charges such as quantitative restrictions.95 On their side, the main obligation of the ACP 
countries is to apply the principle of non-discrimination in their relations with EC 
member states.96
The present section focuses on the practical implication of the Lome’ conventions
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as a model of relationships between EC and third world countries with regard to 
agricultural trade provisions. Its basic principles are: duty and quota free access to the 
EC market for almost all ACP exports, coupled with non-discrimination97 and non­
reciprocity. The treatment of ACP agricultural and food exports (the only ones which 
do not benefit from entirely free access), although already preferential, has been further 
improved by the reduction of existing restrictions on some forty products, several of 
them such as molasses, sorghum, millet, rice, fruit and vegetables of considerable 
importance to ACP countries.98 In return the ACP countries are required to extend only 
MFN treatment to EC countries. Certain criticisms exist of the overall practice of the EC 
under the Lome’ Conventions. Some writers believe that the Lome’ Conventions are a 
device to secure the present and past industrial countries interests. For example, 
Zartman" believes that the main aim of the EC treaty particularly Articles 133-135 was 
to secure certain interests for EC member states: 100
Although French and other EC states may justify the continuation of their 
relationship with their old colonies under development aid etc., such a practice is in 
contradiction to the MFN principle, since the other developing countries have also a 
right to benefit from special preferences accorded to French colonies.
It is worth mentioning that the place of the Lome Convention within the GATT 
system is currently under review by a GATT panel established in 1992. Lack of 
reciprocity between the EC and the ACP states indicate that the arrangements do not fall 
within Article XXIV. However it has been argued that the Convention should be 
examined 'in the light o f the totality o f the objectives' of the GATT.101
There was a level of disappointment with the nature of EC concessions. The 
speech of the President of the ACP Council of Ministers during the signing ceremony 
of the Lome’ II, reflected this:
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we could not escape a feeling of deep frustration that the EEC could not finally respond 
positively to our legitimate claims of unhindered access for our agricultural products, 
insignificant as they are, to the European m arket."102 
In reply to this frustration Article 130 (2)(b) LomeTII.indicates that:
if during the application of this convention, the ACP states request that new lines of 
agricultural production or agriculture products which are not subject of specific arran­
gements upon the entry into force this convention should benefit from such arrangement, 
the Community shall examine these requests in consultation with the ACP states.
The Article also refers to the treatment applicable to agricultural products by
indicating that;103 products originating in the ACP states under certain conditions, "shall 
be imported into the EC notwithstanding the general arrangements applied in respect of third 
countries in accordance with the following provisions;...." The Article further states that the
EC shall take the necessary measures to ensure, as a general rule, granting more 
favourable treatment than the general treatment applicable to the same products 
originating in third countries to which the MFN clause applies. In other word the ACP 
countries should receive more favourable treatment than any other party involved in a 
bilateral trade arrangement with EC, even other developing countries who are not an 
ACP members, 
a- Access to EC markets
The Lome’ IV negotiations took place at the same time as progress towards the 
completion of the Community’s internal market were quickening.Talks of a ’fortress 
Europe’ fuelled ACP fears of a more protectionist Community after 1992. The trade 
provisions of Lome’ IV are supposed to eliminate such fears. Existing unrestricted access 
to the EC market for the vast majority of ACP agricultural exports is maintained, and 
the EC offers significant new concessions for a number of agricultural products, more 
liberal rules of origin and a promise of post-1992 protection for ACP bananas and
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liberalisation for rum. In addition, there are promises for renewed efforts to develop the 
ACPs’ processing capacity in agricultural products.
It must be noted that the demands of the ACP countries for totally free access 
for all agricultural and processed agricultural products, irrespective of whether or not 
they are subject to the CAP, have not been met. However, the level of concessions given 
to ACP countries are more generous than any other EC arrangement with a third 
country. There is an inherent conflict between the demands for market access by ACP 
countries and the present structure of the CAP. The latter is characterised by an element 
of protectionism (as EC preference) which sits uneasily with demands for totally free 
market access. This is so despite the fact that in many areas of agricultural trade the EC 
and the ACP states are not in direct competition. Consequently one of the aims of the 
developing countries is to persuade the EC countries to break down the structures which 
operate to exclude their products from their markets and their domestic support system, 
b- GSP and Lome Convention
Generally speaking the beneficiaries of EC preferences may be seen as 
Mediterranean countries, the ACP countries under the Lome’, and other countries being 
in association agreements with EC. Preferential treatment applies to a very broad groups 
of products such as all industrial and all non-competing agricultural products. The 
coverage and margin of preferences is determined by factors other than potential 
comparative advantage. The most important factors are:
a)- former colonial ties; these were partly responsible for the Yaounde’ and Lome’ 
Conventions and the Mediterranean Agreements;
b)- proximity; Africa and the Mediterranean region tend to be more preferred than Latin 
America and Asia. This means that there are more advantages in a regional or local deal.
c)- the structural position of a particular industry or its important role in the EC. If the
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situation of such a hypothetical industry is structurally weak, it may, as a sector, be
protected by relatively high tariffs, quantitative restrictions and subsidies.
Since 1982, the ACP states requested more favourable and genuine EC 
preferences for them such as:104 preferential treatment to strawberry imports during the 
off-season in Europe or to examine105 the effect of the increase in the co-efficient used 
to calculate the variable component of the import levy on processed cereal products, in 
particular wheat, bran and wheat residue. Lome III responded to those requests in the 
following terms:
...the Community shall, in the context of the special nature of ACP-EC co-operation, 
examine on a case-by-case basis the requests from the ACP States for preferential 
access for their agricultural products to the EC market... 106 
One of the practical features of the Article is that developing countries need to make 
a request for equal preferential treatment from the EC countries. This means that the 
ACP countries need up-to-date knowledge of the market and adequate expertise to raise 
cases, otherwise their competitors are able to benefit from the situation. First class 
lawyers, economists, diplomats and managers are needed to establish an adequate system 
of continuous market intelligence and other related instruments to pinpoint weaknesses 
and submit, when necessary, cases against other competitors. Unfortunately similar to 
other developing countries, many ACP countries are deficient in this respect.
On the other hand it should be realised that granting such preferences to ACP 
countries generally does not harm the EC internal market, since all safeguard measures 
are already taken into consideration. An example case is when on the base of the above 
request, preferences were granted to strawberry products that allowed a 60% reduction 
of custom duties from 1st. November to the end of February within the limits of 700 
tonnes. However, this preference is extended to all states and it does not solely benefit 
ACP states.
Despite the widespread application of preferences for agricultural products in
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relation to ACP countries, the share of ACP in the EC agricultural imports from 
developing countries has actually declined since 1975.107 Such a decline has happened 
despite the fact that in all Lome’ Conventions there were provisions which called for 
trade promotion efforts. It means that these provisions are not sufficient to contribute to 
the growth of the ACP’s agricultural export.108
Twitchett109 notes a need for substantial investment in quality control, efficient 
local market improvement and regional trade arrangements as a practical solution to 
these problems.
It is possible to conclude that the present trade provisions of the Lome’ 
Convention to some extent have contributed to maintain and increase the volume of trade 
between the ACP countries and EC. However, in practice the preferences given to the 
ACP over third world exporters have been small because most ACP exports are primary 
products which would in any case enter into the EC market at low or zero tariff rates. 
Some believe that the Lome’ Conventions have been an arrangement for trade continu­
ation rather than trade development. In addition, Lome Conventions have maintained EC 
access to ACP- markets (on the MFN basis) and have encouraged a continuing flow of 
ACP agricultural products to the EC.110
c- STABEX system a wav of financial support for Lome products.
One of the main demands of ACP states during the Lome negotiations was
guaranteeing stable, equitable and remunerative prices in the EC market for their main
products. Their hope was that these measures would increase their export earnings and
provide funds for development. Protocol 22 recognised such a mood by indicating that:
The Community will have as its firm purpose the safeguarding of the interests of all the 
countries referred to in this Protocol whose economies depend to a considerable extent 
on the export of primary products......
Later, the EC offered a guarantee, albeit limited, of stabilising the export receipts
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from certain primary products exported by the ACP to the EC. The scheme, which was
to became known as STABEX, was one of the reasons why the Convention was hailed
as a new model for relations between industrial and developing countries. Article 16 of
the first Lome Convention lists the aim of the scheme as being to remedy :
....the harmful effects of the instability of export earnings and ...thereby enable the ACP 
States to achieve the stability, profitability and sustained growth of their economies.111 
Certain criteria were set for selecting products, stabilisation of export earnings
of certain primary products exported by the ACP on which they are dependent and 
eventually are affected by price and /or quantity fluctuations. 112
This system became of increasing importance for many ACP countries as a result 
of the downward trend of agricultural commodity prices. It has been thoroughly 
overhauled and improved in several ways. It is considered as a major innovation in the 
sense that the EC guarantees the ACP countries certain minimum returns on the export 
of specific raw materials to EC countries. The STABEX covers about 50 products, 
including many agricultural commodities such as coffee, cocoa, tea and sisal. In addition 
the EC committed itself, despite its high degree of self-sufficiency, to taking an annual
1.3 million tonnes of raw sugar at the price obtaining on the internal EC market.113
The application of the system means that most of the exports by ACP countries 
to the EC are subject to a kind of protection from the fluctuation of world commodity 
markets which helps to secure a stable basis for their development.
It is possible to use the STABEX as a practical model for stabilising the agricul­
tural trade of developing countries in the GATT system. It requires an accurate 
assessment of the present situation of agricultural products in the GATT system in order 
to draw a stable framework for securing certain sales and compensating the developing 
countries losses.
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D- JAPAN'S AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY AND ITS EFFECTS ON DEVEL­
OPING COUNTRIES.
(1) General background
As a GATT signatory, Japan has subscribed to the liberal principle of open trade, 
comparative advantage and respect for the economic interests of other countries. To this 
extent Japan, EC and the US find themselves substantially in agreement.
Japan has been one of the fastest growing industrial countries. Evidence for this 
fast growth is the annual rate of 1.5%, of agricultural production. On the other hand, 
agricultural imports have been growing at 7.9% Such a six fold increase made Japan the 
world’s largest food importer in the early 1980s.114
The Japanese agricultural system has its own distinctive feature. The protection 
of farmers is very high as a share of all fiscal expenditure. A distinctive feature of 
Japanese agriculture is the small scale of its farms. Considering 1982 figures, in terms 
of scales of operation, even with access to the latest techniques, Japanese farmers would 
not be regarded as efficient by the standards of other industrial countries.115
This creates special problems in relation to agricultural policy in Japan. In view 
of the small number of workable farms, some of which may be part time, 60% or more 
of full-time farms are probably not workable in the light of the above conditions. As a 
result Japanese policy in agriculture in relation to industrial and developing countries 
may be different from the policies of other industrial countries. In the other words, Japan 
may demand more protectionist policies to keep its farm activities.
Japanese agricultural trade policy, based on the 1961 Agricultural Basic Law, has 
encouraged promotion of the farm sector by having two objectives:
a)- to raise productivity so that the gap of productivity between agricultural and other 
industries can be reduced and;
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b)- to enable farmers through increased farm income to enjoy equal standards of living 
with workers in other economic sectors. This means that like other industrial countries, 
Japan needs to support her agricultural population. As a consequence Japan has used 
various measures to protect domestic agriculture by using particular instruments such as: 
direct subsidies, credit, investment grants and market intervention.116 
a-Customs Duties:
Figures on Japanese agricultural trade policy concerning customs duties indicate 
that:117 i)- a number of items are subject to zero duty, ii)- the rate goes up as the degree 
of processing increases, iii)- comparatively lower duty rates apply to grains, fresh 
vegetables, oilseeds, some tropical products and meats, iv)- comparatively higher rates 
or non-ad valorem duties are set for certain meats, milk products, certain fruits, sugar 
and sugar products. The reason for applying higher rates for the later categories are, high 
internal production and vice versa for former categories. Similar to other industrial 
countries Japan committed herself to reduce or bind its base tariff rates, especially in 
favour of developing countries.118 
b- Import Quotas
Japanese agricultural import policy is carried out on a commodity by commodity 
basis, taking into account the specific nature of each product. A total of 29 items of 
agricultural and fishery products are subject to an import quota system in Japan, of 
which 22 items are counted as commodities affected by quantitative restrictions 
applicable to them, excluding security and other purposes (so-called non-liberalised 
commodities).119 The quota is normally ‘global,. Import quotas are either ’general’ or 
’special ’
c- General Quotas
There are three ways of quota allocations in Japan,
i)- Purchasing by the government or by statutory bodies: rice, wheat and barley by the
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Food Agency; designated milk products and beef.
ii)- Allocation to trading companies: applicable to commodities for which the specifica­
tion of the particular users is difficult or is not required. In such allocations, special 
factors as the actual import quantity of the specific commodity or similar ones during 
a given period in the past are taken into account.
iii)- Allocation to users; this aims to prevent misappropriation of the imported 
commodities and to secure a stable supply to the user manufacturer, tender or processor. 
These three different approaches seem suitable for developing countries since the size 
of the import requirement is small and may be difficult to estimate.
d- State trading practices
As stated before, in this approach the government takes charge of all transactions 
relating to certain commodities. There are six items of farm commodities subject to state 
trading in Japan: Rice, raw silk, barley, wheat and muslin, butter, milk and cream are 
covered by the scheme.
(2) Japan and protection policies
There are similarities between the non-profitable situation of Japanese agricultural 
activities and many developing countries. Perhaps to overcome the problem of non­
profitability of the agricultural sector, the level of protection for the farming population 
is high. Japanese consumers have had to shoulder much of the burden of domestic 
agricultural support policies. It was estimated that each consumer spends an additional 
$290 annually on food to maintain agricultural support. This is nearly twice the per 
capita costs that consumers in the EC have had to bear to support their agricultural 
sector. It is another example for developing countries that they should not cut their farm 
support even if they do not gain short term interests, in order to protect jobs and rural
• • 1 ortcommunities.
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Bearing in mind the highly protectionist nature of the farm sector in Japan, there 
are a number of initiatives within the agricultural policy that could be applied in 
developing countries.Their granting different loans such as ’Agricultural Moderation 
Loan ’, ’Natural Disaster Relief Loans' and loans from the ’Agricultural Improvement 
Fund’ helps farmers.121 An agricultural insurance policy also gives a degree of protection 
to Japanese farmers. It applies to a number of products such as, rice and grains, 
livestock, fruit and fruit trees, potatoes and sugar crops insurance, greenhouse insurance, 
and covers farmers’ house insurance.122 It is possible to consider the application of many 
of these policies for supporting farmers in developing countries.
(3) Agricultural trade relations with developing countries.
The substantial demand of agricultural commodities as a result of relatively small 
scale farming indicates the vital need for Japan to import from the outside world, par­
ticularly regional developing countries such as ASEAN countries. Japan is the single 
largest importer of agricultural products in the world, though never a significant exporter 
in any major farm product after World War II. As a consequence Japan considers it 
necessary to rely on imports of agricultural commodities and has applied certain 
measures to stabilize the imports of such products. Furthermore, Japan has realised that 
one of the possible ways to achieve such objectives is to have a positive participation 
in international commodity agreements and to support development plans in developing 
countries.
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Table NO. 10
Japan’s trade with major developing and the total industrial countries: 1986
Developing Regions Imports from % Export to %
LATIN AMERICA 4.8 4.1
Brazil 1.5 0.5
Mexico 1.1 0.5
ASIA 23.3 20.0
Hong Kong 0.9 3.4
Korea 4.2 5.0
China 4.5 4.7
Taiwan 3.6 3.8
India 1.0 1.0
Pakistan 0.3 0.4
AFRICA 1.3 1.4
OIL PRODUCERS 14.1 4.4
countries
INDUSTRIAL Countries 56.5 70.1
Total 100.0 100.0
The main source is UN Commodity Trade Statistic 1986 Series D VoLXXXVI, No.1-4, New York, 1987, but the design and 
selection o f figures is mine.
Table No. 10 gives a clear picture of Japanese farm deals with major developing 
countries of the world. It also shows the total amount of these trade exchanges in 
comparison to the deals with industrial countries. Among the former group, certain Asian 
countries (especially China, Korea and Taiwan) will benefit more from exports to Japan. 
The oil producers have the same advantages but it is mainly due to their agricultural 
exports but also to the high demand for oil in Japan’s industries. In comparison the same 
groups of countries have the biggest shares of these exports, while the industrial 
countries receive more than 70% of Japanese exports.
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Considering the extreme level of agricultural protection and relatively high degree 
of food prices in the Japanese market, if Japan liberalises its agricultural import policies, 
such changes would affect the fragile economy of developing countries with its effects 
varying according to the level and the type of commodity that they export to 
Japan.Those who are dependent on exporting rice to the Japanese market would benefit 
more than other developing countries. Similarly industrial countries, especially the US, 
will gain from such liberalisation, particularly on rice exports to Japan.123
In 1987 the US lodged a complaint at the GATT concerning import restrictions 
on twelve relatively minor agricultural commodities. The GATT panel concluded that 
Japan has no grounds to continue applying such restrictions to ten of the twelve 
commodities, and consequently Japan agreed to reduce the restrictions within a scheduled 
time framework.124
Being one of the strongest industrial economies of the world, Japan has some 
commitment to food and development aid to developing countries.The notable feature 
of food aid from Japan is that commodities subject to aid are often purchased from other 
developing countries. For example Japan purchased all the quantity required for food aid 
from Asian developing countries during the period 1974 to 1978. Even in 1982 when 
Japan held several million tonnes of surplus rice domestically, it bought about 0.1 
million tonnes of rice from Asian countries and 77,000 tonnes of US wheat on top of 
97,000 tonnes of Japanese rice in order to fulfil its commitment to food aid towards 
developing nations. 125
Perhaps this policy will help those developing countries who are selling their 
commodities to Japan in this scheme, but it would be more helpful if such purchases 
were based on a secure commodity agreement rather than a temporary and infrequent
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sale. Here there is a contradiction between managed and regulated trade. A beneficial
and effective support system to developing countries should be based on a regulated 
trade pattern rather based on a managed126 trading system currently in practice by many 
industrial countries.
The Japanese approach could be contrasted with other food aid approaches, such 
as the EC approach in the Lome Conventions that is generally based on buying 
guaranteed supplies for a certain period of time. It gives them marked access facilities 
for certain times, depending on the availability or production of similar products in the 
industrial (importing) countries. In the Japanese approach two groups of developing 
countries may benefit from the scheme, that is, the receivers of the food aid and the 
suppliers of such commodities who are selling their products to Japan for that purpose. 
This food aid policy is more acceptable since its operation ends criticism that the 
industrial countries are dumping their surplus products in the name of food aid to 
developing countries.
CONCLUDING REMARKS TO THE CHAPTER
In examining the perspectives of developing and industrial countries in the 
GATT, the first question which may arise is the relation between industrialisation and 
development. It must be realised that until not so long ago, it was widely believed that 
industrialisation was the key to economic development, that once the process of 
industrial expansion has picked up momentum and reached a certain stage, modernisation 
of other sectors of the economy would follow more or less automatically. In recent years 
it has become abundantly clear that development cannot be achieved simply by building 
factories. A real and comprehensive development is one in which the agricultural sector
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plays a leading and substantial role. It is now generally realised that development is 
more than economic development and that agriculture should function as an important 
basis on which the process of development is to be founded.127
Political changes in the world raise other questions on the equal bargaining 
position of the early GATT founders and the theory of ’reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous ’ agreements. In such a situation the inclusion of Part IV of the GATT was 
inevitable. This inclusion in itself does not solved any substantial problem but must be 
implemented in line with other development objectives of the GATT and by full and 
mutual co-operation of all industrial and developing countries. The examination of the 
industrial countries’ agricultural trade policy towards developing countries gives a clearer 
picture of the policies adopted by industrial countries for a relatively long period of 
time.
The fundamental question that may be raised here is the effectiveness of the 
existing GATT provisions in eliminating the obstacles and barriers of developing 
countries agricultural trade in industrial countries markets .
Despite all these difficulties, expansion of world agricultural output and the 
consequent decline of demand by developing countries has been explained in terms of 
the sudden expansion of world output resulting from improvements in technology in 
industrial and developing countries, such as the so-called Green Revolution, and the 
change of policies in the developing world. Some countries tried hard to secure some 
gains in total production and trade. A good example is Indonesia’s promotion of self- 
sufficiency in rice,128 Vietnamese self-sufficiency and even over-production in tea, coffee 
and cacao129 and Iranian self-sufficiency in wheat and potatoes.130 Until recent years Iran 
was among the big markets for wheat exports from industrial countries.
Although there are many provisions calling for the promotion and protection of 
developing countries agricultural trade with the outside world, in practice industrial
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countries have been able to either to ignore these rules or to find escape routes to 
discharge their responsibilities, as well as using their legislative powers for protectionist 
rules against cheap imports from the third world.
There has been growing awareness in the industrial world of wider political 
linkage between trade issues with developing countries and other issues such as 
immigration. There have also been negative developments as far as industrial countries 
are concerned, such as bilateral arrangements from which developing countries are 
excluded. Similarly developing countries have made some positive moves toward 
bilateral deals and regional arrangements among themselves that have had relatively 
successful outcomes.
The other negative move is directed towards certain newly industrialised 
developing countries under the ’graduation ’ doctrine131 that constitutes a threat of some 
new trade restrictions for products of these countries in industrialised markets not 
offering liberalization in their trade policy. The TR negotiations provide a certain degree 
of credibility to the threat of conditional MFN treatment by industrialised countries.132
On the base of what has been discussed, regional customs unions could have 
substantial advantages for developing countries. Their structural difficulties in applying 
modern techniques such as adequate packaging, cooling systems and transport facilities, 
to be able to send their commodities to long destinations could be resolved. 
Regarding the protection of the farm sector, the experience of some developing countries 
shows that similar to industrial countries, the protection of farmers has vital effects on 
the self sufficiency of these countries, especially in production of grains and other 
agricultural commodities. Despite the high level of protection in the EC, still food and 
food products constitute an important part of its external trade.
In recent years the share of food imports to the EC from third countries has been 
decreasing sharply; while the share of EC foodstuff exports to third countries amounts
CHAPTER FOUR CONCLUDING REMARKS 235
to 11% in the late 1980s’. In its exports to developing countries this share has risen 
somewhat to 10 per cent in 1986. Consequently the position of the EC in world 
agricultural trade has changed fundamentally over the last two decades: traditionally 
being a net importer, the EC is now a net exporter of agricultural products. These can 
be treated as a direct result of protectionist policies of the EC which leads not only to 
self sufficiency but also to over production in many agricultural products.
At the same time agricultural subsidies are expensive: they create large distortions 
in world markets for farm products and act as a drag on overall economic growth. 
Agricultural policies in industrial countries alone cost consumers about $245 billion in 
1989.133 International pressure through the GATT talks, coupled with domestic budget 
pressures, provides the best way to gain support for domestic farm reforms, since a 
significant part of the cost of national farm programmes is inspired by the need to offset 
the policies of other countries including developing countries.
It can be concluded that the US and EC have a similar goal of increasing farm 
income by using similar price support policies to achieve that goal.These policies have 
encouraged over production, generated surpluses and government stocks, and resulted 
in large government expenditures. These impacts have been more severe in the EC.134
Despite the fact that the application of the industrial protectionist model has 
many adverse effects on the agricultural trade performance of developing countries, it 
is ideal for EC countries, since it has secured their markets from cheap imported agricul­
tural commodities. This is a direct result of protectionist policies of industrial countries 
in combination with their industrial superiority.
The overall stand of industrial countries in the negotiations follows their national 
policies. They do not give any concession or change their positions without considering 
the overall economic consequences. The industrial countries collective policies and 
approaches derive from the same calculated approach.
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Although there are many different factors such as the level of production, the size 
of farming units, technical differences and trade advantages which vary between 
industrial and developing countries, some agricultural trade policies adopted by industrial 
countries could be adjusted and applied by or to developing countries. Considering the 
similarity of farming structure with developing countries, Japan’s trade policy is a good 
example for this purpose.
All industrial countries have some commitments to assist developing countries. This is 
partly a way of securing their own supply of food and agricultural commodities, because 
a good rural and agricultural structure enables the developing countries to produce 
commodities at a competitive price. Both industrial and developing countries should 
make positive moves towards a more constructive and co-operative trade policy 
relationship.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE URUGUAY ROUND (1986-93)
Another artistic expression of final phase of Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Source; GATT, Focus Newsletter, No. 103 GATT, Nov. 1993.
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Introduction
’....trade wars, once they start, have a dangerous 
momentum of their own. There is no way of pre­
dicting their course or their end. It is easy to adopt 
a measure either to assert one’s  position or to 
establish a basis for future negotiation. But it is 
much more difficult to control the clamour for such 
measures and close to impossible to remove them 
in the short term.1
This Chapter considers the progress and outcome of the final phase of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round), from its inception in 1986. The
purpose and the aim of the study is to examine the agricultural trade problems of
developing countries in the light of the recent multilateral trade negotiations and the 
substantial amount of work done by the negotiating group on agricultural trade.
The Chapter is divided into five sections. The first Section introduces the launch 
of the UR by the Punta del Este ministerial declaration and the major elements of 
agricultural trade in the Round.2 This is followed by an overview of the overall state of
agricultural trade problems noting the issues relevant to developing countries. Section
Two will deal with a summary discussion of the leading industrial countries’ agricultural 
trade proposals and policies in the negotiations, particularly the EC and the US. The 
importance of the Cairns group of agricultural exporting countries contribution to the 
negotiations is also examined.
In practice, the UR negotiations offered not only a major opportunity for 
developing countries to raise their voices, but also a challenge. Section Three is devoted 
to developing countries’ proposals and policies in the Round. The UR negotiation was
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intended to provide the third world with an opportunity to compete on a more equal 
footing in the international agricultural trading system. Concern exists as to how inter­
national food prices and trade will react to a less controlled trading regime. It is 
important to note how international institutions and governments find out the possible 
consequences of liberalisation for agricultural trade in the Round.
Section Four deals with questions such as: what are the trade effects of a 
successful resolution in liberalizing agricultural trade ? If, as a result of the UR 
negotiations, the price of grain and other food commodities rise, how serious will the 
implications be for developing countries that are net food importers? In the case of net 
exporters, what are the possible opportunities and gains? Can we be confident that the 
UR results have produced a new initiative in the existing pattern of dispute settlement 
on agricultural trade issues ?
The fifth section of the chapter concentrates on the decisive package of measures 
in the Round, especially the final ’UR Agreement on Agriculture?, (FAA) and its impact 
on developing countries. Owing to the substantial number of issues in the Round agenda, 
the main emphasis of the chapter is on the substantive relevant points of views, impres­
sions and suggestions of the contracting parties, rather than a description of almost seven 
years of claims and counterclaims by them. This Chapter focuses on the way the issues 
and the conflicts were dealt with in order to find substantive solutions for agriculture 
trade problems of developing countries.
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I. THE OVERALL STATE OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE PROBLEMS IN 
THE ROUND .
A -TH E  LAUNCH OF THE UR NEGOTIATIONS
The UR was envisaged, with an assumption that developing countries would play 
an effective role in it, in part in the wake of unfinished business in the TR (1973-79). 
Many notable issues had remained then unresolved, especially in critical areas of 
agricultural trade.
Following the initiative of a group of industrial countries, the ministerial meeting 
of contracting parties was held in November 1982 to assess the results of the TR and 
discuss outstanding issues facing the global trading system. A further factor in 
determining the launch of the UR was, in part, concern over growing protectionism 
during the economic recession of 1981-2.
Some countries saw the meeting as the beginning of a process aimed at starting 
off a new round of multilateral negotiations. The developing countries were not entirely 
reassured by the manner in which the TR negotiations had been conducted, and 
anticipated that their interests might not again be taken into full consideration.3 Another 
important concern in the 1980s was the growing tension in international trade relations, 
especially in the agricultural sector. Long standing conflicts of interests, which had been 
the major cause of failure in agricultural trade negotiations in previous rounds, had 
persisted.
In pursuing the long-term objective of agricultural reform, consideration may be 
given to social and other concerns, such as food security, environment protection or
CHAPTER FIVE SECTION I 250
overall employment, which have not only economic dimensions. But in practice any
progressive correction of policies to achieve the long-term objective will require a 
suitable period of time, and the real intention and commitment of the parties to change 
the situation.
Considering the rising disputes in agricultural trade, Dale Hathaway4 emphasized 
in 1987, the controversy over agricultural trade disputes damaged the credibility of the 
GATT discipline in overall trade. Agricultural trade disputes also threatened trade in 
other products; retaliation would not necessarily be limited to 'like products' 5. It might 
be extended to other products of interest to the defending parties. Against such a 
background, substantive results in the agricultural trade negotiations were expected for 
a universal success of the UR.
Despite all the ambiguities surrounding the launch of the round, many people 
hoped that this new attempt would make substantive progress in tackling developing 
countries’ agricultural trade problems and "integrate agriculture more closely into the global 
trading system".6
B-THE PUNTA DEL ESTE MINISTERIAL DECLARATION7
Each ministerial declaration in the recent Rounds tended to reflect the intentions 
of the parties to put new initiatives into action. They specifically called for a reform of 
the GATT provisions on agriculture with better treatment and fuller participation of 
developing countries in the negotiations. Dead locks developed after each round, which 
were finally broken by the US compromise of abandoning its demands for reform.8 In 
practice, in those Rounds, most of the prospects for major reform in agricultural policies 
were regretfully put aside for the next round of multilateral trade negotiations. In 
contrast, at the beginning of the UR, a fundamental reform in the GATT agricultural
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trading regime was stated as a high priority. Against this presumption, as in previous
experiences, the negotiations quickly deteriorated into a conflict of wills between the two 
major players, the US insisting on reform of the EC Common Agricultural Policy and 
the EC refusing to do so.
One of the main ambitions of the UR was to solve deadlocked issues remaining 
from previous Rounds and to build a consensus with respect to the conflicting views and 
interests of all parties. As discussed in the introductory chapter of the present thesis, the 
Punta Del Este Ministerial Declaration (1986) presented the aims and desires of the 
participants in broad terms. The Contracting Parties agreed on the urgent need to bring 
more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and 
preventing restrictions and distortions to trade, including those related to structural 
surpluses so as to reduce uncertainty, imbalances and instability in world agricultural 
markets.9
Among other things the Declaration encouraged the Contracting Parties to take 
appropriate steps on three broad issues: 1)- Reduction of import barriers, 2)- Increasing 
control over direct and indirect subsidies affecting agricultural trade; 3)- Minimising the 
use of sanitary and health regulations as a form of trade barrier.
Subsequently the negotiations were aimed at achieving greater liberalization on 
trade of agricultural products to bring all measures affecting import access and export 
competition under strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and dis­
ciplines. In order to achieve the above objectives, the ’Committee on Trade in 
Agriculture’ was obliged to follow the recommendations proposed by all participants and 
develop them in accordance with the GATT 1982 Ministerial Work programme adopted 
by the Contracting Parties. Account was to be taken of the approaches suggested in the
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work of the Committee.
At the start of the UR negotiations the question was whether the Round would 
follow the traditional pattern (of previous Rounds) or seek a different approach with a 
genuine intention for reform by the contracting parties. One assumption was that unless 
substantial sacrifices of interests by big players were made, a repetition of past disputes 
would be inevitable. The long continuation of the Round was a clear sign of the 
extension of the old conflicts of interests.
C-THE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IN  THE ROUND AND THEIR M AIN  
PRO PO SALS .
In the UR negotiations it is possible to distinguish two major groups: a group of 
negotiations on goods and another on services. The first group may be classified into 
four different areas: a)- general trade liberalization issues, containing 2 out of 14 
committees, b)- sector specific trade liberalisation issues, comprising 4 main sectors 
including agriculture, c)- improvement of the GATT legal framework with 6 committees 
and d)- improvement of the GATT as an institution covered by 2 committees. Thus, the 
negotiating tasks were divided among 14 different committees excluding the surveillance 
body that applies to all GATT activities.Table 11 on the next page is representing the 
negotiating committees in UR Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Although the agriculture committee was specifically devoted to agriculture group, 
a number of other related committees were also applicable to agricultural trade issues 
such as ’Tropical Products', 'Subsidies and Countervailing Measures', 'Safeguards’, 
’Tariffs and Non-Tariff Measures' which in one way or another were linked to agricul­
tural trade.
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TABLE NO. 11
The GATT negotiation committees in Uruguay Round
Surveillance Body Trade Negotiations Committee
Groups of Negotiations on Goods ) ( Group on Services (GNS)J
General Trade 
Liberalisation issues.
Sector Specific Trade 
Liberalisation Issues
Improvement o f  GATT as 
an institution
General Trade 
Liberalisation Issues
1 Tariffs
3. Natural Resource 
Based Products
5. Agriculture
6. Tropical Products
4. Textile & Clothing
7. GATT Articles
8.MTN Agreements 
and Arrangements.
13. Dispute Settlement
2. Non T ariff
M easures
10. Subsidies & Coun­
tervailing Measures.
11. Trade-Related int- 
tellectual Property 
Rights.______________
9. Safeguards
14.Functioning o f the 
GATT System
12.Trade-Related 
Investment Measures
See (GATT Secretariat): From Anna Murphy, The European Community and the International Trading System Volume 1, Completing the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT, (1990).P.45
CHAPTER FIVE SECTION I 254
The UR negotiations were carried out by a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) 
under the chairmanship of the GATT Secretary-General. For the first time, the 
negotiations included reference to domestic policies as well as border protection 
measures. All the proposals proposed binding commitments by contracting parties in the 
UR negotiations.10
This helped to classify different subjects of the negotiations for individual 
discussion, but in practice there were some technical difficulties as to the nature of each 
committee. For example, Committees No. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 14 were allocated 
to general issues (subjects) and did not represent any specific goods such as agriculture 
etc. On the other hand the Group of Negotiations on Services was treated as a separate 
category of negotiations. It seems that the intention of the drafters of the UR agenda, 
who were mainly from industrial countries, was to give more weight to trade negoti­
ations on services by placing it under an individual heading. This is further evidence of 
how industrial countries may influence the decision making authority of the GATT to 
suit their own interests.
In the course of UR the EC, US, Cairns Group,11 Japan, Nordic Countries and 
Developing Countries12 were considered as the most influential groups. It should be 
realized that there was no official categorisation of these groups; their groupings were 
mainly based on the fact that the countries had common interests with a collective 
response to the issues on the agenda.
A number of proposals were submitted on how to deal with agricultural trade 
issues that reflected the ideas and expectations of individual participants from the 
negotiations and were influenced by the policy and perspectives of other interested 
contracting parties. In practice the main struggle was between two distinctive groups as
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the supporters of reform and the proponents of restraint.
The reformists demanded the removal of agricultural exceptions from current 
GATT Article XI and XVI; by phasing out all gray-area practices, Grandfather Clauses 
exceptions,13 waivers; and eventually prohibiting domestic subsidies that create trade 
distortions. The advocates of restraint were opposed to any changes to the GATT rules 
which would remove the present agricultural exemptions or prohibit any national 
policies. Instead, they suggested that national policies in the agricultural sector are 
legitimate and should be allowed to operate, provided that the levels of protection and 
support granted under such policies needed to be restricted. The reformist group was led 
by the US and the Cairns Group, who shared similar ambitions.
The leading proponents of the restraint policy were the EC, supported in 
philosophy if not in detail by Japan, the Nordic Group (Sweden, Norway, and Finland), 
Switzerland, and Austria. The main area of confrontation lasting until the end of the 
Round focused on two major players, namely the EC and the US .
Between these two major opposing groups, there was obviously little room for 
any independent policy or practical manoeuvre by developing countries, except for those 
agricultural exporting countries which were amongst the Cairns Group, or some 
individual developing countries whose export interests were in harmony with one of the 
two groups.
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II. THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
A- THE EC  POLICY, PROPOSALS AND EXPECTATIONS
It should be realise that each individual EC member state has different levels of 
dependency on the agricultural sector.14 For example amongst the EC countries, the 
Netherlands is a country characterized by intensive farming, and its value of output per 
hectare is ECU 7700 compared to a total EC average of ECU 1900.15 It clearly shows 
high incomes for the farmers in this country in comparison with the other EC members. 
This is why the levels of opposition or resistance against cuts in farm subsidies are 
different in EC countries, with the French farmers being most opposed to any radical 
reductions of state subsidies.The EC had important interests in overall economic and 
trade objectives of the Round. The EC proposal for negotiations in the Round contained 
four essential elements:
1)- coordination of action to stabilise markets in sugar, cereal and dairy products.
2)- significant cuts in the levels of support over an agreed period and achieving a better 
balance between different commodities;
3)- using Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE)-type measures for monitoring, with 
adjustment for supply control and exchange rate variations; 4)- strengthening GATT 
rules to consolidate advances .
The EC believed that negotiations on agriculture should tackle the root problems 
affecting world agricultural markets, i.e. the imbalance between supply and demand, 
while allowing the maintenance of agricultural activity to adapt to a changing 
environment and taking account of the development needs of the various parties to the 
negotiations.16
In reality some EC policy makers believed that reducing uncertainty and
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widespread instability on world agricultural market would enable the balanced 
implementation of a collective farm policy reform that requires:
i) better control of production by appropriate means, including the phased reduction 
of support which directly or indirectly affects trade in agricultural products;
ii) an increase in the sensitivity of agriculture to market signals;
iii) a change in methods of income support for farmers to make greater use of direct 
aids not linked to output.17
In practice the EC policy makers had other instruments to reduce farm support, 
such as setting aside of a specific portion of fertile lands by farmers.18 
1) The EC polic ies towards devetoping countries.
The EC applied special policies toward developing countries in the Round, by
pushing them towards the application of ’across the board , binding duties. These
binding duties were suggested under 20-35% depending on the current level of duties
and specific needs of these counties. The EC recognized that such duties may be bound
at ’ceiling rates' , whereby actually applied duties may have been much lower. The EC
asked the developing countries to sign the GATT Codes on Non-tariff Measures (for
example on import licensing procedures or methods of valuation of goods for customs
purposes).
Regarding tropical products, which are of specific interest to developing 
countries, the EC offered to make radical cuts, aiming to reach a degree of total 
elimination of duties which cover a variety of products of interest to developing 
countries.
C- US POLICIES AND EXPECTATIONS
In the course of the UR each industrial country tried to pursue its own policy 
line in order to get maximum benefits and reach its particular goals and objectives in 
the negotiations. In practice, the US followed a policy of trade unilateralism, expressed 
in several ways. To justify some irregular trade practices, the US claimed that in the
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past bad deals from the multilateral trading system had placed them at a disadvantage. 
The US believed that "America, in short, must use its economic strength for its own 
good, not for everybody else V '.19
In connection with the US policy in the Round, the question was raised, why 
such priority was given to agriculture? Part of the answer lies in the domestic policies 
o f the US,20 since for many years the agriculture sector had been the backbone of the 
open trade lobby in the US economy. The US GATT trade policies arrangements with 
other contracting parties came under four main headings:
a)-Regional trade deals. In these ambitious projects, the US put forward strong 
alternatives for the creation of its own trade policy measures to keep them under 
control, but at the same time tried not to breach the GATT rules.
b)-Bilateral trade arrangements.This is an ever-expanding category and, since such 
arrangements are always called ’voluntary’ in name, the GATT is unable to discipline 
them effectively. The most notable are ’voluntary’ export restraints (VER’s) and similar 
measures. In the GATTs’ recent review of US trade policy, 47 such arrangements were 
counted.21 As indicated in Chapter Three, such regional arrangements generally reduced 
the GATT’s credibility. The US is in favour of these arrangements especially in the 
agricultural sector, contrary to the liberal trading environment that the GATT advocates.
c)- Anti-dumping and countervailing duties. These apply when a foreign supplier is 
found to be ’dumping’ its goods into the US market,22 if this is found to cause ’injury’ 
to US producers. Even under GATT rules, duties can be levied on imports.23
d)- Section 301 of the US Trade Act 1974 actions.This Section authorises the 
Administration to take action to enforce US rights under international trade agreements 
and to combat foreign governmental practices which the US government concluded to 
be discriminatory or unreasonable and to burden or restrict US commerce. When it
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comes to the GATT, it permits unilateral action to be taken by the US against its 
trading partners, without the prior authorization of the Contracting Parties.24 In other 
wwds this part of US trade law authorises the government to identify unfair trade 
practices and punish the perpetrators. This has led to criticism that the application of the 
measures violates GATT rules.25 The first US ’unilateral’ action was launched in 1985 
through more active use by the Administration of section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act .26
Justifying the application anti-dumping and countervailing duties, the US claimed 
that its domestic producers had suffered serious injury. As indicated in Chapter Two, 
there is a need for a proper definition of the term serious injury otherwise, in the 
absence of a clear definition, it is open to any misuse by contracting parties, especially 
by those who have both executive and legislative powers for such abuses. If all 
contracting parties were to adopt practices similar to Section 301 there would be no 
room for any dispute settlement mechanism or even any international regulatory 
machinery such as GATT.
Different countries have asked for a promise that the US will not use Section 
301 to retaliate against other countries before it has exhausted the GATT dispute 
procedures, but the US has refused to do so.27 This refusal to rule out retaliatory action 
against other trading partners is another indication of US self interest towards other 
contracting parties and threatens the interest of developing countries.
1) The main US objectives
Within the UR negotiations the US administration pursued the following objec­
tives: l)-Far-reaching, fundamental reform of agricultural trade, leading to fairer 
competition and market openings; 2)- Greater market access and lower tariffs and non- 
tariff barriers for industrial products and other goods by removing all barriers to market
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access over a ten-year period; 3)- Rules to protect the intellectual property rights of US 
entrepreneurs on which their high-technology and entertainment industries depend, and 
comprehensive rules of fair play for $560 billions of world trade in services;28 4)- In 
Trade Related Investment Measures, the implementation of agreed rules governing in­
vestment and fewer restrictions on the ability of US investors to operate overseas; 5)- 
An agreement to end trade-distorting subsidies, over a 10 year period, subsidies being 
the ’unfairest' of unfair trade practised in the form of government grants to bribe the 
market, rather than win it on the basis of price and quality; 6)- Effective rules on 
dispute settlement; subsidies, antidumping, standards, balance of payments (BOP), 
import licensing, import safeguards and functioning of the GATT system (FOGS); 7)- 
Lastly, application of the rules of the game to developing countries.29 In other words 
full participation of these countries in the global trading system.
To justify the call for application of the rules to developing countries, the US 
calculated that the full integration of these countries into the global trading system 
wTould generate stronger growth for them and could increase US exports by as much as 
50% until the year 2000.30
These objectives clearly reflect US goals in the Round, but the reality is that 
many of those objectives can be treated as one sided policies that disregard third parties 
interests, especially those of developing countries. For example the first four objectives 
exclusively serve industrial countries’ interests. How could the developing countries’ 
agricultural products, particularly cereals, be able to compete with US products? How 
can poor farmers in developing countries compete and survive, while their respective 
countries are lowering tariffs and non-tariff barriers and opening their markets to 
agricultural imports from industrial countries? The indication of ’Market access for in­
dustrial products, in a 10 years period’, means a gradual destruction of the infant
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industries in the third world, particularly those of the South-East Asian new industrial 
countries. It can be seen in similar cases that the industrial countries have employed all 
the necessary techniques and expertise to dictate (impose) their own terms and 
conditions on multilateral trade negotiations.
Among the negotiation areas listed above, three of them, services, TRIMs, and 
TRIPs were considered as ’new issues’. The US fully supported the inclusion of them 
into the UR agenda and believed that their importance to the world economy was 
beyond doubt, but the main beneficiaries would be industrial countries.31
The US tried hard to persuade all Contracting Parties to support the inclusion 
of the new issues on the UR agenda, and also claimed that US economy had grown 
faster in the past four decades than in any similar period of their trading history. This 
is partly because of the high speed expansion of trade in all these new issues in addition 
to traditional agricultural export earnings. In case of new issues, except for a small 
number of developing countries which provide these services, the majority of them are 
the potential losers in the majority of deals in new issues.
Another point which deserves attention is the protection of foreign investment 
in the third world, without considering the interests of the host state and ’local 
partners’. In simple words it means that investors are able to invest overseas without 
being forced to take any local partner, export a mandated portion of their output out of 
the host state, use local parts, or meet any number of other government imposed 
investment restrictions.32 These are the issues that the developing countries do not 
accept unless they are compelled to play the unfair ’game’. Some participants also 
believed that in return for concessions in the agricultural trade sector, the developing 
countries should accept the industrial countries terms on new issues.
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D>- THE EC AND US CONFLICTS IN  THE ROUND
One of the major problems in the UR, similar to those in previous rounds, was the 
conflict of interests between the EC and the US.33 Such a conflict had a major impact 
om overall global economic relations, especially in the agricultural trade sector. The 
available economic data and a comparison of the agricultural situation in these two 
miajor blocks helps us to understand the reasons behind all these conflicts of interest:34
1)- Employment; despite the fact that, since 1960, farm employment in the EC has 
fallen by 60%, farming is still the main source of income for almost 10 million people 
in Europe (8% of the total workforce). This contrasts with 3.4 million farmers in the 
US, (3% of the workforce).
2)- Production capacity; the average size of EC farms is 13 hectares, against the 187 
hectares average within the US, which is considerable.
3)- Imports; the EC is considered to be a large net agricultural importer, taking about 
one fifth of all world food and agricultural exports. It always has a large deficit in its 
agricultural trade: for example in 1988, it was $27.5 billion (on imports of $63 billion 
against exports of $35.5 billion), compared with $18 billion agricultural trade surplus 
in the US.35
4)- Implementing drastic measures only in the EC, such as price freezes and reductions, 
applying levies on over-production, are envisaged for reducing surpluses and their 
burden on the EC and national budgets. The situation is also a burden for the EC 
farmers, many of whom are not happy with heavy income losses during the 80’s and 
more to come.
5)- Surplus production; The US has substantial grain production surpluses that dampen 
international markets, in comparison the EC has a surplus of over 20 million tonnes of 
cereals, one million tonnes of milk that accumulated to huge butter mountain stocks, and
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international markets, in comparison the EC has a surplus o f  over 20 million tonnes 
of cereals, one million tonnes of milk that accumulated to huge butter m ountain stocks, 
and 750,000 tonnes o f  beef by 1991.36
EC underpriced surpluses in agricultural commodities hit A m erica’s farm ex­
porters badly, since US farmers who are themselves subsidised and protected, though 
for most products less so than EC farmers. So, in the UR. the US demanded 
far-reaching reforms of the E C ’s CAP.
©//vitcUfj.yy i
Visual expression  of Trade Wars in Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Artist Yancolen 
(1989), taken from the Development and Cooperation Periodical No. 6. ISSN 0723, (1990) p.9.
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(1) Two Substantial p lans for solving the d ispu tes over agricuiture
Two leading proposals were considered in order to solve disputes between EC 
and US a)- The ’new p lan’, based mainly on the ’Draft Final Act o f  UR on Agricul­
ture’, was initiated by the GATT’s ex-Secretary General, Arthur Dunkel, on 20 
December 1991. The Dunkel plan included a solution for cereal products, an area where 
Europe and US were furthest apart37
b)- The second proposal, by Mr MacSharry, the EC Commissioner for agriculture and 
rural development, was considered as a compromise between reformers and protec­
tionists and known as the MacSharry Plan .
The Dunkel proposal suggested:
-first, a 20% cut in domestic farm subsidies by 1999; -second a 36% cut in the value 
of export subsidies, in addition to 24% in the volume of subsidised exports, -third, 
converting into tariffs most quotas and other non-tariff restrictions on farm trade, and 
then gradually cutting them.
There was a similarity between the MacSharry and Dunkel plans, since both 
supported a form of direct payment to farmers independently from production for 
reducing the pressure on farmers.38 The Dunkel plan contained more drastic measures 
because it fails to control payments to big producers since the payments were supposed 
tc be paid based on the area of owned land to all farmers.39
In practice, the agricultural trade talks became hampered on three main 
issues.The EC was willing to advance some way towards the above proposal, but in 
decreasing its protection for farmers, its aim was to rebalance the CAP anticipating a 
protection increase, especially for some commodities.40
In the early phase of the negotiations, the US pressed for cuts in EC subsidies 
between 75% and 90%; Europe offered cuts of only 30%, from a base year of 1986 (a
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device that reduces the offer of future cuts to roughly 15%). The wide gap between the
proposed farm subsidies cut was one of the main sources of disagreement41
One should ask what the main reasons was for the EC not accepting the US 
demands. The answer was very obvious; the EC considered the US and Cairns group 
demands as wholly unrealistic. The US also stressed that direct export subsidies were 
not the only factor for promoting exports. Opposing this view, the EC believed that 
other support measures such as the deficiency payments practised by the US had the 
same effect on production and the market.
The conflict was so intensive that if agreement on any of the elements proved 
impossible, the whole Round was in danger of collapse. America’s negotiators used such 
a possibility as a threat, gambling that Europe either would deliver a radical reform of
its farm policies or let the Round negotiations collapse.42
(2) S teps towards a final com prom ise
After many bilateral discussions between the EC and US to resolve their 
differences, on the 20 November 1992 an agreement was concluded to allow the UR 
negotiations to proceed, and it was considered as a substantive breakthrough. Some 
elements of this agreement are as follows: 
a- Internal Support
The EC believed that subsidies should be assessed by their effect on international 
trade; export subsidies should remain prohibited and anti-subsidy measures justified only 
where government aid has a negative effect on trade. In this respect "internal" subsidies, 
especially those subsidies related to regional development and structural adjustment, 
were unlikely to distort international trade and should be considered as part of a
’green' list on which no action was required ,43
The prohibition of internal subsidies, did not even exempt the least developed
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countries.The US administration also opposed some contracting parties’ views for 
special consideration of developing countries and considered any subsidies as harmful, 
whatever their effects might be.
Discipline measures concerning internal support in the UR was based on the 
Aggregate Measures of Support (AMS), which is a figure that allows economists to 
express and compare different kinds of government support policies.44 The proposed 
Dunkel plan, that considered as a compromise, had four essential elements:
1)- 1986-88 was considered as a base year; 2)- internal reduction commitment of -20%;
3)- credit from 1986 for reduction of AMS; 4)- proposed duration between 1993-99.
Some of these elements were adopted in the final UR agricultural agreement. For 
example, elements 1 and 2 were accepted, as the 1986-88 base year and the average 
global reduction level of 20% for internal support. It should be realised that although 
the EC endorsed the general idea concerning internal support, it was in practice unac­
ceptable that the income compensation introduced under the CAP reform would be 
subject to a reduction commitment by the EC. In the end, the EC and US agreed to 
exempt those types of income support payments which the EC applies under its 
reformed CAP from the reduction commitments under the AMS. In such a situation it 
was possible to compensate the EC farmers fully for income losses resulting from price 
reductions under the new commitments, 
b- M arket Access
The main element of any discipline in the area of market access is based on the 
concept of tariffication. This means that all non-tariff barriers on agricultural products 
should be transformed into a tariff equivalent and be reduced over time. In this respect 
the base year and duration of transformation into tariff equivalent remained as above,45 
but the level for all tariffs and tariff equivalents was reduced by an average of 36%
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across all product /tariff lines over six years, and was subject to a minimum 15% 
reduction for any one line.46 In addition the EC insisted on applying special safeguard 
mechanisms as an integral part of tariffication.
The EC accepted the overall orientation of tariffication, but objected to the 
Dunkel Plan as not containing any provisions regarding rebalancing. These provisions 
are examples of measures necessary to stabilize imports of cereal alternatives or 
substitutes.
c- Export competition
The discipline on export competition consists of two commitments, one 
concerning budgetary outlays, the other concerning subsidized export quantities;
- base period average was 1986-90, the duration was again 1993-1999,
- and the reduction budget 36% and the quantities was considered the same 24%.
The EC was also ready to make a specific commitment on subsidized exports but 
considered the quantities reduction figure of 24% as too high to implement.
In this area the EC and the US agreed to apply a figure of 21% for the 
quantitative export commitments instead of the 24% proposed in the Dunkel Plan. In 
addition it was agreed to confirm the 1985 EC commitment not to subsidize beef 
exports to the Far East market (South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan and Japan), 
d- Peace Clause
The adoption of ’Peace Clause’ was suggested as a major step to resolve one 
of the most controversial and long standing issues between the EC and US over farm 
subsidies and market access. The EC sought an assurance that the use of different CAP 
instruments could not be challenged in the GATT after the achievement of an agreement 
on the agricultural sector. The EC also believed that such an assurance had not been 
given under the Dunkel Plan.
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To set aside differences, both the EC and US agreed on a text whereby the
application of agricultural policy instruments of each individual country would not be
challenged under Articles XVI and XXIII (nullification and impairment) of the GATT,
on condition that the final disciplines of the UR in the three proposed negotiating areas
were fully respected.47 The text, in substance, lays down that:
Internal support measures are exempt from actions undertaken under Article [XVI] of 
the GATT, as well as actions for nullification and impairment. This latter type of action 
led to the oilseed panel. Export subsidies are exempt from claims under Article 16 of 
the GATT. This eliminates the risk of panels. 48
It should be realised that countervailing duty actions remain possible but are 
subject to conditions which make them unlikely. It is possible to conclude that for the 
first time the instruments of the CAP, comprising internal support measures and export 
refunds measures have been fully recognized in the GATT system . 
e- Oilseeds dispute
As stated earlier oilseed is one of the crucial agricultural commodities for the 
EC and despite the application of CAP measures such as the payment of subsidies to 
EC producers by member states, they have not been able to fulfil domestic demands, 
so are dependent on imports from US and some developing countries.
The EC tried to buy its oilseed products, particularly seed meal and oils 
regardless of their origin. In addition to US products, the EC market attracted Latin 
American countries to compete with US producers. Since under the Lome Conventions, 
the ACP countries benefited from the general exemption of duties, they then became 
competitors of US producers.49 At the same time this situation affected the arrangements 
under the GATT and General System of Trade Preferences. The table below shows 
certain advantages for ACP producers to sell their oilseed products in comparison with 
other schemes.
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Table No. 12
Ec customs duties for oils and vegetable fats50
[ Product coverage ] GATT% GSP % ACP %
Unrefined food oils 10 10 0
-palms
6 4
0
-coconut / palm kernel
10 7
0
Refined or particularly 15 15 0
refined food oils
-palms 14 12 0
-coconut /  palm kernel 15 13 0
Source : FEDIOL, Statistics 1992,51
It should be realised that by applying the new liberalisation of tariff barriers 
under CAP52 the imports from certain developing countries will increase substantially, 
for example the imports of sunflower oil from Argentina and palm oil from Southeast 
Asia.53 In the latest UR negotiations, the EC and US agreed to set aside their differences 
on the basis of the findings of two panels reviewing the oilseed dispute. They agreed 
that the EC would apply the set-aside level resulting from the annual decision of the 
Community in this respect on a base acreage of 5.128.000 ha. Contrary to what the US 
requested, there was no supplementary ceiling in terms of tonnage on total production. 
The EC set-aside for oilseeds can, however, in no case be less than 10%.54 On the basis 
of the results it was possible to terminate a dispute which overshadowed the UR for four 
years in which two major GATT partners came to the verge of a real trade war.
In similar cases the EC countries were very cautious about their agricultural
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trade performance, since any change in the pattern of international trade would have 
effects on their farming populations as well as effects on the ACP countries as their 
major partners in the agricultural sector. But the EC have some commitments to protect 
the ACP countries against the consequences of any change in its CAP.
E- THE JAPANESE PROPOSAL AND VIEWS
In the course of negotiations the Japanese delegation submitted a proposal that 
was described as realistic. Japan stressed the need to establish long-term stability for 
trade in agricultural products and to ensure food security for all countries. In Japans’ 
opinion improved market access should be sought by reducing customs tariffs through 
a request and offer procedure and also by improved criteria for allowing waivers from 
the general principle of the elimination of quantitative restrictions. Japan also believed 
that different kinds of waivers, which allow some countries to maintain import 
restrictions, are a destabilising element, and that the growing concerns of importing 
countries are not sufficiently taken into account by the rules on export restrictions. Japan 
also pointed out that in the case of basic foodstuffs any GATT rules should ensure the 
stability of supply and allow the maintenance of some degree of domestic production.55
although the japanese interests and commitment to agricultural trade negotiations 
were a clear sign of their concern as a leading industrial country over the issue, some 
participants considered them as over-cautious in that the proposal laid too much 
emphasis on agricultural self-reliance, whereas the food security could be obtained by 
opening up and diversifying markets. Despite there objections, especially from the main 
exporters of agricultural commodities, the Japanese proposal had its own significance 
as being realistic to agricultural trade situation in UR negotiations.
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F- THE ROLE OF THE CAIRNS GROUP IN  THE NEGOTIATIONS
The ’ Cairns Group’ had a collective interest in agricultural trade issues and was 
one of the leading groups in the UR agricultural trade negotiations. The group presented 
its fundamental aims in a proposal intending:
a)- to provide the means to achieve fully liberalized trade in agriculture, b)- to abolish 
distorted agricultural policies and lastly, c)- to secure the necessary undertakings under 
strengthened GATT rules and disciplines.
The Cairns Group proposal went further by suggesting a long-term framework 
for agreement and the integration of agriculture into the existing consultation, 
surveillance, and dispute settlement provisions of the GATT.56 
The main elements of the Cairns Group proposals may be summarised as follows:
a)- freezing present subsidies and other distorting measures,
b)- reducing levels of support over a ten-year period by an agreed amount,
c)- introducing new strengthened rules for agricultural trade in the period after the 
phase-down of support,
d)-using PSE (Producer Subsidy Equivalent)-type measures for monitoring progress.57 
It is possible to identify two major elements in the Cairns Group plan:
i)- a long-term framework under which, inter alia, market access restrictions would be 
largely removed (with binding tariffs at low levels or zero) and new GATT rules and 
disciplines that they wished would be agreed for covering the use of all subsidies and 
other government support measures affecting agricultural trade. Later the Cairns group 
elaborated its suggestion for short-term action. They expected countries to agree to a 
'down reducing’ of support in any of the next two years by 10%, as measured by 
Producer Subsidy Equivalents.
ii)-a reform programme involving governmental commitments to phase down aggregate
CHAPTER FIVE SECTION III 272
levels of agricultural support using schedules of reduction for each country to be 
facilitated by a new measurement of aggregate support, perhaps along the lines of the 
PSEs.
The US objective of eliminating trade-distorting support was broadly in 
conformity with the Cairns Group, but the Group argued for short-term actions to 
reduce surpluses and amendments to GATT rules.
Some of the Cairns group proposals were incorporated into the final Agricultural 
Agreement of the UR. Such an adoption of the proposals is a sign of how a strong 
coalition of individual countries with the same aims and interests may be able to change 
the rules. It can be a good lesson for developing countries in their common goal for 
more preferential and favourable treatment by industrial countries.
III. Developing countries
Considering the large number and sheer diversity of developing countries, it is 
quite clear that in early negotiating rounds the GATT system failed to provide them 
with a secure platform to raise their voices. It was later, in the course of the TR, that 
some encouraging steps were taken to consider their interests.
Greater stability of agricultural markets is in the interest of the developing 
countries. The industrial countries have arranged to cut down barriers to their imports 
to the level applied to other industrial countries. The EC also was in favour of 
improving the rules governing food aid since 1971. As a result each importer has been 
allowed to set quotas and to select the eligible countries for such preferential treatment.
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The exclusion of agriculture from most disciplines has especially affected 
developing countries because agriculture often constitutes their largest sector. On the 
other hand agricultural negotiations in the UR was dominated by commodities of export 
interest to industrialised countries, whereas tropical products exported by developing 
countries were dealt with under a separate trading regime.58
The UR Ministerial Declaration again reiterated that special and more favourable 
treatment be accorded to developing countries in accordance with the terms of the 1979 
Framework Agreement. To apply this as a rule the developing countries expected more 
clarification on certain issues in the UR .
For example, they were not certain whether the negotiations would change 
GATT balance-of-payments provisions, or the method of their application. Some 
industrialised countries argued for the abolition of both Article XII and XVIII-B on the 
ground that in a flexible exchange rate world, neither of these Articles is needed, but 
at the same time they recognized the improbability of persuading the vast majority of 
participating countries in the negotiations, especially developing countries, of the 
beneficial consequences of such action.59 Perhaps the removal of some relatively 
beneficial provisions to developing countries may not only solve a problem, but may 
also widen the gap between industrial and developing countries in the world.
In practice, the developing countries actively participated both on drafting the 
UR text and also in the course of the main negotiations. There were large contributions 
to the negotiations by such countries as Brazil, India, South Korea, Singapore and 
others.60 Contrary to previous expectations developing countries proved that they could 
influence the negotiations and indeed exercise their rights and obligations.They were 
also involved in many joint proposals.
Despite the fact that before and during the UR the developing countries were not
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treated as full and equal partners to the GATT system, in the course of the UR 
nonetheless more than 70 countries took autonomous trade liberalization measures to 
reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers. This goes to the heart of two critical questions 
about the future of the global trading system. The first is to evaluate what developing 
countries have gained from the final package of measures in the Round and also what 
developing countries should do now that the Round is completed in order to play a 
strengthened role in the international trading system ?
A - THE M AIN  PROPOSALS
In addition to the industrial countries’ proposals and commitments towards 
developing countries, there have been a number of proposals by developing countries 
that received particular attention in the UR that may be categorised as:
(1) Market a c ce ss  and tariff harmonization
Egypt, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco and Peru tabled a formula-cut approach to 
market access, incorporating factors for tariff harmonization, with the objective of 
having zero or low tariffs in developed-country markets. They also requested an 
improvement in the preferential treatment scheme as well as a total elimination of 
internal consumption and excise taxes on export products of interest to developing 
countries on an agreed time scale.
(2) Technical assistan ce
There were a number of proposals calling for technical assistance to developing 
countries. The improvement of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, eradicating plant 
and animal disease were particularly mentioned.61 Further assistance was demanded in 
the form of advice, credit, donations, training, and equipment having direct effects on 
market access for developing countries’ products.
(3) Increase in financial resources for net food importing countries
In a global liberalisation scheme, the net food importing countries are the
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potential losers. Considering the proposals by the Cairns Group to establish a com­
pensatory scheme for developing countries’ losses as the result of application of 
industrial countries protectionist policies, some developing countries (Egypt, Morocco, 
Jamaica and Peru) tabled a proposal that increased financial resources be made available 
to net food importing developing countries. This was proposed to reduce the burden of 
increased import prices resulting from global agricultural reform, and to enhance their 
agricultural productivity and production.
The Jamaican delegation highlighted the interest of net importers of agricultural 
products or those who are heavily dependent on such imports. The application of the 
UR final agreement on agriculture and reduction in the level of agricultural support and 
protection brings more chaos and disarray in the short term for food importing countries 
since they will pay higher prices for their food commodities exports from industrial 
countries. They will pay particularly higher prices for sugar, red meat and dairy 
products imports.62
In a situation where net food importing developing countries should pay higher 
prices for their imports, they proposed certain measures to offset unexpected higher bills 
as follows:
i)- enhancing purchasing capacity through concessionary sales, including increased 
availability of low-cost export credits and grants;
ii)- increasing [the] export earning capacity of net food-importing developing countries, 
through import market access conditions for their agricultural exports, by immediate tariff 
and para-tariff reductions, and phasing out or elimination of non-tariff measures or trade 
-distorting support;
iii)- increased food aid, through inter alia, a flexible approach to the usual marketing 
requirements, and triangular arrangements which safeguard and promote production and 
exports of developing countries;and
iv)- flexibility in structural adjustment programmes which are negotiated with interna­
tional financial organizations.63
In addition the developing countries proposed the establishment of a ’ multilateral
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funding arrangement The main capital funds in this system were to be contributed by 
industrial countries who will be curtailing their subsidies as a result of negotiations. The 
fund would remain in force until the net food-importing countries adjust their internal 
trading policies to comply with the new market situation.
(4) The lo ss  o f preferential a c ce ss  opportunities
In case of a general liberalisation of market access opportunities in the Round, 
the developing countries who had previously preferential access would lose their 
advantages. This was a point for consideration for preferential receivers, mostly 
developing countries. Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala suggested that these losses 
should be considered as a credit or contribution made by the preference- receiving 
developing countries to the general liberalization programmes. In such a situation 
preference-giving countries should consider the need to increase their assistance to 
developing countries in compensation for the loss of preferential access to their markets. 
It should be realised that, among the members of regional economic unions, the scope 
for preferential arrangements will be limited to the extent that common external tariffs 
are reduced. These regional arrangements may require external assistance to strengthen 
their systems by other means.64
These proposals show a general awareness amongst developing countries and 
imply very different consequences for the nature of any future GATT rules and 
discipline on agricultural trade. The range from proposing a radical fundamental change 
or re-writing of the GATT provisions on agricultural trade, to lesser expectations for 
short -term commitments on agricultural support measures coupled with a common 
approach for interpretation of the existing GATT regulations in this area. At the same 
time they include the intention or common goals and collective approaches of their 
drafters, mainly developing countries.
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A- DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CHALLENGES IN OTHER SECTORS
(1) Textile and clothing
Two of the issues of particular importance to developing countries textiles and 
clothing. They were excluded from the recent GATT negotiating framework under a 
quasi-official status with the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) as the most extensive 
example. In the final UR negotiations many contracting parties were obliged to improve 
their trade situation in order to pave the way for the integration of this sector into the 
GATT system after the UR negotiations. Developing countries who are the main 
exporters of textiles and fibre products intended to dismantle the MFA (which expired 
in 1991), and re-integrate it into the GATT system. 65
In addition to developing countries, major industrial countries, particularly the 
US, Italy and Portugal, have vital interests in the textile sector. It is a politically 
sensitive area since it employs thousands of workers, often living in depressed 
regions.66
Despite its vital role in trade and the prosperity of many developing countries, 
sometimes heavily dependent on its exports earnings, the political pressure of industrial 
countries forced the textile and clothing sector to remain outside the framework of the 
GATT negotiations. Even if industrial countries liberalised agriculture and textiles in 
the UR, in return they expected the developing countries to open their markets to the 
products which in turn benefit the providers of services and capital, and to furnish better 
protection for intellectual property rights. 67
On the area of new issues, as a distinguished expert in developing countries’ 
affairs, Mr. Bhagwati68 has pointed out, a grand compromise expects the developing 
countries to swallow serious misgivings about services, TRIMs and TRIPs, misgivings 
that have not entirely to do with trade. The third world has good reasons to regard these 
issues as outside the scope of traditional give-and-take on trade policy. On top of all
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this, delivering the extensive compromise would be greatly complicated, precisely 
because it cut across the negotiating structure of the talks.69
(2) Arrangements on Tropical Products
Trade in tropical products accounts for 5% of world trade. For least developed 
countries this means a large share of their total export earnings,70 since most of them 
are economically dependent on the foreign sale earnings of a single commodity. 71
After many discussions on how to tackle this sector, one of the final proposals 
was the request for and offer of a procedure which seemed to be the most appropriate 
for such products.
In the negotiating group on tropical products two separate export-interest lists 
were submitted. They classified some 300 products of interest to thirteen developing 
countries in Africa, the Caribbean, Pacific and Central America. On their side the 
industrialized countries also tried to ensure that such classification did not influence 
domestic producers in importing countries of similar products. Consequently, a number 
of important products were excluded from the list. This happened partly because of the 
specific nature of tropical products, there was no classification for them throughout the 
years.72 Since many of the agricultural and fishery products that are subject of industrial 
countries’ trading interests generate still some ambiguity; it is no surprise if tropical 
products are not yet properly categorised.
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IV. THE MAIN ISSUES IN AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS
Agriculture has been called the ’linchpin o f the Round\  Agreement by the 
industrial countries to negotiate on agriculture was one of the predominant factors in 
bringing the developing countries to the negotiating table and determine their blessing 
for several elements in the industrial package.73
In relation to internal support, disagreements remain on how to define the 
instrument for reduction commitments affecting ’ domestic support'. On market access, 
there was some progress on the method to convert non-tariff measures to tariffs, a 
policy that was favoured by the US. However, not all the participants agreed to such 
alteration. In the area of export subsidies, there was some progress in identifying 
policies that were included in the final arrangement to the round.
A - THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE IN  MID-TERM REVIEW.
The Mid-Term Review was held in Montreal in December 1988. Many important 
issues such as agricultural trade problems were discussed, and some agreements were 
reached (except, agriculture, intellectual property, textiles and safeguards measures). The 
preparation of a work programme for the final negotiations was one of the main issues 
on the agenda. In addition, three major negotiating areas in agricultural trade received 
particular attention: domestic support, market access, and export competition.
From the beginning, two different concepts marked the preparation of the mid­
term review:
1)- The US and the Cairns Group favoured a substantial mid-term negotiation beginning 
with first conclusions and agreements, the so called ’early harvest ’ particularly in the 
field of agricultural trade. 2)- In order to bridge the wide gap between US and EC
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views in agricultural trade, the Cairns Group offered a sensible compromise, consisting 
o f both short-term and long-term policy reforms. In the short run, it proposed that the 
multilateral trade negotiation should call for a standstill74 approach on subsidy 
programmes and then a subsequent schedule to scale back both production and export 
subsidies over a fixed period of time. The long term approach required that agreement 
on any form of trade distorting practices should be covered by the liberalization 
commitment and elaborated to determine how the level of subsidies should be 
calculated.75 The Cairns approach was incorporated into the limited policy reforms 
established in both the US and the EC in recent years.76
The final package of the mid-term review was generally interpreted as a 
balanced and acceptable approach on the following basis:77
a)- both industrial and developing countries offered a first set of concessions in the field 
of tropical products. The latter group expected further concessions to be made at the end 
of the negotiations, b)- in the field of tariff and non-tariff measures they agreed on 
further significant tariff reductions during the Round and some specific criteria were to 
be established for the elimination of non-tariff measures, c)- in the sensitive area of 
agricultural trade, significant progress was achieved on a short term freeze in the overall 
support level and a first reduction 'down payment' of the relevant levels, counting from 
the beginning of the Round was agreed.
The TNC finally accepted the formula that the long-term objective of the 
agricultural negotiations was to provide for substantial progressive reduction in support 
and to sustain protection over an agreed period of time.78
It is possible to summarise the mid-term agreement as follows:
a)- not to exceed current levels of support and protection: b)- to guarantee market 
access in 1989 and 1990, equal to the average levels applying in 1987 and 1988;
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c)- to freeze support to producers, expressed in terms of national currencies (the ECU 
for the EC), at the levels applicable on the date of the agreement.
The EC was asked to provide specific measures to assist the developing 
countries. All these attempts highlighted the intention of many participants to reach a 
consensus in the final phase of negotiations. However it was as the result of unsuccess­
ful attempts to reach consensus after the mid-term review, particularly with conflicting 
interests in agricultural trade, that the UR negotiations were prolonged.79 
B- THE M AIN  REASONS FOR LONG DELAYS IN  THE FINAL STAGES OF UR.
Referring to the long delays in the UR negotiations, Carla Hills, the top US trade 
official at the time stated: ’The UR is adrift’ ...to some extent she was right, but who 
was responsible? The most serious deadlock in the Round was over the conflict in 
agricultural policies of the US and the EC. The core of the issue was the US and some 
other participants demanded that the EC eliminate its export subsidies and import 
controls on agricultural products. The EC, however, was not effectively able to do this 
without a drastic reform of its internal agricultural policy involving extremely 
controversial and political issues common to almost all EC member countries. Until the 
agricultural reform was settled internally, the EC would not be able to agree with the 
rest of the world on its agricultural export policy.
The US authorities decided to continue until 1993,80 but their negotiating position 
created some political controversy that even had some effects on the US political 
campaigns (Presidential election). In addition some delays had specific linkage to the 
consideration and approval of the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by 
the US Congress. This is why the final conclusion came after such Congressional ap­
proval.
In relation to the overall results of the Round, three scenarios with legal 
implications were predicted by commentators. 81
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i)- First was the idealistic view that the EC might come to an internal agreement on 
agricultural policy,82 but, there were few signs that the EC could come to such a 
settlement. The main reasons to support this view were numerous internal pressures and 
protests over the cuts on agricultural support in major EC countries during the crucial 
phase of the negotiations, particularly the later stages.
ii)- The second scenario centred on the US and other participants lowering their 
expectations for the quality of a UR consensus.
iii)- In the third scenario a substantial collapse of the Round was predicted.83
The conclusion of the Round and the final deal in agriculture ended those 
ambiguities but there is no assurance that it will not generate tensions in future over the 
agricultural problems of the developing countries in the GATT system. The deal does 
not significantly rectify world agricultural trade distortions, and may introduce new 
areas of ambiguity into the GATT, requiring more dispute settlement practices. For 
example, putting more restrictions on domestic subsidy levels would be added to the 
ongoing issues over market access and export subsidies, as areas of existing controversy.
(1) Difficulties on dispute settlement procedures
Bringing more operationally effective rules and disciplines for agriculture was 
one of the prime objectives of the Round. It is why most of the proposals on agriculture 
called for stronger and enforceable international rules governing trade in agricultural 
products. The dispute settlement mechanism is thereby one of the central issues in 
adopting effective rules.84
The mid-term review of the Round added significant interim amendments to the 
dispute settlement process on May 1st, 1989 and these were applied until the conclusion 
of the Round as a trial period. These amendments corrected many of the procedural
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weaknesses in the dispute settlement process, eliminating opportunities to delay the 
establishment of a panel or to delay the proceedings after a panel is established.
In addition to other progress in this area; relating to sub-articles 35 and 36 of the 
final UR Agreement on Agriculture (FAA) regarding sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations, it was agreed that " th e  C ontracting  P a rtie s  sha ll a p p ly  to  co n su lta tio n s  a n d  th e  
s e t t le m e n t  o f  d is p u te s  u n d e r  th is  d ec is io n" Sub-article 36 requests the panels to seek 
technical advice from the experts chosen or independent bodies when their decisions 
involve scientific or technical issues. It is possible to conclude that such practices could 
assist developing countries normally lacking the assistance or consultation of experts in 
this area, otherwise any wrong or misleading information regarding their export products 
may easily have the same effect as a sanitary and phytosanitary obstacle.
A sound dispute settlement mechanism would add to a more transparent trading
environment. It would help every participant to get a fair share, especially weaker
parties with no other retaliatory instrument to enforce their terms. In such a situation
rule oriented policies would flourish, otherwise as Carla Hills indicated:
Without internationally agreed rules in the enormous areas of commerce where now 
there are no rules, trade disputes could grow into costly trade wars,.... 85
When rules are weak or non-existent, trade disputes may turn into trade wars;
foreign sales are frustrated and inefficient industries maintained at taxpayers’ expense 
through subsidies. It is why every effort should be made to build a proper and rule 
oriented dispute settlement system to safeguard the application of GATT rules and 
decisions.
Despite these improvements, it is still possible to hamper the dispute settlement 
process by blocking the adoption of panel reports by the losing party, in the absence of 
effective procedures to ensure that there is prompt compliance with panel findings. The
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ability of the losing party to block the winning party’s request to retaliate in the absence 
o f compliance is another weakness. The US also has sought agreement on restricted 
time limits for the dispute settlement process consistent with the time frame permitted 
under Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, as amended.86
(3) The Blair House negotiations
In November 1992, the EC Commission forwarded to the Council a detailed 
report on the outcome of the negotiations at that stage and, in particular, the con­
troversial negotiations with US at Blair House. The report contained important and 
crucial areas of negotiations on:
- access to the EC market -internal support -rebalancing strategy
- commitments on exports -peace clause
Since the major task of the negotiations were focused on the EC disputes with 
US over agricultural support in EC, the main discussion in the Council was over the 
compatibility of the Blair House Agreement with the CAP reforms. It was realised that 
the exclusion of the compulsory payments to farmers under CAP was a major and 
essential improvement of the Draft Final Act. It was indicated further that this is part 
of the global reduction in support, that led to further flexibility of the EC in the final 
stage of negotiations. Other issues such as stocks and duration of the peace clause with 
the US was further raised and led to the final Brussels negotiations in December 1993.
(4) The need for an agricultural trade reform in the UR.
For many years, the EC and the US have been massively subsidizing their 
agricultural exports, particularly in the cereal sector. At the same time they raised 
barriers to food imports. In this situation they have been hitting consumers twice, 
through, a)- high prices for agricultural commodities, by protecting national products;
b)- high taxes due to subsidies. Some other countries banned any import of selected 
agricultural commodities.
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Who are the losers in this game? Certainly those competitive farming nations 
(mainly developing countries) squeezed out of the potential international markets by a 
combination of trade restrictions and different forms of subsidies and barriers.
The FAA was designed to reform trade in agriculture, to bring sense to this 
politically and economically important sector. One of the main aims of the negotiating 
committee was to inject some fair competition in the agricultural trade sector and 
discourage governmental support that generally brings trade distortions.87 How would 
this be carried out to create a balance between the conflicting interests? Three measures 
considered by the participants may be cited here:
First, opening of national markets to international competition through the 
replacement of non-tariff measures with progressively reduced normal customs duties. 
In this situation consumers would benefit from lower food prices.
Secondly, criteria should be set for a progressive reduction in government aids 
that generally lead to over-production and surpluses. Such surpluses should either be 
disposed of through export subsidies to international markets, or destroyed. Govern­
ments could continue to support farmers’ incomes, but in a manner which would not 
stimulate over-production.
The third measure imposes new disciplines on export competition. Progressive 
reductions in the amounts governments pay for these subsidies and the volume of 
subsidized exports would bring fairness to international markets and provide opportun­
ities for competitive agricultural exporters.
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V. THE FINAL PACKAGE OF MEASURES IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE
The 550 page document embodying the final text of the UR Agreement spells 
out the results of the negotiations since the launch of the Round by the Punta del Este 
Ministerial Declaration.The Final Act covers all negotiating areas cited in the 
Declaration with two main exceptions. The first is the result of the ’market access 
negotiations' which left it to individual countries to make binding commitments to 
reduce or eliminate specific tariffs and non-tariff barriers to merchandise trade.88 The 
second exception is the ’initial commitments' on liberalization of trade in services. 
These commitments on liberalization are also subject to individual national schedules 
records.
The conclusion of the Round negotiations opened the way to substantial increase 
in trade flows among the 117 participating countries in all different sectors. It opens up 
worldwide markets by an average tariff cut of around 40% that should lead to a boost 
in the world economy by hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of century.
A - THE SCOPE OF 'UR TEXT ON AGRICULTURE ' 89
The Agriculture Agreement is largely based on the proposed Draft Final Act 
tabled by the GATT former Director General, Arthur Dunkel, in December 1991.90 The 
agricultural package of measures is conceived as a first step in a long-term reform 
process designed to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system, as 
agreed by Ministers at the UR Mid-Term Review.
The scope of coverage for agricultural negotiations concerns all raw and 
processed products, with special priority given to sectors with structural surplus and 
sectors where serious disruptions may be expected. The final text on agriculture has four 
elements:
a)- a basic 'Final Agreement on Agriculture' (FAA), comprises thirteen parts, which 
contain 21 Articles. The Agreement also contains 5 Annexes that became an integral 
part of the Agreement.
b)- an agreement on the modalities for establishing specific binding commitments under
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the reform programme,
c)- a decision on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures;
d)-a declaration on measures to assist the net food-importing developing countries who 
will lose by the reform programme. The last three sections are supplementary to the first 
final Agricultural Agreement.
B- THE M AIN  ISSUES UNDER CONSIDERATION
(1) Market Access
Market access is one of the most sensitive political issues in agricultural trade
negotiations and an area of conflict especially amongst industrial countries.The
prominent problems in this area are the EC variable levy, the US section 22 waiver
(used to protect dairy products, sugar, cotton, and peanuts), the Japanese prohibition
against rice imports and Canada’s import quotas on dairy, poultry, and egg products;
all voluntary export restraints, including those periodically negotiated on beef exported
to the US and currently on manioc to the EC; and a host of other tariff and non-tariff
barriers around the world.
It is possible to distinguish two common features in these policies. First, they
isolate producers in those countries both from competition and from changes in the
world markets. Secondly, they help maintain internal prices above world prices. Article
4 of the final UR text on agriculture sets out two criteria in the area of market access
for participants as follows:
1 .Market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and reductions 
of tariffs, and to other market access commitments as specified therein.
2. Participants undertake not to resort to, or revert to, any measures which have been 
converted into ordinary customs duties pursuant to concessions under this Agreement.
These criteria are very general and they do not cover all details for implementa­
tion of the market access measures. However, the JAgreement on Modalities for the 
Establishment o f  Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme sets 
specific binding commitments under the agricultural reform programme. The
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commitments apply to measures maintained by participants relating to products that are 
listed in Annex 1, that relate to agricultural products.
The modalities for market access in agricultural products can be classified as:
a)- Those agricultural products that are currently subject to ordinary custom duties only. 
In this situation, the reduction commitment shall be implemented on the bound duty 
level or, in the case of unbound duties, the base date of application is considered as 1st 
September 1986.
b)- The second category are those agricultural products that are currently subject to 
certain border measures other than ordinary customs duties. The reduction commitment 
specified in paragraph 5 (the third category here) shall be implemented on customs 
duties resulting from the conversion of such ’tariffication’ measures.
c)- The third category covers ordinary custom duties, including those resulting from 
tariffication, which shall be reduced, starting from year 1993 to the year 1999, on a 
simple average basis by 36% with a minimum rate of reduction of 15% per annum for 
each tariff line. All agricultural customs duties would be bound in the GATT. It is also 
agreed that in case of an import surge or shipments at prices below a certain reference 
level, importing countries could impose additional duties under a special safeguard 
clause. The current access opportunities would be maintained. Where there are currently 
no significant imports, minimum access opportunities of 3% of domestic consumption 
would be established, expanding to 5% by 1999.91
In a nutshell it is possible to summarise the FAA measures in this area as 
establishing that all import restrictions are to be converted to tariffs and reduced by 36% 
over six years. The base period is considered as 1986-88. Minimum access requirement 
of 3% based on domestic consumption (1986-88), rising to 5% by the end of the 
agreement. It was also agreed that the current market access to opportunities to be
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mentioned.
The Agreement on modalities also indicates that the reductions in ordinary 
customs duties and exceptions for market access opportunities shall be implemented in 
equal instalments. It will help the contracting parties to establish their specific binding 
commitments under the UR reform programme, and avoid any ambiguity and confusion 
regarding the implementation of access opportunities.
(2) Domestic Support
Domestic support measures were discussed in the Montreal mid-term agreement 
which called for a ’substantial progressive reduction’ in protection and support. There 
was a question as to what ’substantial reduction’ really means, since the EC and the US 
had different interpretations and expectations of it. The EC assumed that a substantial 
progressive reduction meant an end to the US and Cairns Group demands for complete 
elimination of all trade distorting domestic policies. In return, the US delegates insisted 
that substantial reductions still meant reducing to zero.92
The next question was how the reductions were to be implemented, monitored 
and enforced, and to what degree internal supports should be reduced and which specific 
policies and commodities should be subject to reductions.
Some believed that a search for a complete prohibition against trade-distorting 
domestic subsidies in agriculture was not realistic. Such a prohibition would liberalise 
agricultural trade to a point well beyond other sectors, and that seemed unlikely.
If the idea of adjustment to domestic policies were not implemented, the question 
remained as to how the cuts in domestic support policies were to be made and how deep 
they might be. This disregards the vital needs of rural communities in the developing 
world who are heavily dependent on agriculture and rely on internal support measures. 
These are two parallel elements in a scale.
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a- The final agreement on Domestic Support
Article six of the final UR Agreement on Agriculture is devoted to internal or 
domestic support. Under these commitments;
1)- The participants bound themselves to follow the schedule of commitments that apply 
to all domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers with the exception 
of domestic measures which are not subject to reduction in terms of the criteria set out 
in Annex 2 to the final Agreement.93 The commitments are based on an Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (AMS) and of equivalent commitments.
2)- The second Paragraph refers to two types of exception to domestic support reduction 
commitments policies for developing countries, otherwise such measures are to be 
applicable to them; namely: investment subsidies, generally available to agriculture in 
developing countries and agricultural input subsidies, generally available to low-income 
or resource-poor producers in developing countries. The main reason for applying them 
in developing country is to encourage diversification and sometimes even develop away 
from growing illicit narcotic crops.
Paragraph 4 relates to the calculation of the Aggregate Measurement of Support, 
and states th a t"For developing country members, the de minimis percentage under this 
paragraph shall be 10 percent."9*
It was agreed that investment subsidies are to be available only for a small
proportion of low income and poor farmers in the developing world. In comparison with 
different varieties of internal support policies in industrial countries (such as income 
support, set aside land schemes etc.) such investment subsidies may not be considered 
as an effective measure for supporting developing countries farmers. In addition, 
investment is a common way of generating support in any system and since it is part 
of states’ development policies, it could not be treated as a strong supportive measure
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for developing countries. The ability of developing countries to provide such investment 
subsidies in large scale is a question, {k}
Article 7 of the final UR text in agriculture lays out some general disciplines on 
domestic support policies.
In summary the agreed reduction on internal support is 20% over a six year 
period, based on the total Aggregate Measure of Support, and the base period is 
considered as 1986-88. What is significant in the case of least-developed countries under 
the final Agreement is that they were exempted from export subsidies reduction 
commitments. The reduction commitments for other developing countries are less 
severe, specifically not less than two-thirds of the reductions mentioned above. The 
implementation period could be extended by them to a maximum of 10 years. In 
recognizing their need to encourage agricultural and rural development, developing 
countries are exempted from reduction commitments with respect to generally available 
input subsidies and investment aids. In analysing domestic support measures in the 
Round, it is possible to divide them into two categories of measures namely ’Amber 
policies' or trade distorting policies that are considered harmful and 'Green policies’ 
meaning those policies which have a minimal impact on overall trade of participants. 
The draft text contains a list of export subsidy measures that are subject to reduction 
commitments. A ’green list' has been established of subsidies that will not be subject 
to retaliatory action by other parties, provided they are applied in conformity with the 
new rules on subsidies. On the other hand the reductions subject to ’amber policies' 
should be carried out on the base of a time schedule.95
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Table NO. 13
DOMESTIC SUPPORT POLICIES IN URUGUAY ROUND
AMBER BOX (amber policies or trade distorting policies)
[subject to reduction commitments]
20% global reduction in expenditure on domestic support for agriculture compared to 1986-88 
levels by the end of 6 years implementation period.
Industrial countries
Amber support would be a subject to a reduction on quantity of subsidised export products by 20% between 
1993-99 96
Developing countries= 13.3 % reduction of total AMS.
Least- developed countries = no reduction
GREEN BOX (green policies)
Policies with a minimal impact on trade
General government services such as: support for research and development 
subsidies, disease control, infrastructure, environment protection and food 
security; in addition to direct payments to producers such as ’decoupled’ forms of 
income support, structural adjustment assistance, direct payments under 
environmental programmes and under regional assistance programmes.
Source: The table is my own initiative, using figures from sources specified in the table.
As this table No. 13 indicates there are different disciplines for less-developed 
and developing countries in comparison to industrial countries. But developing countries 
reduction commitments vary according to their level of development and the degree of
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competition within the specific sector concerned. In addition the subsidies code allows 
for ’graduation’ for developing countries from least developed to developing stage, 
according to a per-capita income criterion.97
One may argue that as the majority of developing and less developed countries 
do not have many of these practical support measures for their agricultural products they 
may eventually affect only a number of small number of the more advanced developing 
countries.
(3) Export Subsidies and Competition
As referred to in Chapter Two, the special exemption of agriculture from the 
general prohibition against export subsidies in Article XVI of the GATT has been a 
source of disputes in international agricultural trade. The exemption was a major source 
of distrust and contention for the GATT dispute settlement process, and a sticking point 
of US-EC negotiations in the past few rounds of trade negotiations. It has provoked 
political confrontation.
The UR response was to phase out and then to prohibit all export subsidies for 
either raw or processed agricultural products. There was a call for additional refinement 
of Article XVI:3. involving a definition of what was an ’equitable share ’ of the world 
market. It might have involved some market-sharing formula of one type or another, 
a- The final agreement on export competition and subsidy commitments.
The final UR text in agriculture regarding export competition is divided into two 
different sections: Article 8 relates to export competition commitments and recommends 
that ’each participant undertakes not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in 
conformity with this agreement and with its commitments as specified in its schedule 
of export competition commitments’. Article 9 is devoted to export subsidy reduction 
commitments. It consists of four sub-Articles. The first sub-Article counts six kinds of
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export subsidies that are subject to reduction commitments under the Agreement:
(a) The provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including 
payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, to 
a co-operative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board, 
contingent on export performance.
(b) The sale or disposal for export by governments or other agencies of non­
commercial stocks of agricultural products at a price lower than the comparable price 
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market.
(c) Payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed from the 
proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural 
product from which the exported product is derived.
(d) The provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural 
products (other than widely available export promotion and advisory services) including 
handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the costs of international 
transport and freight.
(e) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated 
by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments.
(f) Subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported 
products.
In brief it was agreed that the volume of subsidies exports is to be reduced by 
21% over six years (base period 1986-90). It was also decided that the budgetary 
expenditure on export subsidies would simultaneously be reduced by 36% over six 
years.
These provisions illustrate the very elaborate and hidden ways that industrial 
countries support export promotion programmes. It is evident how such methods may 
be applied, for example sub Article (b) forbids the sale or disposal of non-commercial 
stocks of agricultural product....in the domestic market. This happened in many 
developing countries, where even if under the food-aid banner, stocks could be harmful 
to domestic producers.
There is concern about sub-Article (e), regarding possible discrimination by 
governments on internal transport and freight charges for export shipments of exported
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goods against domestic shipment. Considering the bulky nature of agricultural products 
and the possible need for cool containers, this can amount to a substantial cost for 
exporters. Sub-Article (e) discourages or seeks a possible reduction98 of such assistance 
by governments since it has the same effect as an export subsidy.
Sub-Article 4 of Article 9 indicates that, during the implementation period, 
developing countries shall not be required to undertake commitments in respect of 
export subsidies listed in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) above on condition that the export 
subsidies should not be applied in a manner which would circumvent reduction 
commitments.
With few exceptions, the majority of developing countries are generally not in 
a position to assist their agricultural producers on issues subject to the above sub- 
paragraphs (d) and (e). Therefore these exemptions from reduction commitments is a 
realisation of developing countries’ poor export position.
(4) Health and Sanitary Standards
One of the main goals of the UR was to reduce or eliminate trade distortions in 
agricultural trade by challenging national agricultural policies that are usually the major 
cause of distortion in production, trade and consumption.
The negotiations involved a major effort to reduce the adverse trade effects of 
national health and sanitary standards for food and agricultural products. This arises 
from a belief that these standards have been, and will increasingly become, a major non- 
tariff barrier that threatens the free movement of agricultural products .
Article 14 of the FAA refers to the intention of participants to give effect to the 
agreement on ’Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’. At the same time the main 
objective of the negotiating group in this area was to harmonize the existing national 
standards so as to reduce their negative impact on trade. Perhaps one of the main
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instruments with which to achieve such an objective is to develop an effective dispute 
settlement mechanism within the GATT regarding health and sanitary regulations. The 
main concerns in this area are devoted to scientific evidence and judgment in the dispute 
settlement procedure."
One of the most controversial cases in recent years concerning public health was 
the dispute between the US and the EC over the use of hormones in beef production 
which has withstood resolution for many years. Recent cases in this area are the so- 
called BSE or mad-cow disease in cattle, salmonella in poultry products in the EC, 
particularly the UK. It should be realised that at the present time, consumers in rich 
countries have become increasingly sensitive to real or perceived health hazards, and 
these issues have taken on a new complex and political dimension in international trade 
deals.
In addition to Article 14 of the FAA, part B of the main ’Uruguay Round Text 
on Agriculture’ or the ’Agreement on Modalities for the Establishment o f  Specific 
Binding Commitments Under the Reform Programme ’ is of particular importance. The 
Agreement comprises 46 paragraphs (or sub-Articles) setting down the grounds for the 
elaboration of rules for the application of the provisions of the GATT which relate to 
the use of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions relating to 
Article XX(b). It should be realized that it is one of the most elaborate parts of the 
agreement, covering different angles of the problem.
This part of the Agreement marks one of the most important decisions in the UR 
and considers the protection against risks to human health or life, or animal100 and plant 
health or life. The main desire of the negotiating committee was to establish a multilat­
eral framework of rules and disciplines to guide the adoption, development and the 
enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in order to minimize their negative
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Paragraph 7 seeks to ensure that the use of sanitary measures by contracting 
parties does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between contracting parties 
where identical or similar conditions prevail. It also discourages the application of these 
measures in a manner that would constitute a disguised restriction on internal trade.
It is possible to conclude that the drafters realised the importance and sensitivity 
of this area and the possible abuse of its rules to create an unnecessary discrimination 
or obstacle to free trade .
Paragraph 22 may assist developing countries by providing:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a contracting party may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the base of available 
pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organizations as 
well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other contracting parties.101
This is an indication that scientific information from international bodies and 
those applied by other contracting parties could be a useful base for a developing 
countries’ approach. In order to harmonize the sanitary and phytosanitary measures as 
widely as possible, members are encouraged to base their measures on international 
standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist.
(5) Other important measures in the Final Agreement 
a- Consideration of developing countries problems
Several paragraphs in the FAA refer to the problems of developing countries. 
These references addressed only a small proportion of developing countries’ trade 
problems. Since many of them are not able to meet requirements in this area and to 
combat unnecessary obstacle, the FAA devised some safeguards in favour of developing
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countries. For example paragraph 20 urges the contracting parties to:
avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate 
in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.102
There is another step in this area that seeks the co-operation of the contracting 
parties in the ’Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures', to develop 
guidelines to further the practical implementation of this provision.103
Paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 set out regulations regarding the ’Adaptation to 
regional conditions, including pest-or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence’.
Paragraph 29 is based on the participants’ desires to facilitate the provisions of 
technical assistance to other contracting parties, especially developing countries, either 
bilaterally or through other international organizations. Such assistance may cover 
processing technologies, research and infrastructure, including the establishment of 
national regulatory bodies, and may take the form of advice, credits, donations and 
grants, for the purpose of technical expertise, training and equipment to allow such 
countries to comply with sanitary or phytosanitary protection in their export markets.
A possible implementation of these provisions will open new windows of 
opportunity for developing countries to cope with their problems, for example assistance 
in the area of processing technologies, including research and infrastructure, is one of 
the key areas in which developing countries are in vital need. In addition, the 
establishment of national regulatory bodies presenting advice, credits, training and grants 
is essential. However, it remains to be seen whether these regulations will be 
implemented, and the extent of their application. Since the developing countries lack 
technical and practical instruments to assess or examine their various needs any positive 
step even the possibility of proper consultations, will help them to solve their problems.
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b- The indication of special and differential treatment for developing countries
Article 15, Paragraphs 31, 32, 33, and 34 emphasise the need for special and 
differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries. Paragraph 32 does 
not prescribe exemption but indicates ’ longer time frames' for these countries to comply 
with the newly erected obstacles on sanitary or phytosanitary measures by industrial 
countries. It would have been better if these periods were defined in a more concise 
manner. Otherwise, some may interpret the comparably shorter implementation period 
as the intention of the drafters. As indicated in Chapter One, any small change in a 
production line may take a long period of time,104 especially in developing countries.
Paragraph 46 is a response to the lack of a time-frame in paragraph 32, since it 
exempts the least developed countries from applying these rules for a period of 2 years. 
It also allows other developing countries to delay the application of this decision, other 
than paragraphs 23 and 27 of the same agreement:
for 2 years following the date of entry into force of this decision with respect to their 
existing sanitary or phytosanitary measures affecting importation or imported products 
where such application is prevented by lack of technical expertise, technical 
infrastructure or resources.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and their possible abuse, act as a strong
obstacle to the export promotion programmes of developing countries. It is vital to 
consider their position and chose the available resources to combat such difficulties. A 
simple example in this areas is in pharmaceutical goods, pesticide and fertiliser products. 
The developing countries face a dilemma here. On the one hand, there is increasing 
demand for the use of certain substances whose uses have been banned in industrial 
countries for many years because of health hazards. On the other hand, the products of 
developing countries sometimes face regulations which ban the importation of 
horticultural or agricultural products in which certain categories of pesticides have been
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used in their production chain, pesticides which are imported from industrial countries, 
or received free under development aid. This is an unprecedented obstacle for 
developing countries agricultural products. What these countries need for the moment 
is to be vigilant and to avoid the repetition of the negative results of unlimited use of 
pesticides and generic hormones that was practised in the past, and had some negative 
results in industrial countries.
(6) Further elaboration of the Peace Clause
The Clause states that agricultural policy measures, provided that they do not 
directly contravene the provisions of the UR final agreement, are not subject to 
challenge through GATT panels or any other dispute settlement procedure. In the final 
text there is precise reference to those types of measures that are exempted from such 
challenges. The Peace Clause, originally presented in the Blair House Agreement, has 
been extended from 6 to 9 years.105 The FAA brings an essential innovation: the CAP 
is 'safe' under the legal rules of GATT because of the adaptation of the ’peace clause ’ 
which takes a legal form since it is included in the Final UR Act. It is an indication that 
for a period the CAP will be protected against a range of challenges within the GATT, 
giving the CAP the ability to develop in a more market-oriented manner, free from the 
uncertainties of repeated challenge. In other words the CAP is now compatible with 
GATT and recognised as such by the adoption of the ’peace clause It gives a kind of 
legitimacy to the CAP measures for the first time .
In relation to the US situation, the EC may claim a victory since it could extend 
the application of the Peace Clause for three years beyond the six years initial duration 
set out in the Round until the year 2003.
(7) New initiatives on the dispute settlement system
In addition to the Montreal mid-term review provisions on strengthening the 
dispute settlement procedure, it was always understood that a far more comprehensive
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reform of the system would be evolved as part of the final package. The text which 
appears in the Draft Final Act extended the scope of the dispute settlement mechanism 
to all of the agreements covered by the Agreement on the Multilateral Trade 
Organization. For this purpose, a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will exercise the 
authority of the General Council and the Councils and Committees of the agreements.106
There are a number of changes in the panel procedures including the establish­
ment of an Appellate Body with seven members, three of whom serve on any one 
case.107 It was envisaged that a panel would normally complete its work within six 
month or, in cases of urgency, within three months. Panel reports could be considered 
by the DSB for adoption 20 days after they had been issued to the contracting parties. 
Within 60 days of their issuance they should be adopted, unless the DSB decides by a 
consensus not to adopt the report or one of the parties notifies the DSB of its intention 
to appeal.
What is important to least-developing countries is setting out special procedures 
for using arbitration, and possible resolution of disputes, that do not involve a violation 
of GATT obligations but where, nevertheless, a contracting party believes benefits are 
being nullified or impaired.108 The new changes and initiatives in dispute settlement 
system are laid down in table No. 14 in the next page.
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WTO Dispute Settlement Flow Chart
od Offices, 
nciliation 
VIediation by 
ector-General
iert Review 
Group
DSB adopts panel report 
(within 60 days unless appealed)
DsB adopts panel report 
(within 30 days)
Appellate Review 
(Not to exceed 90 days)
Parties negotiate compensation 
pending full implementation
PANEL CIRCULATES REPORT TO DSB
DSB authorises retaliation 
pending full implementation 
(60 days after expiry of 
“reasonable period of time”)
CONSULTATIONS 
Members May request if no solution found within 60 days
DSB ESTABLISHES PANEL 
(No later than at 2nd DSB meeting)
PANEL SUBMITS REPORTS TO PARTIES
Interim Review
DSB monitors implementation of adopted 
panel/ Appellate Body recommendations 
(To be implemented within defined reasonable 
period of time)
PANEL EXAMINATION
In General not to exceed 6 months, 3 months in cases of urgency 
+ Meeting with 3rd parties
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
(Standard terms unless special terms agreed within 20 days)
COMPOSITION 
(To be agreed within 20 days or decided by Director General)
Source: Reproduced from: GATT FOCUS, Newsletter NO. 103, ’The WTO dispute settlem ent
m echanism’ p. 13.
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C- SOME IMPORTANT DECISIONS ON THE GATT ARTICLES
One of the striking features in the FAA is the clarification of many ambiguous 
terms to avoid mis-interpretation of the provisions by individual contracting parties. Part 
one of the Agreement is devoted to this purpose and defines certain terms such as; 
’Aggregate Measurement o f Support', ’basic product’, 'Equivalent Measurement o f  
Support’, ’export subsidies', ’implementation period  and ’market access concessions' . 
In addition, unlike many previous agreements, the scope of coverage for agricultural 
products is identified in a full list. 109
There were other suggestions for clarifying the Articles related to agricultural 
trade or issued related to developing countries. In Article XI: 1(b), transparency in the 
recording of duties and charges that are not considered as tariffs has been achieved.
Certain Articles also were clarified by the adoption of a number of agreements 
in the final package of the UR, for example the Agreement on the ’Interpretation o f 
Balance- of-Payments Provisions'. It was agreed that the imposition of BOP restrictions 
is possible providing that they should be applied in the least trade -disruptive manner 
and should favour price-based measures, like import surcharges and import deposits, 
rather than quantitative restrictions.110 Developing countries also have accepted 
limitations on the use of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Thus, the new balance of payments 
agreement will reduce recourse to such measures.111 More agreements were reached on 
Article III, (national treatment), Article XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions) and 
Article VI (the application of anti-dumping measures). In respect of Article XVII on 
state trading enterprises, it was agreed that there should be increasing surveillance of 
the activities of such enterprises through stronger notification and review procedures. 
In addition to greater transparency in the operation of State-Trading enterprises112
Regarding Articles XXII and XXIII on the dispute settlement mechanism, the 
final results emerging from the negotiations is close to a quasi-automatic and quasi-
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judicial system. Two fundamental innovations are planned:
1)- the modification of the decision-making rules of the GATT Council,
2)-the institution of an appeal body to re-examine the findings of panels which present 
problems of legal interpretation.
In addition, the new mechanism prevents the use of unilateral trade sanctions and 
submits all the important stages of a dispute to multilateral provisions.
Article XXIV: In view of the new global dimension to and the enlargement of 
regional arrangements it was established in the FAA that new criteria and procedures 
for the review of the situation should be given. Also the evaluation and effects of the 
customs unions or free -trade areas on third parties must come under consideration. It 
also further clarified the procedure to be followed for achieving any necessary 
compensatory adjustment in the event of contracting parties forming a customs union 
seeking to increase a bound tariff. The obligations of contracting parties in regard to 
measures taken by regional or local governments or authorities within their territories 
are also elaborated.
The purely economic analysis of free trade areas subject to Article XXIV, 
suggest that in principle formation of such areas might hurt rather than help the world 
economy. Trade diversion may outweigh trade creation even with external protectionism 
unchanged; and the increased market power that countries gain by consolidating 
themselves into trading blocs could lead to optimizing but non- cooperative governments 
which may raise tariffs thus increasing trade costs.
The possibly emergent trading blocs consist of more or less neighbouring 
countries, who would be each others’ main trading partners even without special 
arrangements. As a result, the potential losses from trade diversion are limited and the 
potential gains from trade creation are large.113 The GATT, and the relatively free
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trading system built around it, are developments resulting from an ideology that 
encourages free trade. In addition by modification of Article XXVIII, less developed 
countries could obtain a new principal supplier right.
D- ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
As the result of the final UR negotiations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
was established to create a single institutional framework encompassing the GATT, (as 
modified by the UR), all agreements and arrangements concluded under its auspices as 
well as the complete results of the UR. WTO will be headed by a Ministerial 
Conference meeting at least once every two years. The General Council is supposed to 
act as a Dispute Settlement Body and a Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
It will concern itself with the full range of trade issues covered by the WTO, and 
will also establish subsidiary bodies such as a Goods Council, Services Council and 
TRIPs Council. The WTO framework will ensure a ’single undertaking approach ’ to 
the result of the UR. Membership in the WTO will entail accepting all the results of the 
Round without any exception.
What is important in relation to the WTO is the lessons from the failure of the 
proposed ITO that were referred to in the First Chapter of the thesis. It is possible to 
conclude that the new organisation will face the same objections to ITO. In those days 
the question remained as why did the proposed ITO fail but the GATT succeed ? Does 
the proposed WTO resolve those fundamental issues that led to the failure of the ITO? 
One of the reasons might be that the GATT concerns a narrower area in international 
trade activities, mainly tariffs and other related matters. Secondly, through its agreement 
nature, states who participate in the GATT do not require any special legislative 
approval within many contracting parties. They were able to participate in GATT as in
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any other commercial agreement, just by executive authority, but participation in the 
ITO would have required legislative approval. Thirdly, commitments into the GATT 
Agreements were less binding than those envisaged in the ITO. A contracting party was 
able to withdraw from the GATT by giving sixty days’ notice, compared to six months 
notice for withdrawal from the ITO.114 Unless the WTO organisation provides a 
satisfactory answer to these fundamental problems its future is in doubt.115 The below 
able shows a general framework of the proposed WTO, that will be completed by the 
new issues in the agenda.
Table No. 15
World Trade Ooganisation proposed Chart:
□□□□□□□□□
_[ Trade Policy ReviewSettlement of disputes GENERAL COUNCIL
Committee on Budget
COUNCIL
FOR
GOODS
TRIPS 
COUNCIL 
(intell. prop.)
Committee on Balance 
of Payments
COUNCIL
FOR
SERVICES
Committee on Trade 
and Development
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
(every two years)
CH Committes set up to administer the various arrangements.
Source: GATT FOCUS, Newsletter NO. 103, ’WTO Briefing, What is the WTO ?’ p. 11.
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E- THE CONCLUDING REMARKS TO THE CHAPTER
In the GATT system there has always been an inherent tension between bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations. Being a body of multilateral trading rules and a forum for 
multilateral negotiations, the GATT system has been and continues to be a depository 
of each contracting state’s schedule of trade concessions. Although these concessions 
are negotiated bilaterally, they are generally applied to all signatories under the MFN 
principle. Bilateral negotiations are considered to be an integral part of the GATT 
negotiating process.116 
a- The main deadlocks
Despite the disagreements in different stages of the Round, there were good 
reasons for hope. No country liked to let the UR fail, which might then lead to an 
erosion of free trade and, potentially the fragmentation of the world into warring trading 
blocs. Some believe that many of the disagreements were tactical: since countries tended 
to hold on to their concessions until the last possible moment, hoping to strike better 
bargain. In practice many of the blockages were linked to progress in the talks on 
agricultural trade.117
There were many reasons for the lack of substantial progress in the negotiations 
and long delays in concluding the Rounds agenda. As indicated by Mr. Dunkel, one of 
the main reasons was that countries failed to provide new instructions to their 
negotiators, leaving them stuck in their old trenches.118
With regards to the US and its allies, the common view was that they clearly did 
not get the farm-trade deal they were looking for. Many efforts had been successfully 
blocked by the EC and others, and even many less developed countries were not happy 
with the negotiations and objected to the introduction of new issues. There had been a 
fundamental change in US trade policy, from a single, overriding commitment to the 
GATT, to a multitrack policy of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism.119 They
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finally came to consensus to avoid fragmentation of almost seven years of UR
negotiations.
b- Encouraging steps
In contrast with earlier rounds, the UR was undoubtedly the most ambitious of 
its kind. It went beyond traditional issues like tariff or non-tariff measures and tried to 
solve important problems like agricultural trade, an issue that was substantially 
neglected in the past. The Round was also aimed at re-establishing GATT rules and dis­
ciplines in sectors like textiles and clothing that have a close relation with agricultural 
products, and the interests of developing countries. In practice, they were subjected to 
special treatment in the past. The negotiations also tried to protect the rules of fair 
competition in a multilateral environment and remove unjustified barriers to trade.
For better or for worse, the UR negotiations showed that the future success of 
the GATT or its WTO successor depends on the goodwill of the US, and above all on 
the EC’s willingness to reform its ’absurd common agricultural policy’, and other major 
trading countries to make real adjustment in their policies.120 The UR produced some 
28 agreements with provisions to establish about 20 bodies to administer them, under 
the new WTO as the common institutional framework for the conduct of the trade 
relations among the members. The UR provided some signs of a true test of their 
willingness to do so. Possibly the future strength and endurance of the multilateral 
trading system lies in adjusting such a balance of interests between these major players, 
no matter if the majority of developing countries gain or lose.
The lengthy duration of negotiations and the long gaps for making final 
decisions created further confusion and dissatisfaction. Mr Dunkel was right in saying 
that ’the negotiators are playing hide-and-seek’. When the possibility of a total failure 
was raised, some were persuaded that the UR was different from previous bargaining 
sessions, making brinkmanship unsurprising. Unlike in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds
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in the 1960s and 1970s, this time all the protagonists, rich and poor alike, had vital 
interests on which they expected to gain from freer trade.
One of the main goals of the Round was steps towards the liberalization of 
world trade. It is clear that such a global liberalization increases exports, but the main 
beneficiaries would be countries who have flexible trading systems and are able to adapt 
quickly to new demands. This is not generally the case for developing countries.
The rich countries were anxious to liberalise trade in new areas, such as 
intellectual property, investment and services. The US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand also sought a deal in agricultural trade. On the other hand the EC was keen that 
financial services be included, an area that the US regarded with suspicion. So, in the 
end, such linkages provided a motive for contracting parties, especially the industrial 
countries, to come to a deal.121
c- General effects on developing countries agricultural trade
Before the launch of the UR, the developing countries were not entirely 
convinced with the manner in which the previous TR negotiations had been con- 
ducted.They believed that their interests might not again be taken into consideration. 
They were right on this issue, since the lengthy duration of the UR negotiations not only 
produced no substantial gain for them, but also improved their fear in playing any such 
games in future. It raised their awareness of how, despite their optimistic hopes for 
more equitable treatment in comparison to industrial countries, they have gained very 
little.
More liberalisation of agricultural trade in the UR brings different results for 
developing countries depending on their different economic structures and the sources 
of export earnings. In case of higher world food prices, the heavier price will be paid 
by the net food importing countries. In order to reduce its effects, the GATT authorities
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argue that unlike the 9 oil price shocks' of the 1970s, to avoid 5 food price shocks' the 
reform programmes will be phased in gradually over six years. In that case the price 
increases, to the extent that their effects will occur gradually, will give consumers and 
farmers in the importing countries time to adjust.
In the UR agricultural negotiations there was some tariff cut commitments by 
leading developing countries giving benefits to industrial countries markets.The 
industrial countries agreed that the key Asian developing countries had tariffs as high 
as 100%. They were persuaded to cut their tariffs between 10% and 30% in Malaysia 
and Thailand and between 25% to 45% in India. At the same time, Indonesia and the 
Philippines set their top rates at 40% and 50%, South Korea will cuts its customs duties 
by 40% and apply tariffs of no more than 10% to EC exports. Singapore’s tariffs will 
be bound at 10% and Hong Kong applies between zero to 35% tariff cuts in favour of 
outside competitors, mainly industrial countries.122
At the same time, Latin American countries were also obliged to reduce their 
tariffs substantially with a top tariff ranging from 25% to 35%, although countries like 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico resisted such tariff cuts except for textiles and clothing. 
These cuts will assist the economies of industrial countries who export their products 
to the developing countries.Considering the high level of competition with industrial 
countries, these tariff cuts are significant for industrial countries, as the developing 
countries markets have always been a prime target for western industrial exporters.
In the case of the least developed countries, it was agreed that these countries 
will not be required to undertake any commitments and concessions which are 
inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs. It also allows 
for the completion of their schedules of concessions and commitments in market access 
and services by April 1995 rather than immediately after the completion of negotiations.
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d- The effects of the negotiations on farming populations
A recent study by Australia’s Centre for International Economics has used an 
unusually detailed model of the international trading system to examine possible 
outcomes of the negotiations and their effects on the farming population. The Centre 
has estimated that the Round has brought minimal progress on farming (even a 10% 
cut in protection over the next ten years), modest cuts in tariffs; but almost no progress 
in lowering non-tariff barriers would increase the joint incomes of North America, 
Europe and the Asia-Pacific region by less than $100 billion a year. If these three 
regions reduced their tariff and non-tariff barriers by 50%, the total gain would be close 
to $750 billion.
In practice the UR has achieved more than the Centre expected, but under all 
circumstances its estimates remain striking. If any region liberalised unilaterally, its 
gains would be substantially bigger than the estimate marked in for the GATT’s attempt 
at multilateral trade liberalisation. Despite all attempts for liberalization of world trade, 
according to GATT figures in 1992, agricultural support policies in the industrial 
countries cost them $350 billion (almost £ 230 billion). 123 
e- The effects on net food importing countries
The UR effects on the net food importing countries is quite substantial and it has 
received attention in many developing countries. It is recognized that in the course of 
the reform programme least-developed and net food-importing countries may face 
negative effects with respect to supplies of food imports on reasonable terms and 
conditions. It is estimated that the developing countries food commodities imports bill 
will be increased by 5% as a result of the final package of reforms in UR.
To reverse such adverse effects, in the course of UR, certain provisions for food 
aid were decided. These provisions recommended substantial grants of basic foodstuffs 
to those food importing countries to compensate their losses. Therefore, a special 
Decision sets out objectives with regard to the provision of food aid, the provision of
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basic foodstuffs in the form of full grant and considering aid for agricultural 
development. The recourse to IMF and World Bank for short term financing was also 
considered.124
Developing countries may ask why they need to recover only part of their losses 
with donations, while it was possible to forecast their potential losses beforehand. In 
addition, food aid imports have a negative and direct effect on their internal markets as 
well as on their internal infant food processing industries. A total or partial liberalization 
of agricultural products have different effects to developing countries, depending on 
their overall trade performance.125
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CHAPTER SIX
RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSIONS:
SEEKING AN OPTIMAL PERSPECTIVE (LEGAL FRAMEWORK) FOR 
THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE REGIME OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
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The sad  reality of barriers facing developing countries in their exports to industrialised countries  
markets. Source: Artist KAL, Langhammer Rolf J. and Andre Sapir, 'Economic Impact o f  G eneralised  
Trade Preferences,'  Thames E ssays  No.49, Trade Policy Research Centre, London, (1987).
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INTRODUCTION
Poverty was the consequence of a chain of exploitation 
through which small towns in the periphery expropriated 
surplus from the rural areas, large cities exploited the 
towns, and in return the large cities were exploited by 
the cities in the metropolis. Surplus extraction was the 
result of unequal trade arrangements; crudely, the 
weaker partner in each trade relationship received less 
than its ’exports’ was worth and paid more in ’imports’ 
Ultimately, most of the surplus from this process of 
unequal exchange was accumulated by the metropolis1
This final Chapter attempts to seek an optimal legal regime for the agricultural 
trade performance of developing countries in the GATT system. Such a legal framework 
is supposed to be there to serve all contracting parties on a basis of certain fair rules and 
provisions. The area of investigation (agricultural trade) is the most controversial issue 
in the history of the GATT, and is always subject to conflicts of interest between the 
two groups of industrial and developing countries. However, the main deadlock over 
agricultural issues in the final UR negotiations is not mainly the consequence of this 
conflict of interests, but lies within the disputes of industrial countries over farm 
subsidies. What was finally agreed is an attempt by the leading industrial contracting 
parties to reach a consensus over several crucial issues of which agricultural support 
measures was the most important.
Before investigating the achievements of different parties in the negotiations, 
certain questions may be raised as to what would be an optimal perspective for relations 
between developing and industrial countries. Could the result of the UR help to fill the 
huge legislative gap in the existing system, or should the developing countries abide by 
the final outcome ? Is the proposed WTO going to pay more attention to the problems 
of developing countries more than did its predecessor ?
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I. SEEKING AN OPTIMAL PERSPECTIVE (SOLUTION) ?
An optimal trading regime should offer a package of measures that takes into 
account the consideration of all parties. It should also offer practical opportunities as 
well as legal rules of practice for all participants. In other words, under an optimal legal 
trading regime each participant should get their fair share of the market, although there 
is difficulty in the definition of fair if equality is to be included. It may be argued that 
under the present situation equality is not appropriate but being fair is a more practical 
and possible procedure that does make sense. It is crucial to discuss the criteria of 
fairness between developing and industrial countries. For example, trade barriers are the 
main obstacle to a liberal flow of trade in the world. In such a situation countries who 
have weaker bargaining positions receive less benefit from the trading system.
One may ask whether the current economic policies under the dominance of 
industrial countries are sufficient to do justice to the weaker developing countries. If not, 
should wealthy countries adopt different policies involving a principle of legal obligation 
to treat the economic interests of developing countries much more favourably than 
hitherto under GATT ?
Hudec2 argues that there were usually two broad economic and legal categories 
of criticism relating to the GATT’s policy towards developing countries. Considering 
some economic criticism, the dominant belief has been and is that the economies of 
developing countries will benefit from trade protection. Simultaneously there are many 
commentators who challenge this view and argue that trade protection will reduce the 
economic welfare of these countries. Although criticism opposing this view may seem 
logical, it is worthwhile to examine it in more detail.
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The second criticism is directed towards the legal trade policy. This considers 
that a one-sided non reciprocity system does not work properly, and argues that 
reciprocity is necessary to include meaningful, and legally secure improvements to 
facilitate the access of certain competitive agricultural products from developing 
countries to the markets of industrial countries. It believes that the non reciprocity 
doctrine is really an obstruction, instead of aid, to achieving such market access.
A- IS  THE PRESENT TRADING SYSTEM  FAIR ? gag
One of the main questions that all participants in a trading system should answer 
is whether the present system is fair in dealing with them or not. In the course of this 
thesis it was shown that developing countries are not receiving their fare share of the 
market. Many industrial countries have also accepted this reality.
Referring to US unfair trade practices, Sen. John Taylor admits that: ’Fair 
Trade' as the term is now used, usually means government intervention to direct, 
control or restrict trade. By fair trade it means government officials deciding what the 
US may be allowed to buy and what prices they have to pay.3 He states:
Fair trade means that Jamaica is permitted to sell the US only 35,292 bras a year, ...and 
that Haiti is able to sell the US only, 7,730 tons of sugar a year. Fair trade means 
permitting each American citizen to consume the equivalent of only one teaspoon of 
foreign ice cream per year, two foreign peanuts per year and one pound of imported 
cheese per year. Fair trade means that the US Congress can dictate more than 8,000 
different taxes on imports, with tariffs as high as 458 percent.
According to a US Federal Commission estimate in 1984, imposition of certain 
tariffs cost the US economy $81 for every $1 of adjustment costs saved. In addition, 
according to the Institute for International Economics, trade barriers are costing US 
consumers $80 billion a year. In other words it costs more than $1,200 for each 
American family.4
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Many dimensions on the question of fairness were discussed in previous chapters 
of the thesis. It is possible to conclude that many developing countries consider the 
system as being unfair in treating them equally in comparison to industrial countries and 
taking care of their real needs.
On the question of the fairness of the present trading system it must also be 
recognised that, for several decades, agriculture has escaped being subjected to the rules 
and disciplines of the GATT. Some developing countries have continued to provide 
considerable governmental support to exports and to domestic production. At the same 
time, the access of agricultural products to the markets of several industrial countries 
have been inhibited by tariffs and various non-tariff measures, mainly because of waivers 
and special provisions in protocols of accession by industrial parties in the agricultural 
sector. The result has been the imposition of constraints on efficient producers and 
exporters, particularly among the developing countries, since they could not afford to 
engage in competitive subsidisation in comparison to industrial countries. Their market 
opportunities have thus seriously diminished, while for many developing countries 
agriculture offers the only real possibility for income growth and generation of foreign 
exchange earnings.5
The regional pattern of trade growth in 1992 was shaped by divergent trends in 
economic activities among the regions. The table below is a self evidence of the degree 
of divergence in the world trade especially the huge gap between the industrial and 
developing countries.
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TABLE No. 16
Value of world merchandise trade by region, 1991-1992 
( Billion dollars and percentage )
Countries and Regions Exports (f.o.b) Import (c.i.f)
Value 1992 Value 1992
World 3,700 3,830
North America 580 685
Latin America 150 170
Western Europe 1,705 1,770
EC 1,455 1,520
EFT A 225 215
Central & Eastern Europe 85 90
Africa 95 100
Middle East 120 125
Asia 970 895
Japan 340 235
China 85 80
Six other Asian exporters of
manufactures * 415 430
Figures are affected by difficulties in covering data expressed in national currencies into dollars. See 
Box 1 Volume 1 of International Trade 1990-91. China Taipei, Hong Kong, Republic o f Korea, 
Malaysia,Singapore and Thailand .
B-THE M AIN  SOLUTIONS FOR A N  OPTIMAL PERSPECTIVE FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ AGRICULTURAL TRADE.
In an optimal perspective all contracting parties should squeeze maximum 
benefits from the existing provisions. There are many articles and provisions that could 
favour developing countries. In the course of the thesis and highlighted in Chapter Four, 
these provisions were explained in detail. Some of the striking issues that are of 
particular importance could be considered as the subject of an optimal perspective which 
lays down certain solutions as follows:
CHAPTER SIX SECTION I 3 2  7
(1) Protection o f developing countries internal m arkets
The previous two decades have seen historically unprecedented rates of economic 
growth in many of the developing countries,6 achieved principally through improved 
mobilization of their own resources.7
These countries are questioning how they can defend themselves against the 
demands for widening their markets to industrialized exports, since it is very difficult 
to withstand the flow of cheap, higher quality products that incorporate more 
technologically advanced innovations within them from industrial markets.
There are many ways that developing countries could overcome the present 
situation. They need to protect their internal markets and encourage their infant 
agricultural processing industries. They need to integrate themselves into regional trading 
associations to be able to extend preferential treatment to regional producers. Otherwise 
the free access of extra-zonal suppliers (competitors) to their markets could devastate the 
integration movement in certain regions and thwart the increasing trend of South-South 
trade and investment.
(2) The establishm ent o f buffer s to ck  system s.
One of the common mechanisms for controlling the export level in industrial 
countries, especially in the EC and US, has been to create a buffer stock system. Faster 
growth of production than of consumption and the resulting high stock levels have 
exerted a depressing influence on commodity prices. The main aim of such schemes is 
to establish a balance between production and consumption. Cereals stock in US and 
dairy (especially butter) stock in the EC are examples of industrial countries’ practices.
A practical example illustrates the importance of the application of a buffer stock 
on the consumption, production, stocks and market prices for coffee and cocoa products
CHAPTER SIX SECTION I 3 2 8
for the past decade.8 This shows a rise of consumption in both products in the world. In 
the case of cocoa it was even stronger, because of the more rapid growth of production. 
Since the stocks of these products in industrial countries were already high, it resulted 
in the lowest prices since the mid-1980s. This means that the stock system could play 
a negative role against developing countries since major stocks are controlled by 
industrial countries.9
The stock system may appear in three different shapes; i)- national stocks; ii)- 
quasi-national stocks (i.e. internationally coordinated as in the 1977 ISA); or iii)- 
international or so called buffer stocks. There is a similarity between the export quota 
system, and buffer stock system since it (the former) serves the same objectives by 
balancing supply and demand.10
An adequate stock system could help an agricultural producing or even importing 
country to reserve a substantial amount of goods when the market price is low in order 
to release them when there is a shortage of products. This serves to stabilize the price 
and secure a relatively fixed source of income. At the same time the management and 
technical aspects of the system should not be underestimated.11
The main concern regarding the application of the system by developing coun­
tries is that the inherent unpredictability of the world markets requires a sufficient, 
accurate and reliable forecast of the market prices in order to use the buffer stock 
mechanism for regulating international agricultural transactions. As these countries 
generally lack the relevant market intelligence, many of them are not able to create such 
stocks.
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(3) Active role of International Trade Centre
As indicated in Chapter Two, the Centre responds to developing countries’ 
requests for assistance in formulating and implementing export promotion programmes. 
It provides information and advice on export markets and marketing techniques, and 
helps in establishing export promotion and marketing services, and training personnel 
required for such services.12 If the Centre functions according to its basic principles, it 
can be regarded as a helpful technical instrument for any inexperienced developing 
country in order to cope with the complex and conflicting world of economic and 
foreign trade exchanges.
The developing countries need further progress inter alia information and market 
intelligence. In one of the recommendations of the Report by ’Committee III o f  Trade 
Information and Trade Promotion Advisory Service’12 it was suggested that there is a 
vital need to provide: ...a)- establishment of a documentation centre and operation of a 
clearing house for trade information; b)- provision of a ’correspondence- answering 
service'; c)- publication of a ’Register o f Sources o f  Trade Information’; d)- resumption 
of publication of the ’International Trade News Bulletin ’, in a form designed to meet 
the special needs of the less-developed countries; e)- preparation of a manual on efficient 
means for establishing and operating export promotion services;.
The main function of the ITC has been to assist developing countries with trade 
information and market surveys. Four categories of technical co-operation programmes 
could be found to assist developing countries and their agricultural programmes:
i)- Special Programme of Technical Co-operation with the least developed countries;
ii)- Trade promotion oriented to rural development;
iii)- Technical Co-operation with national Chambers of Commerce;
iv)- Follow-up action on the MTNs.14
Owing to the lack of knowledge and expertise in international negotiations within
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many developing countries, the Centre can actively provide a good base for assisting 
them. These could be done through practical programmes such as:
i)-Regular visits from developing countries by independent experts to discuss trade 
problems and trade promotion opportunities.
ii)- Consultation assistance regarding the day to day problems of developing countries.
iii)- Legal assistance for those countries who are involved in dispute settlement panels.
iv)-Training civil servants from developing countries. In this regard the ITC organized 
trade promotion sessions at its headquarters as part of two annual GATT trade policy 
courses for developing countries.There are other official lectures in various ITC training 
events throughout the year. 15
ITC activities may be diverted into eight programme areas:16 1)- institutional 
infrastructure for trade promotion at the national level, 2)- special national trade 
promotion services, 3)-export market development, 4)-commodity promotion, 5)- 
training, 6)- import operations and techniques, 7)- trade promotion for least-developed 
countries, 8)- activities with national Chambers of Commerce.17
Among the newer ITC activities that received special attention in 1992 were 
export business development, including enterprise-oriented projects, trade in technical 
consultancy services, and export-oriented joint ventures; promoting trade in a variety of 
agricultural and raw materials, and producing a number of trade promotion handbooks 
and training materials in 1992. These steps are very helpful for developing countries and 
increase their awareness of how the GATT system functions.
(4) Financial support and monetary considerations
The legal base for monetary co-operation in the area of trade and development 
in the GATT could be Article XXXVI (6) which clearly emphasises the importance of
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international lending agencies for contributing to the economic development of third 
world countries and the important inter-relationships between trade and financial 
assistance for development. As indicated in Chapter One, the international monetary 
establishments such as the World Bank and IMF should have clear guidelines to use their 
resources for the purpose of economic development in a more constructive way.
In addition other agencies such as European Development Fund (EDF), the 
STABEX stabilization of export prices scheme between the EC and ACP countries.18 and 
lastly, ’The Western Grain Stabilization Program (WGSP)’,19 that present a kind of 
insurance for agricultural products could be considered as practical models for the 
stabilization of prices and monetary support in developing countries.
Such measures are to help developing countries to fund their agricultural sector 
and to stabilise their markets. For example when the price of bananas is under pressure 
by fluctuation many producers will suffer, whereas in the industrial world the prices of 
Japanese cars and similar industrial products, are not under such pressure. Stabex and 
other monetary systems are practical ways to avoid such losses in the developing world, 
a- The establishment of funding arrangements.
This is another way of tackling the problems of developing countries that accrue 
as a result of industrial countries protectionist policies. The Cairns group proposed a 
scheme for granting compensation to developing countries’ trade losses, as a result of 
measures applied against them which are not supported by scientific evidence. In 
addition to the proposal by the Cairns group, several studies have concluded that 
reductions in agricultural support and protection will lead to higher world market prices 
for most products in the short term, as demand expands and supplies contract. Such 
pressures force the developing countries to pay more for their basic consumer goods. 
The best example of this can be observed particularly for sugar, red meat, and dairy
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products.
Another proposal, that submitted by Egypt, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, and Peru 
in this area, demanded that increased financial resources be made available to the net 
food importing developing countries to reduce the burden of increased import prices 
resulting from global agricultural reform, and to enhance their agricultural productivity 
and production. The main elements of such measures for reducing higher food bills are 
as follows:
-enhancing purchasing capacity through concessional sales, including increased 
availability of low -cost export credits and grants;
-increasing export-creating capacity of net food-importing countries, through improved 
market access conditions for their agricultural exports, by immediate tariff and non-tariff 
measures or trade distorting support;
-increased food aid, through inter alia, a flexible approach to the usual marketing 
requirements, and triangular arrangements which safeguard and promote protection and 
exports of developing countries; and
-flexibility in structural adjustment programmes which are negotiated with international 
financial organizations.
Considering different initiatives for funding arrangements in favour of losing 
parties, it seems that a global approach in this area is necessary to co-ordinate all 
individual approaches and to establish a Global Multilateral Arrangement (under the 
GATT sponsorship). It may compensate or give long term investment grants to 
developing countries who face losses as the result of industrial countries liberalisation 
policies.
(5) Proper use of Article XXIV in favour of developing countries
Regional trading arrangements under Article XXIV are believed to be helpful to 
all contracting parties, including developing countries. In practice, however, any radical 
shift towards expanding regional arrangements will undermine market access 
opportunities for the rest of the contracting parties. Some politicians and economists
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despair of GATT’s multilateral process and would like to see further effort focused on 
regional or bilateral negotiations as more likely to achieve better results.20
Customs unions and free-trade areas are lawful exceptions to MFN treatment but, 
bearing in mind the criteria set out in Article XXIV for regional arrangements, and 
considering their wide dimensions, it is difficult to see how the MFN principle is able 
to operate when it encounters such enormous exceptions which may transform the entire 
global trading system ultimately into regional blocks.21
Considering the previous discussions on the advantages of local or regional 
trading arrangements, and comparably equal bargaining positions and treatment for 
developing countries on their operation, it is possible to conclude that regional 
arrangements have potential economic benefits for developing countries. In practice the 
industrial countries have ’won the game ’, and consequently regionalism is growing faster 
in industrial countries than among the developing states.22 In a critical comparison 
between the successes of regional free trade agreements, and the failure of efforts to 
liberalize trade at the global level, it is possible to see how those two issues contradict 
each other.
A compromise in this area which would make regionalism more consonant with 
GATT would be to insist that any country that joins a free trade area must 
simultaneously reduce its external tariffs for all GATT contracting parties.23 It should 
be noted that regionalism and multilateralism are not alternatives because 58% of global 
trade exchanges are inter-regional. In any case, cheap international air transport is 
eroding the advantage of trading with near-by partners.
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(6) Proper application of Part IV of GATT by more co-operation and 
negotiations among developing countries .
As stated in Chapter four many development reports emphasise the significance 
of trade among developing countries. Trade between developing countries only 
represents 3% of the world merchandised trade. At the same time industrial countries 
markets absorbed almost 75% of the world exports of manufactured goods in 1990 
(against 41% in 1965).24
In an optimal trading perspective all contracting parties should have a right to be 
involved in bilateral or multilateral negotiations. When industrial countries promote their 
trade performance by building regional treaties such as EC, NAFTA, etc. the developing 
countries should also seek more co-operation and exchange of commercial goods among 
themselves by using similar models. The legal base for such arrangements are Article 
XXIV and part IV of the GATT. Article XXXVI (4) in Part IV, inter alia emphasises 
cooperation among the least-developed countries. Furthermore, regional co-operation 
among developing countries could be derived from Article XXXVII of the General 
Agreement.
One example of such co-operation was the 1967 agreement between India, United 
Arab Republic (Egypt) and Yugoslavia called ’The Trade Expansion and Economic Co­
operation among the parties,'. It was also open to the participation of other developing 
countries.In addition the 1973 'Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations Among Develop­
ing Countries ’ was another significant step in this area. Its objective is to increase trade 
exchanges among developing countries.
The Protocol will be governed by the Committee of Participating Countries. In 
addition the Committee is in charge of to day-to-day issues relating to the operation of 
the Protocol. One of its interesting features is the participation of developing countries
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who are not contracting parties to the GATT.25 Such participation may give them a 
united voice to stand up against unfair decisions and practices of industrial countries.26
The main task of the Protocol is to exchange mutually advantageous trade 
concessions through the identification of complementary features in the structure of trade 
and production of the participants. Until 1988 some 500 tariff concessions were 
exchanged in this way, about one quarter of them covering agricultural and raw materials 
and the rest processed and manufactured products. 27
(7) Adjusting the present rules and articles of the GATT and a fundamental 
change of agricultural provisions.
Two central GATT principles need to be re-examined: ’national treatment' (of 
foreign businesses comparable to that received by native business in the host country) 
and 'M F N . In order to end certain unfair practices a single standard is needed. ’GATT 
treatment' would enable all members to contribute fully to the system and play by the 
same rules. Achieving such a goal may require creating a ’super-GATT\ perhaps a small 
homogeneous group of countries willing to take on new obligations.
One commentator has said: "Most current GATT benefits would remain for members 
who chose not to participate."2*
As was discussed in Chapter two, the rules and disciplines on agricultural trade 
are spread over several articles or provisions which are largely unenforced, inadequate 
or unenforceable; as well as other instruments, codes, and decisions. Many of the areas 
such as safeguards, quantitative restrictions, subsidies, market access and graduation 
issues have been subject to lengthy and controversial negotiations and some 
improvement and adjustment has been made especially during the TR and UR 
negotiations. The special treatment for agriculture of certain contracting parties’ has also 
received special attention. Thus, a key question and preoccupation in the negotiation of
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improved and operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines is universality: 
comprehensive policy coverage, overall balance of rights and obligations, and rules of 
general application.
GATT needed more fundamental reforms for accommodating the interests and 
active participation of developing countries. The feeling among many participants is that 
new commitments should be incorporated into the General Agreement itself through new 
provisions, or through interpretative notes to the present rules with equivalent legal force 
thereto, rather than under separate arrangements or codes (with limited participation). It 
seems that a substantive improvement of the present GATT structure would be more 
beneficial and desirable than setting up a new institutional framework such as WTO. It 
may be one of the reasons that even under different structure, the WTO is generally 
based on GATT rules. At present the following changes in the GATT RULES are more 
desirable:
a - A clear definition of agricultural products.*
As discussed in Chapter two, Article XI:2(a) permits export prohibitions or 
restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or 
other essential products. There is no provision under the GATT for an importing country 
to restrict imports of foodstuffs in order to assure or encourage domestic production for 
food security reasons, since the flood of cheap imports dumps the national products and 
further investment in food production. A permanent exception in this area could possibly
• » • • T Oassist importing countries.
It was agreed in the FAA that when a contracting party applies any new export 
prohibition or restrictions on foodstuffs in accordance (conformity) with Article XI 2(a) 
they shall observe two criteria:
1)-They ’shall give due consideration o f the effects o f such prohibition or restriction on
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importing members ’food security; ’30 2)- Before the institution of such export prohibition 
or restriction by any party they are obliged to notify in writing, "to the Committee on 
Agriculture comprising such information as the nature and the duration o f such measure 
in question. The Member instituting such export prohibition or restriction shall provide, 
upon request, such a Member with necessary information."31 The other important 
decision in relation to developing countries was that the provisions of Article XI 2(a) 
shall not apply to any of them, unless the measure is taken by a developing country 
which is considered as a net-food exporter of the specific foodstuff in question.
One area of dispute has been the lack of a clear and comprehensive definition of 
agricultural products. Perhaps a clear definition of agricultural products and foodstuffs 
could help to resolve disputes over different commodities that may come under the 
foodstuff categories. The lack of such provisions and the ambiguous definition of food 
commodities acts as a negative measure against developing countries.
In reality the rules governing trade in agriculture are normally weaker than those 
applying to other goods because governments have insisted on the right to restrict 
imports and assist exports in order to protect or support farm incomes. The serious trade 
conflicts and the high budgetary costs experienced in agriculture in the 1980s’ combined 
with the growing realization that farm programmes are not working effectively, 
convinced governments to begin negotiations to establish a 'fair and market oriented 
agricultural trading system'. They also realized that stronger trade disciplines could not 
achieve the required reforms on their own.32 In relation to Article XVI three interrelated 
improvements might be considered as follows:
i)- the existing Article XVI :1 (second sentence) obligation to discuss the possibility of 
limiting subsidization which has been determined by the Contracting Parties to cause or 
threaten serious prejudice should be converted into an obligation to take appropriate
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remedial action in cases involving displacement in individual markets;
ii)- a conventional and readily ascertainable indicator of what constitutes an ’equitable 
share’ should be introduced as a reference point for countries using export subsidies 
together with general policy guidance for the determination in contested cases of whether 
a share acquired through the use of subsidies is, or should be treated as, ’more than 
equitable’ under Article XVI:3;
iii)- a particular regime should be considered on the subsidization of agricultural primary 
products which are incorporated in processed agricultural products.
Perhaps the strengthening of the concept of serious prejudice under the second 
sentence of Article XVI :1 would be intended to establish a greater degree of harmony 
or equivalence of obligations within Article XVI as a whole.
In addition to strengthening the rules governing sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations, it seems necessary to install an improved basis for consultations in which 
expert opinion, technical as well as trade policy, would have a role to play. Whether we 
could go beyond this, towards some element of compensation where concessions are 
nullified, is an open question. Concern was also raised over the trade effects of rules 
covering scientific evidence, international standards and national treatment since these 
are some of the main obstacles to developing countries agricultural trade.
For many years governments have traditionally been reluctant to accept interna­
tional rules which directly constrain their choices of internal support policies for agricul­
ture.
In negotiating stronger rules, one of the main concerns should be rules related 
to the use of internal subsidies and other support programmes and conditions for policy 
adjustments. As governments adjust their policies to less trade-distorting policies and 
freer trade, there is likely to be more frequent use of emergency actions on imports
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subject to Article XIX and other safeguard mechanisms such as anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties (Article VI).33
b- A selective application of safeguard measures under Article XIX .
A selective application of the safeguard measures under this Article would 
contribute to the proliferation of various market sharing arrangements for certain 
products in which developing countries have an internationally competitive advantage. 
Developing countries contracting parties have specific questions that deserve particular 
attention: i)-reaffirming and institutionally strengthening a non-discriminatory approach 
to the application of safeguard measures; ii)- clarifying and delineating more rigorously 
the basic concepts covered by Article XIX, including the need for specifying the reasons 
for increased imports, the causal link between increased quantities of imports and 
’serious injury ' to domestic producers of like products, as well as the need to define the 
concept of ’serious injury' ; iii)- establishing an obligation that the introduction of 
safeguard measures should be accompanied by structural adjustment measures to be 
implemented in a transparent manner; iv)- working out a programme for phasing existing 
’gray-area’ measures; v)-ensuring effective surveillance in any new multilateral 
safeguards system.34
There is a serious need to improve GATT disciplines for processed products with 
regard to export subsidies. According to Article XVI, export subsidies are not allowed 
for processed products, but some countries, in particular the EC, make regular and heavy 
use of export subsidies for processed agricultural products.
It is possible to conclude that, in negotiating stronger rules for GATT, 
governments must continue to remain sensitive about the different problems faced by 
developing countries in their agricultural sector, in particular, by food importing 
countries. In this area the essential goal was always to achieve a fair and market oriented 
trading system.
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(8) Effective preferential treatment to exports from third world.
Preferential treatment is considered an essential element that could generate 
agricultural exports form developing countries. In practice, certain countries who have 
greater access to industrial countries markets, or share particular political ties, are able 
to receive more preferential treatments than others. As an example, ACP countries have 
had duty-free access to the EC market, within a quota, for many of their agricultural 
exports.
Since its introduction in 1971, the EC’s preferential scheme has been extended 
considerably, especially for processed agricultural commodities. For example, by 1990, 
more than 400 agricultural products qualified for preferences, and around 100 items are 
imported completely free of duty. In addition the EC granted the poorest developing 
countries complete freedom from duty on about 700 farm products. In 1985 farm 
products exported from developing countries covered by the scheme were worth about 
ECU 2.3 billion.35
In the study prepared by the joint UNCTAD/UNDP and World Institute for 
Development Economics Research,36 three practical methods for the application of 
preferential treatment were considered:
(a) The beneficiary has a comparative advantage in the preferred product, so that total 
exports exceed the quota and the excess has to be sold at the world price. In this case, 
the only benefit of preferential treatment is a transfer of tariff revenue on quota exports.
(b) The beneficiary does not have a comparative advantage in the preferred product but 
is nevertheless able to fill the quota allocation. Consequently, neither small variations in 
the world price nor variations in the support price affect production...
(c) The beneficiary does not have a comparative advantage in the preferred product and 
is unable to fill its quota allocation. In this case, the relevant supply price for the 
preferred supplier is identical to the supply price received by domestic producers in the 
preferred market.37
As concluded in Chapter Four, trade preferences should have a permanent rather
CHAPTER SIX SECTION I 3 4  ]_
than a temporary time scale for application.They must have wider product coverage of 
export interest to developing countries, and they should not be abolished arbitrarily by 
industrial countries so as not to it hamper all efforts and investments mobilized for 
production of products (as was explained in Argentinean cattle case for export to EC).38 
In the process of differential and more favourable treatment the critically important role 
of agricultural trade in generating incomes and development should not be ignored. The 
reform programme on agriculture should be framed in a such a way as to enable 
developing countries to expand and develop their agricultural exports. This implies, for 
example, that in the area of domestic support and border protection, they should be able 
to retain the necessary flexibility to continue with, or to institute, public programmes to 
develop their agricultural sectors.
In addition, in order to raise export earnings, their market access opportunities 
need to be significantly enlarged. This requires greater and /or accelerated liberalization 
of access to the markets of industrial countries for products of export interest to 
developing countries (including both raw and processed non-traditional tropical 
products,). Finally, measures to deal with the possible effects of the industrial countries 
reform programme on net food-importing developing countries will also need to be 
adopted, including financial assistance, food aid and improved market access to generate 
additional foreign exchange earnings.
(9) Stronger commitments by industrial countries.
Considering the fact that the 24 high income countries account for 80% of world 
imports and 88% of world exports,39 it leaves little room for developing countries to 
grow, unless industrial countries make genuine commitments to change this pattern in 
favour of developing countries. 88% of world exports means the rest of the world that
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comprises (of) more than 150 countries have the remaining share of 12% of world 
exports, it means an average share of 0/08 for each developing country.
Despite many proposals and demands in the negotiating rounds, especially in the 
course of the UR for industrial countries to reduce their internal support and trade 
barriers to products of priority export interest to developing countries, there are still 
many obstacles including tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers to their exported products.
The industrial countries’ commitments in favour of developing countries should 
be reflected in their individual schedules of tariff concessions by giving better access 
opportunities on an accelerated basis. Such an approach should also grant tangible 
compensation for higher costs to the net food-importing developing countries. This is 
because, during the reform programmes of industrial countries, most of the least-devel­
oped and net food-importing developing countries may experience negative effects with 
respect to supplies of their food imports. This would especially be the case when the 
level of export subsidy in industrial countries fell, since any decrease in export subsidy 
leads to an increase of overall prices.
In this respect Egypt, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, and Peru have proposed a 
formula-cut approach to market access, incorporating factors for tariff harmonisation, 
with the objective of having zero or low tariffs in industrial country markets. They also 
have asked that preferences be improved. Internal consumption and excise taxes on 
products of export interest to developing countries should be eliminated by industrial 
countries within an agreed time frame.
In order to overcome these negative effects, a special Declaration sets out certain 
objectives by industrial countries, including the provision of food aid.40 The provision 
of basic foodstuffs takes different forms such as the full grants for foodstuffs and aid for 
agricultural development. The latter method could be viewed as a better way of helping
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developing countries since it has many advantages in comparison to food aid. The 
Declaration also refers to the possibility of assistance from the international monetary 
agencies with respect to the short-term financial assistance for food imports of 
developing countries.
(10) Technical assistance for developing countries
In the course of this thesis, especially in the discussions of the TR, it was shown 
that one of the main difficulties for developing countries is their lack of technical 
knowledge. This is why wider exchange of information and the establishment of an 
International Agriculture Consultative Council was suggested as a practical solution by 
the agricultural committee of that Round. A broad consensus and improved level of 
international co-operation in technical issues affecting agricultural trade policies seems 
very necessary.41
Technical assistance may apply to a wide range of issues relevant to developing 
countries’ development process. It may be divided into three distinctive categories 1)- 
General efforts regarding infrastructure and overall welfare and change of life style in 
developing countries such as building of roads, dams and irrigation channels, improving 
the rural education systems, that need substantial national or international investments. 
Since a major agricultural problem facing developing countries throughout the world is 
the inadequate supply of water for irrigation.42 Technical assistance in this area is of 
particular importance. 2)- Technical assistance in production that have different forms 
such as establishing the national research units for seed and plant selection. Choosing 
the best products of national and export interest to developing countries by considering 
geographic and environmental potentials and indigenous knowledge. 3)-Technical 
assistance in trade promotion: This may starts from research on the potential markets at 
the regional and international level.Technical assistance in processing techniques, such
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as suitable packaging, presentation quality, trade marks, labelling, and advertising 
facilities43 as practical ways for such technical assistance to developing countries.
(11) More effective dispute settlement system
As mentioned before, the GATT is unique among international trade arrange­
ments because other agreements may contain legal rights and obligations but they do not 
apply to trade generally. Other systems such as UNCTAD and OECD are general in 
nature but contain no legally binding clauses for ensuring enforcement of their decisions.
Despite substantial developments in the GATT dispute settlement procedure, its 
panel procedures and reports are quite different from procedures which exist in many 
national courts, even if the arguments used by panels in reaching their conclusions have 
shown legal characteristics and quality.44
Although trade disputes should be resolved through trade negotiations based on 
agreed rules and acceptable norms of international trade, political issues have recently 
dominated many negotiating outcomes and have interfered with the panel procedures.45 
In such a situation, those who have political power have the upper hand. In recent years 
industrial countries are realising their political ambitions through either ’economic 
sanctions’ or ’ trade concessions' , or by using human rights as a political instrument, 
not against all political parties or countries, but against a few selected countries.The 
depoliticization of international trade decisions, particularely in the GATT system, is of 
vital importance, especially in favour of developing countries.
It is possible to conclude that dispute settlement, as originally provided in GATT, 
was largely a part of the process of negotiation. The institutionalisation of the panel 
system has not changed the essential nature of the machinery. In addition, the contracting 
parties recognize that dispute settlement is supposed to preserve their rights and 
obligations. It is also considered as one of the practical instruments for clarification of
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existing provisions and lastly a central element in providing security and predictability 
to the present multilateral trading system.
The proposed WTO has a strong structure in addition to carrying out all 
commitments negotiated as the results of UR in the area of dispute settlement. These 
tasks will be done by the Dispute Settlement Body that will have the sole authority to 
establish panels, adopt panel and appellate reports, maintain surveillance of 
implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize retaliatory measures in 
cases of non-implementation of those recommendations. This compares favourably to the 
present dispute settlement system that is fragmented between the GATT Council and 
different GATT Committees.46
(12) More active participation in the Worid Trade Organization.
The World Trade Organization, suggested in the course of UR negotiations by 
the EC and Canada is based on the model described by John H. Jackson47. He indicated 
that the WTO would not be a substitute for the GATT, but rather an institutional 
reinforcement for it. On the base of that proposal WTO would not involve substantive 
trade obligations; rather it would deal with the legal issues involved in restructuring the 
GATT system into a membership organization, strengthening the secretariat, removing 
the provisional character of some obligations under the GATT, and various adminis­
trative reforms.48
Although what GATT or WTO will tackle in the future remains to be decided 
by the contracting parties, a global organization of this magnitude is quite different from 
a general agreement such as GATT. In an institutional framework it could have more 
commitment towards its members in comparison to a general agreement that follow the 
desires of its signatories. What is vital for developing countries is for them to sit 
together to evaluate the past disadvantages and negative results in order to design a
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common policy attitude for the future. It is very unlikely that more than 95 developing
countries in the GATT system would not have some impact in the WTO. There are
many new issues to be considered. Some developing countries hoped that under the
classical GATT framework a new round may be created to consider all their trading
problems. On the question of initiating such a new round, Sutherland, the GATT
Director General, believes that:
that is very unlikely because it was too large and too interdependent to be decided. I 
think we will probably look at things issue by issue in the future, rather than in such a 
wide and interdependent way, but I may be proved wrong.49
The proposed WTO has a huge task to tackle developing countries outstanding 
problems. The question is whether it will consider the reality of developing countries 
interests, or whether they should seek for a better platform to forward their concerns 
about agricultural, raw materials or tropical trade. Against that presumption one of the 
first signs of the continuation of big players role in GATT policies, could be found in 
the proposal for the WTO organization, since it requires the establishment of subsidiary 
bodies on certain sectors of particular interest to industrial countries such as, Goods 
Council, a Service Council and a TRIPs Council. It is a sign of giving more weight to 
these sectors rather than emphasising sectors of interest to developing countries, such as 
agriculture, textiles, tropical products etc.. The third world countries hope that the new 
organisation does not change into a 'rich mans club' as did its predecessor.
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II. FINAL CONCLUSIONS
Despite all the difficulties facing the international trading system, after the eight 
rounds of negotiations some tariff rates were slashed by more than 80%. As a result of 
this international collaboration, world trade has expanded from just $60 billion in 195050 
to nearly $4.5 trillion today. In its past 46 years history, the GATT functioned as the 
principle international body concerned with negotiating the reduction of trade barriers 
and with international trade relations. GATT is thus both a code of rules and a forum 
in which contracting parties can discuss and overcome their trade problems and negotiate 
to enlarge world trading opportunities. The eightfold growth in the volume of 
international trade since the Second World War has provided continuing evidence of 
GATT ’s relative success in this double role.
The GATT endeavours to bring Taw and order’ to a trading world where 
political power, economic strength and international diplomacy prevail. The GATT does 
not ignore relative economic and political strengths but provides a basis for all countries, 
large or small, to trade with each other without being subject to the laws of the jungle.51 
Trade in agricultural products is considered as one of the central issues related to 
development objectives. The main reason is that agricultural commodities are 
predominant products in most developing countries and any affirmative change in overall 
trading patterns would give them a substantial trading advantage, particularly because 
of the heavy dependence of these countries on the export of one or more primary 
agricultural commodities. A fundamental change in developing countries’ patterns of life 
requires greater efforts to be made to resolve their serious problems which will be 
referred later.
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One of the principal obligations of the Havana Charter was the call for full 
participation of developing countries in the system.52 Such participation is useless unless 
it provides them with an opportunity to be involved in many decision making authorities.
In the present trading system, there is little basis for North-South organized 
negotiations, since the major trading problems are looked on within a global scale. 
Moreover, the trade patterns and concerns of developing countries are just as varied as 
those of industrial countries. Considering current pattern of North- South relations, three 
practical channels may be considered, a)-Trade relations based on international law, b)- 
Development co-operation and c)- Aid co-operation.
a)- First, the existing situation based on international economic law, as part of 
international law, covers regulations relating to the existing world economic order which 
is generally challenged by the developing countries as one reflecting the pattern of the 
colonialist time. On its philosophical /jurisprudential aspect, such law follows a positivist 
view which legitimises the economic status quo.
b)- On the other hand, developing countries put forward the concept of international law 
of development. This law sees development as the only way out of the unjust world 
economic order. As its philosophical/ jurisprudential basis, this law follows a policy- 
oriented approach which views the world as a unit comprised of diverse components 
some of which are weaker than others in need of a systematic protection.
Considering a new international economic order is needed to safeguard the 
interests of the weak as one of its main objectives. International law of development is 
the law which would cover and regulate various aspects of economic intercourse in the 
context of this new international economic order.This system been trying to put North- 
South relations on a legal and durable framework.
c)- The third approach is the aid co-operation that some industrial countries are
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practising it in the form of food aid that is not functioning on a secure legal basis. 
Many political and economic considerations may be involved and many developing 
countries are not in agreement with such an approach.
There were many attempts in the past to create an institutional framework or 
regulatory device to assist developing countries. Although GATT is one of the vehicles 
for carrying out this mission, it should not be forgotten that GATT was mainly designed 
for mutual trade relations between equal partners.The principles of MFN and reciprocity 
are the best signs of such claim. GATT was not intended to consider who will lose and 
who will gain in its mutual trade exchanges. For example, it seemed not to react to the 
EC opening its market to Central American banana products although such action will 
automatically destroy the African banana producers economy. This is why the GATT 
founders tried to adjust the system towards developing countries by granting differential 
treatment to them and adding Part IV.There is an element of moral duty in international 
economic relations, but to what extent the GATT should consider this as a principle is 
a question open to debate.
GATT’s rules for conducting the trade relations between the contracting parties 
are based on contractual rights and obligations which have been accepted, voluntarily, 
to serve mutual interests. GATT is also a place where countries negotiate and work 
together for the reduction of trade barriers in search of its constant and fundamental aim 
for further liberalization of world trade. Its main aim has been always to remove the 
obstacles to trade. Bearing in mind that the GATT is a fragile and complex instrument, 
it must be used and strengthened to operate effectively. But in the 1980s, its 
effectiveness was placed in doubt, partly due to widespread difficulties in agricultural 
trade.
When the GATT rules were originally drafted in the late 1940s they were
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intended to apply to trade in agricultural and industrial products alike. Things have 
worked out differently however, agriculture has been virtually excluded from the broad 
sweep of trade liberalization and insulated from the normal disciplines of market forces 
and international competition.
The pattern of agricultural trade policies emerging across the world at the end 
of this century exhibits distinctive features. Nearly all of the industrial countries hold 
resources in agriculture behind a panoply of protectionist barriers that insulate this sector 
from international competition. The first question relevant to the thesis to be answered 
is, therefore, whether the system is applicable to agricultural trade. There are many 
different answers to this; Dr. J.MacMahon believes that:
"The GATT work, in areas of agricultural trade reflects the legacy of misconception."53 
He also believes that agriculture by its very nature is protectionist. The protectionist 
policies of industrial countries and the waiver for agricultural programme granted to the 
US in 1955 is evidence of this protectionist nature. It may be concluded that the 
inclusion of the agriculture sector into the GATT agenda, is a step toward the 
liberalization of agricultural trade. Consequently GATT attempts to deal with 
protectionist nature of agriculture, enshrined as it is in domestic agricultural programmes, 
and have been singularly unsuccessful.
A-TH E ADEQUACY OF MEASURES RELATED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES9 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
GATT claims that the economic growth of the developing countries, particularly 
the least-developed countries, is its prime objective and commitment. The question is, 
has the system managed to reach that objective ?
One of the instruments to reach this goal was the preferential tariff preferences 
that have already been discussed. Most of these tariffs have a minimal effect on the
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developing countries, since they are selective, arbitrary, and have a time limit. They are 
often harmless to the economy of donor countries. In other words, the developing 
countries have allowed themselves to be distracted by the idea of preferences, seeing 
them as a means of offsetting handicaps created by trade restrictions and distortions in 
access to industrial countries markets.
One of the main aims of preferential treatment is to encourage infant industries 
in developing countries to flourish, but not all developing countries have the capability 
of setting up industries to promote their exports. Developing countries tend to support 
their urban-industrial sector at the expense of their primary processing industries. This 
creates a heavy distortion in world markets for agricultural temperate- zone products. 
Exports from the third world usually face competition from rich countries who restrict 
access to their domestic markets and dump their surpluses on the world market. This is 
a common story in many newly industrialised countries who tend to imitate this pattern 
by raising barriers to agricultural trade as the development of their industrial sectors 
gains momentum.
In summary the allocation of preferences affects developing countries economies 
as regards to:
a)- measures to influence exports and imports. The country concerned enjoys a relatively 
large degree of freedom. To the extent, however small, that the measures it takes can 
reasonably be linked to its development policy, it has considerable levy in regard to cus­
toms matters, taxation, quantitative restrictions or other measures.
b)- measures that the country concerned can expect from others, it is entitled to expect 
that, on their territory, developing countries will accord preferential treatment to its 
exports;
c)- lastly, if any developing country wants to establish particularly close economic co­
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operation with other countries, it can lawfully conclude simple preferential agreements 
without having to encumber itself with free-trade area or customs union arrangements.54
Some still believe that special and differential treatment of developing countries 
has had only a marginal effect on their economic performance. A glance at the rapidly 
growing economies of newly industrialized countries such as the Republic of Korea and 
Turkey shows that there is little evidence that special and differential treatment has 
played much of a role in their strong trade performance.
Agricultural negotiations in the UR covered commodities whose exports are 
dominated by industrial countries. The UR negotiations also excluded tropical products 
whose exports come principally from third world countries. Regardless of whether the 
separate treatment of developing countries has benefited them or not, one clear effect of 
limiting developing countries obligations in the GATT has been to limit their influence 
in negotiations.
One of the motivations for reforming the agricultural trading system under the 
GATT was the increased cost burden on the industrialized countries over the last decade 
to support their agricultural sectors. They have already taken measures to reduce the 
costs. The real challenge ahead is to ensure industrialized countries do not continue to 
reduce their costs in a manner detrimental to developing countries. The hope is that the 
reductions in support of the agricultural sector may be a vehicle for strengthening 
agricultural productivity and trading opportunities for developing countries, otherwise 
the results are contrary to developing countries interests in the system.
B- PATTERNS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES
In recent years the rise of protectionism in the agricultural sector has created 
special circumstances. Industrial countries have used more support for their agricultural 
sector in comparison to developing countries. Importers of agricultural commodities also
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tend to be more protectionist than the exporters. Developing countries who are exporters 
of agricultural products often tax their agricultural sector in two ways, directly by 
interventions within the sector and indirectly by protecting their urban industrial sectors. 
The level of protection is positively correlated with the level of per capita income. In 
this situation, the newly industrial countries tend to shift from taxing to protecting their 
farming populations.
As stated before there is conflict of interest in the GATT between two distinct 
groups, as developing countries who are exporters of primary products and protectionist 
industrial countries, and among the latter group themselves. In recent decades there was 
a sharp deterioration of the trade balance in many food importing developing countries. 
At the same time, food surpluses have increased steadily in developing countries. This 
is a clear sign of a larger scale structural difference between the North and South. In 
Africa, as a result of famine, a child starves to death every four seconds. Meanwhile, the 
Eurocrats in Brussels insist on the destruction of 600,000 tonnes of fruit, grain and 
vegetables every year -to keep their prices high.55 It is evidence of two extremely 
different agricultural policies.
It should be realised that these policies are not the sole explanation for such an 
outcome, but they have undoubtedly contributed to them as policies in the North have 
depressed world prices and policies in the South have further decreased producer 
incentives. In addition the agricultural trade liberalisation in the North causes general 
price increases in many products such as cereals. Such increase in the world price of 
cereals and food commodities will directly affect the developing countries. This is why 
the net food-importing states will especially suffer from agricultural policy reforms in 
industrial countries.
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C- STATE TRADING UNDER GATT
As mentioned earlier, state trading practices, especially in the agricultural sector 
among the developing countries, have recently become a controversial issue. The 
industrial countries have demanded a free function of market forces and competition in 
commodity markets, whereas in many eastern block and developing countries the 
involvement of government in this area is quite apparent. The state trading rules in the 
GATT system basically have two distinctive elements: a)- that state-trading entities 
operate on a nondiscriminatory basis, governed only by commercial considerations, b)- 
that entities with import monopolies negotiate a limit on the level of protection applied 
in the form of price mark-up.
In practical terms, neither of these provisions has been enforced, so that states 
using such entities have essentially been free to operate without regard to rules normally 
applied in the form of a price mark-up.
In addition, the GATT system interprets such enterprises in terms of exclusive 
and special privileges. It requires the parties to apply the principle of non-discrimination, 
which is interpreted as meaning that decisions in relation to commercial transactions by 
state trading enterprises are required to be made strictly on commercial considerations.56 
In contrast, special measures for developing countries in respect of their development 
objectives in establishing the new industries are subject to investigation and approval.57 
Not surprisingly, these cumbersome provisions have been very sparingly used.58 
D- GATT AND THE BALANCE OF POWER
In the whole history and evolution of the GATT, the industrial countries have 
been the dominant power, whereas despite having a substantial majority in the system 
the developing countries have no choice except to follow what has been prepared or 
dictated for them. In other words they have only a marginal role in the decision making
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authority of the GATT system. In economic terms, they are the substantial losers in the 
world market share as a result of the difficulty in balance of power and their marginal 
role. In addition there are many barriers to exports of the products of their interest such 
as cereals, sugar, tropical beverages, spices and vegetables.
In comparison to developing countries, the share of industrialised countries 
imports of agricultural products shows a general decline in recent decades while 
developing countries have had an increase in demand on the whole. This means that the 
overall balance is against developing countries who became more dependent on agricul­
tural imports. On the other hand, international agricultural trade generally continues to 
be characterized by supply increasing faster than demand, overhanging surpluses and 
depressed world market prices especially in industrial countries.
The high level of support to agricultural production in industrial countries has 
been clearly identified as the major cause of these difficulties. Some countries tried to 
persuade the international community that export subsidies are not a major source of 
difficulty. It is true that the present problems were not created by a single source, but 
they resulted from a combination of distorting policies in industrial countries, such as 
deficiency payments and export enhancement programme in the US and import 
restrictions in Japan. It is possible to conclude that ’all industrialised countries are 
sinners ’ in one way or another.
In relations with the developing world, the industrial countries policies are a 
matter of deep consideration. In recent years, in addition to bilateral and regional deals, 
single commodity approaches became popular, but the best solution is a multi-product 
and multi-country approach for lowering the level of support and production.
For example, one of the main principles of the Lome’ Conventions is to allow 
the ACP products to enter into the EC market free of custom duties and other charges
CHAPTER SIX SECTION I 3 56
with equivalent effect and quantitative restrictions.59
The assumption is that in any deal between industrial and developing countries 
each side is supposed to get its fair share. Do the Lome arrangements contain the same 
economic colonialism which derives from the Treaty of Rome? Doubts arise when we 
realise that the Tanzanian farmers are receiving only 5% of the selling price for their 
instant coffee that is exported for English consumers.60 This is a sad story that exists in 
similar agricultural and raw commodities exports of the developing world. How is it 
possible to call this a fair and just trading system? Despite all those imaginative 
objectives in trade agreements, the developing countries should persist in looking for a 
fair and mutual advantage in all multilateral and bilateral treaties.
In the industrial communities, such as the EC, the establishment of the CAP has 
secured a good standard of life for the farming population. The main reason is that in 
practice all member states individually or collectively have applied the CAP rules by 
giving a fair protection to their farming communities. The same pattern for protection 
exists in other industrial countries. In comparison the third world lacks such support for 
its farmers. Despite many written rules and conventions calling for a better protection 
of rural communities in developing countries, their farmers are substantially ignored and 
left alone, vulnerable to different negative forces and factors of their harsh life styles.
Such pressure forced the farmers in the developing world to abandon their 
farming villages and move to the big cities for a better lifestyle. For example for many 
years in the pre-revolution time in Iran, I personally witnessed a mass immigration of 
farmers from villages to big cities, causing more chaos and difficulties for the 
government.The quick expansion of many cities that are mere agricultural product 
consumers with numerous economic and social problems is another phenomena for 
consideration. Could we blame the farmers who usually received five time less income
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(wages) than a simple and unskilled employee in the capital city ? I have seen that many 
of those who have moved to the cities not only secured their minimum standard of life, 
but guaranteed a better life and education for their next generation, whereas those who 
remained in the villages had a backward trend in their life. This is a common feature in 
many developing countries.
E- THE CONSTITUTION OF A N  OPTIMAL PERSPECTIVE
In an optimal and desirable trading framework the existing balance should be 
changed towards agricultural trade promotion as well as guaranteeing a fair standard of 
life for rural agricultural communities in the third world. No participant should be richer 
at the expense of others. When industrial countries speak about environmental protection 
and equality of their farmers by other segments of the society, in developing countries, 
farmers are not only thinking of being equal, but falling into a deep grave leading to a 
total devastation.
The GATT and other parallel international organisations, especially UN bodies 
dealing with developing countries, should seek a proper and practical solution to 
agricultural trade problems of developing countries, since this is the major source of 
export earnings in many of them.
The sharp fall of the oil price in the 1980s’ and recent years after the boom of 
the 1970s’ is the best evidence of a real and sad fact that the third world could no longer 
rely on a single commodity export, even if such a commodity became as important as 
oil. The reference to oil is made since among many single national products in the 
developing countries, oil is considered to have a distinctive character as a major source 
of exchange earnings for many developing countries. It means that in the new world of 
competitiveness, sooner or later the balance may change against commodity exporters.61
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To overcome such unpleasant experiences the developing countries should 
multiply their sources of income and export earnings through other commodities, setting 
up industries in relation to their development needs and using new technologies for 
processing their raw materials that usually create jobs and income. In addition recourse 
to other sectors such as service and investment (specially by oil producing countries) are 
other supplementary sources of income for developing countries.
Moreover excessive support policies, especially in industrial countries, 
accompanied by fast growing technological advantages, has created an increased 
distortion of free competition in world markets; and severely damaged the situation of 
many developing countries.
In order to solve the problem, all countries should bear some responsibilities in 
the present situation. An overall effort is needed to halt the deterioration. All hopes were 
focused on the UR final package of measures to create a fair set of rules to tackle the 
problems, but in practice the UR does not seem to have reached such objectives. The UR 
negotiations represented the most important international basis for bringing about a better 
balance in the world trade in agricultural products. It is therefore essential, if practical 
rules are to be achieved, to approach’ the subject in a realistic spirit
It is too early to speculate on the overall practical results of the UR, but even at 
this stage, many developing counties, especially the net food importing countries, 
announced their dissatisfaction with the FAA. At the same time, given the scope of the 
problems, a concerted reform of agricultural policies will be implemented in a balanced 
maimer to tackle them. The main pillars of reform are based on the following criteria:
1)- The long-term objective is to allow markets to influence, by way of a progressive 
and concerted reduction of agricultural support, as well as by all other appropriate 
means, the orientation of agricultural production; this is a hope for developing countries 
to bring a better allocation of resources which will benefit consumers, and the economy
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in general.
2)- As indicated before, in practice any progressive correction of policies to achieve the 
long-term objective will require a suitable period of time, plus the genuine intention and 
commitment of the parties for making the changes.
3)- In such circumstances there is a need for developing countries to receive special 
treatment in the GATT system. But such special treatment is of limited value. Far 
greater emphasis should be placed on permitting and encouraging the developing 
countries to take advantage of their competitive strengths and on integrating them more 
fully into the trading system.62
F- THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES POLICIES ON  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The prime results of reduction or elimination of agricultural support and 
production in the industrial countries could have a dynamic impact on the development 
of agricultural production in developing countries and could provide certain agricultural 
exporting countries with an opportunity to expand foreign exchange earnings from their 
agricultural exports in the long term However, in the short-to-medium term, because of 
reduced production in industrial countries, world food prices will consequently rise. 
While such a rise may be beneficial in the long run, in the short run it would bring 
hardship to developing countries that are net importers of food, particularly to the poorer 
sections of their population.
In industrial countries, agricultural policies based on heavy government 
interference with market mechanisms that are now viewed as a serious problem. 
Consequently huge budget costs, surpluses, environmental degradation and the 
unsatisfactory levels and distribution of farm incomes have strengthened opposition to 
those policies. At the same time, trade conflicts have multiplied as evidenced by the 
increasing number of complaints processed by the GATT panels, and by the export
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subsidy war in the grain trade between industrial countries who are exporters of cereals.
Having higher prices would undoubtedly improve the profitability of the farming 
sector in some countries, and consequently reduce government expenditures on 
agricultural income support programmes in others. On the other hand more subsidies in 
the long run could also attract investment for the production of foodstuffs in food deficit 
developing countries, provided that the benefits of the higher prices are passed on to the 
producers and are complemented by institutional and infrastructural improvements. In 
the short run, however, high food prices would continue to increase pressure on the 
balance of payments of many food-deficit countries, with serious consequences for the 
well-being of the poor, whose food intake is already insufficient.
G- DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND RECIPROCITY
As discussed in the thesis, the rule according to which preferences are extended 
in favour of developing countries has not constituted an unlawful exception to MFN 
treatment. It is already accepted in the context of customary international law. In the 
light of this point it is questionable that industrial countries are reluctant to enter into 
negotiation with developing countries. One may wonder whether their objection is 
because the developing countries have been excluded from reciprocity in GATT 
negotiations or, if under such exclusion they are not able to claim reciprocity in relation 
to developing countries. It may be argued in favour of the principle of reciprocity that 
it is not necessarily considered as constituting an obstacle to preferential practices.
Should one then conclude that the lack of interest from industrial countries to 
promote their economic and trade relations with developing countries is not so much due 
to acceptable legal reasoning as to the consideration of their own specific economic and 
trade interests ? This however does not promote the interests of developing countries. 
It may be concluded that the reciprocity principle with its accompanying assumption of
CHAPTER SIX SECTION I 2 61
an equal bargaining position of the participants and more or less equal economic 
standard, is unsuited for a general organization such as GATT. It has been replaced, 
temporarily at least, in relation to developing countries.63
Developing countries exporting their commodities to industrial markets are facing 
different tariff and non-tariff barriers. The GATT needs to improve measures for 
tackling such counter trade practices. Many developing countries still have not been able 
to secure access to industrial markets and in return they blame the industrial countries 
for the disposal of manufactured products in their markets. This situation raises the 
question of the infringement of the principle of non-discrimination, since such a system 
offers benefits to specific customers, and very limited opportunities for others to promote 
their external trade.64
H- WHY WERE AGRICULTURAL TRADE ISSUES NEGLECTED ?
One of the striking reasons for ignoring trade in agricultural products in previous 
rounds was primarily because at the inception of the GATT a number of countries made 
it a pre-condition for their accession to the Agreement that special waivers and protocols 
be granted to allow them to accord special treatment to their agricultural commodities, 
thus agriculture was virtually taken out of the negotiations. Although from the outset, 
the liberalization of agricultural trade was at the top of the agenda of the multilateral 
trade negotiations, many efforts for a fundamental change of agricultural provisions were 
hampered by industrial countries. Despite a better negotiating position for developing 
countries in the UR, they still had a marginal role in the negotiating process.
Many developing countries are likely to suffer from net foreign exchange and 
welfare losses on account of higher world prices for basic foodstuffs as a result of UR 
agricultural reform. This suggests the need for accompanying measures including trade, 
finance or aid measures, to ’compensate’ such countries and thus provide them a 
balanced outcome of the UR, supportive of their economic and social development.
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7- THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISATION OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE
As indicated before, for many developing countries which are not importers of 
agricultural products, the extent of net gains or losses will depend upon the impact of 
trade liberalization in products of export interest to them. For many, exports are 
concentrated notably on tropical products, sugar, horticultural, and certain natural 
resource-based products. For these products, with the exception of sugar, econometric 
studies indicate that trade liberalization is likely to lead to a substantial increase in world 
consumption. There will be a possible increase, at least for a transitional period, in world 
prices of the main foodstuffs such as grains, livestock products and edible oils. 
Consequently for net food-importing countries there are likely to be difficulties, at least 
in the short run, as a result of a substantial increase in the cost of food imports.
These difficulties could be added to increased pressure on the balance of 
payments of many food-deficit countries, with serious consequences for their 
development process in general and debt repayment capacity in particular, as well as 
consideration of well being of the economically poor nations, whose food intake is 
already inadequate. As far as the final results of UR negotiations on liberalization of 
agricultural trade is concerned, except substantial export gains by some developing 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Thailand, (particularly in rice and sugar 
products),65 the majority of them are potential losers. It is possible to say that the UR 
created better opportunities for some agricultural exporting countries. In such a situation 
it is vital to adopt accompanying measures or special mechanisms to offset the negative 
effects of the trade liberalization process on these countries as follow:
1)- One of the major problems of developing countries is the instability of their markets 
resulting from their unstable level of production; they need to achieve stable conditions 
in commodity supply and trade.
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2)- The improvement of a sustained and real income through increased export earnings, 
and to protect them from fluctuations in export earnings, especially from commodities;
3)- To improve market access and reliability of supply for their primary and processed 
products.
4)-To diversify their production including the food sector, and to expand processing of 
primary products with a view to promote the processing industries.
5)- To encourage research and development of national products competing with other 
synthetics products, and the harmonisation of all research efforts.
6)- To improve market structures in the field of agricultural and raw materials.
7)- To improve marketing , distribution and transport systems by taking steps forward 
for more participation in these activities to support their agricultural economies.
It should be realised that many such efforts are substantially dependent either on 
financial capacity of developing countries or more generous contributions by industrial 
countries in creating a better environment.
J- CONSIDERATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ INTERESTS
Sustainable agricultural development for developing countries has become a 
crucial issue of agricultural and resource management. Agriculture is an extremely 
important engine of economic growth of different countries. It provides not only food, 
fibre, and fuel, but also employment and income, as well as materials, capital, and 
additional resources necessary for running the development of other sectors. However, 
the present and future capabilities of these countries to provide adequate livelihood and 
food security is threatened by lack of management, rapid population growth and 
degraded natural resources.
As indicated before the assumption is as the result of application of UR decisions
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certain developing countries who are agricultural exporters will gain from the outcome 
and this will create a satisfactory balance comparing with those developing countries 
who face losses in their trade. I believe that since industrial countries are the main 
competitors in world agricultural exports, and there is little room for developing 
countries to compete, but even if there is a general rise of export earning for farm 
producers, that may help developing countries’ farmers. Owing to the lack of 
competitiveness, market access opportunities and other relevant resources many 
developing countries are not able to secure any gains as predicted.
Finally it is clear that the GATT system is not able to ignore the interests of 
developing countries who count for more than 75% of the total contracting parties, 
including 36 African countries who were practically out of the game as the result of 
their previous comparative gains from Lome Conventions. Consequently full attention 
should be given to the special problems facing the least developed countries.
The lack of effective multilateral disciplines over agricultural import restrictions 
and export subsidies has largely favoured the industrial countries. Their support policies 
have had a distorting impact on world trade. If developing countries interests are going 
to be considered, there should be effective rules and disciplines over these practices that 
offer them improved market opportunities.The industrial countries should put concessions 
and trade relations with developing countries on a contractual and regulated manner, 
rather than loose and temporary preferences that could easily be changed or ignored.
The developing countries may ask, if they are the majority of the GATT 
contracting parties, why, since the beginning, the main players have been the industrial 
countries. Even many selected places for holding the negotiating rounds is the indication 
of the dominance of multilateral negotiations by industrial countries that were holding 
the sessions under the names of industrial countries cities or individual names of their
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peoples (Geneva, Annecy, Dillon, Kennedy, Tokyo !!) except for UR. The majority of 
Secretary Generals, high rank officials and even staff come from industrial nations. Is 
this a simple indication of the dominant position of industrial countries in the decision 
making authority ? Even the UR period was mainly spent in to tackling the major 
disputes of industrial countries rather than taking substantial steps toward the solution 
of developing countries problems.
K- THE ESTABLISHM ENT OF NATIONAL ACTION COMMITTEES
In order to cope with the consequences that are supposed to lead to an overall 
increase in the production of food commodities and in order to ease the pain it was 
agreed that the reform programmes were to be phased in generally over six years to cope 
with the price increases as they occur. It gives consumers and farmers in the importing 
countries time to adjust. This adjustment period is crucial to developing countries 
economies. In the long term it brings heavy consequences for the third world, especially 
major food importing countries, to set up National Action Committees with the full 
legislative authority to deal with the crisis. It is not possible to sit and wait until the 
effects have occurred. As indicated in the first chapter of the thesis, any adjustment 
programme in the agricultural sector is subject to a long process in rural agricultural 
societies. For this purpose developing countries should set up such National Action 
Committees as early as possible to collect all information and available resources in 
order to find the best solution to such problems. Such action committees are common 
in many industrial countries for solving their economic crises.
Depending on the nature of imports and the possibilities of substituting them, 
developing countries have many options such as stimulating production by different ways 
of farm support, giving technical assistance to farmers and attracting national and 
international investment to increase their food production.
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L- MOVES TOWARDS SELF SUFFICIENCY
In this study there have been references to the positive moves by developing 
countries towards self sufficiency, economic independence and having more say in 
international trade deals. A good case here is the People’s Republic of China that in 
recent years has had outstanding growth in the production of cotton and grain that led 
to a sharp fall in demand for imports; this has resulted a reduction of about $1.5 billion 
worth of US exports to China.66 It is an example of the effect of independent production 
policies of the developing world that could lead to economic self sufficiency. One of the 
main challenges for developing countries is to reach self sufficiency in many of their 
agricultural imports especially in food commodities.
M- WHY FOOD AID IS  N O T A SUITABLE SOLUTION ?
The third possibility of dealing with the present unjust balance between the North 
and South was to grant food aid. This was considered as a quick way of helping 
developing countries to overcome their temporary food shortages and possible 
malnutrition in different parts of the world, to facilitate the liberalization of agricultural 
trade. The notion of food aid has different economic, political, financial and moral 
dimensions, but it is based on a moral obligation that derives from the duty of 
industrially advanced nations to share their gains with the others, the gains which mostly 
came from the losses or bargaining disadvantages of developing countries.
The disadvantages are mainly because the GATT system is relied on to govern 
relations between economically healthy countries. When the majority of its contracting 
parties are developing countries with unhealthy economies they are not able to become 
equal partners and benefit from the system. It is questionable if aid policy is a suitable 
solution for this global problem or whether such aid has adverse consequences for 
receiving countries. There are different theories in respect of the effectiveness of food
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aid as an instrument for helping the developing countries. It should be realised that food 
and other temporary development aids are only ’pain relief rather than proper treatment.
The issue of food security and aid policy are mutually related, thus constituting 
one of the main concerns of both industrial and developing countries. Many industrial 
countries such as EC and Japan never compromise over their food security, and neither 
should developing countries.
Food security could be interpreted from two different angles:
1)-The narrow and simple interpretation would be that of food as a commodity for 
human consumption. As such it must satisfy sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, 
according to the recognised range of current discussions and rules of international trade 
negotiations on this issue. The question remains how to assure an adequate level of food 
aid, especially for food-deficit developing countries, to meet the food needs of their 
people, and at the same time prevent circumvention of the new disciplines on export 
subsidies.67
2)-The other important aspect of food security needs more specification.
Foodstuffs are considered to be a range of commodities connected to economic
security, and as such, sometimes occupy a major place in the political scene. One of the 
main objectives of economic development is to ensure adequate domestic production of 
certain basic or strategic food commodities. Negotiations on financial buffering may 
account for the possible rises in food prices in countries accustomed to importing 
low-cost and subsidised food from industrialised countries. The important issue for 
developing countries regarding a successful outcome of the UR is that they are sensitive 
to any appearance that their food security has somehow been compromised in the 
multilateral negotiations.This issue has received attention in many North South dialogues 
such as the Lome Convention in terms of agricultural co-operation and food security in
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national regional and inter-regional level. In practice little has been achieved.68
According to the World Food Council, the problem of malnutrition is increasing 
rapidly. It is usually caused by poverty, and its existence represents a heavy cost to 
many countries through lost productivity and additional health and social expenditures.69
In countries where agriculture represents a major part of the economy, food 
security can be assisted by stimulating growth in that sector. Farm prices should be 
market-oriented and provide an incentive to encourage economic production.lt is 
believed also that general subsidies to hold down food prices are often expensive and 
wasteful, although there are circumstances where consumption subsidies directed to 
certain groups are appropriate.
It should be realised that improving world food security and overcoming 
malnutrition and famine are related to general economic and political developments. 
However, the reform of domestic farm policies in line with general trade liberalization 
may help alleviate these problems.70 
N- HOPES FOR THE FUTURE
Referring to previous discussions, the main objectives of the GATT was 
considered to be as: 1)- raising the standards of living, 2)- ensuring full employment and
3)- a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 4)- 
developing the full use of the world resources and 5)- expanding the production and 
exchange of goods. The extent of present agricultural provisions of the GATT that are 
intended to lead to that direction was already discussed. But it may be concluded that, 
since the system is a fragile, complex instrument it must be used and strengthened to 
operate effectively. Its effectiveness has been placed in doubt, partly due to the 
widespread difficulties and diversity of trading interests in the agricultural sector.
Because it is freely accepted by sovereign governments, the GATT’s contractual
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character is very important. It contains the maximum level of concessions, or constraints 
on freedom of action, that its contracting parties offered to achieve an orderly system 
for world trade. The GATT concessions relate in part to tariff reductions, but they also 
involve the acceptance of disciplines over a range of other policy instruments. Hence it 
is vital to insist on unconditional preservation of GATT’s legal and contractual character 
to ensure that it provides an effective system of trade rules. As stated before, since the 
number of developing countries in GATT has increased dramatically in recent decades, 
the GATT authorities could no longer ignore their importance and interests. The GATT 
has correspondingly established a particular committee on trade and development71 to 
deal with developing countries’ problems.
There were some signs of success regarding the Technical Cooperation 
Programme in UR, in that many delegations from developing countries have expressed 
their appreciation for the quality of the programme and their gratitude for the technical 
assistance made available to their countries throughout the negotiations. Furthermore the 
programme has comprised a wide range of activities in order to respond to the various 
needs of the developing countries. It has also paid special attention to supporting the 
trade performance of the least-developed countries in the course of negotiations. In 
addition, in conjunction with UNCTAD72 special seminars and papers on agriculture 
certain other issues relevant to developing countries were conducted. Technical assistance 
is of vital importance for developing countries, since many of them expertise to deal 
with the complex issues of the contemporary international trading system.
Despite the huge gap of agricultural trade advantages of industrial countries with 
developing countries, the ever increasing South-South relations, and the new regional 
arrangements amongst the developing countries are all signs of positive move by 
developing countries.
3 7 0
I hope that the results of this study contribute to a better understanding of the 
role of the GATT in relation to developing countries and their agricultural trade 
interests. These interests have been subject to varying intensity from Round to Round, 
and are under consideration by other multilateral parallel attempts such as UNCTAD, 
FAO, etc. Perhaps the establishment of a permanent institutional framework of that of 
ITO or WTO, may be capable of promoting the interest of developing countries in a 
much more systematic and sustained manner in which the developing countries may play 
a substantive role commensurate to their problems and needs. This could lead to 
permanent and sustained development.
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TABLE OF ANNEXES 
ANNEX NO. 1
List of Basic Instruments and Selected Documents frequently used in the thesis
This documents covers the Decisions, reports, instruments, etc., published in Volume 
I, Volume I (revised), Volume II, Volume III, Volume IV, and the thirty-nine 
supplements. The table indicates the session and year to which the contents of each of 
the supplements are related.
Volume/ Supplement (Supp.) Session of Contracting Parties Year coverage
Volume I --------  -------
Volume I (revised) --------  -------
Volume II
Volume III
Volume IV
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
Twelfth
Thirteenth
First to
Sixth and First 
Special Session
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
Twelfth
Thirteenth
Fourteenth to Fifteenth 
Sixteenth to Seventeenth 
Eighteenth to Nineteenth 
Twentieth 
Twenty-first 
Twenty-second and 
Second Special Session
1948/1951
1952
1953
1954- 1955
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963-1964
1964-1965
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Volume/ Supplement Session of Contractina Parties Year
Fourteenth Twenty-third 1965-1966
Fifteenth Twenty-fourth 1966-1967
Sixteenth Twenty-fifth 1967-1968
Seventeenth Twenty-sixth 1968-1970
Eighteenth Twenty-seventh 1970-1971
Nineteenth Twenty-eight 1971-1972
Twentieth Twenty-ninth 1972-1973
Twenty-first Thirtieth 1973-1974
Twenty-second Thirty-first 1974-1975
Twenty-third Thirty-second 1975-1976
Twenty-fourth Thirty-third 1976-1977
Twenty-fifth Thirty-fourth 1977-1978
Twenty-sixth Thirty-fifth 1978-1979
Twenty-seventh Thirty-sixth 1979-1980
Twenty-eighth Thirty-seventh 1980-1981
Twenty-ninth Thirty-eighth 1981-1982
Thirtieth Thirty-ninth 1982-1983
Thirty-first Fortieth 1983-1984
Thirty-second Forty-first & Fourth Special Se. 1984-1985
Thirty-third Forty-second 1985-1986
Thirty-fourth Forty-third 1986-1987
Thirty-fifth Forty-fourth 1987-1988
Thirty-sixth Forth-fifth 1988-1989
Thirty-seventh Forty-sixth 1989-1990
Thirty-eighth Forty-seventh 1990-1991
Thirty-nine Forty-eighth 1991-1992
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ANNEXES TO THE THESIS 4 1 1
List of some primary and unpublished reports regarding 
developing countries views and proposals in Uruguay Round.
Document No. Title Date
MTN.GNG5/ WGSP/ W/14 Special and Differential Treatment 20/4/ 1990
of Developing Countries
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ WGSP/7 Draft Text on Sanitary and 20/11/1990
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/213 Phytosanitary Measures
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/ 37 Statements by India 21/12/ 1987
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/ 48 Statement by Jamaica on 2/ 03/ 1988
Aggregate Support Measurement
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/53 Statement by the Cairns Group 21/03/ 1988
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/ 57 Communication from Nigeria 20 !M 1988
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/199 Communication from Thailand 5 /09/ 1990
on Special Safeguard Rules
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/204 Statement by Pakistan 19/09/ 1990
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/206 Working Paper Submitted by 10 /09/1990
Net Food- Importing Developing Countries
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/209 Communication from Bolivia 17/10/ 1990
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/210 Communication from Peru 17/10/ 1990
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/212 Communication from Tanzania 17/10/ 1990
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/215 Communication from Hungary 5 / l l / 1990
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/216 Communication from Bangladesh 6 /11/1990
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/217 Communication from Venezuela 9 /11/1990
MTN.GNG/ NG5/ W/218 Communication from Nicaragua 23/ 11/ 1990
L/ 7125 & Add. 1 Council of Representatives- Trade Policy
Review Mechanism
" " GATT/ 1993- NO. 6 Egypt 1993
" " GATT/ 1992- No. 7 Brazil 1993
" " GATT/1992- NO. 8 Romania 1992
" " GATT/1992- NO. 10 Argentina 1992
" " GATT/ 1993-NO. 11 Philippines 1993
" " GATT/ 1992- No. 16 Uruguay 1992
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ANNEX NO. 2:
( ANNEX II OF THE EEC TREATY )
LIST
Referred to in Article 38 of EC Treaty
(1) (2)
No. in the Brussels Description of Products
Nomenclature
Chapter 1 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5 
05.04
05.15
Chapter 6
Chapter 7 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 9 
Chapter 10 
Chapter 11
Chapter 12
Chapter 13 
ex 13.03 
Chapter 15
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.04 
15.07 
15.12
Live animals
Meat and edible meat offals
Fish, crustaceans and molluscs
Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey
Guts, bladders and stomachs of animals (other than fish), 
whole and pieces thereof
Animal products not elsewhere specified or included; dead 
animals of Chapter 1 or Chapter 3 unfit or human consumption. 
Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers 
and ornamental foliage
Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of melons or citrus fruit 
Coffee, tea and spices, excluding mate (heading No.09.03) 
Cereals
Products of the milling industry; malt and starches; gluten; 
inulin
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fii; 
industrial and medical plants; straw and fodder
Pectin
Lard and other rendered pig fat; rendered poultry fat 
Unrendered fats of bovine cattle, sheep or goats; tallow (including 
’premier jus’) produced from those fats 
Lard stearin, oleostearing and tallow stearin; lard oil, oleo-oil 
and tallow oil, not emulsified or mixed or prepared in any way 
Fats and oils, of fish and marine mammals, whether or not refined 
Fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined or purified 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils, hydrogenated, whether or
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15.13
15.17
Chapter 16 
Chapter 17
17.01
17.02
17.03 
Chapter 18
18.01 
18.02 
Chapter 20 
Chapter 22
22.04
22.05 
Chapter 23
Chapter 24
24.01 
Chapter 45
45.01 
Chapter 54
54.01
Chapter 57
57.01
not refined, but not further prepared 
Margarine, imitation lard and other prepared edible fats 
Residues resulting from the treatment of fatty substances or 
animal or vegetable waxes
Preparations of meat, of fish, of crustaceans or molluscs 
Beet sugar and cane sugar, solid
Other sugars; sugar syrups; artificial honey (whether or not mixed 
with natural honey); caramel 
Molasses, whether or not decolourised
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted
Cocoa shells, husks, skins and waste
Preparations of vegetables, fruit or other parts of plans
Grape must, in fermentation or with fermentation arrested 
other wise than by the addition of alcohol 
Wine of fresh grapes; grape must withe fermentation arrested 
by the addition of alcohol
Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal 
fodder
Unmanufactured tobacco; tobacco refuse
Natural cork, unworked, crushed, granulated or ground; waste cork
Flax, raw or processed but not spun; flax tow and waste 
(including pulled or gametted rags)
True hemp (Cannabis sativa), raw or processed but not spun; fcv 
and waste of true hemp (including pulled or gmetted rags or ropes)
Treaty establishing the EEC, Rome, 25 March 1957, London, Published Her Majesty’s  Stationary Office
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ANNEXES TO THE THESIS 4 1 4
Annex NO. 3 
DIFFERENTIAL AND MORE FAVOURABLE TREATMENT, RECIPROCITY 
AND FULLER PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
(Known a s  Enabling C lause of 28 Nov. 1979).
Following negotiations within the framework of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES decide as follows:
1.Notwithstanding the provisions of Articlel of the General Agreement, contracting 
parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries1 without 
according such treatment to other contracting parties.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following:2
(a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating 
in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences;3
(b) differential and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of the General 
Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the provisions of instruments 
multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT;
(c) regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less developed contracting parties for 
the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with criteria or conditions which 
may be prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of 
non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another;
(d) special treatment on the least developed among the developing countries in the context of 
any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries.
3. Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause:
(a) shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not b ae 
barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties;
(b) shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other 
restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis;
(c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing
1- The words ’developing countries’ as used in this text are to be understood to refer also to 
developing territories.
2 It would remain open for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to consider on and ad hoc basis 
under the GATT provisions for joint action any proposals for differential and more favourable 
treatment not falling within the scope of this paragraph.
3 .As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to 
the establishment of ’generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences beneficial 
to the developing countries’.
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countries designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, 
financial and trade needs of developing countries.
4. Any contracting party taking action4 to introduce an arrangement pursuant to 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above or subsequently taking action to introduce modification or 
withdrawal of the differential and more favourable treatment so provided shall:
(a) notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and furnish them with all the information they may 
deem appropriate relating to such action;
(b) afford adequate opportunity for prompt consultations at the request of any interested 
contracting party with respect to any difficulty or matter that may arise. The CONTRACTING  
PARTIES s h a ll, if requested to do so by such contracting party, consul with all contracting par­
ties concerned with respect to the matter with a view to reaching solutions satisfactory to all 
such contracting parties.
5.The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in 
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of developing 
countries, i.e., the developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the course of 
trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual develop­
ment, financial and trade needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither 
shall less-developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent 
with the latter’s development, financial and trade needs.
6 .Having regard to the special economic difficulties and the particular development, 
financial and trade needs of the least-developed countries, the developed countries shall 
exercise the utmost restraint in seeking any concessions or contributions for commitments made 
by them to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of such countries, and the 
least-developed countries shall not be expected to make concessions or contributions that are 
inconsistent with the recognition of their particular situation and problems.
7. The concessions and contributions made and the obligations assumed by developed 
and less-developed contracting parties under the provisions of the General Agreement should 
promote the basic objectives of the Agreement, including those embodied in the Preamble and 
in Article XXXVI, less-developed contracting parties expect that their capacity to make 
contributions or negotiated concessions or take other mutually agreed action under the 
provisions and procedures of the General Agreement would improve with the progressive 
development of their economies and improvement in their trade situation and they would 
accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework of rights and obligations under the 
General Agreement.
8. Particular account shall be taken of the serious difficulty of the least-developed
4 . Nothing in these provisions shall affect the rights of contracting parties under the General 
Agreement.
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countries in making concessions and contributions in view of their special economic situation 
and their development, financial and trade needs.
9. The contracting parties will collaborate in arrangements for review of the operation 
of these provisions, bearing in mind the need for individual and joint efforts by contracting 
parties to meet the development needs of developing countries and the objectives of the 
General Agreement. 5
5 . Glick Leslie Alan, Multilateral Trade Negotiations World Trade After the Tokyo Round, 
Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, USA, (1984) p.377.
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Annex No. 4 
PUNTA DEL ESTE DECLARATION ON AGRICULTURE
"CONTRACTING PARTIES agreed that there is an urgent need to bring more discipline and 
predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions 
including those related to structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and 
instability in world agricultural markets.
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all 
measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more 
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the general principles 
governing the negotiations by:
(i) improving market access trough Inter alia,the reduction of import barriers;
(ii) improving competitive environment by in creasing discipline on the use of all direct and 
indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade,including 
the phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their causes;
(iii) minimising the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and barriers can 
have on trade in agriculture, taking into account the relevant international agreements.
In order to achieve the above objectives, the negotiating group having primary respon­
sibility for all aspects of agriculture will use the Recommendations adopted by the CONTRACT­
ING PARTIES at their fortieth Session, which were developed in accordance with the GATT 
1982 Ministerial Programme, and take account of the approaches suggested in the work of the 
Committee on Trade in Agriculture without prejudice to other alternatives that might achieve the 
objectives of the negotiations."
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Members,
Having decided to establish a basis for initiating a process of reform of trade in agriculture 
in line with the objectives of the negotiations as set out in the Punta del Este Declaration;
Recoiling that the long-term objective as agreed at the Mid-Term Review "is to establish a 
fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and that a reform process should be initiated 
through the negotiation of commitments on support and protection and through the establishment 
of strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines";
Recalling further that "the above-mentioned long-term objective is to provide for substantial 
progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period 
of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural 
markets";
Committed to achieving specific binding commitments in each of the following areas: market 
access; domestic support; export competition; and to reaching an agreement on sanitary and 
pfiiytosanitary issues;
Having agreed that in implementing their commitments on market access, developed country 
Members would take fully into account the particular needs and conditions of developing country 
Members by providing for a greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for 
agricultural products of particular interest to these Members, including the fullest liberalization 
of trade in tropical agricultural products as agreed at the Mid-Term Review, and products of 
particular importance to the diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic 
crops;
Noting that commitments under the reform programme should be made in an equitable way 
among all Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need 
to protect the environment; having regard to the agreement that special and differential treatment 
to developing countries is an integral element of the negotiations, and taking into account the 
possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform programme on least-developed 
and net food-importing developing countries;
Hereby agree, as follows:
Page 420
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
I
Parti \
Article 1 - Definition of Terms j
])
j
In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires: j
(a) "Aggregate Measurement of Support" and "AMS" mean the annual level of suppodj 
expressed in monetary terms, provided for an agricultural product in favour of t  ^
producers of the basic agricultural product or non-product-specific support providej 
in favour of agricultural producers in general, other than support provided und  ^
programmes that qualify as exempt from reduction under Annex 2 to this Agreement 
which is: 1
(i) with respect to support provided during the base period, specified in the relevaq
tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of a Member 
Schedule; and I5II
(ii) with respect to support provided during any year of the implementation period
and thereafter, calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 3 of thi. 
Agreement and taking into account the constituent data and methodology use< 
in the tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Pan IV q 
the Member’s Schedule; ]
(b) "basic product" in relation to domestic support commitments is defined as the producj 
as close as practicable to the point of first sale as specified in a Member’s Scheduli 
and in the related supporting material; j
1
(c) "budgetary outlays" or "outlays" include revenue foregone;
(d) "Equivalent Measurement of Support" means the annual level of support, expressa 
in monetary terms, provided to producers of a basic agricultural product through th! 
application of one or more measures, the calculation of which in accordance with th 
AMS methodology is impracticable, other than support provided under programme 
that qualify as exempt from reduction under Annex 2 to this Agreement, and whic! 
is:
(i) with respect to support provided during the base period, specified in the relevar
tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of a Member’ 
Schedule; and i
(ii) with respect to support provided during any year of the implementation perio
and thereafter, calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex 4 of thi 
Agreement and taking into account the constituent data and methodology use 
in the tables of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV c 
the Member’s Schedule;
(e) "export subsidies" refer to subsidies contingent upon export performance includin 
the export subsidies listed in Article 9 of this Agreement;
(f) "implementation period" means the six-year period commencing in the year 1995, excq 
that, for the purposes of Article 13, it means the nine-year period commencing in 199f
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"market access concessions" include all market access commitments undertaken pursuant 
to this Agreement;
"Total Aggregate Measurement of Support" and "Total AMS" mean the sum of all 
domestic support provided in favour of agricultural producers, calculated as the sum 
of all aggregate measurements of support for basic agricultural products, all non-product- 
specific aggregate measurements of support and all equivalent measurements of support 
for agricultural products, and which is:
(i) with respect to support provided during the base period (i.e., the "Base Total
AMS") and the maximum support permitted to be provided during any year 
of the implementation period or thereafter (i.e., the "Annual and Final Bound 
Commitment Levels"), as specified in Part IV of a Member's Schedule; and
(ii) with respect to the level of support actually provided during any year of the
implementation period and thereafter (i.e., the "Current Total AMS"), 
calculated in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, including 
Article 6, and with the constituent data and methodology used in the tables 
of supporting material incorporated by reference in Part IV of the Member’s 
Schedule;
"year" in (f) above and in relation to the specific commitments of a Member refers 
to the calendar, financial or marketing year specified in the Schedule relating to that 
Member.
Article 2 - Product Coverage
This Agreement applies to the products listed in Annex 1 to this Agreement, hereinafter referred 
to as agricultural products.
Part II
Article 3 - Incorporation of Concessions and Commitments
1. The domestic support and export subsidy commitments in Part IV of each Member’s Schedule 
constitute commitments limiting subsidization and are hereby made an integral part of the GATT 1994.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article 6 of this Agreement, a Member shall not provide support 
in favour of domestic producers in excess of the commitment levels specified in Section I of Part IV 
of its Schedule.
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of Article 9 of this Agreement, a Member 
shall not provide export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural products 
or groups of products specified in Section II of Part IV of its Schedule in excess of the budgetary outlay 
and quantity commitment levels specified therein and shall not provide such subsidies in respect of 
any agricultural product not specified in that Section of its Schedule.
(g)
(h)
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']
Part III *
Article 4 - Market Access
\
1. Market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and reductions of tariffs, 
and to other market access commitments as specified therein. J
2. Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have beer
required to be convened into ordinary customs duties1, except as otherwise provided for in Anicle |
and Annex 5 hereof. £
Article 5 - Special Safeguard Provisions t
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article II: 1(b) of the GATT 1994, any Member may tak«j 
recourse to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 below in connection with the importation of ar 
agricultural product, in respect of which measures referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 4 have beet 
converted into an ordinary customs duty and which is designated in its Schedule with the symbol "SSG" 
as being the subject of a concession in respect of which the provisions of this Article may be invoked,j
if: I
j
(i) the volume of imports of that product entering the customs territory of the Membeii 
granting the concession during any year exceeds a trigger level which relates to thti 
existing market access opportunity as set out in paragraph 4 below; or, but no. 
concurrently:
(ii) the price at which imports of that product may enter the customs territory of the Member 
granting the concession, as determined on the basis of the c.i.f. import price of the 
shipment concerned expressed in terms of its domestic currency, falls below a trigger 
price equal to the average 1986 to 1988 reference price2 for the product concerned
2. Imports under current and minimum access commitments established as part of a concessior 
referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be counted for the purpose of determining the volume of import* 
required for invoking the provisions of sub-paragraph l(i) and paragraph 4, but imports under sue! 
commitments shall not be affected by any additional duty imposed under either paragraph 4 or paragraph 
5 below. i
’These measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary 
import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints and simila 
border measures other than ordinary customs duties, whether or not the measures are maintained under country-specifit 
derogations from the provisions of die GATT 1947, but not measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions o 
under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of the GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreement 
in Annex 1A to the MTO.
2The reference price used to invoke die provisions of this sub-paragraph shall, in general, be the average c.i.f. unit valui 
of the product concerned, or otherwise shall be an appropriate price in terms of the quality of the product and its stage o 
processing. It shall, following its initial use, be publicly specified and available to the extent necessary to allow other Member 
to assess the additional duty that may be levied.
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3. Any supplies of the product in question which were en route on the basis of a contract settled 
before the additional duty is imposed under sub-paragraph l(i) above and paragraph 4 below shall be 
exempted from any such additional duty provided that they may be counted in the volume of imports 
of the product in question during the following year for the purposes of triggering the provisions of 
sub-paragraph l(i) in that year.
4. Any additional duty imposed under sub-paragraph l(i) above shall only be maintained until 
the end of the year in which it has been imposed, and may only be levied at a level which shall not 
exceed one-third of the level of the ordinary customs duty in effect in the year in which the action 
is taken. The trigger level shall be set according to the following schedule based on market access 
opportunities defined as imports as a percentage of the corresponding domestic consumption3 during 
the three preceding years for which data are available:
(a) where such market access opportunities for a product are less than or equal to 10 per 
cent, the base trigger level shall equal 125 per cent;
(b) where such market access opportunities for a product are greater than 10 per cent but 
less than or equal to 30 per cent, the base trigger level shall equal 110 per cent;
(c) where such market access opportunities for a product are greater than 30 per cent, 
the base trigger level shall equal 105 per cent.
In all cases the additional duty may be imposed in any year where the absolute volume of imports 
of the product concerned entering the customs territory of the Member granting the concession exceeds 
the sum of (x) the base trigger level set out above multiplied by the average quantity of imports during 
the three preceding years for which data are available and (y) the absolute volume change in domestic 
consumption of the product concerned in the most recent year for which data are available compared 
to the preceding year, provided that the trigger level shall not be less than 105 per cent of the average 
quantity of imports in (x) above.
5. The additional duty imposed under sub-paragraph l(ii) above shall be set according to the 
following schedule:
(a) if the difference between the c.i.f. import price of the shipment expressed in terms 
of the domestic currency (hereinafter referred to as the "import price") and the trigger 
price as defined under that sub-paragraph is less than or equal to 10 per cent of the 
trigger price, no additional duty shall be imposed;
(b) if the difference between the import price and the trigger price (hereinafter referred 
to as the "difference") is greater than 10 per cent but less than or equal to 40 per cent 
of the trigger price, the additional duty shall equal 30 per cent of the amount by which 
the difference exceeds 10 per cent;
(c) if the difference is greater than 40 per cent but less than or equal to 60 per cent of 
the trigger price, the additional duty shall equal 50 per cent of the amount by which 
the difference exceeds 40 per cent, plus the additional duty allowed under (b);
3Where domestic consumption is not taken into account, die base trigger level under (a) below shall apply.
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(d) if the difference is greater than 60 per cent but less than or equal to 75 per cent, the 
additional duty shall equal 70 per cent of the amount by which the difference exceeds 
60 per cent of the trigger price, plus the additional duties allowed under (b) and (c);;
(e) if the difference is greater than 75 per cent of the trigger price, the additional duty
shall equal 90 per cent of the amount by which the difference exceeds 75 per cent,
plus the additional duties allowed under (b), (c) and (d).
6. For perishable and seasonal products, the conditions set out above shall be applied in such 
a manner as to take account of the specific characteristics of such products. In particular, shorter time 
periods under paragraph l(i) and paragraph 4 may be used in reference to the corresponding periods 
in the base period and different reference prices for different periods may be used under paragraph l(ii).
7. The operation of the special safeguard shall be carried out in a transparent manner. AnyMembetj
taking action under paragraph l(i) above shall give notice in writing, including relevant data, to the
Committee on Agriculture as far in advance as may be practicable and in any event within 10 daysj 
of the implementation of such action. In cases where changes in consumption volumes must be allocatedj 
to individual tariff lines subject to action under paragraph 4, relevant data shall include the information! 
and methods used to allocate these changes. A Member taking action under paragraph 4 shall afford 
any interested Members the opportunity to consult with it in respect of the conditions of application 
of such action. Any Member taking action under paragraph l(ii) above shall give notice in writing, 
including relevant data, to the Committee on Agriculture within 10 days of the implementation of the] 
first such action or, for perishable and seasonal products, the first action in any period. Members] 
undertake, as far as practicable, not to take recourse to the provisions of paragraph l(ii) where the] 
volume of imports of the products concerned are declining. In either case a Member taking such action; 
shall afford any interested Members the opportunity to consult with it in respect of the conditions of) 
application of such action.
j|
8. Where measures.are taken in conformity with paragraphs 1 through 7 above, Members undertake; 
not to have recourse, in respect of such measures, to the provisions of Article XIX: 1(a) and XIX:3: 
of the GATT 1994 or paragraph 17 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
9. The provisions of this Article shall remain in force for the duration of the reform process as; 
determined under Article 20.
Pan TV
Article 6 - Domestic Support Commitments
1. The domestic support reduction commitments of each Member contained in Part IV of it* 
Schedule shall apply to all of its domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers wit! 
the exception of domestic measures which are not subject to reduction in terms of the criteria set on 
in this Article and in Annex 2 to this Agreement. The commitments are expressed in terms of Tota 
Aggregate Measurement of Support and "Annual and Final Bound Commitment Levels".
2. In accordance with the Mid-Term Review Agreement that government measures of assistance 
whether direct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development are an integral part of the 
development programmes of developing countries, investment subsidies which are generally available 
to agriculture in developing country Members and agricultural input subsidies generally available tc
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low-income or resource poor producers in developing country Members shall be exempt from domestic 
support reduction commitments that would otherwise be applicable to such measures, as shall domestic 
support to producers in developing country Members to encourage diversification from growing illicit 
narcotic crops. Domestic support meeting the criteria of this paragraph shall not be required to be 
included in a Member’s calculation of its Current Total AMS.
3. A Member shall be considered to be in compliance with its domestic support reduction 
commitments in any year in which its domestic support in favour of agricultural producers expressed 
in terms of Current Total AMS does not exceed the corresponding annual or final bound commitment 
level specified in Part IV of the Member’s Schedule.
4. (a) A Member shall not be required to include in the calculation of its Current Total AMS
and shall not be required to reduce:
(i) product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required to be 
included in a Member’s calculation of its Current AMS where such support 
does not exceed 5 per cent of that Member’s total value of production of a 
basic product during the relevant year; and
(ii) non-product-specific domestic support which would otherwise be required to 
be included in a Member’s calculation of its Current AMS where such support 
does not exceed 5 per cent of the value of that Member’s total agricultural 
production.
(b) For developing country Members, the de minimis percentage under this paragraph shall
be 10 per cent.
5. (a) Direct payments under production-limiting programmes shall not be subject to the
commitment to reduce domestic support if :
(i) such payments are based on fixed area and yields; or
(ii) such payments are made on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production; 
or
(iii) livestock payments are made on a fixed number of head.
(b) The exemption from the reduction commitment for direct payments meeting the above
criteria shall be reflected by the exclusion of the value of those direct payments in a
Member’s calculation of its Current Total AMS.
Article 7 - General Disciplines on Domestic Support
1. Each Member shall ensure dial any domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers 
which are not subject to reduction commitments because they qualify under the criteria set out in Annex 2 
to this Agreement are maintained in conformity therewith.
2. (a) Any domestic support measure in favour of agricultural producers, including any
modification to such measure, and any measure that is subsequently introduced that
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cannot be shown to satisfy the criteria in Annex 2 to this Agreement or to be exempt 
from reduction by reason of any other provision of this Agreement shall be included 
in the Member’s calculation of its Current Total AMS.
(b) Where no Total AMS commitment exists in Part IV of a Member’s Schedule, the' 
Member shall not provide support to agricultural producers in excess of the relevant 
de minimis level set out in paragraph 4 of Article 6.
Part V
Article 8 - Export Competition Commitments
Each Member undertakes not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with 
this Agreement and with the commitments as specified in that Member’s Schedule.
Article 9 - Export Subsidy Commitments
1. The following export subsidies are subject to reduction commitments under this Agreement:
(a) The provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including payments-j 
in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, to a co­
operative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board, contingent 
on export performance.
1
(b) The sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of non-commercial. 
stocks of agricultural products at a price lower than the comparable price charged for1 
the like product to buyers in the domestic market.
(c) Payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of" 
governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is involved,] 
including payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the 
agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the exported, 
product is derived.
(d) The provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural 
products (other than widely available export promotion and advisory services) including 
handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the costs of international transport 
and freight.
(e) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated by 
governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments.
(f) Subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported products.
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2. (a) Except as provided in sub-paragraph (b), the export subsidy commitment levels for
each year of the implementation period, as specified in a Member’s Schedule, represent 
with respect to the export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of this Article:
(i) in the case of budgetary outlay reduction commitments, the maximum level 
of expenditure for such subsidies that may be allocated or incurred in that year; 
and
(ii) in the case of export quantity reduction commitments, the maximum quantity 
of an agricultural product, or group of such products, in respect of which such 
export subsidies may be granted in that year.
(b) In any of the second through fifth years of the implementation period, a Member may 
provide export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 above in a given year in excess of the 
corresponding annual commitment levels in respect of the products or groups of products 
specified in Part IV of the Member’s Schedule, provided that:
(i) the cumulative amounts of budgetary outlays for such subsidies, from the
beginning of the implementation period through the year in question, does not 
exceed the cumulative amounts that would have resulted from full compliance 
with the relevant annual outlay commitment levels specified in the Member’s 
Schedule by more than 3 per cent of the base period level of such budgetary 
outlays;
(ii) the cumulative quantities exported with the benefit of such export subsidies,
from the beginning of the implementation period through the year in question, 
does not exceed the cumulative quantities that would have resulted from full 
compliance with the relevant annual quantity commitment levels specified in 
the Member’s Schedule by more than 1.75 per cent of the base period quantities;
(iii) the total cumulative amounts of budgetary outlays for such export subsidies
and the quantities benefiting from such export subsidies over the entire 
implementation period are no greater than the totals that would have resulted 
from full compliance with the relevant annual commitment levels specified 
in the Member’s Schedule; and
(iv) the Member’s budgetary outlays for export subsidies and the quantities
benefiting from such subsidies, at the conclusion of the implementation period, 
are no greater than 64 per cent and 79 per cent of the 1986-1990 base period 
levels, respectively. For developing country Members these percentages shall 
be 76 and 86 per cent, respectively.
3 Commitments relating to limitations on the extension of the scope of export subsidization are 
as specified in Schedules.
4 During the implementation period developing country Members shall not be required to undertake 
commitments in respect of the export subsidies listed in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) of paragraph 1 above 
provided that these are not applied in a manner that would circumvent reduction commitments.
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A rticle 10 - Prevention o f Circumvention o f Export Subsidy Commitments
1. Export subsidies not listed in Article 9(1) of this Agreement shall not be applied in a manner 
which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments; nor 
shall non-commercial transactions be used to circumvent such commitments.
2. Members undertake to work toward the development of internationally agreed disciplines to 
govern the provision of export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes and, after 
agreement on such disciplines, to provide export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance 
programmes only in conformity therewith.
3. Any Member which claims that any quantity exported in excess of a reduction commitment 
level is not subsidized must establish that no export subsidy, whether listed in Article 9 or not, has 
been granted in respect of the quantity of exports in question.
4. Members donors of international food aid shall ensure:
(a) that the provision of international food aid is not tied directly or indirectly to commercial 
exports of agricultural products to recipient countries;
(b) that international food aid transactions, including bilateral food aid which is monetised,
shall be carried out in accordance with the FAO "Principles of Surplus Disposal and , 
Consultative Obligations" including, where appropriate, the system of Usual Marketing ' 
Requirements (UMRs); and j
i
(c) that such aid shall be provided to the extent possible in fully grant form or on terms 
no less concessional than those provided for in Article IV of the Food Aid Convention j 
1986.
A rticle 11 - Incorporated Products
In no case may the per unit subsidy paid on an incorporated agricultural primary product exceed 
the per unit export subsidy that would be payable on exports of the primary product as such.
Part VI
Article 12 - D isciplines on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions
1. Where any Member institutes any new export prohibition or restriction on foodstuffs in 
accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Article XI of the GATT 1994, the Member shall observe the following 
provisions:
(i) the Member instituting the export prohibition or restriction shall give due consideration 
to the effects of such prohibition or restriction on importing Members’ food security;
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(ii) before any Member institutes an export prohibition or restriction, it shall give notice 
in writing, as far in advance as practicable, to the Committee on Agriculture comprising 
such information as the nature and the duration of such measure, and shall consult, 
upon request, with any other Member having a substantial interest as an importer with 
respect to any matter related to the measure in question. The Member instituting such 
export prohibition or restriction shall provide, upon request, such a Member with 
necessary information.
2. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any developing country Member, unless the 
meassure is taken by a developing country Member which is a net-food exporter of the specific foodstuff 
conccemed.
P an VII 
Article 13 - Due Restraint
During the implementation period, notwithstanding the provisions of the GATT 1994 and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("Subsidies Agreement"):
1 • Domestic support measures that conform fully to the provisions of Annex 2 to this Agreement
shall 1 be:
(a) non-actionable subsidies for purposes of countervailing duties4;
(b) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of the GATT 1994 and Part III of the 
Subsidies Agreement; and
(c) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the benefits 
of tariff concessions accruing to another Member under Article II of the GATT 1994, 
in the sense of Article XXIII: 1(b) of the GATT 1994.
2. Domestic support measures that conform fully to the provisions of Article 6 of this Agreement
incluiding direct payments that conform to the requirements of paragraph 5 thereof, as reflected in each 
Meimber’s Schedule, as well as domestic support within de minimis levels and in conformity with 
paragraph 2 of Article 6, shall be:
(a) exempt from the imposition of countervailing duties unless a determination of injury 
or threat thereof is made in accordance with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Part V 
of the Subsidies Agreement, and due restraint shall be shown in initiating any 
countervailing duty investigations;
(b) exempt from actions based on Article XVI: 1 of the GATT 1994 or Articles 5 and 6 
of the Subsidies Agreement, provided that such measures do not grant support to a 
specific commodity in excess of that decided during the 1992 marketing year; and
^"Countervailing duties’ where referred to in this Article are those covered by Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Pan V 
of thte Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.
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(c) exempt from actions based on non-violation nullification or impairment of the benefits
of tariff concessions accruing to another Member under Article II of the GATT 1994, 
in the sense of Article XXIII: 1(b) of the GATT 1994, provided that such measures 
do not grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that decided during the 1992 
marketing year.
3. Export subsidies that conform fully to the provisions of Part V of this Agreement, as reflected 
in each Member’s Schedule of Commitments, shall be:
(a) subject to countervailing duties only upon a determination of injury or threat thereof 
based on volume, effect on prices, or consequent impact in accordance with Article VI 
of the GATT 1994 and Part V of the Subsidies Agreement, and due restraint shall 
be shown in initiating any countervailing duty investigations; and
(b) exempt from actions based on Article XVI of the GATT 1994 or Articles 3, 5 and 
6 of the Subsidies Agreement.
Part VIII
A rticle 14 - Sanitary and Phytosanitary M easures 
Members agree to give effect to the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
Part IX
Article 15 - Special and D ifferential Treatment
1. In keeping with the recognition that differential and more favourable treatment for developing 
couniry Members is an integral part of the negotiation, special and differential treatment in respect 
of commitments shall be provided as set out in the relevant provisions of this Agreement and embodied 
in the Schedules of concessions and commitments.
2. Developing countries shall have the flexibility to implement reduction commitments over a 
period of up to 10 years. Least developed country Members shall not be required to undertake reduction 
commitments.
P a rtX
A rticle 16 - Least-developed and Net Food-Importing D eveloping Countries
1. Developed country Members shall take such action as is provided for within the framework 
of the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on 
Least-developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries.
2. The Committee on Agriculture shall monitor, as appropriate, the follow-up to this Decision.
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Pan XI
Article 17  - Committee on Agriculture 
A Committee on Agriculture shall be established.
Article 18 - Review of the Implementation of Commitments
1. Progress in the implementation of commitments negotiated under the Uruguay Round reform 
progrramme shall be reviewed by the Committee on Agriculture.
2. The review process shall be undertaken on the basis of notifications submitted by Members 
in rellation to such matters and at such intervals as shall be determined, as well as on the basis of such 
docuimemtation as the MTO Secretariat may be requested to prepare in order to facilitate the review
proceess.
3. In addition to the notifications to be submitted under paragraph 2, any new domestic support 
measture, or modification of an existing measure, for which exemption from reduction is claimed shall 
be ncotified promptly. This notification shall contain details of the new or modified measure and its 
conformity with the agreed criteria as set out either in Article 6 or in Annex 2 to this Agreement.
4. In the review process Members shall give due consideration to the influence of excessive rates 
of inlflarion on the ability of any Member to abide by its domestic support commitments.
5. Members agree to consult annually in the Committee on Agriculture with respect to their 
participation in the normal growth of world trade in agricultural products within the framework of 
the ccommitments on export subsidies under this Agreement.
6 . The review process shall provide an opportunity for Members to raise any matter relevant to 
the iimpllementation of commitments under the reform programme as set out in this Agreement.
7. Any Member may bring to the attention of the Committee on Agriculture any measure which 
it comsiders ought to have been notified by another Member.
Article 19 - Consultation and D ispute Settlem ent
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, as elaborated and applied by 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, shall apply to 
consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement.
Part XII
Article 20 - Continuation of the Reform Process
M TN ^a TT-A1A-3
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Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support anc 
protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Members agree that negotiation! 
for continuing the process will be initiated one year before the end of the implementation period, taking 
into account:
the experience to that date from implementing the reduction commitments;
the effects of the reduction commitments on world trade in agriculture;
non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing country Members, 
and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system, 
and the other objectives and concerns mentioned in the preamble to this Agreement: 
and
what further commitments are necessary to achieve the above mentioned long-tenr 
objectives.
Part X III 
A rticle 21 - Final Provisions
1. The provisions of the GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A 
to the MTO shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.
2. The Annexes to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of this Agreement. ,
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ANNEX 1 
PRODUCT COVERAGE
1. This Agreement shall cover the following products:
(i) HS Chapters 1 to 24 less fish and fish products, plus
HS Code 29.05.43 (mannitol)
HS Code 29.05.44 (sorbitol)
HS Heading 33.01 (essential oils)
HS Headings 35.01 to 35.05 (albuminoidal substances, modified 
starches, glues)
HS Code 38.09.10 (finishing agents)
HS Code 38.23.60 (sorbitol n.e.p.)
HS Headings 41.01 to 41.03 (hides and skins)
HS Heading 43.01 (raw furskins)
HS Headings 50.01 to 50.03 . (raw silk and silk waste)
HS Headings 51.01 to 51.03 (wool and animal hair)
HS Headings 52.01 to 52.03 (raw cotton, waste and cotton carded 
or combed)
HS Heading 53.01 (raw flax)
HS Heading 53.02 (raw hemp)
2. The foregoing shall not limit the product coverage of the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures.
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ANNEX 2
DOMESTIC SUPPORT: THE BASIS FOR EXEMPTION FROM 
THE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS
1. Domestic support policies for which exemption from the reduction commitments is claimed 
shall meet the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade distortion effects 
or effects on production. Accordingly, all policies for which exemption is claimed shall conform to 
the following basic criteria:
(i) the support in question shall be provided through a publicly-funded government 
programme (including government revenue foregone) not involving transfers from 
consumers; and,
(ii) the support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to producers; 
plus policy-specific criteria and conditions as set out below.
Government Service Programmes
2. General services
Policies in this category involve expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to programmes 
which provide services or benefits to agriculture or the rural community. They shall not involve direct 
payments to producers or processors. Such programmes, which include but are not restricted to the 
following list, shall meet the general criteria in paragraph 1 above and policy-specific conditions where: 
set out below:
(i) research, including general research, research in connection with environmental
programmes, and research programmes relating to particular products; !
(ii) pest and disease control, including general and product-specific pest and disease control 
measures, such as early warning systems, quarantine and eradication;
(iii) training services, including both general and specialist training facilities;
(iv) extension and advisory services, including the provision of means to facilitate the
transfer of information and the results of research to producers and consumers; j
(v) inspection services, including general inspection services and the inspection of particular 
products for health, safety, grading or standardization purposes;
(vi) marketing and promotion services, including market information, advice and promotion 
relating to particular products but excluding expenditure for unspecified purposes that 
could be used by sellers to reduce their selling price or confer a direct economic benefit 
to purchasers; and
(vii) infrastructural services, including: electricity reticulation, roads and other means of 
transport, market and port facilities, water supply facilities, dams and drainage schemes,
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and infrastructural works associated with environmental programmes. In all cases the 
expenditure shall be directed to the provision or construction of capital works only, 
and shall exclude the subsidized provision of on-farm facilities other than for the 
reticulation of generally-available public utilities. It shall not include subsidies to inputs 
or operating costs, or preferential user charges.
3. Public stockholding for food security purposes3
Expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to the accumulation and holding of stocks 
of products which form an integral part of a food security programme identified in national 
legislation. This may include government aid to private storage of products as part of such 
a programme.
The volume and accumulation of such stocks shall correspond to predetermined targets 
related solely to food security. The process of stock accumulation and disposal shall 
be financially transparent. Food purchases by the government shall be made at current 
market prices and sales from food security stocks shall be made at no less than the 
current domestic market price for the product and quality in question.
4. Domestic food aid6
Expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to the provision of domestic food aid 
to sections of the population in need.
Eligibility to receive the food aid shall be subject to clearly-defined criteria related 
to nutritional objectives. Such aid shall be in the form of direct provision of food to 
those concerned or the provision of means to allow eligible recipients to buy food either 
at market or at subsidized prices. Food purchases by the government shall be made 
at current market prices and the financing and administration of the aid shall be 
transparent.
5. Direct payments to producers
Support provided through direct payments (or revenue foregone, including payments in kind) 
to producers for which exemption from reduction commitments is claimed shall meet the basic criteria 
set out in paragraph 1 above, plus specific criteria applying to individual types of-direct payment as 
set out in paragraphs 6 to 13 below. Where exemption from reduction is claimed for any existing 
or new type of direct payment other than those specified in paragraphs 6 to 13, it shall conform to 
criteria (ii) to (v) of paragraph 6 in addition to the general criteria set out in paragraph 1.
5For the purposes of paragraph 3 of this Annex, Governmental stockholding programmes for food security purposes 
in developing countries whose operation is transparent and conducted in accordance with officially published objective criteria 
◦r guidellines shall be considered to be in conformity with the provisions of this paragraph, including programmes under 
which stocks of foodstuffs for food security purposes are acquired and released at administered prices, provided that the 
difference between the acquisition price and the external reference price is accounted for in the AMS.
546For the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Annex, the provision of foodstuffs at subsidized prices with the objective 
o f  meeting food requirements of urban and rural poor in developing countries on a regular basis at reasonable prices shall 
be considered to be in conformity with the provisions of this paragraph.
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6. Decoupled income support
(i) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly-defined criteria such as 
income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a defined 
and fixed base period.
(ii) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, 
the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer 
in any year after the base period.
(iii) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, 
the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any 
year after the base period.
(iv) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, 
the factors of production employed in any year after the base period.
(v) No production shall be required in order to receive such payments.
7. Government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net programmes
(i) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by an income loss, taking into account . 
only income derived from agriculture, which exceeds 30 per cent of average gross 
income or the equivalent in net income terms (excluding any payments from the same J 
or similar schemes) in the preceding three-year period or a three-year average based 
on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and the lowest entry. Any ; 
producer meeting this condition shall be eligible to receive the payments.
(ii) The amount of such payments shall compensate for less than 70 per cent of the y
producer’s income loss in the year the producer becomes eligible to receive this \ 
assistance. IsI
(iii) The amount of any such payments shall relate solely to income; it shall not relate to I
the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer; || 
or to the prices, domestic or international, applying to such production; or to the factors |  
of production employed. I
(iv) Where a producer receives in the same year payments under this paragraph and under J
paragraph 8 below (relief from natural disasters), the total of such payments shall be: 
less than 100 per cent of the producer’s total loss. j
8. Payments (made either directly or by way of government financial participation in crop insurance 
schemes) for relief from natural disasters
(i) Eligibility for such payments shall arise only following a formal recognition by
government authorities that a natural or like disaster (including disease outbreaks, pest 
infestations, nuclear accidents, and war on the territory of the Member concerned) 
has occurred or is occurring; and shall be determined by a production loss which 
exceeds 30 per cent of the average of production in the preceding three-year period 
or a three year average based on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest 
and the lowest entry.
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(ii) Payments made following a disaster shall be applied only in respect of losses of income, 
livestock (including payments in connection with the veterinary treatment of animals), 
land or other production factors due to the natural disaster in question.
(iii) Payments shall compensate for not more than the total cost of replacing such losses 
and shall not require or specify the type or quantity of future production.
(iv) Payments made during a disaster shall not exceed the level required to prevent or 
alleviate further loss as defined in criterion (ii) above.
(v) Where a producer receives in the same year payments under this paragraph and under 
paragraph 7 above (income insurance and income safety-net programmes), the total 
of such payments shall be less than 100 per cent of the producer’s total loss.
9. Structural adjustment assistance provided through producer retirement programmes
(i) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by reference to clearly-defined criteria 
in programmes designed to facilitate the retirement of persons engaged in marketable 
agricultural production, or their movement to non-agricultural activities.
(ii) Payments shall be conditional upon the total and permanent retirement of the recipients 
from marketable agricultural production.
10. Structural adjustment assistance provided through resource retirement programmes
(i) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by reference to clearly-defined criteria 
in programmes designed to remove land or other resources, including livestock, from 
marketable agricultural production.
(ii) Payments shall be conditional upon the retirement of land from marketable agricultural 
production for a minimum of 3 years, and in the case of livestock on its slaughter or 
definitive permanent disposal.
(iii) Payments shall not require or specify any alternative use for such land or other resources 
which involves the production of marketable agricultural products.
(iv) Payments shall not be related to either the type or quantity of production or to the prices, 
domestic or international, applying to production undertaken using the land or other 
resources remaining in production.
11. Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids
(i) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by reference to clearly-defined criteria 
in government programmes designed to assist the financial or physical restructuring 
of a producer’s operations in response to objectively demonstrated structural 
disadvantages. Eligibility for such programmes may also be based on a clearly-defined 
government programme for the reprivatization of agricultural land.
(ii) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, 
the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer 
in any year after the base period other than as provided for under (v) below.
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(iii) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, 
the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any 
year after the base period.
(iv) The payments shall be given only for the period of time necessary for the realization 
of the investment in respect of which they are provided.
(v) The payments shall not mandate or in any way designate the agricultural products to 
be produced by the recipients except to require them not to produce a particular product.
(vi) The payments shall be limited to the amount required to compensate for the structural 
disadvantage.
12. Payments under environmental programmes
(i) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined as part of a clearly-defined government 
environmental or conservation programme and be dependent on the fulfilment of specific 
conditions under the government programme, including conditions related to production 
methods or inputs.
(ii) The amount of payment shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved 
in complying with the government programme.
13. Payments under regional assistance programmes
(i) Eligibility for such payments shall be limited to producers in disadvantaged regions. 
Each such region must be a clearly designated contiguous geographical area with a 
definable economic and administrative identity, considered as disadvantaged on the 
basis of neutral and objective criteria clearly spelt out in law or regulation and indicating 
that the region’s difficulties arise out of more than temporary circumstances.
(ii) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, 
the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer 
in any year after the base period other than to reduce that production.
(iii) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, 
the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any 
year after the base period.
(iv) Payments shall be available only to producers in eligible regions, but generally available 
to all producers within such regions.
(v) Where related to production factors, payments shall be made at a degressive rate above 
a threshold level of the factor concerned.
(vi) The payments shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in 
undertaking agricultural production in the prescribed area.
r
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ANNEX 3
DOMESTIC SUPPORT: CALCULATION OF AGGREGATE MEASUREMENT OF SUPPORT
1. Subject to the provisions of Article 6, an Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) shall be 
calculated on a product-specific basis for each basic product (defined as the product as close as practicable 
to the point of first sale) receiving market price support, non-exempt direct payments, or any other 
subsidy not exempted from the reduction commitment ("other non-exempt policies"). Support which 
is non-product specific shall be totalled into one non-product-specific AMS in total monetary terms.
2. Subsidies under paragraph 1 shall include both budgetary outlays and revenue foregone by 
governments or their agents.
3. Support at both the national and sub-national level shall be included.
4. Specific agricultural levies or fees paid by producers shall be deducted from the AMS.
5. The AMS calculated as outlined below for the base period shall constitute the base level for 
the implementation of the reduction commitment on domestic support.
6. For each basic product, a specific AMS shall be established, expressed in total monetary value 
terms.
r
7. The AMS shall be calculated as close as practicable to the point of first sale of the product 
concerned. Policies directed at agricultural processors shall be included to the extent that such policies 
benefit the producers of the basic products.
8. Market price support: market price support shall be calculated using the gap between a fixed 
external reference price and the applied administered price multiplied by the quantity of production 
eligible to receive the applied administered price. Budgetary payments made to maintain this gap, 
such as buying-in or storage costs, shall not be included in the AMS.
9. The fixed external reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988 and shall generally 
be the average f.o.b. unit value for the product concerned in a net exporting country and the average 
c.i.f. unit value for the product concerned in a net importing country in the base period. The fixed 
reference price may be adjusted for quality differences as necessary.
10. Non-exempt direct payments: non-exempt direct payments which are dependent on a price
gap shall be calculated either using the gap between the fixed reference price and the applied administered 
price multiplied by the quantity of production eligible to receive the administered price, or using 
budgetary outlays.
11. The fixed reference price shall be based on the years 1986 to 1988 and shall generally be the
actual price used for determining payment rates.
12. Non-exempt direct payments which are based on factors other than price shall be measured 
using budgetary outlays.
13. Other non-exempt policies, including input subsidies and other policies such as marketing cost 
reduction measures: the value of such policies shall be measured using government budgetary outlays
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or, where the use of budgetary outlays does not reflect the full extent of the subsidy concerned, the 
basis for calculating the subsidy shall be the gap between the price of the subsidised good or service 
and a representative market price for a similar good or service multiplied by the quantity of the good 
or service.
ANNEX 4
DOMESTIC SUPPORT: CALCULATION OF EQUIVALENT MEASUREMENT OF
SUPPORT
1. Subject to the provisions of Article 6, equivalent measurements of support shall be calculated 
in respect of all products where market price support as defined in Annex 3 exists but for which 
calculation of this component of the AMS is not practicable. For such products the base level for 
implementation of the domestic support reduction commitments shall consist of a market price suppon 
component expressed in terms of equivalent measurements of support under paragraph 2 below, as 
well as any non-exempt direct payments and other non-exempt support, which shall be evaluated as 
provided for under paragraph 3 below. Suppon at both national and sub-national level shall be included.
2. The equivalent measurements of suppon provided for in paragraph 1 shall be calculated on 
a product-specific basis for all products as close as practicable to the point of first sale ("basic products") 
receiving market price suppon and for which the calculation of the market price suppon component 
of the AMS is not practicable. For those basic products, equivalent measurements of market price 
suppon shall be made using the applied administered price and the quantity of production eligible to 
receive that price or, where this is not practicable, on budgetary outlays used to maintain the producer 
price.
3. Where products falling under paragraph 1 above are the subject of non-exempt direct payments 
or any other product-specific subsidy not exempted from the reduction commitment, the basis for 
equivalent measurements of suppon concerning these measures shall be calculations as for the 
corresponding AMS components (specified in paragraphs 10 to 13 of Annex 3).
4. Equivalent measurements of suppon shall be calculated on the amount of subsidy as close as 
practicable to the point of first sale of the product concerned. Policies directed at agricultural processors 
shall be included to the extent that such policies benefit the producers of the basic products. Specific 
agricultural levies or fees paid by producers shall reduce the equivalent measurements of suppon by 
a corresponding amount.
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ANNEX 5
SPECIAL TREATMENT UNDER ARTICLE 4:2
Section A
1. The provisions of Article 4:2 of this Agreement shall not apply with effect from the entry into 
force of this Agreement to any primary agricultural product and its worked and/or prepared products 
("designated products”) in respect of which the following conditions are complied with (hereinafter 
referred to as "special treatment"):
(a) imports of the designated products comprised less than 3 per cent of corresponding 
domestic consumption in the base period 1986-1988 ("the base period");
(b) no export subsidies have been provided since the beginning of the base period for the 
designated products;
(c) effective production restricting measures are applied to the primary agricultural product;
(d) such products are designated with the symbol "ST-Annex 5" in Section IB of Part I 
of a Member’s Schedule annexed to the Uruguay Round (1994) Protocol as being subject 
to special treatment reflecting factors of non-trade concerns, such as food security and 
environmental protection; and
(e) minimum access opportunities in respect of the designated products correspond, as 
specified in Section IB of Part I of the Schedule of the Member concerned, to 4 per cent 
of base period domesdc consumption of the designated products from the beginning 
of the first year of the implementation period and, thereafter, are increased by
0.8 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the base period per year for 
the remainder of the implementation period.
2. At the beginning of any year of the implementation period a Member may cease to apply special 
treatment in respect of the designated products by complying with the provisions of paragraph 6 below. 
In such a case, the Member concerned shall maintain the minimum access opportunities already in 
effect at such time and increase the minimum access opportunities by 0.4 per cent of corresponding 
domestic consumption in the base period per year for the remainder of the implementation period. 
Thereafter, the level of minimum access opportunities resulting from this formula in the final year 
of the implementation period shall be maintained in the Schedule of the Member concerned.
3. Any negotiation on the question of whether there can be a continuation of the special treatment 
as set out in paragraph 1 above after the end of the implementation period shall be completed within 
the time-frame of the implementation period itself as a part of the negotiations set out in Article 20 
of this Agreement, taking into account the factors of non-trade concerns.
4. If it is agreed as a result of the negotiation referred to in paragraph 3 above that a Member 
may continue to apply the special treatment, such Member shall confer additional and acceptable 
concessions as determined in that negotiation.
5. Where the special treatment is not to be continued at the end of the implementation period, 
the Member concerned shall implement the provisions of paragraph 6 below. In sucli a case, after 
the end of the implementation period the minimum access opportunities for the designated products
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shall be maintained at the level of 8 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the base period 
in the Schedule of the Member concerned.
6. Border measures other than ordinary customs duties maintained in respect of the designate  
products shall become subject to the provisions of Article 4:2 of this Agreement with effect from the 
beginning of the year in which the special treatment ceases to apply. Such products shall be subject 
to ordinary customs duties, which shall be bound in the Schedule of the Member concerned and applied, 
from the beginning of the year in which special treatment ceases and thereafter, at such rates as would 
have been applicable had a reduction of at least 15 per cent been implemented over the implementation 
period in equal annual instalments. These duties shall be established on the basis of tariff equivalents 
to be calculated in accordance with the guidelines prescribed in the attachment hereto.
Section B
7. The provisions of Article 4:2 of this Agreement shall also not apply with effect from the entry 
into force of this Agreement to a primary agricultural product that is die predominant staple in the 
traditional diet of a developing country Member and in respect of which the following conditions, in 
addition to those specified in paragraph 1(a) through 1(d) above, as they apply to the products concerned, 
are complied with:
- minimum access opportunities in respect of the products concerned, as specified in 
Section IB of Part I of the Schedule of the developing country Member concerned, correspond 
to 1 per cent of base period domestic consumption of the products concerned from the beginning 
of the first year of the implementation period and are increased in equal annual instalments 
to 2 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the base period at the beginning of 
the fifth year of the implementation period. From the beginning of the sixth year of the 
implementation period, minimum access opportunities in respect of the products concerned 
correspond to 2 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption in the base period and are 
increased in equal annual instalments to 4 per cent of corresponding domestic consumption 
in the base period until the beginning ofthe tenth year. Thereafter, the level of minimum access 
opportunities resulting from this formula in the tenth year shall be maintained in the Schedule 
of the developing country Member concerned.
appropriate market access opportunities have been provided for in other products under 
this Agreement.
8. Any negotiation on the question of whether there can be a continuation of the special treatment 
as set Out in paragraph 7 above after the end of the tenth year following the beginning of the 
implementation period shall be initiated and completed within the time-frame of the tenth year itself 
following the beginning of the implementation period.
9. If it is agreed as a result of the negotiation referred to in paragraph 8 above that a Member 
may continue to apply the special treatment, such Member shall confer additional and acceptable 
concessions as determined in that negotiation.
10. In the event that special treatment under paragraph 7 above is not to be continued beyond the 
tenth year following the beginning of the implementation period, the products concerned shall be subject 
to ordinary customs duties, established on die basis of a tariff equivalent to be calculated in accordance 
with the guidelines prescribed in the attachment hereto, which shall be bound in the Schedule of the 
Member concerned. In other respects, the provisions of paragraph 6 above shall apply as modified 
by the relevant special and differential treatment accorded to developing country Members under this 
Agreement.
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Attachment to Annex 5
Guidelines for the Calculation of Tariff 
Equivalents for the Specific Purpose Specified in 
Paragraphs 6 and 10 of this Annex
1. The calculation of the tariff equivalents, whether expressed as ad valorem or specific rates, 
shall be made using the actual difference between internal and external prices in a transparent manner. 
Data used shall be for the years 1986 to 1988. Tariff equivalents:
(i) shall primarily be established at the four-digit level of the HS;
(ii) shall be established at the six-digit or a more detailed level of the HS wherever
appropriate;
(iii) shall generally be established for worked and/or prepared products by multiplying the 
specific tariff equivalent(s) for the primary agricultural product(s) by the proportion(s) 
in value terms or in physical terms as appropriate of the primary agricultural product(s) 
in the worked and/or prepared products, and take account, where necessary, of any
additional elements currently providing protection to industry.
*
2. External prices shall be, in general, actual average c.i.f. unit values for the importing country. 
Where average c.i.f. unit values are not available or appropriate, external prices shall be either:
(i) appropriate average c.i.f. unit values of a near country; or
(ii) estimated from average f.o.b. unit values of (an) appropriate major exporters) adjusted 
by adding an estimate of insurance, freight and other relevant costs to the importing 
country.
3. The external prices shall generally be converted to domestic currencies using the annual average 
market exchange rate for the same period as the price data.
4. The internal price shall generally be a representative wholesale price ruling in the domestic 
market or an estimate of that price where adequate data is not available.
5. The initial tariff equivalents may be adjusted, where necessary, to take account of differences 
in quality or variety using an appropriate coefficient.
6. Where a tariff equivalent resulting from these guidelines is negative or lower than the current 
bound rate, the initial tariff equivalent may be established at the current bound rate or on the basis 
of national offers for that product.
7. Where an adjustment is marie to the level of a tariff equivalent which would have resulted from 
the above guidelines, the Member concerned shall afford, on request, full opportunities for consultation 
with a view to negotiating appropriate solutions.
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